By the end of 1976, the People's Republic of China found itself in a state of deep socio-political and economic crisis. The cause of the crisis was the militaristic great-power course of Mao Zedong and his supporters, the voluntaristic policy of the "Great Leap Forward", the Maoist "cultural revolution". According to the Chinese press, 1966-1976. became a "lost decade", which threw the country back, putting the national economy on the brink of collapse.

The country's economy was almost completely destroyed, hundreds of thousands of people were below the poverty line. The "class struggle" declared during the "cultural revolution" further exacerbated the accumulated socio-political and economic contradictions. The social policy of Mao Zedong led to a split in society - a phenomenon that is directly opposite to the strengthening of political and moral unity, which is characteristic of a socialist society.

The leadership that came to power after the death of Mao Zedong (September 9, 1976), headed by Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC and Premier of the State Council of the PRC Hua Guofeng, an adherent of the "cultural revolution", announced the continuation of the course of Mao Zedong. The process of reforming the Maoist leadership, which became necessary, was accompanied by a struggle between groups for predominance in the party and state apparatus. The leading positions were gradually occupied by the Maoist-pragmatic group headed by Deng Xiaoping, whose rehabilitation took place in June 1977 (a year after his second dismissal) at the Third Plenum of the tenth convocation of the CPC Central Committee. Deng Xiaoping was again reinstated in all posts - Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the Military Council and Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, Deputy Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. Hua Guofeng took over as Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. However, already in the late 70s, Deng Xiaoping became the leader of the party and the country.

Basis for practical development reformist ideas of Deng Xiaoping was the course of "four modernizations" approved in the mid-70s, which set the goal of transformation in four areas - agriculture, industry, army, science and technology. The formula of "four modernizations" reflects the material content of the reform. If we talk about the ideological and political line, then its essence is represented by "four basic principles": the socialist path of development, the democratic dictatorship of the people, the leadership of the Communist Party, Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Mao Zedong.

At the III Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPC of the eleventh convocation, held on December 18-22, 1978, on the initiative of Deng Xiaoping and his associates, a historic decision was made to abandon the theory of "continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" and the political orientation of waging "class struggle" as the main task , and shift the center of gravity of party work to the implementation of modernization. According to this, a new policy of "reform and opening up" of the PRC was announced and approved.

Thus, reforms and an open policy were declared to be the main means of modernization. The reforms are aimed at bringing production relations in line with the tasks of developing the productive forces so that production relations do not become an inhibitory factor for the development of the country. And an open policy is designed to include the PRC in the process of globalization of the economy and other spheres of life of the human community, actively attract foreign capital, use the achievements of science and technology, and managerial experience in order to ultimately increase China's global competitiveness.

The reform process was characterized by Deng Xiaoping as the "second revolution" after 1949, but not a revolution aimed at breaking down the old superstructure and against any social class, but a revolution in the sense of "revolutionary renewal of socialism on its own basis through self-improvement".

The goal of socialist modernization is to bring China by the middle of the 21st century to the level of moderately developed countries in terms of production per capita and, on this basis, to achieve the general well-being of its citizens. The path of modernization is the accelerated growth of economic potential, its qualitative renewal and increase in efficiency based on the development of scientific and technical potential, based on the fact that science is the "main productive force."

From the very beginning of the development of the country's modernization strategy, Deng Xiaoping abandoned dogmatic adherence to the canons of socialist construction adopted in the USSR and "led a search for the construction of his own model of socialism with Chinese characteristics." The essence of “national specificity” was seen by the reformer politician in the historically established and objectively determined socio-economic backwardness of the country, the lack of arable land and other necessary resources to ensure normal living conditions and development of a country with a billion people. Taking into account the fact that overcoming China's backwardness will take a long time, a fundamental theoretical position was adopted that the PRC is at the initial stage of socialism, which will last until the middle of the 21st century.

Thus, in order to ensure the main internal condition for the normal course of reforms - political stability, the political life of the country was built in accordance with the "four basic principles" put forward by Deng Xiaoping: follow the socialist path, adhere to the dictatorship of the proletariat, adhere to the leadership of the CPC, Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of Mao Zedong . No deviations from this line in the direction of political and ideological liberalization were allowed.

However, Deng Xiaoping managed to start a full-scale implementation of the modernization program only after creating the necessary political conditions for this. Economic reform, according to Deng Xiaoping's theory, is impossible without the reform of the political system.

A special place in the reform of the political system, and in general in the process of modernization, was given to the ruling party as a guarantor of ensuring socio-political stability, without which it seemed impossible to successfully pursue a course towards socialist modernization. In this regard, issues of party building, strengthening party discipline and strengthening internal control of the party were constantly in the center of attention of the leadership of the CPC. The greatest importance in the reform of the political system was given to the development of a comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework and its implementation, the transformation of China into a modern legal state, "ruled on the basis of law."

The content of the reform of the political system, aimed at the development of democratization, was seen in the development and strengthening of the existing system of representative bodies of power (assemblies of people's representatives, etc.), the expansion of their controlling functions and democratic principles in their activities, the simplification and reduction of the administrative apparatus, a clear division powers between party and administrative bodies, between the center and the localities, and so on.

In Deng Xiaoping's theory of modernization, the human factor was of paramount importance. The program of educating the "new man" has been introduced since the beginning of the 80s as part of the course towards the creation of a socialist spiritual culture, covering the entire spiritual sphere of the life of Chinese society - ideology, culture itself, morality, law - and aimed at the formation of a modern cultural and civilizational environment, without which modernization is unthinkable.

In the process of developing China's modernization strategy, Deng Xiaoping revised the previous concept of development modern world, which boiled down to the fact that its basis was the world war and revolution. According to Deng Xiaoping's theory, the main trends that determine the state of modern international relations are peace and development, the preservation of which is an external guarantee of the successful modernization of the PRC. Finally, an integral part of Deng Xiaoping's modernization program is the completion of the country's unification according to the "one state, two systems" formula, which provides for the preservation of the existing capitalist system in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan after their reunification with the PRC.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping, a veteran of the revolution and a leading political figure in the PRC, was named "the chief architect of Chinese reforms" at the opening of the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 25, 1987.

During an inspection trip to southern China in early 1992, Deng Xiaoping draws conclusions about the need to further accelerate reform and development based on expanding the scope of market relations and proposes three criteria for determining the effectiveness of ongoing reforms and open policies: whether the reforms contribute to the development of productive forces, contribute to whether they strengthen the comprehensive state power, whether they contribute to raising the living standards of the people.

Developing the reform, the leadership of the People's Republic of China, headed by Deng Xiaoping, made a theoretical "breakthrough" at the III Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the fourteenth convocation in 1993, announcing the combination of a market economy with socialism.

At the XV Congress of the CPC in 1997, the Party Charter included a provision on leadership"theories of Deng Xiaoping" at the initial stage of socialism. It is declared a new stage in the development of Marxism in China, the second theoretical achievement after the "ideas of Mao Zedong", "the continuation and development of the ideas of Mao Zedong", a scientific system for building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The current leaders of the PRC not only emphasize their adherence to the ideas of the "architect of reforms", but also develop them as new problems arise. The new leaders of China are trying to make the country's development more comprehensive and coordinated, without abandoning the policy of "reform and opening up" outlined by Deng Xiaoping.

Summing up the above, it is necessary to note the following: the Maoist "cultural revolution" cost the country dearly and brought the PRC's economy to a crisis state. The experiments of Mao Zedong clearly demonstrated that the cruel (Stalinist at its core) model of socialist construction does not produce the desired results and is destructive. Returning to power in 1977, Deng Xiaoping embarked on a policy of modernizing China. A turning point in the history of the PRC was the holding of the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee in December 1978, which became the starting point for the process of modernizing the country. The most important merit of Deng Xiaoping is that the policy pursued by him was entirely subordinated to the task of building up the comprehensive state power and improving the life of the people.

On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong died at the age of 83. This was expected and prepared for by various factions in the leadership of the PRC, whose leaders understood that the struggle for power was inevitable. Undeniable advantages in it were those who owed their political career to the “cultural revolution”, which later in China began to be called the period of “ten years of unrest”. During the years of the “ten-year turmoil”, about 20 million people joined the CCP, which accounted for approximately 2/3 of the party, which by 1976 numbered 30 million. The majority of leading party workers and officials in the country’s administrative management system belonged to the camp of the nominees of the “cultural revolution”. Supporters of the most radical faction of the Cultural Revolution, the Quartet, seemed to have a particularly strong position. They owned about 40% of the seats in the revolutionary committees, about half of the members and candidate members of the CPC Central Committee were guided by the leaders of this faction. Supporters of the "quartet" controlled the media, had a solid base in Shanghai, where a militia supporting them, numbering 100 thousand people, was created.

The natural allies of the Jiang Qing group were other proponents of the “cultural revolution” who were not organizational members of it, the most prominent figure among whom was Hua Guofeng, who after the death of Mao Zedong concentrated the highest party and state posts in his hands. The most prominent figures among the "nominees" were the commander of the Beijing military region, General Chen Xilian, the head of military unit 8341, designed to protect the central party organs, Wang Dongxing, the mayor of Beijing, Wu De. In general, the leaders of the "cultural revolution" owned a stable majority in the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, which immediately after the death of Mao Zedong included Hua Guofeng, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao and Ye Jianying. Only Marshal Ye Jianying, who served as Minister of Defense, represented in the PC Politburo not just the army, but the forces that sought to restore political stability in society by returning to the political course of the first half of the 1950s. Of the major politicians active at that time, he could count on the support of Deputy Premier of the State Council and member of the PB Li Xiannian.

Just as the Quartet's natural allies were the promoters of the "cultural revolution" headed by Hua Guofeng, the representatives of the army, striving for political stability, sought the support of the "old cadres" faction, of which Deng Xiaoping was the acknowledged leader. However, this faction, despite the first steps towards rehabilitation, taken in the first half of the 70s. first by Zhou Enlai, and then by Deng Xiaoping, was extremely weakened. Deng Xiaoping himself, after the April events on Tiananmen Square, was deprived of all party and state posts. Under the pretext of the need for treatment, he was forced to take refuge in the south in Guangzhou, where he was patronized by a prominent military leader of the PRC, the head of the Guangzhou military region, General Xu Shiyu. In addition to the Guangzhou military region, Deng Xiaoping could count on the support of the leadership of the Fuzhou and Nanjing military regions.

On the eve of Mao Zedong's death, the position of the top military leadership was determined. Ye Jianying and some representatives of the CCP leadership came to Guangzhou for secret talks with Deng Xiaoping. As a result, an agreement was reached on unity of action against the Quartet.

Thus, by the autumn of 1976, the country and the army were in a state of deep division. However, if the top military leadership and the "old cadres" managed to reach an agreement on the unity of action, then an internecine struggle unfolded in the camp of the promoters of the "cultural revolution". Her main motive was political ambitions. Jiang Qing clearly claimed to be the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, and Zhang Chunqiao saw himself as the future premier of the State Council. At the meetings of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held in September after the death of Mao Zedong, these claims appeared almost openly. At the same time, through their channels, the Quartet tried to organize a mass movement from below in support of Jiang Qing's demands. In particular, an attempt was made to initiate a campaign of letters from students and teachers of the largest Beijing universities in support of it.

The members of the "quartet" planned to organize a coup d'état to remove Hua Guofeng from power, as well as those who occupied moderate positions in the army leadership. These plans were scheduled to be implemented by October 10. After receiving information about the plans of his political rivals, Ye Jianying, who was in Beijing, went underground.

In this situation, something happened that, from a political point of view, looked unnatural. Ye Jianying not only managed to enlist the support of the disgraced representatives of the "old cadres", but also concluded an agreement with Hua Guofeng, who was very worried about his political future. On October 5, a meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee was held at the residence of the PLA General Staff, in which Ye Jianying, Hua Guofeng and Li Xiannian played the main role. Members of the Quartet were not invited to this meeting. In fact, the headquarters of the Conspirators was formed on it. Hua Guofeng, who originally planned to bring the issue of replacing the post of Chairman of the CPC Central Committee to a plenary meeting, under the influence of other participants in the meeting, agreed to organize a coup d'état. The denouement came on October 6th. Wang Dongxing, who received an order on behalf of the party authorities to arrest the "four" using military unit 8341, brilliantly coped with the task assigned to him. Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao, allegedly invited to a meeting of the Politburo, were arrested, and Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan were taken into custody almost simultaneously. At a meeting of the Politburo convened the next day, the conspirators received full approval for their actions, and Hua Guofeng, who threw his prestige of a successor personally appointed by Mao Zedong, into the scales, was rewarded with the posts of Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee.

The fact that the overthrow of the "Gang of Four" became possible as a result of the joint actions of factions that held fundamentally different positions on the issues of the future development of the country made it inevitable that the internecine struggle in the leadership of the CCP would continue. However, now the situation has become simpler: it was a confrontation between the promoters of the "cultural revolution" - the "left" and the fraction of the "old cadres" - the "pragmatists".

Hua Guofeng tried to maneuver, fighting both against the supporters of the Quartet, which was made responsible for the excesses of the "cultural revolution", and against the supporters of Deng Xiaoping. The "criticism of the Gang of Four" campaign was launched in the press and the "criticism of Deng Xiaoping" campaign continued.

However, the support that the “pragmatists” received from the army made their chances preferable. In February 1977, on behalf of the Guangzhou Grand Military Region and the Party Committee of Prov. Guangdong Hua Guofeng was sent a closed letter with demands that were clearly unacceptable to him. Xu Shiyu and other military leaders demanded to admit the mistakes made by Mao Zedong. First of all, the “cultural revolution” was criticized, a demand was put forward to confirm the appointments to the highest party and state posts received by Hua Guofeng from the plenum of the Party Central Committee, it was said about the need to rehabilitate those who were repressed during the “ten-year turmoil”. The names of Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, even Lin Biao were mentioned.

From similar positions, Hua Guofeng was criticized at a working meeting of the Central Committee held in March. Chen Yun, one of the leaders of the "pragmatists", demanded the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping and a change in the official attitude towards the events on Tiananmen Square in April 1976. In April 1977, Deng Xiaoping addressed the Central Committee with a special letter, still in disgrace, but also from exile influenced the course of the political struggle. In fact, it was a proposal for a compromise on the basis of a change in attitude towards the events of April 1976, which could become a prerequisite for his rehabilitation.

A compromise that prevented a clash between the "leftists" and the "pragmatists" was worked out during the work of the III plenum of the tenth convocation, which took place in July 1977 on the eve of the convening of the next XI Congress of the CPC (August 1977). Most important decision adopted by the plenum was the restoration of Deng Xiaoping to the posts that he held until the next disgrace in the spring of 1976: Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, Deputy Premier of the State Council and Chief of the General Staff of the PLA. At the same time, Hua Guofeng was approved as the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee by the decisions of the Central Committee Plenum, while remaining the Premier of the State Council. Deng Xiaoping, who thus received an official opportunity to prepare a broad rehabilitation of his supporters, refrained from criticizing the essentially pro-Maoist course that Hua Guofeng insisted on continuing.

The continuation of the “leftist” policy by Hua Guofeng was announced at the XI Congress of the CPC. In the report made by him, the main slogans of the Maoist era were voiced, including the call to build socialism according to the principle of “more, faster, better and more economical”, put forward back in the period of the “big jump." The Chairman of the CPC Central Committee insisted on the broad development of the movement to create enterprises in the city and in the countryside along the lines of Daqing and Dazhai. The party and society were promised to continue campaigns like the "cultural revolution". Along with this, the need to modernize China was stated in order to turn it into a modern state based on the rise of agriculture, industry, defense, the development of science and technology (“four modernizations”). The latter was addressed to the “pragmatically” thinking part of the party, but the methods of achieving the set goal essentially remained the same.

One of the most important results The congress was that the opponents of Hua Guofeng managed to strengthen their own positions in the leading bodies of the party. The CPC Central Committee included numerous representatives of pragmatically minded military and "old cadres", including those who were repressed during the years of the "cultural revolution". Without challenging the leading role of Hua Guofeng, without publicly questioning the Maoist dogmas, the "pragmatists" gradually prepared the ground for a kind of "revolution from above" carried out by the leadership of the party without a radical change in the foundations of power.

The months that followed the Eleventh Congress were filled with acute internal struggles, chiefly over personnel matters. Deng Xiaoping and his followers, who were still in the minority in the highest party structures, managed to achieve a significant renewal of party cadres at the central and regional levels. For six months, about 80% of the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the provincial revolutionary committees were replaced. During 1978, hundreds of thousands of party workers who had been repressed in previous years were returned to political life.

Concentrating their efforts mainly on the return of their supporters to the party-state structures, the "pragmatists" for a while left the economic and economic problems to be solved by the "left" headed by Hua Guofeng. The latter could only offer a slightly modified version of the Maoist model. This became apparent at the next fifth session of the NPC (February-March 1978). The plan of "four modernizations" proposed by Hua Guofeng at the session was, in essence, a new version of the "great leap forward". However, unlike the "great leap" at the end of the 1950s, based on the concept of "self-reliance", the new "leap" was supposed to be carried out at the expense of Western creditors, intensive imports of modern technologies and equipment from industrial developed countries. In the context of the international situation that developed in the late 70s. and marked by an even greater deterioration in Soviet-Chinese relations, the leadership of the PRC counted on the establishment of broad trade and economic cooperation with the countries of the West, and these calculations were not groundless. However, attempts to achieve a lightning-fast acceleration in the pace of economic development, undertaken over a period of about a year and a half and not envisaging any radical change in the economic policy itself, could not but end in failure. The outlined plans were truly grandiose: to increase steel production by 1985 from about 20 million tons to 60 million tons, oil - from 100 to 350 million tons. In eight years, it was planned to implement 120 industrial projects, 14 of them in the heavy industry. At the same time, capital investments were planned equal to those made over the past 30 years. Thus, like Mao Zedong at the end of the 1950s, Hua Guofeng, instead of earning the laurels of a statesman who raised the country from ruins after the disasters of the "ten years of unrest", again tried to bring it to the brink of economic collapse. This was not slow to take advantage of his political rivals, who were interested in weakening the influence of the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. However, the failure of the next "great leap" had some positive results - it once again convinced the members of the "pragmatic" opposition that it was impossible to solve China's economic problems without deep structural reforms.

In the spring of 1978, a powerful campaign began in the Chinese press under the old slogan of Mao Zedong "practice is the only criterion of truth." However, it soon became clear that it was directed against Hua Guofeng and other promoters of the "cultural revolution" and, in fact, against Mao Zedong himself. An important role in organizing this campaign was played by Hu Yaobang, the leader of the Chinese Komsomol, who was repressed during the years of the "cultural revolution", and later rehabilitated and introduced to the Central Committee at the XI Congress of the Communist Party of China. In the spring of 1978, he served as head of the Higher Party School, whose professors prepared a series of articles that marked the beginning of a new ideological campaign. The call hidden in them was clear: only such an economic policy has the right to exist, which ensures economic efficiency. It was definitely a challenge thrown by the "pragmatists" to the promoters of the "cultural revolution" and meant that they were ready to move from the struggle for the broad rehabilitation of the "old cadres" to attacking the fundamental dogmas of Maoism. Thus, the struggle for power has become inseparable from the solution of the question - to be or not to be profound reforms in the PRC.

The turning point in this clash was the Third Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee (December 1978). It took place already in the conditions of a clear weakening of Hua Guofeng's faction. By this time, a wide purge of the party and state apparatus had reached the county level. Its main task was considered to be the liquidation of the supporters of the Quartet, but in reality, the people of Deng Xiaoping were working to free themselves from the promoters of the "cultural revolution" as a whole. Supporters of Deng Xiaoping circulated dazibao criticizing the policies of Hua Guofeng and those who supported him. The dazibao campaign was especially widespread in the spring of 1978, on the anniversary of the April events on Tiananmen Square. In general, by November it became clear that the regional party leadership had overcome its hesitation and was ready to support Deng Xiaoping's faction.

The decisions of the plenum can be assessed as a complete victory for the supporters of Deng Xiaoping. It was decided to stop political campaigns and focus all the efforts of the party and society on economic problems. The activities of Deng Xiaoping before the April events were highly appreciated, and they themselves began to be called the "great revolutionary mass movement." Despite the fact that the participants in the plenum sought to justify the "cultural revolution" (which was a concession to Hua Guofeng and his faction), a decision was made to rehabilitate those figures who were associated with its most consistent opponents and unjust victims. Peng Dehuai was rehabilitated. Such supporters of Deng Xiaoping as Hu Yaobang and Chen Yun were introduced to the highest organs of the party. An equally important measure, from the point of view of strengthening the position of "pragmatists" in the highest echelons of power, was the reorganization of military unit 8341 and its reassignment to trusted people of Deng.

The problems of economic strategy in the decisions of the plenum were touched upon only in part - rather in a negative than in a positive form. The main thing was the rejection of Dazhai's experience, which meant abandoning the stakes on forms of social organization in the countryside, like people's communes. However, in real life The decisions of the plenum created the prerequisites for a return to the methods of "settlement" used after the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" in the early 1960s. Hua Guofeng's policy of pursuing a new "Great Leap Forward" was also criticized, which seriously hit his prestige.

The 3rd Plenum of the CPC Central Committee was indeed a turning point in the history of the PRC, which created the political prerequisites for a gradual transition to profound economic transformations. Naturally, economic issues were at the center of attention of the next session of the National People's Congress in June-July 1979. Implementing the idea formulated at the III Plenum of shifting the center of gravity of all the work of the party to the economic sphere, the session decides to pursue a policy for three years (1979-1981) "settlement" of the national economy. This new policy meant, first of all, a change in economic priorities and a corresponding adjustment in investment policy. By reducing investment in heavy industry, the development of the light industry, especially the textile industry, was accelerated. The reduction in capital investment also affected the military industry, which began to implement conversion programs, ensuring the mass production of durable goods - bicycles, watches, refrigerators, washing machines, televisions. Agriculture has also become a priority area: purchase prices for agricultural products have been significantly increased; mechanical engineering was largely focused on the production of agricultural implements, equipment for irrigation systems, etc.

A significant increase in the mass of commodities fundamentally changed the situation in the consumer market, the commodity deficit decreased sharply, and the process of improving money circulation began. The export of consumer goods began to grow rapidly. The share of the consumption fund in the national income increased significantly, the downward trend in the living standards of the population was interrupted and its growth began, including in the countryside. The social consequences of the "settlement" became an important factor in strengthening the power and influence of the new party leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping, creating favorable social conditions for defeating his political opponents.

After the decisions of the Third Plenum, which created the conditions for the “pragmatists” to go on a broad offensive, the isolation and removal of Hua Guofeng from the most important party and state posts that he continued to hold was only a matter of “political technique”, which Deng Xiaoping and his supporters mastered to perfection . Already at the 4th Plenum of the CPC Central Committee (September 1979), the new leadership managed to achieve an uncompromising condemnation of the "cultural revolution". In the text of the official commemorative report of Ye Jianying, Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee Ye Jianying, approved at the plenary session, the "cultural revolution" was regarded as "an amazing, monstrous disaster", during which "the dictatorship of fascism, utterly rotten and the most gloomy, with an admixture of feudalism" was planted. And although subsequently such a sharp assessment of the “cultural revolution” was no longer reproduced in official publications, the new party leadership clearly dissociated itself from this sad past.

At the Fifth Plenum (January-February 1980), the secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and the post of general secretary, which had once been held by Deng Xiaoping himself, were recreated. Hu Yaobang, a supporter of Deng Xiaoping, was elected general secretary. At the same time, the "pragmatists" took a number of steps aimed at depriving Hua Guofeng of the post of premier of the State Council. At the suggestion of Deng Xiaoping, who came up with the idea of ​​the need to separate the party and state leadership, the meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee that met in August decided that a number of top party leaders should resign from their duties as deputy premiers. An example was set by Deng Xiaoping himself, who announced his desire to leave his leadership position in the State Council. At the same time, Hua Guofeng had to transfer the leadership of this supreme executive body to the devoted supporter of Deng Xiaoping, the reformist Zhao Ziyang, known for bold reforms in Sichuan province, whose party leadership he headed in the mid-70s. The next session of the NPC authorized these personnel transfers.

During 1980-1981. on the forums of the party leadership, Hua Guofeng was sharply criticized by "pragmatists". He was blamed for the role he played in the overthrow of Deng Xiaoping in 1976, in the events on Tiananmen Square, and failures in economic policy. The culmination of this struggle came at the next 6th Plenum of the Central Committee (June 1981), when Hu Yaobang was elected Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Subsequently, the post of chairman was abolished and Hu Yaobang took over the top leadership of the party in the role of general secretary. The Military Council under the CPC Central Committee was headed by Deng Xiaoping himself. The defeat of the "leftists" and the triumph of the "pragmatists" were confirmed at the XII Party Congress (September 1982), at which Hua Guofeng was reduced to just a member of the CPC Central Committee.

The victory of the Deng Xiaoping faction was finally secured as a result of the trial of their political opponents - the "gang of four" and their inner circle, which took place over several months in the fall of 1980 - winter of 1981. In fact, it was a political trial over the "cultural revolution" . Among the 10 defendants, there were 9 former members of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee. The leaders of the clique, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao, who said that they were only following Mao Zedong's instructions, were sentenced to death, later commuted to life imprisonment, and the other defendants also received harsh sentences.

The course of this process and the revelations that preceded it could not but raise the question of Mao Zedong's personal responsibility for the disasters and crimes that have been committed since the time of the Great Leap Forward. The legitimization of the new political regime required an updated version of the history of the CCP, primarily during the period of the PRC. “The Decision on Certain Issues in the History of the CPC Since the Formation of the PRC” was adopted at the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee in 1981. In this highly controversial document, Mao Zedong was recognized as an outstanding political figure, under whose leadership the CPC came to victory in 1949. Along with this, in the decision his mistakes were recognized, starting with the "great leap", and the facts of the most severe repressions. These grave accusations, however, did not greatly affect the overall assessment of the role of Mao Zedong: "... his merits occupy the main place, and his mistakes are of secondary importance."

The reasons for such a rapid triumph of the "pragmatists" seem in many respects mysterious. How, in just three years, did the persecuted part of the CCP succeed in peacefully eliminating the leftist, adventurist, Maoist-dogmatic faction in the leadership of the party and the state, which for many years proclaimed and tried to implement its utopian ideas? It can be assumed that the speed of political change is primarily associated with the position of the Chinese political elite (ganbu), which was the true social pillar of Mao Zedong's regime of personal power. After all, it was she who was the main object of his brutal political repressions (by the end of 1982, about 3 million ganbu were rehabilitated!), The main object of continuous ideological studies, the main victim of the “permanent revolution”. With the name and policy of Deng Xiaoping, the ganbu began to pin their hopes on the stabilization of the socio-political order, on the opportunity to fully realize their claims to a share of the state "pie" and to their "legitimate" place in the party-state structure. Naturally, Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic political course did not meet any resistance either from the "silent majority" in the CCP or from the "ordinary" Chinese citizen.

All these profound changes in the life of China testified to the relatively rapid process of demaoization of Chinese society, although this process was uneven. If in domestic policy the new pragmatic leadership quickly overcame the utopian, "anti-market" approach to solving real socio-economic problems, then in foreign policy the overcoming of the Maoist heritage - nationalism, Sino-centrism, anti-Sovietism - proceeded very slowly.

The new leadership still considered the Soviet Union as "enemy No. 1" and sought to strengthen its foreign policy positions in expanding political cooperation with the United States on an anti-Soviet basis. Sino-American rapprochement in the late 70s. went fast enough. In 1978 diplomatic relations with the USA were restored. Political, economic and cultural ties developed rapidly. Mutual probing of the possibilities of military cooperation begins. In January-February 1979, Deng Xiaoping makes a triumphant visit to the United States. In the final communiqué, the parties proclaimed a joint opposition to the "hegemonism of third countries."

The new Chinese leadership continued to support the terrorist regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia, and used Vietnam's assistance to the anti-Pol Pot forces as a pretext for putting pressure on the SRV. In February-March 1979, Beijing set out to “teach a lesson” to Vietnam: the armed forces of the PRC invaded the northern part of Vietnam, but, having met stubborn resistance and suffered heavy losses, they were forced to retreat, in fact admitting their military and political defeat. The failure of this action may have accelerated the new leadership's revision of some approaches to China's foreign policy.

In the second half of the 70s. profound political changes took place in the country. The main one is the coming to the leadership of the CPC of well-known party leaders of the older generation, who at various times and on various occasions were criticized and repressed by Mao Zedong. And although they were all now rehabilitated, their disagreements with Mao Zedong persisted (in this sense, Mao Zedong did not repress them in vain!). The main thing in these differences is the unwillingness to try to realize the Maoist "collectivist" and "anti-market" social utopias, the desire to take a pragmatic approach to solving the problem of turning the PRC into a rich and powerful power. They came to the leadership after a difficult political struggle that allowed them to remove the most fanatical followers of Mao Zedong from power. In the course of this struggle, great ideological and theoretical changes also took place. While maintaining verbal and ritual fidelity to the "ideas of Mao Zedong" and Marxism-Leninism, the new leadership, in fact, took the path of ever greater de-ideologization of its policy, bringing to the fore only the patriotic ideas of building a rich and powerful China. All these profound political changes created the prerequisites for the implementation of the new economic policy, for the implementation of the course of economic reforms.

2. "Market socialism" and features of the modern modernization of the PRC

Having rejected the utopian ideas of Mao Zedong (and his follower Hua Guofeng), the new party leadership did not yet have its own reform program, its own program of China's economic and political modernization. The reasons for this are quite simple. During the ideological discussions of the late 70s - early 1980s. more and more it became clear that the change required not so much tactics as the strategy of economic modernization. Socialist development within the framework of a totalitarian state led nowhere, to a dead end, doomed China to backwardness. The "successes" of other socialist countries (USSR, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, etc.) only better highlighted the tragic nature of the socio-economic situation. The successful implementation of the program of "settlement" of the economy only helped to delay the solution of the fundamental issues of strategic development.

Somewhat unexpectedly, the answer to this historical question was found in the course of the spontaneous movement of the peasantry in the poorest, most backward regions. In December 1978, 21 peasant families of the poorest people's commune in Fengyang County, Anhui Province, fleeing starvation, decided to divide the land of their brigade into households. The peasants did not claim to privatize this land, to change the form of land ownership - they only wanted to change the order of land use, remaining, in fact, tenants of state-owned land. Thus, in fact, a household contract was born, which soon changed the face of the Chinese village, and indeed the whole country.

The initiative of the peasantry fleeing the famine did not initially meet with support in Peking. In January 1979, the CPC Central Committee, considering the development of the countryside, supported the initiative to restore household plots, subsidiary crafts, and rural markets, but the initiative of the Anhui village has not yet been supported. However, the real effectiveness of the Anhui experimenters (the threat of famine was eliminated in the very first year), supported in Sichuan and then in other provinces, forced the authorities to change their position, first in the localities, and then in Beijing. In June 1979, Wan Li, the first secretary of the Anhui Committee of the Party, visited the village, where the brave peasants managed, and supported their initiative. Finally, the leadership in Beijing saw and realized the benefits of the new land use system and approved its widespread introduction. The largely spontaneous process of abandoning collective forms of land cultivation and switching to individual farming continued under the leadership of the CPC.

These events, for all their seeming routine, were of an epoch-making character. The peasant breakthrough showed the effectiveness of private forms of production, the importance of private initiative, and the great importance of market relations for stimulating production. There has been a genuine upheaval in the minds of the CCP leadership. This turn was also facilitated by the fact that in many respects the initiative of the Anhui and Sichuan daredevils was a kind of return to the methods of restoration and organization of agriculture used by Liu Shaoqi and his supporters during the elimination of the consequences of the "Great Leap Forward" and continuous "communization" in the early 60s gg. For Deng Xiaoping and his associates, recently criticized and repressed as "capputists", this was also a reminder of their struggle in the early 1950s. for the preservation and development of market relations, which have shown their socio-economic efficiency in the restoration of the post-war national economy.

However, these economic reminiscences cannot obscure the fundamental novelty of the situation. Now it was not only about the methods of economic recovery, but also about profound ideological changes, which were supposed to radically change the views of the CPC leadership on the nature of China's socio-economic development. The spontaneously found effective form of saving agriculture prompted the leadership of the CCP to look for new ways of developing all sectors of the economy within the framework of a natural, market-based approach based on personal initiative. This turn could not be quick, it took all the 80s. The new strategy was worked out by a painful method of trial and error. As they say in China, "crossing the river, we feel the stones with our feet." The gradual development of the reform program was made possible not least because the severity of the economic crisis that arose as a result of the "cultural revolution" was significantly weakened by the successful "settlement" policy. Therefore, the change in economic strategy (instead of “production for the sake of production”, the idea of ​​“production for the sake of the consumer” was affirmed) grew gradually, passing through economic experiments, through critical reflection on the experience of reforming the economy accumulated in China and abroad. Such slowness and gradualness in turning the economic policy of a huge country by almost 180 degrees significantly reduced the social costs of the transition to a new economic strategy.

An integral part of the new economic strategy was the idea of ​​"opening up" China to the rest of the world. Moreover, it was not only about the development of economic relations, but also about the development of cultural and scientific ties, about the openness of borders for foreign businessmen and journalists, about the opportunity for a Chinese citizen to see the big world with his own eyes. “The current world is a world of wide relations,” Deng Xiaoping said in 1984, “China in the past was backward precisely because of its isolation. After the formation of the People's Republic of China, we were blockaded, but to a certain extent we ourselves kept ourselves closed ... The experience gained over more than 30 years shows that it is impossible to conduct construction behind closed doors - you will not achieve development.” Along with the developing market relations, the "openness" of the country is the most important component of the new economic (and, more broadly, social) policy of the leaders of the Communist Party of China. And the understanding of the strong connection between the possibilities of China's modernization and its "discovery", with its inclusion in the global processes of material and spiritual development of the whole world, is a great merit of the new leadership of the CPC and personally Deng Xiaoping, who opposed one of the most persistent Chinese (and, more broadly, totalitarian) traditions .

The gradual turnaround of the entire internal policy of the CPC and the PRC did not immediately affect the foreign policy, which had its own significant inertia. However, the process of changing foreign policy still went on, albeit slowly. The main change in the foreign policy views of the Chinese leadership was associated with the gradual "pragmatization" of Chinese diplomacy, with the desire to put foreign policy at the service of China's modernization, with the understanding (which came by no means automatically) of the futility of the adventurist and great-power foreign policy that developed during the "cultural revolution". Fundamental changes in the foreign policy of the PRC were recorded at the XII Congress of the CPC (1982), which demonstrated a significant renewal of the Chinese view of the outside world (it is becoming more and more adequate to international realities) and gave impetus to fundamental changes in foreign policy.

As for China's policy towards Soviet Union, here noticeable changes affected only in the mid-80s. In the second half of the 80s. these changes were stimulated by the perestroika process in the Soviet Union. This process contributed to the attenuation of ideological disputes, the search for a mutually acceptable model of cooperation. This process led to the complete normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, which was recorded during the visit of M.S. Gorbachev to Beijing in the spring of 1989. This was, of course, a great diplomatic victory, behind which stood the fundamental changes that had taken place in both countries. New Russia got the opportunity to develop relations with the PRC on the basis of these great achievements in the diverse Sino-Russian cooperation. The visit of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin in April 1996. The final documents of this visit recorded the determination of the leaders of China and Russia to develop relations of equal and trusting partnership aimed at strategic interaction in the 21st century.

80s became a time of profound ideological and political changes for China. One can even talk about the evolution of the worldview of the political elite, which allowed China to make epoch-making socio-economic changes.

The most radical and rapid changes took place in the agrarian policy of the CCP. The success of the reforms in the countryside not only stimulated the implementation of profound reforms of the entire national economy, but also created the food, raw material, financial, and social basis for a successful reform policy.

A new organization of agricultural production, called "systems of production responsibility", was gradually introduced from 1979. By 1982, the stage of experiments, during which different methods were tested, ended with the predominant approval of the system "bringing production tasks to a separate yard." Of course, this was impossible without dividing the land of the people's communes between the courts. The essence of “production responsibility” was that the peasant household, having received land (in some cases, the same plots that belonged to it before, before collectivization), entered into a contract with the leadership of the production brigade, representing the interests of the state. The contract did not limit the peasants to certain forms of economic use of the land, but only provided for the payment of an agricultural tax to the state and the sale of part of the crop to the state. All the surplus remaining in the peasant household could be used depending on the desires of the peasants and market conditions. At the same time, purchase prices were significantly increased and they were the higher, the more above-plan products were handed over to the state.

Initially, the term of the contract was short, but later, realizing that this limited the initiative of the peasants (in relation to increasing the fertility of the land and its more careful and efficient use), the authorities made appropriate decisions and the land passed, in fact, into the hereditary possession of peasant households. Along with this, the hiring of farm laborers and free purchases of agricultural machinery were allowed (by the second half of the 1980s, already 2/3 of the tractor fleet was in the hands of individual farms). The reform carried out was nothing more than a step towards the creation of a market-oriented peasant economy, running on land leased from the state.

The main achievement of this rather radical land reform was the creation of opportunities for the manifestation of economic initiative and enterprise. The results were not long in coming. Yields began to grow, which led to a steady increase in agricultural production in general. Over four years, it increased by almost 90 million tons (407 million tons in 1984), which was unprecedented in the history of the PRC. This was accompanied by an increase in the incomes of the peasantry, which grew in the first half of the 1980s. almost three times compared to the pre-reform period.

Permission to sell a significant part of the product produced by the peasants on free markets, as a next quite logical step, was the mitigation of state control over individual, and in fact private enterprise. Along with the public sector in the industrial sector and trade, new private structures began to take shape in the field of first small and then medium-sized businesses. By the end of the 1980s, about half of those employed in urban industry were already working outside direct state centralized control. At the same time, one quarter worked in enterprises owned by the private sector of the economy. Thanks to new positive, from an economic point of view, processes in the second half of the 70s. a huge number of new jobs were created, absorbing approximately 70 million people. Significantly increased the incomes of citizens, which increased by the end of the 80s. more than twice. These processes took place in the conditions of a real economic boom (the annual increase in industrial production on average exceeded 10%).

In the context of the rapid growth of production, which the "architects" of Chinese reforms sought to combine with a breakthrough in the technical modernization of the economy, an important role was played by the flow of foreign investment and technology. In order to stimulate these processes, the leadership of the PRC embarked on the path of establishing "special economic zones" (SEZs), where favorable conditions were created for foreign capital. In essence, SEZs were "islands" of capitalism in the country's still remaining socialist economy. The largest of them was the Shenzhen zone with an area of ​​more than 300 square kilometers, formed next to the English colony of Hong Kong.

On the basis of foreign technology with the participation of foreign capital, modern light industry enterprises were built here, then electronics, whose products were intended for export. At the same time, foreign exchange earnings were supposed to be used for further purchases of modern technologies with the far-reaching goal of turning the FEZ into regions for the development of modern industry and spreading the achievements of this still “focal” industrialization to other regions of the country.

The reformist leadership of the People's Republic of China faced the most difficult questions in solving the problems of the public sector of the economy. After several years of economic experiments, in October 1984, at the next plenum of the CPC Central Committee, it was decided to extend the large-scale reform to the public sector. The essence of the reform was to reduce the sphere of direct government controlled enterprises and, as a consequence, directive planning. The purpose of this course was to achieve the most complete cost accounting in the activities of enterprises while maintaining state ownership.

Enterprises received considerable economic freedom, which included the right (with the inviolability of fixed assets) to dispose of existing funds, determine the number of employees, wages and material incentives, and even set prices for manufactured products. This was accompanied by the transfer of managerial functions from party committees, in which the secretary played the main role, into the hands of the directors' corps. Gradually, the process of corporatization of state-owned enterprises began.

The implementation of the reform program has led to significant achievements in general economic indicators. For the period of the 80s. per capita income doubled from $250 to $500, although China continued to be one of the poorest countries in the world according to this indicator. However, the huge absolute scale of the country's economy allowed China in the first half of the 90s. to come out on top in such industries as grain harvesting, coal mining, cement production, cotton production, meat production, television production. Significant results were also achieved in foreign economic activity. In the mid 90s. the volume of China's foreign trade was about 200 billion dollars. Foreign investments in the country's economy exceeded 100 billion dollars.

The undeniable and unprecedented achievements in economic development were accompanied by the emergence of new problems. After a period of rapid growth, the development of agricultural production in the second half of the 80s. somewhat slowed down. This is due to the fact that the effect of such a factor as an increase in economic initiative has been largely exhausted. Such a problem as the pressure of the surplus rural population, inherited from the past, seems to be historically intractable. With land rights still uncertain, the peasantry is not very interested in long-term improvement of land fertility, which is fraught with lower yields. Attempts by the state to get away from directive relations with the rural producer, giving him the right to decide for himself whether to sell grain to the state or to surrender to the spontaneous mechanisms of the market, could result in a mass refusal of the peasantry from grain production. This, in turn, jeopardized the main achievement of the reforms - food self-sufficiency. As a result, the economic policy of the state in the field of agriculture was a cyclical process, accompanied by either an increase or a decrease in state pressure on the countryside. Along with this, in some years there was a shortage of food in the country, which necessitated the purchase of grain abroad.

However, the most significant problem that reformers still have to face today is the question of transformations in the public sector of the economy. The reforms carried out in the second half of the 1980s failed to solve the main problem - how to make the public sector economically efficient. Undoubtedly, the reforms carried out, aimed at giving state enterprises more economic freedom, stimulated the development of production, but their interaction with the market showed that they were largely unprofitable. In the first half of the 90s. the share of such enterprises reached approximately 40%, and their debt exceeded 10% of GNP. The experience of reforming the public sector has shown that a cost-effective solution to its problems is possible only through large-scale privatization, which so far remains politically unacceptable for the PRC leadership. As a result, he put forward the concept of "double-track economic development", which implies the creation of conditions for the growth of private economic relations while maintaining a dominant position for the public sector, which to this day includes the largest, most modern enterprises that are the foundation of the country's economy.

The successful implementation of economic reforms, the development of market relations, the decollectivization of agriculture, the formation of a fairly significant and economically influential private sector resulted in a fundamental change in the nature of modern Chinese society. From now on, it is no longer in the full sense of the totalitarian, since the economic life in the country to a large extent turned out to be “set free”, emancipated from comprehensive state control. These processes had as their logical consequence the emergence of the sprouts of civil society, which is also manifested in the desire to also emancipate from the rigid "embrace" of the state, the general type of structure of which continues to be based on totalitarian principles. These circumstances created the prerequisites for the development of the democratic movement, which could not but come into sharp confrontation with the authorities.

The April events on Tiananmen Square in 1976 can be considered its first stage. However, during that period, appeals directed against the Quartet in support of the “pragmatists” dominated, and democratic slogans proper were not widely put forward. The second stage in the development of the democratic movement is associated with the "wall of democracy", which in 1978 became a symbol of the demands for establishing the norms of democratic life. In dazibao, which the people of Beijing pasted on one of the city walls overlooking the central avenue of the capital, they demanded that the most urgent economic problems be resolved, guarantee human rights, and introduce democratic institutions. At this stage, the popular movement, quite possibly, was inspired by the authorities, primarily by the supporters of Deng Xiaoping, who tried to use him in the fight against their political rivals. However, it soon turned into a spontaneous protest against the totalitarian social foundations.

In that situation, much depended on the position of the leader of the reformist faction, Deng Xiaoping. Initially, when issues were discussed among senior leaders, he insisted that violent suppression of dissent was unacceptable, but in late March 1979, largely under pressure from both the "left" and some of his more conservative supporters, Dan authorized the actual defeat of the movement. It was carried out under the slogan of loyalty to "four fundamental principles": the socialist path, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leading role of the CPC, Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of Mao Zedong. At a political trial held in October 1979, the most prominent members of the democratic movement were sentenced to long prison terms. Thus, the "pragmatic" leadership of the CCP, which fought for power, made it clear that its goal is to abandon the Maoist model of communism, but while maintaining the foundations of the existing socio-political order, even if these foundations begin to be challenged by society.

The next stage in the development of the democratic movement was the student demonstrations at the end of 1986, supported by the population of large urban centers. The immediate causes that led to the emergence of a mass movement are related to the costs of reforms and the contradictions caused by this. One of the most difficult problems, for which the population was not prepared, was the jump in inflation. The economically least protected segments of the population, to which students belonged, suffered first of all from the rise in prices. They reacted especially sharply to the growth of corruption among the party and state apparatus, which sought to use the reforms for personal enrichment. Thus, the protest movement during this period was directed not so much against the costs of reform, but against the actual process of formation of something too similar to bureaucratic capital. The calls of the participants in this movement testified that for them the development of reforms is inseparable from the development of democratic institutions. This became clear after the first demonstrations held in Prov. Anhui, where the demonstrators, numbering no more than 5 thousand people, marched under the slogan "Without democracy, there is no reform." This happened in early December and soon demonstrations were engulfed in Wuhan, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, Shanghai. It cannot be said that direct calls for the immediate introduction of democratic norms of life dominated everywhere, but it can be argued that they were the quintessence of the unfolding social movement. Along with slogans calling for an end to bureaucracy and corruption, calls were made for the democratization of the elections, increasing the representation of the intelligentsia and students in government. There were also slogans praising the revolutionary democrat Sun Yat-sen. In Shanghai, demonstrations that were initially peaceful soon escalated into clashes with the police. At the end of December, the movement spread to Tianjin and Beijing.

This movement, which was undoubtedly a spontaneous manifestation of popular protest, nevertheless, was also associated with the struggle in the leadership of the CPC between various groups within the framework of a single "pragmatic" faction in the past. The most radical reformist wing, led by General Secretary Hu Yaobang, apparently expected to supplement economic reforms with radical changes in the political sphere aimed at weakening the CCP's total control over public life. However, in mid-January 1987, Hu Yaobang was accused of patronizing "bourgeois liberalization", of excessive radicalism in the course of economic reform, and dismissed. Apparently, in this climate of political crisis, Deng Xiaoping took the side of the conservative wing of the reformers. The problems of political reform were considered at the next XIII Congress of the CPC (September 1987). At the congress, a program was outlined for further economic reforms and the task was set to double the per capita GNP by the beginning of the next millennium so that by about 2050 China could reach the level of moderately developed countries and thus carry out basically the task of modernizing the country.

In formulating this strategic task, Deng Xiaoping refers to the Confucian concept of xiaokang, which was already used in the 1950s. Chiang Kai-shek at the promotion of the modernization program for Taiwan. At the level of ordinary consciousness, the phrase xiaokan shuiping used by Deng Xiaoping can be translated as "the level of the environment of a non-prosperous life." However, for a Chinese familiar with the Confucian tradition, the concept of xiaokang turns out to be filled with much more significant content related to Confucius's concept of an ideal state structure (which was already discussed when analyzing Chiang Kai-shek's program in Taiwan). One can probably say that the concept of xiaokan was taken by Deng Xiaoping as a symbol of building socialism with Chinese characteristics (market socialism).

In the work of the Thirteenth Congress, a considerable place was occupied by the problems of implementing political reform, and it was recognized that economic reforms should be accompanied by the process of creating "socialist political democracy." Such measures were outlined as delimiting the functions of the party and administrative and economic leadership, restructuring the administrative apparatus in order to overcome bureaucracy, and also changing the personnel system. During this period, the country's leadership hatched plans for the liberalization of the mechanisms for the formation of representative bodies of power, the admission of self-nomination and the nomination of several candidates in the formation of lower bodies of power.

However, as a result of a new outbreak of a popular movement under the slogans of democratizing the country's political system, these plans were not destined to come true. These problems were already being dealt with by the new general secretary Zhao Ziyang, who accepted the appointment, leaving the post of head of government. The immediate causes that caused a new upsurge of the student movement under the slogans of democratic reforms are similar to those that led to an outbreak of discontent at the end of 1986. The main factor was inflation, which led to an increase in consumer prices and caused by contradictions in economic policy, the unresolved problems associated with the reform of the public sector economy.

In this situation, the student movement flared up again, this time centered on the capital. The immediate impetus for student demonstrations was the death of the disgraced general secretary Hu Yaobang in April 1989. In the eyes of the Chinese intelligentsia and students, his name was associated with attempts at democratic change, interrupted by the intervention of conservative forces.

In April 1989, mass demonstrations began in Beijing under the slogans of the democratization of political life and the fight against corruption. Hundreds of thousands of students took part in the demonstrations, including those who came from other regions of the country. This was followed by student strikes, and in the central square of Beijing - Tiananmen - part of the students went on a hunger strike in protest against the publications of the central press, which condemned the student movement. The movement was joined by the workers of the capital's enterprises, and then the urban outcasts. The question of the degree of involvement in the movement of the radical leadership of the CPC, including Zhao Ziyang's entourage, remains open, but it is undoubtedly with him that the demonstrators pinned their hopes for deepening political reform and advancing towards democracy.

Meetings of party and state leaders, including Zhao Ziyang himself, with students, attempts to persuade them to stop the protests were unsuccessful. This was used by the conservatives, who said that the mass movement threatened the foundations of the social order, created an atmosphere of chaos, and thus hindered economic reforms. On at least one point, the students' critics were right - a serious democratization of public life threatened the monopoly role of the CCP and, in this sense, really undermined the existing political order.

In this situation, at the end of May 1989, martial law was declared in the capital, demonstrations and strikes were prohibited, and the strategic facilities of the city were taken under the control of military units transferred to Beijing. Nevertheless, the hunger strikers in Tiananmen Square continued to persist, believing that the authorities would not dare to resort to force. However, on the night of June 3-4, the troops, supported by tanks and armored personnel carriers, crushed the erected barricades and drove the strikers out of the square. The clashes, during which the troops used weapons, led to numerous casualties. It took several days to establish full control over the situation and resume life in the city.

In the midst of a deep political crisis, a plenum of the CPC Central Committee met at the end of June. Zhao Ziyang was made responsible for what happened and, by decision of the plenum, he was removed from the post of general secretary. The mayor of Shanghai, Jiang Zemin, was elected to this seat, having shown firmness two years earlier in suppressing the student movement in Shanghai. Of course, the shifts in the top leadership of the CPC would not have been possible without the approval of Deng Xiaoping, who retained the status of the indisputable leader of the party and once again supported the conservative part of the party leadership with his authority.

The leadership of the CPC "events in Tiananmen" were assessed as another manifestation of "bourgeois liberalization", the essence of which was the desire to undermine the foundations of the state system, the leading role of the party, eliminate state property, turn the country onto the capitalist path of development. Despite the fact that the demonstrators did not raise "anti-socialist slogans", this definition of the possible end results of the country's democratization is not without foundation.

The defeat of the democratic movement in 1989 clearly revealed both the achievements and the limits of reforms in the PRC. China has achieved undeniable and even unprecedented economic progress and, perhaps even more importantly, society itself has ceased to be completely totalitarian. However, within the framework of the “socialist choice”, the reforms have almost completely exhausted themselves, faced with the problem of transforming the public sector of the economy. Within the framework of this choice, the problem of carrying out real broad democratic transformations seems to be unsolvable.

The bloody suppression of the Tiananmen uprisings and the defeat of the democratic movement removed the question of political reforms and the democratization of the political structure for a long time. These tragic events also delayed the deepening and expansion of economic transformation. The Fifth Plenum of the CPC Central Committee, held in Beijing in November 1989, spoke in favor of continuing the policy of "settlement" adopted by the leadership of the CPC back in 1988 and caused by a sharp increase in inflation, an increase in the state budget deficit, the need to return in a number of places to supply by "cards and other side effects inevitably associated with the restructuring of the economic system. The plenum adopted a decision "On the further regulation, streamlining and deepening of the reform", proposing to carry it out until 1992. The main goal of this policy is to remove the social tension that has arisen. In fact, it was about a significant slowdown in the reform process. One of the consequences of the Tiananmen tragedy is a sharp increase in the ideologization of all public life. Leftist-dogmatic figures became active again, trying to return to the concept of "aggravation of the class struggle", striving to revive the "spirit of Yan'an", calling to follow the "models" of Daqing and Dazhai, etc. However, as subsequent events showed, this attempted Maoist counteroffensive failed to change the direction of China's development.

The 5th Plenum also accepted the resignation of Deng Xiaoping from his last leadership post - Chairman of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee. However, this departure only emphasized that Deng Xiaoping remained the real informal leader of the CCP, determining the socio-economic strategy of the party and state leadership. Already in 1992, believing that the political and economic consequences of the Tiananmen tragedy had been overcome, Deng Xiaoping, during a trip to the country's southern regions, called for the resumption and intensification of economic reforms. This call was taken up by the leadership of the CPC, which at the XIV Party Congress in the autumn of 1992 officially proclaimed the course towards building a "socialist market economy." This was a fundamentally important decision, because at last the socio-economic goal of the reforms was determined. In the course of economic transformations, this goal was by no means found immediately: the development of the thought of Chinese economists and Chinese political leaders went from a “planned economy with elements of market regulation” through a “combination of plan and market” to the concept of a “socialist market economy”. It was an intense pragmatic search for the safest and most efficient model of a post-totalitarian economic system.

In his report to the 14th CPC Congress, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, President of the People's Republic of China Jiang Zemin sought to describe this model in sufficient detail, avoiding giving it simplistic ideological definitions. However, there is still a long way to go before complete mutual understanding in the interpretation of this concept. This is primarily due to the fact that socialism, by definition, cannot be market-based. However, this inaccuracy of the wording cannot be blamed on the leaders of the CCP and the ideologists for at least two reasons. First, this definition helps to avoid the abrupt and dangerous ideological turnaround that is necessary for an adequate description of radical economic change. These changes within the framework of the chosen approach are described as reforming, "improving" already built (or under construction, "the initial stage of socialism", etc.) socialism. Such an ideological interpretation does not weaken, but, on the contrary, even strengthens the legitimacy of the power of the CPC. Secondly, the wording adopted by the congress is by no means final and can be repeatedly corrected.

These ideas were developed at the XV Congress of the CCP, held in mid-September 1997 - six months after the death of Deng Xiaoping and two months after the official return of Hong Kong to the sovereignty of the PRC, which was widely and solemnly celebrated in the country. As in the course of the previous highest forums of the ruling communist party, this congress was to form a new composition supreme bodies party, and to make decisions regarding the future of political and economic reforms.

The composition of the new supreme bodies of the 58 million party, elected at the congress, has undergone significant changes. The average age of members of the CPC Central Committee has dropped from 69 to 56, and their

the average educational level has increased significantly. In the new composition of the Central Committee, formed at the congress, the percentage of its members who received higher or special secondary education increased from 73 to 96. At the same time, the reduction in the representation of the military in the Central Committee continued: their share decreased from 25 to 21%. Along with this, significant personnel changes took place in the highest echelon of the leadership of the party - in the Politburo and the Standing Committee of the PB of the CPC Central Committee. Qiao Shi, who held the post of NPC Chairman at that moment, was removed from the PB. This opened the way for further castling of the highest party and state cadres. The following year, Li Peng was elected chairman of the NPC, and Zhu Rongji, who had previously held the post of deputy, took the vacant seat of premier of the State Council. premiere.

The personnel changes in the highest Party bodies testified, first of all, to the strengthening of the centrist group in the leadership of the CPC, headed by General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. The positions of the centrists, as before, were characterized by an extremely cautious attitude towards the question of the future of political reforms in the country. Evidence of this was the removal of Qiao Shi, who was considered almost the only representative of those forces in the top leadership who sought to return to the implementation of real political transformations.

The strengthening of Zhu Rongji's positions indicated that the leadership of the CPC, seeking to freeze any radical political reforms, was determined to deepen economic reforms. This was clearly manifested in the report to the congress made by Zhao Ziyang, as well as in the general nature of the decisions taken by the congress.

A significant part of the report to the congress was devoted to the assessment of Deng Xiaoping, who was put on a par with such figures. Chinese history XX century, like Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong. Along with Marxism-Leninism and the "ideas of Mao Zedong", the theory of building "socialism with Chinese characteristics", put forward by Deng Xiaoping, received the status of "the guiding ideology of the party." A corresponding provision was included as an addendum to the CPC program, in which it was written that the essence of "Deng Xiaoping's theory" consisted in the provision put forward by him on "the need to emancipate consciousness and productive forces."

A significant place in the report was given to the analysis of theoretical issues related to the interpretation of the path of social and economic development of the PRC, which, as before, was characterized as the building of socialism. In an effort to clarify the logical contradictions that arise as a result of an obvious gap between the ultimate goals declared in party program documents and the practical side of state policy, Jiang Zemin dwelled in detail on the concept of the "initial stage of building socialism", put forward at the turn of the 1980s. In his interpretation, not only is communism a distant prospect, but socialism is "a very long stage of historical development", which can last for "several generations or even several tens of generations." Obviously, by putting forward this position, the leadership of the CCP sought to free its hands to continue to pursue a truly pragmatic line, formulated as "development is our priority."

These priorities naturally corresponded with the call for deepening economic reforms, primarily in the public sector of industry. It was this topic that became the main point of Zhao Ziyang's report and determined the entire nature of the decisions taken by the congress. In fact, it was about the methods of privatization of public sector enterprises, the main place among which was to be occupied by corporatization, which was in obvious contradiction with the main doctrinal provisions contained in the program of the Communist Party. In an effort to protect this course from possible attacks from the "left", Jiang resorted to the following argument: since the shares will be distributed among the "people", this will not change the status of enterprises as being in "public property".

In the field of political reforms, the course proclaimed by the leadership of the CPC looked immeasurably more conservative. The report once again emphasized the role of the "democratic dictatorship of the people" as the main means of "fighting against all factors that undermine stability, the need to fight against bourgeois liberalization, the subversive and splitting activities of internal and external enemies."

The documents adopted at the congress confirmed once again that the leadership of the party, deciding to carry out deep reforms in the field of the economy, consistently opposes any serious structural reforms of the political system. As before, democracy is only "socialist" democracy, and the proposals related to "political reform" included only calls for increased public control over the activities of the administrative apparatus, and also to ensure that the norms of the law become the only basis for decisions, accepted by the legal authorities. Another indication that serious political reforms are unacceptable to the current leadership was the reaction to a letter sent to the congress by the disgraced former general secretary Zhao Ziyang. The letter stated that the official assessment of the events of 1989 as a "counter-revolutionary rebellion" was incorrect, since the student movement was inspired only by the desire to eliminate corruption and accelerate political change. However, this issue did not become a subject of discussion at the congress, and Zhao Ziyang himself was reprimanded by the leadership of the CCP and the regime of his detention under house arrest was tightened.

Another topic actively discussed at the congress was the principles of military reform. It was decided to reduce the armed forces by 2000 by 500,000 people (up to 2.4 million), while simultaneously increasing the technical and combat characteristics of weapons and raising the level of training of military personnel. On the issue of relations between the "two shores," the positions taken by the congress corresponded to the traditional line pursued by the CPC over the past few years. The PRC authorities called on the Taiwanese leadership to resume dialogue, interrupted after the 1996 crisis, on the basis of recognizing the principle of "one China". As Jiang Zemin stated, provided that the Taiwan side accepts this principle, any issues of interest to both sides could be the subject of negotiations.

After the 15th Congress of the CPC, it was precisely the problems of reforming the public sector that became the main focus of the CPC's activity in the sphere of domestic policy. The need to reform the public sector of the country's economy does not raise doubts among the leadership of the party, which has repeatedly made decisions over the past two decades on the need for profound transformations in the system of organization of state industry. However, each time these attempts ended with the adoption of palliative measures.

Meanwhile, by the second half of the 1990s. two-thirds of the approximately 120,000 leading state-owned enterprises were chronically unprofitable, which naturally placed a heavy burden on the country's economy and budget. Increasing the efficiency of enterprises, which is impossible without serious changes in the organization of labor relations, should almost inevitably give rise to acute social conflicts. The main sources of these conflicts were promised to be growing unemployment (according to data for the second half of the 90s, the number of "surplus labor" was more than 200 million people), as well as changes in the social security system, which did not lie on the shoulders of state bodies, and provided by the enterprises themselves.

In the course of a series of conferences "on questions of economic work" convened after the Fifteenth Congress, a specific program for the reform of the state sector of industry was developed. The program envisaged, on the one hand, the reorganization of inefficient enterprises through bankruptcies, mergers, dissolution, and so on. On the other hand, measures were taken to support those state-owned companies that represented the most modern industries and provided the bulk of industrial production. Out of more than 300,000 state-owned enterprises, about 500 were selected, providing 40% of the total consumption in the market and giving 85% of annual revenues to the treasury from tax collections. It was here that the main flow of state investments was directed, and it was at these enterprises that corporatization should first of all be carried out with the placement of shares on the domestic and foreign markets.

In order to avoid exacerbating social conflicts, measures were taken to reform the social security system. Everyone employed in the public sector, it was announced, must receive an insurance policy that entitles them to medical care and a pension, regardless of which company they work for.

The new stage of economic reforms brought with it both significant positive results and serious problems, the solution of which may require a long period. First of all, it should be noted that as a result of the implemented measures, the largest and most modern enterprises benefited, and previously they were distinguished by greater efficiency. The experience of reorganization and corporatization of less successful state-owned enterprises has shown that the reorganization itself often does not lead to the formation of new structures that operate more efficiently. One of the main reasons for this is that it is not market motives but administrative expediency that largely governs how reorganizations or mergers are carried out. In a significant number of cases, state bodies generally refuse to authorize the reorganization of unprofitable enterprises if they play a serious role in providing their own social services. Finally, an important circumstance hindering the increase in the efficiency of the work of corporatized enterprises was the fact that even after the corporatization the state block of shares of large and medium-sized enterprises remains the largest, and shareholders from among the workers are not allowed to sell their shares on the market.

However, seeing the existing problems, the PRC leadership is in no hurry to take more radical measures. Gradual “real” privatization will cover an increasing number of public sector enterprises, and the state itself will strive to remain the guarantor of social and political stability, without which the creation modern structure market relations is hardly possible.

The development of the PRC in the 90s. showed the ability of the existing political mechanism not only to overcome political obstacles in the way of economic transformation, but also to ensure the progressive development of economic reform. However, the irony of history lies in the fact that any movement of the economy forward in modern conditions in China means the development of elements of civil society that are increasingly incompatible with the authoritarian political mechanism. All this makes inevitable - sooner or later - the reform of the political system, the democratization of political life.

It is difficult to predict how and when, in what forms it will take place. The Chinese "social laboratory" in Taiwan showed one of the possible options for a gradual and fairly painless change of political regime. The PRC is well aware of this political experience, and various ties between the PRC and compatriots in Taiwan are growing rapidly. The rapid socio-economic development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the similarity (but not the same!) of many processes of modernization of the Chinese society. This once again emphasizes the socio-cultural unity of Taiwan with the mainland and, at the same time, demonstrates the process of socio-political convergence between the PRC and Taiwan. At the beginning of 1995, Jiang Zemin came up with a broad program of rapprochement between compatriots. This program once again testifies to the significance of the Taiwanese experience for the PRC, on the one hand, and to the impact of the success of the PRC's economic development on the reunification process, on the other. The faster the process of economic and political modernization of the PRC proceeds, the greater the opportunities for peaceful reunification, for uniting all Chinese around Beijing, for the revival of "Greater China".

3. Development of Taiwan after 1976

The "economic miracle" created, regardless of the subjective intentions of its organizers, the socio-economic and socio-psychological prerequisites not only for a qualitatively new round of economic growth and development, but also for profound political changes that were overdue.

With its industrial development, Taiwan became more and more involved in the international division of labor, becoming more and more an integral part of the world market. In many ways, it was this "openness" that stimulated Taiwan's economic development. However, at the same time, this involvement in world economic relations made the Taiwanese economy dependent on all the fluctuations in the world economy. Thus, the oil crisis that erupted in 1973 hit the Taiwanese economy, which was completely dependent on oil imports, and led to a reduction in demand for Taiwanese goods on the world market and a reduction in Taiwanese exports. But the Taiwanese economy managed to overcome this crisis. The decisive role in this was played by the cooperation of the state with private entrepreneurship. In 1974, the government put forward a program for the construction of a dozen large facilities in the power industry, transport, heavy industry (nuclear power plant, railways and highways, metallurgy, etc.). This program did not remain on paper, it was completed by the end of the 70s, which helped the Taiwanese economy to minimize crisis losses and maintain high rates of capital accumulation, industrial production and exports. The success of this program has allowed the government to continue programming the expansion of construction facilities necessary for a more harmonious development of the island's economy.

The implementation of these programs and their impact on the growth of production in all sectors of the national economy testified to the formation of an effective "mixed economy" system in Taiwan, in which state and private enterprises not only competed, but also cooperated in the development of the Taiwanese economy.

During the second half of the 70s, in the 80s and 90s. the growth and development of the Taiwanese economy continues at a new qualitative level. The rates of this growth are significant (almost 10% of the annual increase over the period under review) and, what is very important, stable. Despite all the difficulties in the development of the world market at this time, Taiwan continues to expand its exports, which by the beginning of the 90s. accounted for more than half of the GNP (in 1952 - only 10%). Imports are also growing, including consumer goods due to the huge increase in the purchasing power of the Taiwanese population. The investment climate in Taiwan is becoming more and more favorable, which constantly attracts foreign investors. In 1990, the size of foreign direct investment was already approaching 10 billion dollars. (however, we note that 3/4 of these funds accounted for overseas Chinese - huayaqiao). Stable economic growth, the constant excess of exports over imports led to the creation of huge foreign exchange reserves in Taiwan: in the 90s. they fluctuated around the figure of 100 billion dollars. (sharing the first place in the world with Japan). Taiwan begins active export of capital.

An integral indicator of Taiwan's economic development is the increase in per capita GNP to more than $10,000. in 1992, which already marks Taiwan's exit to the level of developed industrial countries. At the same time, it is important that the social orientation of the economic policy in the spirit of Sun Yatsen made it possible to avoid the strengthening of social differentiation ("the rich get richer - the poor get poorer"). Moreover, if in 1953 the ratio between the average per capita income of the top 20% of the population (“rich”) and the bottom 20% (“poor”) was 15:1, now it has fallen to 4:1 (one of the most favorable ratios in the world).

The growth of prosperity, the increase in the level of education of the population, the expansion of the layer of highly qualified workers and employees, the development of private entrepreneurship created the conditions for the formation of the so-called new middle strata, or "middle class", for the emergence of elements of civil society. Allied and friendly relations with Western democracies (and also with Eastern democracies - Japan), the logic of their own socio-economic development pushed the Kuomintang to political reforms, to the liberalization of political life following the transformations in the liberal spirit of economic life.

The name and time of Jiang Jingguo is associated with the beginning of the vigorous activity of the opposition forces. By this period, as it were, two main opposition tendencies had already taken shape: the separatist opposition and the democratic opposition. In real political life, these tendencies often intertwined, without removing, however, their fundamental differences. For all the authoritarianism of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, this regime left some political space for dissent. First of all, these are the possibilities of journal and newspaper activities. Control over the press is gradually weakening, publications of the intellectual opposition from the academic environment appear. Some magazines actually become centers of consolidation of opposition forces.

Kuomintang party and state structures and Money etc. There was no unity in the party on the issue of Taiwan independence, and for tactical purposes this demand has not yet come to the fore, remaining, however, in many respects the structure-forming idea of ​​this party.

The political weight of the DPP can be correctly assessed by comparing it with other political parties that have emerged like mushrooms after rain in connection with the lifting of the state of emergency. Now participating in elections on a multi-party basis, only the DPP managed to become a real political opposition to the Kuomintang. In the elections to the National Assembly in December 1991, the DPP received more than 23% of the vote, and in the elections to the Legislative Yuan in December 1992 - already 31%, sharing mandates with the Kuomintang (out of 161 parliamentary seats, the Kuomintang received 96, the DPP - 50, and the rest are independent deputies).

However, the two-party system did not work out. Already in August 1993, a group of authoritative Kuomintang figures formed the Chinese New Party (Zhongguo Xindan). These leaders left the Kuomintang not so much for ideological reasons, but because of their rejection, as they themselves emphasized, of the Kuomintang's political conservatism, rampant corruption, weakness of internal party democracy, and so on.

In ideological terms, the New Party (NP) rather opposes the DPP. The main composition of the NP is people from the continent, who by no means strive to create a separate state, but, on the contrary, put forward the idea of ​​China's reunification in the future, striving to develop various ties with the continent as a prerequisite for such an unification. The new party immediately became a prominent political force to be reckoned with by its rivals. Actively participating in local elections and gaining some experience, this party achieved significant success in its first parliamentary elections - elections to the Legislative Yuan in December 1995, winning 21 seats (the Kuomintang won 85 seats, the DPP - 54).

All this indicated that the constitutional reform had already borne fruit - a multi-party parliamentary system began to take shape in Taiwan. Such a course of Taiwan's political development also had an impact on the inner-party processes in the Kuomintang itself. The renewal of the inner-party life of the Kuomintang began at the initiative of Chiang Ching-kuo, who understood the connection between economic and political reforms in Taiwan and the need to renew the Kuomintang's political strategy and the style of inner-party life itself. Of course, in such a political party as the Kuomintang, which many political scientists consider local elections, and then parliamentary elections, to be an even more important sphere of opposition activity. In itself, the holding of local elections was a certain tribute by the Kuomintang to its democratic allies abroad, as well as in Taiwan, because the Kuomintang authorities needed to create a certain political image, especially since in their fight against Chinese and world communism, the Kuomintang sought to act as an alternative democratic force .

Unable to form a political party, opposition politicians ran as "independent" candidates in local elections and were successful in many cases. The opposition forces are gradually consolidating, for example, the Taiwan Non-Party Aid Group is being created, which was supposed to assist non-Party candidates in the election campaign. This actual liberalization of the political regime is explained primarily by the political tolerance of the new leader of the Kuomintang, Jiang Ching-kuo, who understood the historical inevitability of profound political changes and rightly believed that the objective social prerequisites for this were already ripe.

Thus, in September 1986, a group of Taiwanese opposition figures proclaimed the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in flagrant violation of the state of emergency law that was still in force. The authorities did not react. The new party, which united the opposition elements for the first time, was very diverse in its composition. However, it can be noted that it was primarily a party of Taiwanese who aspired for Taiwanese independence.

This was one of the signals that political reforms should not be delayed. As leader of the Kuomintang, Jiang Jingguo did much to push the old and conservative leadership of the Kuomintang towards political reforms. The process of democratization of political life began with the lifting of the state of emergency in July 1987, which fundamentally changed the internal political situation in Taiwan. DPP became legal political organization, who managed to create a great prestige among the indigenous Taiwanese with her previous illegal work. The DPP became the main political opposition to the ruling party. Her criticism of the Kuomintang was of a general democratic nature, but with significant elements of separatism. Thus, the DPP demanded that the Kuomintang give up its monopoly on the media, the release of political prisoners, the division is defined as a Lenin-type party (claims for a political monopoly, rigid centralization, ideological unanimity, etc.), democratization processes could go very slowly. Jiang Chingguo initiated the rejuvenation of the party apparatus by increasing the recruitment of native Taiwanese into the party and its leadership. Among his nominees is the Taiwanese Lee Teng-hui, who became the mayor of Taipei and, since 1984, vice-president. Jiang Jingguo also instructed him to head a commission to develop a program of political reforms. Well-educated, Westernized young technocrats are beginning to play an increasingly important role in the Kuomintang. Li Tenghui, who headed the Kuomintang after Jiang Chingguo's death, continued to develop this trend. In 1993, the XIV Congress of the Kuomintang, on the initiative of Li Teng-hui, introduced the election of the chairman of the party by secret ballot, and in program documents the Kuomintang began to be defined not as a "revolutionary" party (as has been customary since the time of Sun Yat-sen), but as a "democratic" party. Following this, the election of the President of the Republic of China in 1996 was held by direct voting by the voters of Taiwan. The majority of voters cast their votes for Lee Teng-hui.

However, already in the 2000 presidential elections, the Kuomintang was defeated, and opposition candidate Chen Shui-bian became president of the Republic of China. The defeat of the Kuomintang, which took the initiative in accelerating the process of democratization, symbolizes the completion of a certain historical stage in the life of Taiwan. Of course, this defeat does not mean the removal of the Kuomintang from power; it is quite possible that the Kuomintang will be able to win the next elections while continuing to actively participate in political life. But that will be at a different historical stage. It is the defeat of the party that took the initiative in accelerating political reforms that symbolizes the victory of Taiwan's democratization process.

Of great importance for the political atmosphere in Taiwan were the changes in the political strategy of the Kuomintang in solving the problem of reunification of China, undertaken on the initiative of Jiang Ching-guo. After the death of Mao Zedong, the leadership of the CCP put forward the formula "one state - two systems" as the basis for the unification of China. Having rejected this formula, the Kuomintang at the same time at its Twelfth Congress (1981) puts forward the idea of ​​unifying China "on the basis of Sun Yat-sen's three people's principles", removing the slogan put forward by Chiang Kai-shek "counteroffensive on the mainland." The Kuomintang seemed to be inviting the CCP to peaceful competition. Considering that the "three people's principles of Sun Yat-sen" were in 1923-1927 and in 1937-1945. the ideological basis of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the CPC, as well as the fact that the post-reform economic development of the PRC and Taiwan is largely the implementation of Sun Yatsen's plans, putting forward this idea is not without great sense. These political and strategic changes have opened up enormous opportunities for developing not only economic, but also cultural and political contacts across the Taiwan Strait. Their rapid development in the 80s and 90s. creates fundamentally new objective prerequisites for the unification of China.

The development of political reforms in Taiwan (following deep economic changes) leads to the conclusion that under certain conditions, self-transformation of an authoritarian regime into a democratic regime is possible. And, apparently, following the concept of "Taiwan's economic miracle", its political counterpart arises.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

UDC 323(510):316

D.B-O. Regzenova

MAIN PRINCIPLES AND ESSENCE OF DENG XIAOPING'S REFORM

The article discusses the basic principles and essence of the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. The decision for socialist modernization was made at the third plenum of the 11th convocation of the CPC Central Committee in December 1978. The reform began with the weakest link in the economy - agriculture. Then it spread to the urban sector. The state basis is socialism, but socialism in China was built taking into account national specifics.

Key words: Chinese Communist Party, dictatorship of the proletariat, socio-economic reforms, socialist modernization, socialism with Chinese characteristics, market economy, public property, reform and opening up.

D.B.O. Regzenova

THE MAIN PRINCIPLES AND THE ESSENCE OF DENG XIAOPING'S REFORMS

The article deals with the main principles and the essence of reforms, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. The decision of socialistic modernization was made on the third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of the 11th convocation in December of 1978. The reform was started from the weakest sector of the economy - agriculture. Then it was focused on the urban sector. The base of the state is socialism, but socialism in China has national characteristics.

Key words: Chinese Communist Party, dictatorship of proletariat, social-economic reforms, socialistic modernization, socialism with Chinese characteristics, market economy, public property, policy of reforms and openness.

The enormous successes achieved by China over the past quarter century in raising the economy and living standards of the people, developing science and technology, education and culture are well known. These successes are inextricably linked with the activities of the outstanding statesman of China, Deng Xiaoping, who managed to lead the most populous country in the world out of political chaos, poverty and backwardness and direct it to the path of sustainable socio-economic development. Deng Xiaoping, having proclaimed a policy of market reforms within the country and its openness to the outside world, put forward a strategy of "socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics" - yu

zhongguo tese de shehui zhui xiandaihua).

Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) was born in a village in Sichuan Province to a family that understood the importance of education. Here he graduated from elementary school. In 1920, at the suggestion of his father, he went abroad - to France, to study and work. There, having accepted Marxism, in 1924 he joined the ranks of the Communist Party of China. In 1926, under the threat of expulsion from France, he left for Moscow, where he began studying at the Sun Yat-sen University, specially created for students from China.

melting. And although training at Sun Yat-sen University was designed for two years, less than a year later, Deng Xiaoping was recalled home for practical participation in the revolution. This was at the end of 1926. And a year later, during the first revolutionary civil war in China, when the Communist Party was forced to go underground, Deng Xiaoping became the administrator of the CPC Central Committee.

There were many dramatic moments and events in Deng Xiaoping's ascent to the political Olympus and his stay on it. He was removed from all leadership positions three times, and then restored. Moreover, this happened both during the period of the national liberation revolution in China (in 1933) and after the formation of the PRC.

In 1966, during the "cultural revolution"

(^¥- wen ge), deployed on the initiative of Mao Zedong, he was removed from the posts of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council of the PRC and all other posts.

In 1973, at the suggestion of Mao Zedong, he was reinstated as Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, and in 1975 he was appointed Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee, and Chief of the General Staff of the People's

Chinese Liberation Army (PLA). But already

a year later, during the life of Mao Zedong, he was again removed from all posts. After the death of Mao Zedong (September 1976) and the defeat of the Gang of Four, Deng Xiaoping was again restored to his former positions.

In these posts, Deng Xiaoping was engaged in the implementation of the course adopted by the leadership of the PRC in January 1975 to implement the “four

Modernizations"

Agriculture, industry, defense, science and technology. But first of all, he began to carry out a "comprehensive streamlining" of the entire administrative and economic life undermined as a result of the "cultural revolution", setting the task of creating an effective structure for managing production, reforming the system of relations between the center and places on the basis of transferring part of the powers to grassroots organizations, simplifying the military and administrative apparatus, restoration

regulatory framework, the introduction of a system of responsibility for the management of enterprises and the implementation of the principle of distribution according to work.

All these decisions later became integral part the program of modernization of China that he developed, which gives reason to Chinese researchers to consider 1975 the beginning of the formation and testing in practice of the main ideas of Deng Xiaoping on reform and open policy, primarily his central idea of ​​the priority of economic construction, formulated by him back in the 50s gg. .

In December 1978, the third plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee was held in Beijing. He summarized the experience of the previous period in building socialism in China and condemned the mistakes made mainly during the "cultural revolution" of 1966-1976. It was noted that the country's economy has been marking time for more than a decade, as a result of which a lot of problems have accumulated in the life of the Chinese people. The plenum worked out a directive for carrying out the above-mentioned "four modernizations" - agriculture, industry, defense, science and technology, which was supposed to lead to an improvement in the financial situation of the people. Thus, the third plenum marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of the PRC - the stage of reforms. At the plenum, Deng Xiaoping and his supporters, who advocated reforming China, significantly strengthened their positions in the CCP. From that moment on, Deng Xiaoping became the main reformer of the Chinese economy and, in fact, the main leader of the country. After the third plenum, Deng Xiaoping formed the key theoretical and program provisions of the reform strategy.

The goal of socialist modernization was the withdrawal of China by the middle of the 21st century. to the level of moderately developed states in terms of production per capita and the achievement on this basis of the general well-being of its citizens. The path of modernization is accelerated economic growth, a qualitative renewal of the economy and an increase in its efficiency based on the development of scientific and technical potential. Proceeding from the fact that science is "the main productive force"

Zhong yao shengchanli), he attributed its development to the most important tasks of economic construction, at the same time calling for borrowing advanced foreign scientific and technological achievements. Setting the task of developing science and technology was associated by Deng Xiaoping with an increase in the role of intellectual labor in the implementation of modernization and, in general, the position of the intelligentsia in society.

The state basis is socialism, because it makes it possible to ensure the necessary concentration of material and human resources for accelerated socio-economic development and the achievement of general welfare, preventing the concentration of the main part of social wealth in the hands of a small part of society. But socialism in China was built taking into account national specifics, which consisted in the historically established and objectively determined socio-economic backwardness, in the conditions of a shortage of arable land and other necessary resources to ensure normal living conditions and development of a country with a billion people. Therefore, from the beginning of the development of a modernization strategy, Deng Xiaoping abandoned dogmatic adherence to the canons of socialist construction adopted in the USSR and searched for the construction of his own model of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Considering that overcoming China's backwardness will take a long time, a fundamentally theoretical position was adopted that the PRC is at the initial stage of socialism, which will last until the middle of the 21st century. .

The economic basis of this model is public ownership of the means of production, while encouraging the development of non-socialist sectors of the economy, including the private sector. Deng Xiaoping abandoned the literal opposition between the plan and the market, considering both of them only as means in the hands of the state that do not determine its essence (since under socialism, as well as under capitalism, both the plan and the market are used) and during the period of reforms 80 -90s leadership of the CCP gradually through a series of intermediate stages,

expanded the role of market relations as the main regulator of economic development.

The main means of implementing modernization are reforms and an open policy. The reforms are aimed at bringing production relations in line with the tasks of developing the productive forces so that production relations do not become an inhibitory factor for the development of the country. And an open policy is designed to include the PRC in the process of globalization of the economy and other spheres of life of the human community, actively attract foreign capital, use the achievements of science and technology, and managerial experience in order to ultimately increase China's global competitiveness.

Economic reform, according to Deng Xiaoping's theory, is impossible without the reform of the political system. The political-ideological superstructure is characterized in his theory as the dictatorship of the proletariat under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. The political life of the country is built in accordance with the "four basic principles" put forward by Deng Xiaoping (

Si Xiang Jiben Yuanze): follow the socialist path, adhere to the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the CPC and Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Mao Zedong, in order to ensure the main internal condition for the normal course of reform - political stability. No deviations from this line in the direction of political and ideological liberalization were allowed. Deng Xiaoping refused to borrow the Western model of democracy with the separation of the three branches of power and the struggle of parties for power, considering it unsuitable for Chinese conditions. The content of the reform of the political system consists in increasing the efficiency of the current system of representative bodies of power (assemblies of people's representatives, etc.), expanding their controlling functions and democratic principles in their activities, simplifying and reducing the administrative apparatus, a clear division of powers between party and administrative organs, between the center and the localities, etc. .

The implementation of Deng Xiaoping's course is inextricably linked with the transformation of China into a modern state of law, ruled on the basis of law, while maintaining the leadership status of the Communist Party and the existing system of people's congresses and multi-party cooperation under the leadership of the CPC in the PRC. During the years of reforms, a huge array of legislative acts has been developed, regulating all aspects of economic, state and public life.

Particular importance in the reform of the political system, and in general in the process of modernization, is given to the ruling party as a guarantor of ensuring socio-political stability, without which it is impossible to successfully pursue a course of modernization, therefore, the issues of party building, strengthening party discipline and strengthening internal party control are constantly in the focus of the CPC leadership.

In the process of developing China's modernization strategy, Deng Xiaoping revised the previous concept of the development of the modern world, which boiled down to the fact that it was based on world war and revolution. According to Deng Xiaoping's theory, the main trends that determine the state of modern international relations are development and peace, the preservation of which guarantees the successful modernization of the PRC. Of particular importance for the peoples of China and the USSR is the fact that the mutual overcoming of former ideological stereotypes and differences led to the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Finally, an integral part of Deng Xiaoping's modernization program is the completion of the process of unification of the country according to the formula "one

a state - two systems ”(_NM $ U - and guo liang zhi), providing for the preservation in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, after their reunification with the PRC, of ​​the capitalist system existing there.

Thus, on January 1, 1979, China and the United States officially established diplomatic relations. The United States recognized the PRC government as the sole legitimate government of China and Taiwan as an integral part of China. On June 1, 1997, a ceremony was held to transfer Hong Kong under the jurisdiction of the PRC. On December 20, 1999, the PRC government carried out the restoration of sovereignty over Macao.

When developing a program of socialist modernization, Deng Xiaoping did not have ready answers to the most difficult questions of its implementation in such a vast country as China. The development of this program was carried out by the method of "crossing the river, groping for stones"

Mozhe shitou go he). This slogan is used in China as a synonym for a cautious approach to solving economic problems. One of the main factors that predetermined the success of the Chinese reforms is the gradual, evolutionary nature of the reform process.

Deng Xiaoping embarked on a policy of modernizing China after the end of the destruction

a massive “cultural revolution” that led the country to such a dangerous situation when, in fact, it was necessary to solve the problem of saving the nation and the state. The most important feature of Deng Xiaoping's policy was that it was completely subordinated to the task of building up the total state power and improving the people's life. Hence - a balanced and responsible approach to the sequence, depth and pace of transformations, the desire to avoid radicalism in decision-making as much as possible.

Twice removed from his posts by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping never tried to undermine the authority of his predecessor. Carrying out reforms and building a strong state, he did not blacken the previous period in the history of the PRC, at the same time he noted and criticized the negative aspects of this period, contained both in the practice of socialist construction and in the ideas of other leaders.

The experience of twenty years of reforms showed that Deng Xiaoping managed to bring the country out of the state of political, socio-economic backwardness and ensure the beginning of its progressive development.

Deng Xiaoping carried out reforms in the most difficult initial conditions, but still managed to bring the country out of a state of backwardness onto the path of socialist modernization. Since the peasantry makes up the majority of the population of China, Deng Xiaoping began reforms, first of all, in the countryside, giving the peasants the freedom to dispose of the products of their labor. Communes and production cooperatives were dismantled, instead, a family contract was introduced in the countryside: land was transferred to the peasants for use (contract, lease) (usually for a period of 3-5 years); the peasants, after fulfilling their obligations to sell part of the grown crop to the state at fixed prices, had to make deductions in favor of the brigades, the peasant household had the right to dispose of the rest of the products at its discretion.

The transition to a family contract system led to an increase in efficiency and an increase in the pace of production, and the release of significant surplus rural labor. The policy of rigid isolation, blocking the possibility of migration to the cities, contributed to the concentration of surplus labor in the countryside. This actually marked the beginning of the formation of new directions of modernization, but outside the family contract system. The rapid growth of non-agricultural forms of production and economic activity, known in China as settlement-volost enterprises, testified to the new

the first stage of the social division of labor in the countryside.

Then, having stabilized the situation and created the basis for the formation of the market, in the mid-80s. launched a major reform in the city. He rejected the stereotypes of equalization and called for an opportunity at the first stage to achieve prosperity for some people and some regions in order to accelerate overall economic development, which would subsequently allow pulling up lagging regions, industries, etc. All the steps he took took place in constant opposition to those who remained on the positions of the previous model of socialism with the general nationalization of property and leveling, as well as those who demanded the rejection of socialism and borrowing the Western system of democracy.

An important factor that predetermined the success of Chinese reforms is the gradual, evolutionary nature of the reform process. Deng Xiaoping paid attention to the active study of the world experience of socio-economic development, having carefully studied the crisis situation in China, he identified a special socialist development path for China. Deng Xiaoping took a balanced and responsible approach to the sequence, depth and pace of reforms, believing that reforms should, first of all, be carried out in the interests of society.

An important feature of the modernization process is a strong state power. Deng Xiaoping saw the effectiveness of the reforms in political stability. The political system of one-party domination ensures, above all, stability in society.

Also an important feature of Deng Xiaoping's reform, which determined its success, were foreign policy openness and wide attraction of foreign investments. Special economic regions (SERs) oriented to the external market were created, as well as open economic zones in coastal areas, duty-free zones, and open coastal cities.

Deng Xiaoping began economic reform from the weakest sector of the economy - agriculture, his approach to the problem of choosing the path and means of development has always been comprehensive, he was based on taking into account the overall balance of interaction and mutual influence of all spheres of the country's life when making strategic decisions.

Another important feature of the Chinese reform is the rejection of a one-time all-encompassing price liberalization and rapid privatization of the state sector of the economy.

Also, the rather long existence of two economic systems - planned distribution and market - was one of the characteristic features of the reform. There was a gradual weakening of the monopoly position of the state sector in industry, conditions were created for relatively free access to the market for private and collective enterprises, as well as enterprises with the participation of foreign capital.

Deng Xiaoping in 1979 singled out two major features of China that determine the specifics of the Chinese type of modernization - the weakness of the economic basis and the large population. At the same time, he formed four main ideological and political principles: uphold the socialist path, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, Marxism-Leninism - the ideas of Mao Zedong.

At the 15th Congress of the CPC in 1997, a provision on the leadership role was included in the Party Charter

"theories of Deng Xiaoping" (- Deng Xiao-

ping lilun) at the initial stage of socialism. It is regarded as a new stage in the development of Marxism in China, the second theoretical achievement in China after the "ideas of Mao Zedong" (- Mao Zedong xixiang) and

scientific system for building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Under the conditions of a long-term reform of the entire economic life of the country on a market basis, it was impossible to avoid negative phenomena, such as the polarization of society, the gap in the level of development of the city and the countryside, and the increase in corruption against the backdrop of poverty. The conditions for these phenomena are constantly reproduced by the market environment itself and the country's openness to the outside world. Therefore, the preservation of socio-political stability largely depends on the political will, the ability and ability of the authorities to counteract negative phenomena, limiting their scope and degree of impact on the economy, society and state power itself, the ability to take into account and regulate the interests of new social strata and resolve emerging in connection with these contradictions.

In the theory of Deng Xiaoping, Chinese social scientists distinguish the doctrine of development, political ideology, economic philosophy and other aspects. The core of the doctrine of development is the conclusion about the socialist nature of the modernization of the PRC, the unity of politics and economics, which guarantees, in contrast to the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, a socialist

path of China. Deng Xiaoping reached a new level of understanding of socialism, the core of which is the liberation and development of productive forces, and the organization system is aimed at ridding society of exploitation, property polarization and achieving general welfare. The economic philosophy of Deng Xiaoping is based on an integrated approach to the problems of modernization, linking together production relations, the superstructure, the political system, culture, morality, the development of man himself, and so on. The most important merit of Deng Xiaoping is recognized as a philosophical understanding of the possibilities of "using a chance" to raise China's productive forces, which has been successfully implemented. The core of Deng Xiaoping 's political ideology is political stability as a guarantee of the success of modernization .

The reforms initiated and carried out under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and, on the whole, successfully continuing now, have already taken place. It was during this time that China made an unprecedented leap in the development of the economy and bringing Chinese society to the level of "average income" (FS - xiaokang), gaining a strong status as one of the strongest countries in the world economy.

The experience of the reforms carried out under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping is of great interest in Russia and in the world. It is based on the real successes of China, achieved in the shortest, by historical standards, terms and on the inevitable comparison of the Chinese experience of reforms with the reforms in the last years of the existence of the USSR and post-Soviet Russia.

Literature

1. Belov E. 20 years of economic reforms // Asia and Africa today. - No. 12. - S. 11-17.

2. Zotov V.D. Deng Xiaoping - reformer of Chinese socialism // Social and humanitarian knowledge. - 2007. - No. 2. - P.211-225.

3. China. - Beijing: Xinxing, 1999. - 288 p.

4. Mikheev V. Evolution of the socio-economic model of China's development // Society and Economics. - 2000. -№3-4. - P.148-188.

5. Smirnov D. Deng Xiaoping and the modernization of China // Problems of the Far East. - 2004. - No. 5. - S. 21-29.

6. Sizikova V.A. The policy of socialist modernization in China after 1978: chances and challenges // Social and humanitarian knowledge. - 2006. - No. 1. - S. 328-341.

7. Titarenko M.L. China on the path of modernization and reform. 1949-1999. - M.: Eastern literature, 1999. - 735 p.

Regzenova Dulma Bato-Ochirovna - Post-graduate student of the Department of Philosophy, specialty "Social Philosophy", Buryat State University. university.

Regzenova Dulma Bato-Ochirovna - post-graduate of department of philosophy, Buryat State University.

Deng Xiaoping is one of the prominent politicians of communist China. It was he who had to deal with the disastrous consequences of the policies of Mao Zedong and the "cultural revolution" carried out by the famous "gang of four" (these are his associates). For ten years (from 1966 to 1976) it became obvious that the country did not make the expected "great leap", therefore pragmatists came to replace the supporters of revolutionary methods. Deng Xiaoping, whose policy is marked by consistency and the desire to modernize China, to preserve its ideological foundations and originality, considered himself one of them. In this article, I would like to reveal the essence of the transformations carried out under the leadership of this person, as well as to understand their meaning and significance.

Rise to power

Deng Xiaoping overcame a thorny career path before becoming the unofficial leader of the CCP. Already by 1956, he was appointed to the post of Secretary General of the Central Committee. However, he was removed from his post after ten years of service in connection with the start of the "cultural revolution", which included a large-scale purge of both personnel and the population. Already after the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of his close associates, the pragmatists were rehabilitated, and already during the 3rd plenum of the eleventh convocation party, Deng Xiaoping's reforms in China began to be developed and implemented.

Policy Features

It is important to understand that in no case did he renounce socialism, only the methods of its construction changed, and a desire arose to give the political system in the country a uniqueness, Chinese specifics. By the way, Mao Zedong's personal mistakes and atrocities were not advertised - the blame fell mainly on the aforementioned "Gang of Four".

The well-known Chinese reforms of Deng Xiaoping were based on the implementation of the "policy of four modernizations": in industry, the army, agriculture and science. Its end result was to be the restoration and improvement of the country's economy. A specific feature of the course of this political leader was the willingness to contact the world, as a result of which foreign investors and businessmen began to show interest in the Celestial Empire. It was attractive that the country had a huge cheap labor force: the rural population prevailing there was ready to work for a minimum, but with maximum productivity, in order to feed their families. China also owned a rich resource base, so there was an immediate demand for state resources.

Agricultural sector

First of all, Deng Xiaoping needed to carry out reforms, because the support of the masses was vital for him to consolidate his figure in power. If under Mao Zedong the emphasis was on the development of heavy industry and the military-industrial complex, then the new leader, on the contrary, announced the conversion, the expansion of production in order to restore domestic demand in the country.

People's communes were also abolished, in which people were equal and did not have the opportunity to improve their situation. They were replaced by brigades and households - the so-called family contracts. The advantage of such forms of labor organization was that the new peasant collectives were allowed to keep surplus products, that is, the excess crop could be sold on the emerging market in China and make a profit from it. In addition, freedom was granted in setting prices for agricultural goods. As for the land that the peasants cultivated, it was leased to them, but over time it was declared their property.

Consequences of reforms in agriculture

These innovations contributed to a significant increase in the standard of living in the countryside. In addition, an impetus was given to the development of the market, and the authorities were convinced in practice that personal initiative and material incentives to work are much more productive than the plan. The results of the reforms proved this: in a few years, the amount of grain grown by peasants almost doubled; by 1990, China became the first in the procurement of meat and cotton;

End of international isolation

If we reveal the concept of "openness", it should be understood that Deng Xiaoping was against a sharp transition to active foreign trade. It was planned to smoothly build economic ties with the world, the gradual penetration of the market into the unchanging command and administrative economy of the country. Another feature was that all transformations were first tested in a small region, and if they were successful, they were already introduced at the national level.

So, for example, already in 1978-1979. in the coastal regions of Fujian and Guangdong, SEZs were opened - special economic zones, which are some markets for the sale of products by the local population, business ties were established with investors from abroad. They began to be called "capitalist islands", and their number grew rather slowly, despite the favorable state budget. It was the gradual formation of such zones when building foreign trade that did not allow China to lose the lion's share of raw materials, which could be instantly sold out for a very high price by Chinese standards. Nor was domestic production affected, risking being overwhelmed by imported and cheaper goods. Favorable ties with various countries led to the acquaintance and implementation of modern technologies, machines, factory equipment in production. Many Chinese went to study abroad to gain experience from Western colleagues. A certain economic exchange between China and other countries has taken shape, which satisfies the interests of both sides.

Changes in industry management

As you know, before Deng Xiaoping, whose economic reforms made China a powerful power, was chosen as the unofficial leader of the CPC of China, all enterprises were subject to a plan, strict control by the state. The new country recognized the inefficiency of such a system and expressed the need to update it. For this, a gradual method was proposed. Over time, it was supposed to abandon the planned approach and create a mixed type of management of the country's economy with the predominant participation of the state. As a result, in 1993 plans were reduced to a minimum, state control was reduced, and market relations were gaining momentum. Thus, a "two-track" system of managing the country's economy was formed, which is still in place in China to this day.

Affirmation of the diversity of forms of ownership

In implementing one reform after another to transform China, Deng Xiaoping faced the problem of ownership. The fact is that the change in the organization of housekeeping in the Chinese village allowed newly-made households to earn money, capital grew to start their own business. In addition, foreign businessmen also sought to open branches of their enterprises in China. These factors have led to the formation of collective, municipal, individual, foreign and other forms of ownership.

Interestingly, the authorities did not plan to introduce such diversity. The reason for its appearance lies in the personal initiative of the local population, which has its own savings, to open and expand independently created enterprises. People were not interested in privatizing state property, they wanted to run their own business from the very beginning. The reformers, seeing their potential, decided to formally secure the right of citizens to have private property, to conduct individual entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, foreign capital received the greatest support "from above": foreign investors were provided with a range of various benefits when opening their own business in territory A. As for state-owned enterprises, in order not to let them go bankrupt when such high competition appeared, the plan for them was maintained, but reduced from for years, and they were also guaranteed all sorts of tax deductions, subsidies, profitable loans.

Meaning

It is impossible to deny that Deng Xiaoping, together with like-minded people, did a great job of bringing the country out of a deep economic crisis. Thanks to their reforms, China has a significant weight in the global economy and, as a result, in politics. The country has developed a unique "concept of two-track economic development," competently combining command and control levers and elements of the market. The new communist leaders steadily continue the ideas of Deng Xiaoping. For example, now the state has put forward the goal of building a "society of average prosperity" by 2050 and eliminating inequality.

Since 1978, China has embarked on a policy of reform and opening up, one of the most important, majestic and eye-catching events since the 1970s. The 30 years of reform and opening up in China's modern history have become years in which the social productive forces have developed rapidly, the country's aggregate power has increased unprecedentedly, the people have received huge real benefits, China's international position has clearly improved, which has enabled China to make the transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy. economy, the transition from a large agricultural country to an industrial power. China's reform and opening up is guided by the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and has striking features.

First, the nature of the reforms respects self-improvement and development of the socialist system.

Reform and opening up are carried out in accordance with the basic realities of the country, characterized by the fact that China is and will be for a long time in the initial stage of socialism. This has two meanings: First, China has already established a socialist system, we must firmly adhere to this system and the socialist path; secondly, China is still in the initial stage of socialism, the socialist system is far from perfect, very immature, the strengthening and development of the socialist system will require the diligent and persistent struggle of several generations, more than ten or even several dozen generations of people.

Second, in the direction of reforms, adhere to market orientation.

In 1984, at the 3rd Plenum of the 12th CPC Central Committee, it was proposed that the socialist economy is a "planned commodity economy", which became the main definition of the nature of the socialist economy. In 1987, the 13th Congress of the CPC developed a new mechanism for the functioning of the economy - "the state regulates the market, the market guides enterprises." In 1992, the 14th Congress of the CPC clearly defined the goal of the reform: to create a socialist market economy system.

Thirdly, according to the model of the goals of the reform, the creation of a socialist market economy was chosen.

The socialist market economy is based on the main economic system in which public property plays a dominant role and the economy based on several forms of ownership develops together, this system, which has the basic characteristics of a market economy and firmly adheres to the socialist direction, is an organic fusion of socialism and market economy .
Fourth, according to the reform methods, adhere to the principle of from easy to difficult, gradually deepen, consistently promote.

Fifth, in the overall reform plan to adhere to a unified and comprehensive planning, establish a number of important relationships.

How should improve the relationship between rural reform and urban reform. Establish a relationship of interest regulation and mechanism innovation, institutional innovation. Establish relations between the reform of public property enterprises and the development of the non-public sector of the economy. Forge a relationship between internal reform and external openness. Forge a relationship between reform, development and stability.

Sixth, in the driving force of the reform, rely on the leadership of the party and government, respect the spirit of popular initiative, fully deploy the role of the theoretical circles.

Seventh, in assessing the measures, methods and results of the reform, firmly adhere to the criterion of the "three favored nations" (favoring the development of the productive forces of socialist society, favoring the growth of the total might of the socialist state and favoring the improvement of the living standards of the people).

Using the "three favored" criteria to evaluate the measures, methods and results of reforms is an important experience to overcome obstacles one by one, to achieve victory after victory in reform and opening up, and is the specific use of the principle of "practice is the only criterion to test truth".