February 15 is the anniversary of the end of withdrawal Soviet troops from Afghanistan. It was a major war lasting 10 years. On the eve of the date, the VOENTERNET search service has found data for you that will help refresh your memories of this dramatic war. This is what our information analyst Oleg Pavlov reports.
The official purpose of introducing a limited contingent of Soviet troops (OCSV) was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan; formally, the Soviet leadership thereby responded to repeated requests from the Afghan leadership. The decision to introduce it was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret resolution of the Central Committee.
Government forces participated in the Afghan Civil War Democratic Republic Afghanistan (DRA) and OKSV on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other. The Dushmans were supported during the conflict by US military experts, a number of European countries- NATO members, Pakistani intelligence services, other Islamic states.
On December 25, 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka Shindand Kandahar, Termez Kunduz Kabul, Khorog Faizabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar.
The Soviet contingent included: the command of the 40th Army with support and service units, four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments, four combat aviation regiments, three helicopter regiments, one pipeline brigade, a logistics brigade and some other units and institutions.
The military campaign of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is conventionally divided into four stages.
1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980 Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects.
2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.
3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986 The transition from active combat operations primarily to supporting the actions of Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of six Soviet regiments took place.
4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989 Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.
On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation in the DRA. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its troops at 9 month period, starting May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988.
On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.
Major military operations
Kunar operation (1985)
"Kunanar Operation" is a large-scale planned combined arms operation that took place in March - June 1985. Joint air-ground combat operation OKSVA forces and units of the Afghan army on a wide front with the involvement of significant forces and resources.
The command of OKSVA units and formations was carried out by the head of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense - Army General V.I. Varennikov
About 12 thousand military personnel participated on the Soviet side, the objectives of the operation were completed, the Mujahideen suffered significant losses - about 5 thousand.
Panjshir operations
Panjshir Gorge is a gorge in northern Afghanistan, 150 km north of Kabul.
The Panjshir River is one of the main tributaries of the Kabul River, which in turn is part of the Indus River basin. The center of Panjshir is the village of Rukha. The length of the valley is 115 km from east to west, area is 3526 km². The average height of the Panjshir Valley is 2217 m above sea level, and the highest mountains reach up to 6000 m. The population of the valley, according to the results of the Afghan census conducted in 1985, was 95,422 people who lived in 200 settlements. The gorge is inhabited by Afghan Tajiks. Basics natural wealth Panjshir gorges - emerald deposits. The main attraction is the mausoleum of Ahmad Shah Massoud.
During the 10 years of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, Soviet troops several times carried out large-scale military operations in the Panjeshr Gorge against the forces of the field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud.
Operation Trap
A large-scale planned combined arms operation in the Afghan-Iranian border zone on August 18-26, 1986 in the Kokari-Sharshari region, the Kuhe-Senge-Surakh ridges in the Sefid-Kuh mountain range - Safed Kokh - White Mountains. systems Paropamiz - Herat province. A joint air-ground combat operation of OKSVA forces, formations and units of the DRA army, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA - the 17th Infantry Division and the 5th Tank Brigade on a wide front with the involvement of significant forces and means.
The command of the OKSVA units was carried out by Army General V.I. Varennikov, head of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan.
The command of the Mujahideen forces is Ismail Khan.
"Marmol Operations"
A series of large-scale planned, joint and independent combined arms operations to capture fortified areas, fortification complexes and transshipment bases - “Agarsai”, “Bayramshah”, “Shorcha”, and eliminate the infrastructure of rebel bases. Blocking supply channels for weapons and ammunition, neutralizing members of the Mujahideen armed forces. A series of joint or independent ground and air-ground combat operations on a wide front involving significant forces and assets.
Formations of OKSVA - part of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division and KSAPO KGB of the USSR repeatedly carried out military operations of various scales in the specified area - the "Red Rocks" - Tangimarmol, Shadian and Tashkurgan gorges south of the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, Balkh province - the north of the Republic of Afghanistan. The most famous: 1980, 1981, 1982, March 1983, January-February 1984, September 1985, etc.
Operation "Highway"
The largest-scale planned combined arms operation of OKSVA in the Afghan-Pakistan border zone, Paktia province, southeast Afghanistan. A joint air-ground combat operation on a wide front involving significant forces and assets. Was held from November 23 to January 10, 1987-1988.
The main actions took place along the Gardez-Khost highway.
The command of the OKSVA troops was carried out by Army General V.I. Varennikov.
The forces of the Afghan Mujahideen were commanded by the famous field commander Jalaluddin Haqqani.
The reason for this operation was the actions of the Mujahideen to blockade the city of Khost.
In this region, in the fall of 1987, the Mujahideen planned to create a new Islamic state.
Losses throughout the war
According to updated data, the total Soviet Army in the war lost 14 thousand 427 people, KGB - 576 people, Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. More than 53 thousand people were wounded, shell-shocked, injured.
The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.
Follow the publications - memories of eyewitnesses and participants in the events, rare photographs, revelations are expected.
Afghan war...
Despite the fact that the attention of the world community is largely focused on other regional armed conflicts, the Afghan problem still remains one of the most acute in the world.
If you remember, at first the war was hushed up in the USSR, then it was portrayed as an operation of a “limited contingent” against individual gangs in a number of provinces of Afghanistan. The word “war” was avoided for a long time. When the “fulfillment of international duty” dragged on for years and turned into the longest war in the twentieth century for our country, they finally began to talk about the war, about its victims, about veterans and disabled people of the Afghan war.
History of bilateral relations.
The Soviet Union has exerted influence over Afghanistan since 1919. When the country achieved independence in 1919, after a long struggle against the British colonialists, it was Soviet Russia became the first state to recognize this political fact.
Despite its own difficult situation (conditions of civil war, intervention and devastation), Soviet Russia provided free Kabul with a million rubles in gold, 5,000 rifles and several aircraft.
Continuing to build relations with its eastern neighbor, in 1929 the Red Army helped Afghanistan eliminate the pro-British rebellion. By the way, it was then, and not in 1979, that the first entry of Soviet troops into the territory of this country took place.
In turn, Afghanistan repaid the Soviet Union with loyalty in key political issues: it helped eliminate the Basmachi movement in the 20s and 30s and, despite the games of German and British agents of influence, maintained strict neutrality during the Second World War.
The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee. The official purpose of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee used repeated requests from the leadership of Afghanistan as a formal basis.
On December 25, 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka-Shindand-Kandahar, Termez-Kunduz-Kabul, Khorog-Fayzabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar.
Soviet troops have been in the country since December 25, 1979; they acted on the side of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began. The operation was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from the country.
A limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) was directly involved in the flaring up in Afghanistan civil war, and became its active participant.
The Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in the Republic of Afghanistan, in the period 1979-1989, included the following units, formations and associations:
40th Combined Arms Army of the Turkestan Military District (Kabul, former residence of Amin);
34th Aviation Corps (later 40th Army Air Force);
USSR KGB troops;
Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs;
Airborne Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense;
Units and divisions of the GRU General Staff;
Office of the Chief Military Adviser.
The Soviet contingent of the Armed Forces included: the command of the 40th Army with support and maintenance units, four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments, four combat aviation regiments, three helicopter regiments, one pipeline brigade, one logistics brigade and some other units and institutions.
The armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) took part in the conflict on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other.
The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. During the conflict, the dushmans were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.
The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activity conditionally divided into four stages.
Stage 1: December 1979 - February 1980
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of protection of deployment points and various objects.
Stage 2: March 1980 - April 1985
Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.
3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986
The transition from active combat operations primarily to supporting the actions of Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.
Stage 4: January 1987 - February 1989
Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.
On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation in the DRA. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within a 9-month period, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.
According to updated data, in total in the war the Soviet Army lost 14 thousand 427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. More than 53 thousand people were injured and shell-shocked.
Of the 11,294 people discharged from the army due to wounds, mutilations and serious illnesses, 10,751 people became disabled. (95%), including:
1st group - 675 people, 2nd groups - 4,216 people. and 3 groups – 5,863 people.
If we take the losses of the Soviet Army only (irrecoverable - 14,427 people, sanitary - 466,425 people), then they were greatest in the second stage of combat activity (March 1980 - April 1985). Over 62 months they amounted to 49% total number all losses. In general, by stages of combat activity of troops, losses are presented here:
The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 670 thousand to 2 million people.
On February 15, 1989, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, according to the official version, became the last Soviet soldier to cross the border of the two countries across the Friendship Bridge. In reality, both Soviet soldiers who were captured by dushmans and border guard units who covered the withdrawal of troops and returned to the territory of the USSR only in the afternoon of February 15 remained on the territory of Afghanistan. The border troops of the KGB of the USSR carried out tasks to protect the Soviet-Afghan border in separate units on the territory of Afghanistan until April 1989.
FEBRUARY 15, 1989
February night, ice armor
There are headlights on the rocks, machine guns in the loopholes.
The column leaves from under fire.
We go to the border
Let's go to the border!
Water rumbles in the bed of a mountain river
And the darkness in the mountains sparkles like tracers
Today is the last push, guys!
The last push - and we are at the border.
Afghan! You are like a wound in the souls of soldiers.
I know that we will dream about you at night.
After all, there are obelisks along the roads here
To the very border, to the very border.
There are no miracles in this war.
Not all boys are destined to return.
They're watching us from heaven
They help us reach the border.
Let's go out and write to mothers: “Now
There’s no need to pray for us at night!”
God will help us and we will be without loss
Let's get to the border, let's get to the border
"Frontier!" the lead patrol reported
And the dusty faces became lighter
And the commander said quietly on air:
“Fighters! We will live! After all, we are on the border!”
Is this war really over?
And nothing will happen to us now
It’s not for nothing that you kept your stash, sergeant major.
Come on, get it - we're already at the border!
WE PERFORMED OUR SOLDIER'S DUTY WITH HONOR
The population of Afghan villages saw us off mostly in a friendly manner. In some settlements, people came out with flowers and waved welcomingly. Not a single shot was fired during the march. In places of possible ambushes and in populated areas, by agreement with the tribal authorities, elders boarded our combat vehicles and served as a kind of guarantors of the safety of our military personnel. We did not remain in debt to the population. Our well-lived towns with well-established infrastructure were handed over to them. Of particular value were artesian wells, which became sources of water supply for many villages.
Of course, for our soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers, returning to their homeland became a real holiday. In freshly washed uniforms, with hemmed collars, unfolded panels on which the names of the units were written, our soldiers looked spectacular when crossing the border. On the sides of the combat vehicles there were inscriptions: “I’m back, mom!” Sanitation points were deployed in all directions, everyone happily washed themselves after the journey, disinfected their uniforms, and put military equipment and weapons in order. The kitchens did not smoke. Almost along the entire border, the soldiers’ sense of smell was teased by the smell of delicious Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik pilaf. Both old and small border settlements met our soldiers. Leaders of the republics, border regions, internationalist soldiers and officers spoke at rallies dedicated to the exit from Afghanistan. Parents came from many regions of the USSR to meet their sons. They sincerely thanked the officers for returning home their mature boys. After a hearty lunch and dinner, the motorized maneuver groups took marching order and marched to pre-prepared base areas along the state border with Afghanistan.
By this time, we had already dived into “perestroika”, hot spots had already appeared inside the USSR, and some of the motorized maneuver and air assault groups were urgently transferred to other regions. There were fewer and fewer forces and resources left to guard and defend the Afghan border, which had an extremely negative impact in the course of subsequent events on the territory of Tajikistan. Means mass media began openly defaming the causes and consequences of our stay in Afghanistan, extremely negatively influencing the moral and psychological state of internationalist soldiers. I am still in correspondence with many of them. Many do not find their place in our bazaar market of profit and deception, but the absolute majority are confident that we fulfilled our soldier’s duty with honor and dignity.
February 15, 1989 At 10:00 local time, the last Soviet soldier crossed the border separating the Soviet Union and Afghanistan on a bridge over the Amu Darya River near the small Uzbek city of Termez. This soldier was Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who brought up the rear of the last column of the 40th Army, thereby symbolizing completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan after many years of bloody war.
Having crossed the invisible line - state border, the army commander paused and, turning towards Afghanistan, quietly but clearly uttered several phrases that do not fit on paper, and then told the correspondents: “There is not a single soldier of the 40th Army left behind me.” Thus ended the Afghan war, which began and lasted for more than 9 years. A war that claimed the lives of more than 14 thousand and maimed more than 53 thousand Soviet citizens and more than a million Afghans.
On February 7, 1980, a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee took place, where the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was considered. The Soviet leadership spoke negatively at the meeting regarding the withdrawal of troops.
In particular, D.F. Ustinov said: “I think that it will take a year, or even a year and a half, until the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, and before that we cannot even think about withdrawing troops, otherwise we can get into a lot of trouble.” L.I. Brezhnev: “I think that we even need to slightly increase the contingent of troops in Afghanistan.” A. A. Gromyko: “After some time, the troops will certainly be withdrawn from Afghanistan. It seems to me that we should think about what contractual obligations to establish between the parties after such a thing happens that it is possible to withdraw troops. We need to ensure complete security in Afghanistan.”
At the end of February 1980, again on the initiative of L. I. Brezhnev, the issue of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan was considered. It was believed that by overthrowing Kh. Amin and consolidating the new Afghan government of B. Karmal, they had completed their task.
But Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov and, possibly, A. A. Gromyko opposed the withdrawal of troops, so they did not do this. The decision was probably influenced by the sharp escalation of the situation in Kabul at the end of February: the Soviet embassy was shelled and several of our citizens were killed. Then government forces barely managed to disperse the crowds of thousands of fanatics.
In May 1981, the USSR Ambassador to the DRA F.A. Tabeev at a meeting of military advisers outlined official point views on the prospects for the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan: “It was assumed that in a short time, no more than a year, using the army as a deterrent force, without getting involved in fighting, let us create conditions for the establishment and strengthening of a new leadership and the development of a new stage of the revolution. And then, while the world public opinion If there is no time to react negatively, we will withdraw the troops. But a year has passed and it turned out that the Afghan leadership does not have its own military support to protect the country. Therefore, now, for the next two years, the task has been set to create an Afghan army that is combat-ready and loyal to the government.”
At the beginning of 1982, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, his deputy D. Cordovez and others took an active part in resolving the Afghan problem. 12 rounds of negotiations and 41 discussions were organized with the participation of Soviet, Afghan, American and Pakistani diplomats. As a result, a package of documents on the withdrawal of troops was prepared.
In Moscow, immediately after Yu. V. Andropov came to power, these proposals were responded positively.
May 19, 1982 Soviet ambassador in Pakistan officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and the DRA to set a deadline for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops. Yu. V. Andropov was ready to present an eight-month program for the withdrawal of troops. But during that period, the confrontation between the USSR and the USA intensified. Yu. V. Andropov passed away. D. Kardoves sent his project to Moscow and Washington, but received no response.
After K. U. Chernenko came to power, the negotiation process on Afghanistan was suspended, although the military more and more persistently raised the issue of troop withdrawal.
The negotiation process was resumed only in 1985 after the election of M. S. Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In October 1985, the Politburo was tasked with speeding up the resolution of the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. At the same time, the Afghan authorities were notified of our firm intention to withdraw their troops. B. Karmal commented on this decision: “If you leave now, next time you will have to bring in a million soldiers.”
In February 1986, at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, M. S. Gorbachev announced that a plan for the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops had been developed and would be implemented immediately after a political settlement. In May 1986, instead of B. Karmal, Najibullah (Najib) was elected to the post of General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee. B. Karmal went for “rest and treatment” in the USSR.
At a Politburo meeting on November 13, 1986, a large-scale task was set: to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan within two years (in 1987, withdraw half of the troops, and in 1988, the remaining 50%).
On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Geneva, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a series of documents designed to put an end to the bloodshed. The USSR and the USA acted as guarantors of the implementation of the agreements, according to which the USSR undertook to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within a nine-month period starting from May 15, 1988. During the first three months, it was planned to withdraw half of all troops.
Pakistan and the US should have stopped all interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The schedule for the withdrawal of troops on April 7, 1988 was signed by the Minister of Defense, Marshal D. T. Yazov. By this time, their number in Afghanistan was 100.3 thousand people. The withdrawal was planned to be carried out in parallel through two border points - Termez (Uzbekistan) and Kushka (Turkmenistan).
While carrying out the planned withdrawal of troops, the USSR continued to provide significant military assistance to Afghanistan. Afghan specialists were trained at an accelerated pace, and material reserves were created in key areas and at outposts. The 40th Army continued to participate in battles with the Mujahideen, striking militant bases with R-300 missiles and aircraft from the territory Soviet Union.
The closer the start of the second stage of troop withdrawal approached, the more concerned the Afghan leadership became. In September 1988, the President of Afghanistan Najibullah, in a conversation with generals V.I. Varennikov, head of the Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan, and B.V. Gromov,
commander of the 40th Army, attempted to delay Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The military command clearly opposed this proposal. However, this position of the Afghans was understood by some leaders of the USSR. Under their pressure, the troop withdrawal schedule was changed. The second phase of the withdrawal of troops from Kabul was supposed to begin in November 1988, but in accordance with the new directive of the Ministry of Defense, it did not begin until January 15, 1989.
But the matter did not stop there. In January 1989, President Najibullah, during meetings in Kabul with USSR Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze and
KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov persistently asked to leave 12 thousand volunteers from the 40th Army in Afghanistan to guard the international airport in Kabul and the strategic Kabul-Hairaton highway.
E. A. Shevardnadze gave instructions to prepare proposals for the Politburo Commission of the CPSU Central Committee on Afghanistan.
General V.I. Varennikov conveyed his negative answer, despite the fact that it was proposed to establish cash payments to volunteers - officers 5 thousand rubles, and soldiers 1 thousand rubles monthly. At the same time, the military emphasized that if a decision is made, then it is necessary to leave a group of at least 30 thousand people.
Before the final decision was made, V.I. Varennikov gave the order to suspend the withdrawal of troops, since otherwise the abandoned objects would then have to be recaptured with battles and losses.
The pause lasted 10 days, until January 27, 1989. And yet common sense prevailed. At a meeting of the Politburo Commission of the CPSU Central Committee on Afghanistan, it was decided not to leave troops, but to ensure their complete withdrawal within the established time frame.
On February 4, 1989, the last unit of the 40th Army left Kabul. In the capital, in addition to the Soviet embassy, only a small security force remained, the leadership of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the office of the chief military adviser, who already flew to their homeland on February 14.
February 15, 1989 Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent (OKSVA), Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. 
There is still a debate about the reasons that prompted the USSR to intervene in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and the advisability of this step. The only thing that needs no comment is the terrible price our country has paid. About a million Soviet soldiers and officers passed through the Afghan war, which claimed the lives of almost 15 thousand Soviet citizens and disabled tens of thousands, in addition to the deaths of countless Afghan rebels and civilians.
Winners or losers?
Disputes continue over the status of the Soviet military contingent that left Afghanistan in 1989—as a winner or a loser. However, no one calls the Soviet troops the winners of the Afghan War; opinions are divided as to whether the USSR lost or did not lose this war. According to one point of view, the Soviet troops cannot be considered defeated: firstly, they were never officially tasked with a complete military victory over the enemy and control over the main territory of the country. The goal was to relatively stabilize the situation, help strengthen the Afghan government, and prevent possible external intervention. According to supporters of this position, the Soviet troops coped with these tasks, moreover, without suffering a single significant defeat.
Opponents claim that in fact, the goal of complete military victory and control over Afghan territory was, but it could not be accomplished - guerrilla warfare tactics were used, in which final victory almost unattainable, and the main part of the territory has always been controlled by the Mujahideen. In addition, it was not possible to stabilize the position of the socialist Afghan government, which was eventually overthrown three years after the withdrawal of troops. At the same time, no one disputes that significant military losses and economic costs played a large role in the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. It was estimated that during the war the USSR annually spent 3.8 billion US dollars on Afghanistan (3 billion on the military campaign itself). The official losses of Soviet troops were 14,427 killed, more than 53 thousand wounded, more than 300 prisoners and missing. At the same time, there is an opinion that the real death toll is 26 thousand - the official reports did not take into account the wounded who died after being transported to the territory of the USSR.
Nevertheless, despite all the complexity, inconsistency and political assessment of these events, it should be noted that the Soviet military personnel, military advisers and specialists who were in the DRA were faithful to their military duty to the end and fulfilled it with dignity. Eternal glory to the heroes!
Exactly thirty years ago, the withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began.
The tasks of preventing an attack on the southern borders of the USSR and assisting the DRA government in the fight against illegal gangs were completed. Internationalist soldiers were returning to their homeland.
Back in December 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev, during a visit to the United States, stated that the political decision to withdraw Soviet troops had been made. Soon in Geneva, the delegations of the USSR, USA, Afghanistan and Pakistan sat down at the negotiating table with the aim of developing political decision Afghan problem. On April 14, 1988, five fundamental documents on the settlement of the political situation around Afghanistan were signed. According to these agreements, which came into force on May 15, 1988, Soviet troops were to leave Afghanistan, and the American and Pakistani authorities pledged to completely stop funding the Afghan rebels.
By mid-August 1988, half of the limited contingent of Soviet troops had been withdrawn. Western partners responded to this by increasing the supply of weapons to the Mujahideen, effectively violating the Geneva agreements.
On February 15, 1989, the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, was the last to cross the border separating the USSR and Afghanistan. “There is not a single soldier, officer or ensign behind me. This ended our nine-year stay there. I also want to say that we need to erect monuments to our soldiers who have lived through these nine years,” Boris Gromov told reporters, standing on the bridge over the Amu Darya River.
The Soviet army did not fight the Afghan people. Internationalist warriors fought US-sponsored terrorists and arms dealers. Specialists from the USSR built houses and infrastructure. Only 40% of the tasks performed by the army were related directly to military operations. In the 80s of the last century, our soldiers and officers became a barrier to the spread of drugs from Central Asia to the USSR and Europe. It is characteristic that after the withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, there was a colossal increase in the production of heroin and an increase in its exports. The situation deteriorated further with the start of the American military campaign in the region.
Former British Ambassador to the USSR Sir Rodric Braithwaite, in his book “Afghan,” gives the story of a former Mujahideen who fought against our soldiers. When asked by a diplomat whether Soviet soldiers were cruel to the local population, a resident of Herat replied: “Not at all. They were honest warriors, they fought with us face to face. But the Americans are afraid, they kill our children and wives with bombs from the sky.”
The Afghan war became the longest and largest-scale local conflict since the Great Patriotic War. More than 620 thousand military personnel served in Afghanistan. More than 15 thousand soldiers and officers died. 92 people were awarded the titles of Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero Russian Federation. During one of his meetings with Afghan veterans, Russian President Vladimir Putin said: “Everything was tested during the Afghan war - everything that a person is capable of, that he is able to withstand. Our “Afghans” know and remember this: they had to take a full cup of suffering, grief, despair, and difficulties.”
Last April, Vladimir Putin, at a meeting of the Council of Legislators of the Russian Federation in St. Petersburg, proposed holding commemorative events in 2019 to mark the 30th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. According to the Russian leader, it is necessary to evaluate those events. The President noted that specific proposals will be developed in the Kremlin administration and both houses of parliament. Earlier, representatives of veterans' organizations approached Vladimir Putin with the initiative to sum up the political outcome of the stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
