Sunday 22 June 1941 Nazi Germany and its allies attacked our country with an invasion army unprecedented in history: 190 divisions, more than 4,000 tanks, 47,000 guns and mortars, about 4,500 aircraft, up to 200 ships, a total of 5 million people.
The first blows were delivered by German aircraft at dawn. Hundreds of German bombers invaded the airspace Soviet Union. They bombarded airfields, areas of deployment of troops in the western border districts, railway junctions, communication lines and other important objects, as well as big cities Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova.
At the same time, Wehrmacht troops concentrated along the entire length of the State Border of the USSR opened heavy artillery fire on border outposts, fortified areas, formations and units of the Red Army stationed in its immediate vicinity. After artillery and aviation preparation, they crossed the State Border of the USSR along the entire length - from Baltic Sea to Black. The Great Patriotic War began - the most difficult of all wars ever experienced by the country.
It is these events of the first day of the war that are illuminated by the documents presented at the exhibition "The Beginning of the Great Patriotic War".
Among them are orders, directives, operational reports, intelligence reports for June 22, 1941 of the top military leadership of the Soviet Union and the command of the fronts.
It is no less interesting to get acquainted with intelligence reports, reports and other documents of the German troops, reflecting the events of the first day of the war. Such two-sided coverage of the military situation at the beginning of the war will allow us to see the true picture, to feel its scale and tragedy.
The division was formed in 1941 in the Kiev Special Military District.
Before the start of World War II in June 1941, she was part of the 49th Rifle Corps of the Kyiv Special Military District. It was stationed in the area of Cherkasy, Smela. On June 18, 1941, parts of the division began to move in echelons by rail to the Yarmolintsy area.
Until the beginning of July, units of the 49SK, which constituted the reserve of the South-Western Front, advanced to the combat area. On June 25, the division concentrated in the Yagelnitsa area. The last echelons of 587sp were still loaded at st. Cherkasy.
On June 30, the command of the SWF decided to withdraw to the entire front to the line of fortifications on old border.
July 1 The 49th sk is on the move from Volochisk to the areas where the Izyaslavsky and Starokonstantinovsky URs are located with the task of occupying them. 190sd advances along the route Yagelnitsa, Chortkov, Turovka, Volochinsk.
On July 2, at 1500, the enemy captured Zbarazh and the city of Tarnopol. Because of the threat of a breakthrough by German troops to Proskurov, where he was command post South- Western front on the way of the enemy, 24MK and 49SK of Major General I.A. advanced. Kornilov. The 49SK divisions advanced to the line of Yampol, Teofiopol, Ulyanovka (Lanovets region) to take up defense. The building was supposed to become a neighbor on the right of the 24th mk.
3 July The 49th Rifle Corps occupies the Starokonstantinovsky fortified area and field positions on the Lyakhovtsy and Ulyanovo fronts. The forward mechanized detachments of the enemy with artillery had already approached the forward edge of the defense and were probing the defenses of the division. The regiments of the division continued to strengthen the defensive line. On the right, it occupied the defense of the 199th division of the corps, there was no connection with the neighbor on the left. The battered units of the 80sd retreated to the location of the division.
On July 6-7, in the Novy Miropol area, the 11th Panzer Division of the enemy broke through the front of the Ostropolsky UR on the old border and broke through to Berdichev. Corps divisions were covered from the north. There was a threat that the German tank forces would enter the rear of the retreating 6th, 26th and 12th armies.
July 8 The 49th Rifle Corps is concentrated in the area of Kovalenka, Motruiki and forests to the northeast. The headquarters of the corps - Motruiki ... The position of the 190th Infantry Division is being clarified by the communications delegate.
On July 9, 49SK received an order from the headquarters of the 6th Army to strike from the Lyubar region to the north. The purpose of the counterattack was to cut the Shepetovka-Berdichev highway, along which the supply of the broken group XXXXVIII was going on. tank corps enemy (11td, 16td and 16md). Also, one of the goals of the counterattack was the withdrawal from the encirclement of units of 7SK, which fell between two claws of German motorized corps that had broken through into Zhytomyr and Berdichev.
July 9 Part of the forces of the 49th Rifle Corps concentrated in the area of Kovalenka, Motrunki and forests to the northeast. Part of the forces on the march.
July 10 The 49th Rifle Corps, thrown back as a result of an enemy attack on 9.7.41 in the area of Smela, Chesnovka, during 10.7.41 put itself in order in the area of Stupnik, Bol. Ostrozhok. Corps Headquarters - Bol. Ostrozhok.
July, 12 49 sk (without one sd) are defending in the Petrikovtsy area, the exact position is unknown.
July 13 49th Rifle Corps, having regrouped and made a partial withdrawal, continues to defend the line: 190th Rifle Division - Bol. Ostrozhok, Yu.-V. env. Petrikovtsy, front to the north-west.
the 14 th of July 49 sk with the onset of darkness on 14.7.41, having a strong connection with the neighbors, hiding behind strong rearguards, conducting thorough reconnaissance, especially on the right flank, withdraw from the battle and, acting in its lane, by the morning of 15.7.41 reach the line - the junction of roads Bezymyannye , Rayki, Lemeshevka, Kustovtsy, (claim) Rogintsy.
By July 15, the remnants of the division continued to defend themselves as part of 49SK between Berdichev and Lyubar. The enemy of the corps were 16md, 111, 75, 57 infantry divisions of the enemy. The division consisted of 1364 people with 11 guns.
On July 15, units of the XXVIII Panzer Corps of the enemy, having waited for the infantry divisions to approach, resumed the offensive to the southeast from Berdichev to Kazatin. Already on July 16, German troops captured Kazatin, and on July 17 the Ros station was 40 km south of Kazatin.
July 15 16 microns lost control, departs disorganized. There was a threat to bypass 49 and 37 sk, defending the line (claim) Molotkovtsy, Rogintsy, Krivosheintsy. I decided to withdraw 49th and 37th sk to the line of Zalivanshchina, Kordylevka, Yanov.
In connection with the breakthrough of the enemy from Berdichev through Kazatin to the south-east, there was a threat of encirclement of the retreating 6th and 12th armies. Headquarters Directive No. 00411 dated July 18, 1941, was prescribed in stages by July 21 to begin the withdrawal of the 6th, 12th and 18th armies to the line of Belaya Tserkov, Tetiev, Kitay-Gorod, Gaisin. At the same time, it was supposed to carry out a counterattack by the forces of the 27th, 6th and 64th corps in the direction of Zhitomir, Kazatin, Tetiev in the flank of the 6th german army. Also, the 2nd Mechanized Corps of the Southern Front was sent to the Uman region.
July 17th 49 sk, 140, 190, 197 sd, having taken up a defensive line along the line of Nemirintsy, Radovka, (suit.) Pisarevka, strengthened its positions during the night.
6 A, in order to create a more profitable grouping, by the end of 19.7.41, withdraws to the line of Nemirintsy, Gubin, Novaya Greblya, Losievka, Turbov, covering the flank from the side of the Skvir grouping of the enemy with the forces of 189, 173 RD and 16 MK along the line of Skomorishki, Chelnovitsy, Nakaznoe, Pavlovka, Gopchitsa, Starostintsy, Knyazhniki, Nemyrintsy. By the end of July 20, the army retreats to the line of Popovtsy, Pogrebishche, Zozov, hiding on the right along the line of Skibintsy Lesny, Borshchagovka, Kuryantsy, Popovtsy.
By July 19, enemy tank formations broke through to the Skvir area, and their reconnaissance units were already operating in the Oratov area. A huge gap gaped on the right flank of the 6th Army. There was no longer any connection with the 26th Army, the gap in the front reached 100 km. Due to the entry of enemy units into the army's communications, the supply of ammunition was very difficult. In the artillery units, there was practically no ammunition of 122 and 152 mm calibers. Railway trains with ammunition accumulated at Khristinovka station. On July 19, the Headquarters authorized the withdrawal of the 6th and 12th armies to the Pogrebishche - Nemirov - Rogozna line. However, German motorized units had already broken through to the east of the indicated line. Parts of the 6th and 12th armies faced severe trials in the coming days.
49 ck to withdraw, hiding behind the intermediate line Zalivanshchina, Kordylevka. By the end of 19.7, leave the main line of Ovechache, east. env. Losievka, (suit.) Priluka. By the end of July 20, retreat to the Dolzhek-Ocheretno line. ... The withdrawal from the line occupied by the army to the group of Ogurtsov and 49 sk should begin immediately.
July 20 49 sc (190, 197 and 140 sd), displayed in arm. reserve, from the morning of 20.7.41 - on the march to the Pliskov region. There is no corps artillery. Divisional artillery is estimated at 5-6 units in each division, with a meager amount of ammunition.
To destroy the enemy grouping that had broken through in the Oratov area, it was decided to launch a joint counterattack on July 22 by a grouping formed from the 6th and 12th armies.
July 22 By the morning of 22.7, the 49th and 37th brigades, which were breaking through, reached the line: units of the 49th brigades captured Oratov. In the battle for Orats, up to 100 vehicles, 300 motorcycles, 80 prisoners were captured.
July 24, 49 SC, overcoming a strong machine-gun, mortar and artillery. the fire advanced to the boundary of the southern env. Stadnitsa, south forest edge southwest of Kalinovka. Parts of the body are stopped to put themselves in order. 190 rifle division - the western part of the forest southwest of Stadnitsa;
On July 25, the counterattack near Oratov was practically over. German troops, pulling up additional forces, stopped our offensive and themselves launched counterattacks. During July 25, units of the 6th Army retreated to the line: Staro-Zhivotov, Popovka, Skala, Medovka, Chagov; 190th Rifle Division occupied Tarasovka and continued to advance in an easterly direction.
The 6th and 12th armies, by order of the Headquarters of the High Command, from 20.00 on July 25, came under the control of the Southern Front. On the evening of July 25, an order was received from the commander of the troops of the Southern Front to withdraw the 6th and 12th armies to the line of Zvenigorodka, Khristinovka, Teplik.
Fulfilling the directive to withdraw, units of the 12th Army fought their way to the south-east, however, at the junction with the 18th Army, the German 49GSK broke through to Gaisin, and by July 25 had already reached Teplik, while the main forces of the 12th Army acted near Dashev and Monastyrishche. Parts of the Southern Front could not close this breakthrough. In fact, our troops were no longer in front of the German 1gdd, and the path to Uman and to the south was free. To close the breakthrough, the 2MK commander threw his last reserve - 14tp. On July 29, the troops of the 6th, 12th armies, 2nd mechanized corps were united under the general leadership of P.G. Monday. On July 27, 1941, the withdrawal of army troops to the line Monastyrishche, Terlitsa, Granov, Mikhailovka began. The 49th Rifle Corps, having replaced the 58th Guards Rifle Division, occupied the line of defense of Monastyrishche, Letichovka, a forest west of Letichovka. On July 27, 190sd occupied the line of Letichevka, Polovinchik, southern. env. Monastery.
By July 29, units of the 49GSK, which had broken through at the junction with the 18th Army, had already reached the Antonovka area (20 km south of Uman) at a time when units of the 6th and 12th armies were still making their main forces north of Uman. The motorized units of the XXXXVIII TC broke through to Novoarkhangelsk. The retreating units of the 6th and 12th armies were deeply engulfed on all sides by German troops, suffered heavy losses and had a large lack of ammunition. The command of the Southern Front demanded that the direction of withdrawal of the armies be southeast - to the Sinyukha River, while the situation required a breakthrough in the south along the shortest distance to the main forces of the Southern Front.
The 6th Army continued to withdraw to the line Leshchinovka, Khristinovka, Yagubets, (claim) Tomashevka: the 49th Rifle Corps retreated to the line passing Yarovatka, Leshchinovka, Chaikovka, (claim) Khristinovka, Penezhkovo. By this time, units of the 6th and 12th armies, as it were, had changed places. The incapable units of the 12th Army - 24MK, 8SK and 13SK, since the morning of July 30, launched a counteroffensive in the east and northeast direction in order to return Talnoe and reach the Sinyukha River, where motorized units of the 1Tgr went, and units of the 6th Army from the west defended parts of the 12th aria retreating towards Uman. On July 30, the front of the 6th Army was broken through in several places, parts of the army left Khristinovka, and on July 31 Uman. 49SK withdrew north of Uman and by the end of July 31 withdrew to an intermediate line of defense: a collective farm (3 km south of Starye Babany), (claim) Pikovets.
On August 2, units of 49GSK and 1TGr joined in the Pervomaisk area and at the turn of the Sinyukha River. The encirclement of the 6th and 12th armies was completed. The encircled units, which initially tried to break through to the east across the Sinyukha River and, having met strong resistance here, from August 3 began to break in a southeasterly direction near the village of Podvysokoye. Crowded in a small, through-shooting space between the villages of Podvysokoye, Kopenkovatoe and the Zelenaya Brama forest, the remnants of the army tried to break through in the direction of Ternovka and south across the Yatran River. In these battles, the remnants of the 190sd were killed.
Division commander Colonel Zverev G.A. wounded and 11 August 1941 taken prisoner. He was kept in camps near Uman and Vinnitsa. He pretended to be an ordinary Shevchenko, a Ukrainian by nationality, was released and, having made his way from Ukraine to the Bryansk forests, went out in the fall of 1941 to the location of the Red Army near Orel. He fought and again commanded various formations. In March 1943, he was again taken prisoner near Kharkov. Joined ROA. Hanged after the war.
The division was finally disbanded in September 1941.
On June 22, the TsMVS hosted the transfer of fragments of the banner of the 190th rifle regiment.
It is significant that this event was held on the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow - on the anniversary of the start of the bloodiest war in the history of mankind. The solemn ceremony was attended by: First Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation S.B. Ivanov, First Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia, General of the Army A.V. veterans.
 S.B. addresses the audience. Ivanov. |
The 190th rifle regiment (this number was assigned to the regiment in 1938) was one of the permanent regiments of the famous 5th Vitebsk rifle division named after the Czechoslovak proletariat. The formation of the division began in July 1918 under the name "2nd Penza Infantry Division". In the 1920s, the division participated in battles on the Eastern and Western fronts. In 1929 was awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner. From June 1940 introduced into the 16th Rifle Corps of the 11th Army, located on the territory of Lithuania.
In the summer of 1941 The 190th Infantry Regiment occupied a border position in the Luksha region west of Kaunas. On June 22, the regiment took the first blow from the 30th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht. On June 23, being surrounded, parts of the division tried to break through to Kaunas. On June 24, the Nazis took Kaunas. The encircled units of the 5th Infantry Division without communications, without aviation and heavy equipment, having lost most of their personnel, tried to break through towards Dvinsk. By June 26, the 190th Infantry Regiment was actually destroyed.
Fragments of the banner found near Riga testify that the servicemen of the 190th Infantry Regiment fulfilled their duty to the end. After passing about 200 km and realizing the impossibility of saving the regimental shrine, they hid the banner of the unit.
Russian collectors R.V. Slivin and A.B. Stepanov managed to purchase fragments of the found banner from the “black trackers” for 5,000 euros in order to transfer them to the state. Stepanov Aleksey Borisovich (b. 1959) - colonel, head of the direction for the training of foreign military personnel of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, a well-known military historian and collector. Lives in Moscow.
Slivin Roman Vladimirovich (born 1970) is a private entrepreneur, a well-known military collector, one of the authors of the popular website Sammler.ru. Lives in Voronezh.
 Participants of the solemn ceremony at the Banner of Victory. |
Or what does Solonin not write about?
Recently, in online battles, I have come across a lot of discussions on the question: “Why did the Red Army lose the border battle of 1941 so terribly?” At the same time, most of my opponents appeal to the book by M. Solonin, "June 23" M Day ", which is famous in certain circles. In this book, Solonin, dumping on readers a huge number of figures from various sources, paints an apocalyptic picture of the defeat of the giant Red Army by a small but remote Wehrmacht. In order not to be accused of falsifying facts, when writing this article, I used only Solonin's book itself and some sources, on the basis of which Solonin wrote his “Day M”, and to which he periodically refers in the text of his book, namely:
"1941 - Lessons and Conclusions".
B. Müller-Hillebrand. "The German Land Army 1933-1945".
F. Halder. "War Diary"
Here I would like to make a small reservation - B. Müller-Gillebrandt is a major general of the Wehrmacht, who not only studied, but saw what was happening with his own eyes. I should also note that in Western historiography it is customary to consider his works as a model of historical research and almost a textbook on the history of the Second World War (this point of view is to a certain extent shared by our modern historians). As for Halder, he, in the period 1938 - 1942, served as chief of the general staff of the German ground forces. His book is a diary that the author kept during the period indicated above.
Let's try to figure out what forces clashed in the border battles from June 22 to July 10, 1941. To begin with, let's see what the armed forces of Germany and the USSR were like at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In 1941, the strength of the German Armed Forces was 7,234 thousand people. (Müller-Gillebrandt) including:
1. Active army - 3.8 million people.
2. Army reserve - 1.2 million people.
3. Air Force - 1.68 million people
4. SS troops - 0.15 million people.
Solonin agrees with the above figures.
As of 06/22/41, the strength of the USSR Armed Forces is 5.6 million people, which, by analogy with Germany, also include the USSR Air Force and Navy. (“1941-lessons and conclusions”), Solonin admits these data. In total, at the beginning of the Second World War, the strength of the USSR Armed Forces was only 77.4% of the German Armed Forces.
But we are not interested in the strength of the Armed Forces in general, but in the strength of the Armed Forces on the Soviet-German front. Soviet historiography traditionally indicates the following ratio of 150 divisions of the Wehrmacht + 40 divisions of German satellites against 170 divisions and 2 brigades of the Red Army. Those. approximately 190 divisions against 171.
In terms of the size of the Red Army, Solonin generally confirms the data of official historiography, recalling only the presence in the western theater of operations of another 77 divisions of the reserve of the USSR high command. Solonin admits, however, that during the border battle, i.e. from June 22 to July 10, 1941, these divisions were not used in battles - they were too far from the border. But Solonin considers the forces of Germany categorically overestimated. Here is what Solonin writes: “In fact, in fact, as part of three army groups (“North”, “Center”, “South”), the following were concentrated on the western border of the Soviet Union: 84 infantry divisions, 17 tank and 14 motorized divisions (in total number“84 infantry divisions” we also included 4 light infantry, 1 cavalry and 2 mountain rifle divisions, the total number of 14 motorized divisions included parts of the SS troops corresponding to 5 “settlement divisions”). In total - 115 divisions.
At the same time, Solonin does not bother to explain how these 115 divisions are counted. And what do the German generals write about this?
Halder, in his report to the Fuhrer dated June 20, 41 on readiness for Barbarossa: The total composition of the forces:
1. Infantry divisions - 103 (including 2 mountain infantry and 4 light divisions)
2. Panzer divisions - 19
3. Motorized divisions - 14
4. Cavalry divisions - 1
5. Special formations - 5 (3 security and 2 infantry divisions)
In total - 141 divisional formations
Müller-Hillebrandt, in his book German Land Army 1933-1945, gives the following figures for forces in the East:
1. In army groups (i.e. "North", "Center", "South" - ed. note) - 120.16 divisions - 76 infantry, 13.16 motorized, 17 tank, 9 security, 1 cavalry, 4 light , 1 mountain rifle division - the "tail" in 0.16 divisions arose due to the presence of formations that were not reduced in the division.
2. At the disposal of the OKH behind the front of the army groups - 14 divisions. (12 infantry, 1 mountain rifle and 1 police)
3. In the reserve of the Civil Code - 14 divisions. (11 infantry, 1 motorized and 2 tank)
4. In Finland - 3 divisions (2 mountain rifle, 1 motorized, 1 more infantry arrived at the end of June, but we will not count it)
And in total - 152.16 divisions, out of 208 divisions formed by the Wehrmacht. They include 99 infantry, 15.16 motorized, 19 tank, 4 light, 4 mountain rifle, 9 security, 1 police and 1 cavalry divisions, including SS divisions.
Let's try to understand the discrepancies between the data of Halder and Müller-Hillebrandt. It is obvious that Halder does not count the Finnish grouping (3 divisions), 6 security divisions and 1 SS police division as part of the forces. In addition, if we recalculate the formations indicated by Halder, for some reason we get 142 divisionsJ. Taking into account the fact that Finland (respectively, the German divisions on its territory) entered the war on June 25, 1941, and the presence of 9 security and 1 police divisions on the eastern front is confirmed by numerous historians, we have to admit that the Müller-Hillebrandt estimate is still more accurate.
Why such discrepancies - 115 divisions at Solonin against 141-152.16 divisions, which the German generals write about? It is not easy to understand this. Before the attack on the USSR, the German army had a clearly defined echelon formation. The first, strike echelon - army groups "North", "Center" "South" - included 120 divisions, incl. 3.5 SS motorized divisions. The second echelon - so to speak, the operational reserve - was located directly behind the fronts of the army groups and consisted of 14 divisions. The third echelon is the reserve of the main command, also consisting of 14 divisions. And, separately, the Finnish grouping of three divisions. Solonin does not take into account the second and third echelons, does not take into account the grouping in Finland. But even so, the desired 115 divisions do not work out - there are 120 of them. At the same time, formally Solonin does not lie - remember him: “In fact, in fact, as part of three army groups (“North”, “Center”, “South”) ... " He simply fails to mention that there were other forces in the East besides army groups. You can argue for as long as you like whether the exclusion of the above forces is legitimate, but if the German generals count 141-152 divisions for an attack on the USSR, and Solonin believes that there were only 115 of them, Solonin should at least come down to explanations. But there are no explanations - and this gives reason to suspect Solonin of a banal juggling of facts.
But, perhaps, these divisions were not combat-ready, had a pronounced shortage of personnel? Let's try to figure it out.
Have you noticed such an interesting formation of the Nazi army - the "Army of the Reserve"? The fact is that in Germany it was not customary to send conscripts directly to combat units. The reserve army is such an analogue of our training courses, where future soldiers had to master all the intricacies of military science. The training of a Wehrmacht soldier looked like this - 8 weeks in the reserve army, then another 2 months in the active army. In the army, they tried to entrust newcomers with secondary tasks - so that the fighters could adapt to real front-line conditions - and only two months later a trained recruit began to be considered a full-fledged combat unit. It should be understood that the replenishment of the losses of the Wehrmacht and the formation of new divisions was carried out at the expense of trained fighters with (at least) basic training.
The “lament of Yaroslavna” by the German generals (which began, if my memory serves me, from the end of 41) that “recruits had to be thrown into the thick of it, without prior adaptation, and this led to unnecessary losses” should not be understood as “they gave a Schmeisser and threw it under tracks Soviet tanks"But how" they taught the soldier's craft, but did not give time to get used to it at the front "- there is some difference, don't you think?
Thus, it can be argued that all the Wehrmacht soldiers who were in the army by 06/22/1941 were trained and trained fighters.
Now let's try to determine how equipped these 152-odd divisions were. Unfortunately, I do not have data on the personnel of each division, so let's try to calculate differently. To begin with, let's answer the question - how many troops, according to the German generals, fought on the territory of the USSR in June-July 1941? According to Muller-Gilebrandt, out of 3.8 million active army, 3.3 million people were concentrated for operations in the East. If we look into Halder's War Diary, we find that total number he defines the active army as 2.5 million people. In fact, the figures of 3.3 million people. and 2,5 million people do not strongly contradict each other, since in addition to the actual divisions in the Wehrmacht (as in any other army) there were a sufficient number of units listed in the active army but essentially non-combat (builders, military doctors, etc., etc. ). Probably, 3.3 million Muller-Gillebrandt include both combat and non-combat units, and 2.5 million people. Halder - only combat units. So we will not be much mistaken in assuming the number of combat units of the Wehrmacht and the SS on the eastern front at the level of 2.5 million people.
And now let's calculate the staff strength of 152 German divisions indicated by Müller-Hillebrandt. It is not difficult to do this - during the reorganization before the attack on the USSR, numerous "waves" of German divisions were declared unacceptable and the Wehrmacht tried to switch to a single state of an infantry division of 16,859 people. The tank division included 16,952 people, the motorized division - 14,029 people, the mountain division - 14,000 people, and the light division - 11,000 people. The number of security, police and cavalry divisions is unknown to me, so let's take a minimum of 10 thousand people. each. Having made some simple calculations, we get the staff number of 2,431,809 people. All this together suggests that the 152 German divisions deployed in the East had a strength at the regular level, and 2.5 million people. active army, which Halder constantly mentions and there are 2.432 million people calculated by us. staff strength of 152 German divisions.
Now let's try to deal with the Red Army. 170 divisions of the border military districts included 103 infantry, 40 tank, 20 motorized and 7 cavalry divisions. Official Soviet historiography complains about the understaffing of these units. Solonin writes, referring to the data of the book “1941-lessons and conclusions”: “In 99 rifle divisions western districts(including the Leningrad Military District), the number of personnel (with a staff of 14.5 thousand people) was increased to: 21 divisions - 14 thousand, 72 divisions - 12 thousand, and 6 divisions - 11 thousand people. Let's believe Solonin. For further calculations, we will take the actual number of the remaining "unestimated" 4 infantry divisions of the Red Army in peacetime (6 thousand people), we will get the actual number of 103 of our infantry divisions - 1,258,143 thousand people. Since there were 2 more brigades of unknown size to me - let's add another 10 thousand people, we get 1,268,143 thousand people. Solonin does not write anything more about the actual number of the Red Army in the border military districts. Well, let's do it for him, guided by the same source ("1941-lessons and conclusions") from which Solonin takes data on the infantry divisions of the Red Army. If Solonin believes this source, we will believe him too :))
60 tank and motorized divisions of the Red Army were concentrated in 20 mechanized corps, and "1941-lessons and conclusions" give the number of each mechanized corps at the beginning of the war, as well as the total actual number of personnel of the mechanized corps - 510 thousand people. The mechanized corps were manned from 43% to 90% of the regular strength, and on average about 71%. The actual number of 7 cavalry divisions is unknown to me, but there is evidence that their states in peacetime almost did not differ from those in wartime. Which, in general, is not surprising, since the cavalryman is not an infantryman, it is simply impossible to quickly prepare him. So I take them according to the regular number, 9000 people. It turns out - 63 thousand people. cavalry. And in total:
1,268,143 + 510,000 + 63,000 = 1,841,212 people
At the same time, the average actual number of an infantry division of the Red Army is approximately 12,215 people, a tank or motorized division - 8,500 people each.
It turns out interesting. 2.4 million people "small" Wehrmacht against 1.8 million people. "huge" Red Army. But how accurate is this comparison? Maybe the Wehrmacht units were scattered at such a distance that they simply could not all fight together?
To begin with, let's deal with the disposition of the Red Army. For this, again, we will use the book "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions." It provides the following information about the disposition of the Red Army (the book lists only distances and divisions, I will immediately add numbers based on the calculations made above):
The first echelon - (0-50 km from the border) - 53 rifle, 3 cavalry divisions and 2 brigades - approximately 684.4 thousand people.
The second echelon - (50-100 km from the state border) - 13 rifle, 3 cavalry, 24 tank and 12 motorized divisions - approximately 491.8 thousand people.
The third echelon - located at a distance of 100 to 400 or more km from the state border - 37 rifle, 1 cavalry, 16 tank, 8 motorized divisions - approximately 665 thousand people.
I calculated the number of echelons not very correctly, since it is calculated according to the average number of divisions. That is, for example, infantry divisions had from 6 to 14 thousand people. the actual composition, I think on average - 12,225 people. But still, this error for the general calculation is relatively small - I think no more than plus or minus 50-70 thousand people. to the echelon.
I do not know at what distance from the state border the reserves of the OKH and the Civil Code of the Wehrmacht were located. But, if my memory serves me right, there is not even 600 km from Warsaw to Berlin, and no more than 100 km from Warsaw to the then Soviet-German border, so it is almost impossible to imagine that these forces were located further than 400 km. km from the state border. Müller-Gillebrandt points out that exactly 1 (one) division was deployed on the territory of Germany proper (excluding the eastern border) in 41. Therefore, 152 German divisions were echeloned to a depth not exceeding, but rather even less than 170 divisions of the Red Army. It speaks for this common sense- the command of the German Armed Forces did not suffer from idiocy and would not place reserves far from the theater of operations. Müller-Hillebrandt writes: “From among the 208 divisions available for the campaign against the Soviet Union, according to the plan, 152 divisions were initially allocated (including the Finnish front). In quantitative terms, they accounted for about 75% of the active army, in fact, it was a much larger part of the combat power, since the remaining 56 divisions, as a rule, did not represent full-fledged formations .... The efforts of the OKH were aimed at concentrating all available forces on the decisive theater of operations ... regardless of the difficulties and threats that this could result in other theaters of war.
As I wrote above, 3 echelons are clearly visible in the construction of the German army. Let us now recalculate the number of divisions of these echelons into their strength. The first echelon - directly the army groups "North", "Center" "South" with SS divisions plus 3 divisions located in Finland - this is 1,954.1 thousand people. The second tier - OKH reserves - 226.3 thousand people. And, finally, the third tier - the reserve of the Civil Code - 233.4 thousand people.
Well, time to draw conclusions. The first echelon of the Red Army covering armies took fire on itself on the first day of the war. The second echelon could very quickly come to his aid. True, except for 13 rifle divisions, which were hard to walk 50-100 km on foot in a day. Solonin, by the way, writes that the speed of movement of a rifle division in peacetime is 20 km per day. Think for yourself... The third echelon had practically no chance to join the battle within a reasonable time (this is especially true of 37 rifle divisions 100-400 km from the state border). Hence…
The overall balance of power in the border battle was 1/1.3 in favor of the Wehrmacht. But on June 22, 1941, 1,954.1 thousand people. the first echelon of the Wehrmacht hit 684.4 thousand people. the first echelon of the Red Army cover armies. The ratio is -1 / 2.85 in favor of the Germans. With the introduction of the second echelon of the covering armies of the Red Army (491.2 thousand people), this ratio could improve to 1 / 1.66 in favor of the Germans (if compared only with the first German echelon), or 1 / 1.87 (if we count the first and the second echelons of the Germans), but here it is necessary to take into account the losses that the Red Army divisions suffered by the time the divisions of the second echelon approached. After all, before receiving reinforcements, they were forced to fight at the rate of one against three. Especially considering that for many units located directly on the border, the war began with massive artillery and air raids that destroyed most of the personnel even before the Red Army soldiers could fire the first shot at the enemy.
Thus, the main forces of our border military districts fought the enemy twice, or even three times, outnumbered!
And this is not counting the German satellites. At the same time, Müller-Gellebrandt writes that on June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht was directly subordinate to 4 divisions and 6 brigades (i.e., approximately 7 divisions) of the Romanian army (the number of other Romanian forces that entered the war under the leadership of the Romanian command Müller-Gellebrandt unfortunately does not). And on June 25, a certain number of Finnish divisions entered the war ...
But that's not all. The fact is that in the composition of 1.8 million people. In the first strategic echelon of the Red Army, there were 802 thousand recruits called up and sent to units in May-June 1941. These fighters can in no way be considered equal to the soldiers of the Wehrmacht - the period of their stay in units is from 0 to 7 weeks. Their German counterparts at that time were being trained in the reserve army. Those. these 802 thousand people. in terms of the level of training, they approximately corresponded to the German reserve army, which was not listed at all in the active troops of Germany
