Operation Seidlitz combat maps. A defensive operation began near Hill-Zhirkovsky

Plan:

Introduction

1 Prerequisites 2 Planning of the operation 3 Countermeasures of the Red Army 4 Progress of the operation 5 Losses of the sides
5.1 Red Army 5.2 Wehrmacht
6 Results
6.1 Red Army 6.2 Wehrmacht

Notes
Literature

Introduction

Operation Seidlitz(German Unternehmen "Seydlitz"; July 2 - July 1, 1942) - the operation of the German troops to eliminate the Kholm-Zhirkovsky speech. As a result of the operation, the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps of the Red Army were surrounded and destroyed, and the total losses of the Soviet troops exceeded 61 thousand people.

In Soviet historical science, the battles of July 1942 at the Kholm-Zhirkovsky performance were known as Defensive operation in the Bely area or Kholm-Zhirkovska defensive operation.

1. Background

In early January 1942, the Red Army, using the forces of the Kalinin and Western fronts, launched an operation to eliminate the Rzhev-Vyazemsky group of German troops.

The underestimation of the forces of the Wehrmacht led to the fact that in the area of ​​​​the village of Kholm-Zhirkovsky, the 39th army of I. Maslennikov and the 11th cavalry corps were in a semi-encirclement. At the beginning of the summer of 1942, the troops of Maslennikov and Sokolov occupied an area of ​​5 thousand km 2. They were supplied through the Nelidovo region in the corridor between the German troops who held the cities of Olenino and Bely. At its narrowest point, the width of the corridor was 27-28 km.

The content of the Soviet troops in the ring required the allocation of significant forces of the 9th german army, since the command of the Army Group "Center" estimated the number of surrounded by 60 thousand people. In addition, Soviet troops were in close proximity to important communications: the highway and railway lines Smolensk - Vyazma and the railway line Rzhev - Sychevka. In the spring of 1942, the German command began preparations for the operation to clear the Kholm-Zhirkovsky uprising. The operation was codenamed Seidlitz.

2. Operation planning

Planning for the operation began in May 1942. The German offensive was to be led by the commander of the 9th Army, Major General Walter Model, but on May 23, during an air flight to the Belyi region, his plane was shot down by Soviet partisans. The model was taken to the hospital with a lung injury. Already in the Smolensk hospital, Model reported to the commander-in-chief of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Kluge, the preliminary plan of the operation. On June 2, 1942, the command of the 9th Army, further planning and conduct of the operation was entrusted to General tank troops Heinrich von Vietinghoff.

The 9th Army of von Vietinghoff included the 6th, 23rd, 27th and 41st Army Corps, as well as the Esebek Army Group and the Raus Army Group. Especially for the Seidlitz operation, the headquarters of the 9th Army formed a special-purpose cavalry brigade under the command of Colonel K. F. von der Meden

The operational plan for Operation Seydlitz was as follows: First, by attacking from the north of the western flank of the 23rd "corridor". Then squeeze the Soviet troops from the east, split them into separate parts, surround them and destroy them. The offensive from east to west, entrusted to the 27th Army Corps under the command of General Zorn, was to begin 2 days later than the western oncoming offensive. According to the plan of the headquarters of the 9th Army, this would make it possible to avoid a premature withdrawal of the Red Army units to the west and thereby make it difficult to deliver a counter strike.

From the north, from the Olenino region, General Schubert's 23rd Army Corps advanced in two groups. The western group included the 1st Panzer, 110th and 102nd Infantry Divisions, while the eastern group included the 5th Panzer Division and von der Meden's Cavalry Brigade. From the Bely region to the east, the offensive was launched by Yesebek's group as part of the 2nd Panzer and 246th Infantry Divisions. On all directions of the offensive, units of the Wehrmacht met active opposition from the Red Army, and in some areas German attacks were even repelled.

The German 1st Panzer Division found itself in a difficult situation. In the area of ​​​​the village of Starukhi, she came across Soviet do. To support the offensive in this area, the command of the 9th Army brought infantry and motorized divisions into battle.

By the end of the first day of the operation, the 2nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht was counterattacked. Flanking 30 Soviet tanks the Germans managed to recapture only on July 3 with the support of aviation.

The 5th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht also achieved minor successes. Its advance was hampered by anti-tank barriers and minefields.

Von der Meden's cavalry did quite well. Moving through the forest parallel to the 5th Panzer Division, it managed to reach the rear of the Soviet troops and break through the front.

In total, as of July 3, the course of the operation was characterized by the Wehrmacht command as "quite slow", and the success "single".

July 4 at 1-45 by the forces of the 46th tank corps, 86th and 328th Infantry and 20th Panzer Divisions began the second stage of the German operation - an offensive from east to west. On the right wing, they immediately managed to capture the village of robbery, where the headquarters of the 39th Army was located.

On July 5, 1942, at 11:00 a.m., the German 2nd Panzer Division captured the village of Pushkari from the south. At 16-20, from midnight, the 1st Panzer Division approached Pushkari - the ring closed. All units and formations of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps, as well as formations of the 41st (17th Guards Rifle, 135th Rifle Divisions, 21st Tank Brigade) and 22nd (355- a, parts of the 380th and 185th rifle divisions) armies. Attempts by Soviet troops with 12 tanks to the north of Bely and 20 to the west of Starukhi to restore the passage ended in failure.

The broad offensive of the German units, which began on July 2 to the west of Rzhev, was effectively supported by aviation units, and after breaking through the system of enemy positions in heavy forest battles, led to the encirclement and destruction of several rifle and cavalry divisions, as well as one tank brigade. In this 11-day battle, more than 30,000 prisoners of war were taken, 218 tanks, 591 guns, 1301 machine guns and mortars, as well as a large number of other weapons and military equipment of all kinds, were captured or destroyed. Enemy losses are serious. The number of prisoners of war and trophies continues to grow

Message from the Wehrmacht dated 01.01.01

On July 13, the High Command of the German Fascist Army broke out with yet another fraudulent lie? special message" about the next "encirclement" and "destruction" of Soviet troops ...

Between July 2 and 13, battles really took place in the area west of Rzhev ... During the fighting, our troops lost up to 7,000 killed and wounded and 5,000 missing, a significant part of which formed partisan detachments operating behind enemy lines, 80 tanks, 85 guns, 200 machine guns.

During the same period of fighting west of Rzhev, the Germans lost more than 10,000 soldiers and officers only killed, over 200 tanks, more than 70 guns, at least 250 machine guns and mortars, 30 armored vehicles and 50 aircraft ...

From the operational report of the Sovinformburo dated 01.01.01

On July 5, Maslennikov decided to withdraw troops from the Kholm-Zhirkovsky speech. In the evening of the same day, formations of the 39th Army left their positions and retreated with fighting, first to the Belaya River, and then to the Obshaya River. On the morning of July 6, units of the 11th Cavalry Corps moved to meet the 39th Army. Due to heavy rains, extremely poor road conditions, lack of fuel and tractors, a large number of heavy equipment and weapons had to be destroyed during the transition. On July 7, the main forces of the encircled Soviet troops met near the village of Yegorye. Here the German troops, reinforced by units removed from other sectors of the front, attacked the defensive positions of the Red Army, cut through the encircled and formed two boilers - "Southern" and "northern".

On July 9, in a large ("southern") cauldron, the main forces of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps subordinate to it on July 8 made several attempts to seize the crossing over the Obsha in order to get out of the encirclement near the village of Nesterov. The possibility of a breakthrough forced the Germans to pull up reserve units to the area of ​​the "southern" boiler. Already on July 10, units of the Wehrmacht captured the strip between the Belaya and?? Obshaya rivers and forced the Soviet troops to withdraw into the forests. Without food, medicines and ammunition, having lost radio contact with the command of the Kalinin Front, the surrounded Soviet army gradually lost its defense capability. On July 11, another organized attempt was made to break through the German ring, but it ended in vain. After that, the Wehrmacht troops began cleaning the boilers.

On July 12, 1942, the command of the 9th Army reported to the headquarters of Army Group Center on the successful completion of Operation Seidlitz. On July 13, an official message from the Wehrmacht appeared, which the next day was refuted by the Soviet Information Bureau with the wording "Fraud report of the Nazi command".

However, the organized resistance of the encircled did not end on 12 July. On July 17, a group of about 1,500 people gathered in the northern pocket under the leadership of the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, Major General. Approximately 8,000 Red Army men gathered in the southern pocket under the command of the headquarters of the 39th Army. On the night of July 18-19, the commander of the 39th Army was wounded by a U-2 plane and was evacuated to the rear, command was taken over by his deputy lieutenant general. On the night of July 21-22, with the support of the 22nd Army, Bogdanov managed to withdraw a group of 7362 people from the encirclement. He himself was seriously wounded and died on 24 limes at the hospital. On the line Biliy - Dukhovshchina in the smuga of the 41st army, the Radyansk partisans led more than 6,000 soldiers.

On June 23, 1942, there are still records from the combat journal of the Kalinin Front about the camp of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps. This day can be taken as the actual date of the completion of the Seydlitz operation.

5. Spend the parties

5.1. Red Army

Vtrati Kalininskogo front (linden 1942)

Army or Corps		Wounded	the appearance of obscurity	3 other reasons	Ill, evacuated in the hospital
22nd army
39th army
41st army
11th Cavalry Corps
In a pouch

5.2. Wehrmacht

Although there are no specific figures about the expenditure of German troops in the operation "Seydlitz", and the data of the Radinformburo are rather vague, the Russian historian, relying on the help of the participants in the silent marches from the side of the German side, blatantly on the significant losses of the Wehrmacht, especially in the armies.

6. Results

disc"> The Chervona Army has spent a viable foothold for offensive battles against the "Center" army group. Having used the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge, the radian command did not only change the reserves, but it was also a term to reinvigorate the whole row of military formations.

6.2. Wehrmacht

Army Group "Center" hastened the line of the front and wielded units for the other workers of the front. The Wehrmacht troops took control of the Smolensk-Olenino highway, which significantly reduced the supply of the 9th Army. Behind the German tributes, 226 tanks, 58 letaks, 763 artillery pieces, 1995 machine guns, as well as a large number of arrows were destroyed or buried.

Notes

1. Z 8 linden at the warehouse of the 39th army

2. ^ a B C Sovinformburo: operational summary for July 14, 1942 - www. victory. *****/war/sib/index. html (Russian)

3. ^ a b c d e f f defensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin Front in July 1942 (VIA, No. 8 (23)) - ***** / seydlitz. html

4. ^ a B C D Horst Grossman. Rzhev is the cornerstone of the Eastern Front. Summer battle between Rzhev and Bely "Seidlitz"-*****/grossman/g5.html

5. According to the entry in Halder's diary dated 01.01.01

7. The number of fighters who left the encirclement:

§ 135th rifle division - 1000

§ 17th Guards Rifle Division - 1759 (also 2 82mm mortars, 2 heavy and 8 light machine guns, 800 rifles, 2 anti-tank rifles, 3 PPSh, 60 revolvers)

§ Twenty-first tank brigade (without materiel - 43 tanks)

§ as well as individual fighters and units of the 24th cd, 46th cd, 357th, 355th and 262nd sd

Literature

Halder F. War diary. Daily records of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces - militera. *****/db/halder/index. html. - M.: Military publishing house, . (Rus.) defensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin Front in July 1942 - ***** / seydlitz. html. - Military Historical Archive No. 23. - S. 18-56. (Rus.) Grossman H. Rzhev - the cornerstone of the Eastern Front - *****/grossman/grossman. html. - Rzhev: "Rzhevskaya Pravda", 19s. - ISBN 2 (Rus.) A short course in the history of the Second World War. The offensive of Marshal Shaposhnikov - militera. *****/h/isaev_av4/index. html. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 20s. - ISBN -X (Rus.) Von Klaus Christian Richter Unternehmen "Seydlitz". Ein ungew? hnliches Beispiel milit? rischer Improvisation - www. freundeskreis-panzergrenadiere. de/pzgrenadier/artikel_heft_22_2.pdf. - Der Panzergrenadier 22/07. (German)

Operation "Seidlitz" July 2 - 23, 1942 (in the national historical science "Defensive operation near the city of Bely", "Defensive operation near Kholm-Zhirkovsky", Kholm-Zhirkovskaya defensive operation) - offensive 9th German Army of the Army Group "Center", part of the Rzhev battle. Seydlitz was the latest in a series of operations to eliminate penetrations formed as a result of the offensive of the Red Army in the winter of 1941-1942. The main goal of the operation was to defeat the 39th Army of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov and the 11th Cavalry Corps of Colonel S.V. Sokolov, who occupied the front in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area.

At 03:00 on July 2, 1942, after a short artillery and aviation preparation, the German offensive began with two strike groups: from the north, from the Olenino area, the 23rd Army Corps of Infantry General Albrecht Schubert advanced (2 tank divisions, 2 infantry divisions, cavalry brigade). A separate group of Ezebek (tank and infantry divisions) advanced from the south from the Bely region. In the first days of the operation, Soviet troops put up stubborn resistance, and only a deep detour along the forest roads of the German cavalry brigade with access to the rear of the defending troops allowed the enemy to succeed.

During Operation Seidlitz, the Soviet troops of the Kalinin Front suffered a major defeat. An important and profitable foothold in the depths of the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya enemy grouping was lost, which increased its stability in defense. The enemy restored traffic along the shortest roads from Smolensk to Olenino, significantly improving the supply of his 9th Army.

The losses in people and equipment were very great. However, on this issue, the few information of domestic and Western historians differ significantly from each other. So, A. V. Isaev cites the following data in his work: the total losses of the 22nd, 39th, 41st armies and the 11th cavalry corps amounted to 61,722 people, of which 4,386 were killed and 47,072 were missing . Among the dead were Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov, Major Generals P. S. Ivanov, A. D. Berezin, P. P. Miroshnichenko (Chief of Staff of the 39th Army), Brigadier Commissar Yusim (member of the Military Council of the 39th th army). The tank brigade lost all 43 tanks. All Katyushas were blown up. Similar data are given by S. A. Gerasimova.
According to German data, in total, up to 50,000 prisoners were captured during the operation, 230 tanks, 58 aircraft, 760 guns of all kinds were destroyed or captured.

According to official domestic data, the total losses in this operation were determined at 20360 people, of which irretrievable - at 7432 people, sanitary - at 12928 people ("Military History Journal" No. 2 for 1999, G. F. Krivosheev). Given the nature of the battle, these figures are considered clearly underestimated.

The losses of the German side are unknown and are not published even in the works of German historians. Of course, they are much less than the losses of the Soviet troops. But most likely, they were quite significant, and this did not allow the Army Group Center to take part in the summer offensive of the Wehrmacht in 1942. All units of the 9th German Army withdrawn to the reserve remained in the Rzhev ledge and were involved in the course of the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation.

In Soviet historical science, this unsuccessful operation was hardly mentioned or studied.

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The material was first published in #6 and #7 of the journal in 2016. The version of the essay given here about the actions of the 11th Cavalry Corps of Colonel Sokolov in January-April 1942 contains extended information compared to the version that was published in the journal. In particular, the diaries of Andrey Vysotin, political instructor of the corps veterinary hospital of the 24th KD, photographs and maps have been added.

Part 4. After March 23, 1942

last try

Parts of the 24th KD received the task on the night of March 23-24 to proceed to offensive operations in the Izyalovo-Leontyevo sector. Firmly defending the line of Makarovo, Nikulino, Ulyanovo, Trofimovo, mark 203.5, Kuleshovo, Yufanovo, the division was supposed to conduct an offensive battle for the capture of the village of Izyalovo with the development of success on Leontyevo and Serezhan. All attacks during the day on Izyalovo met with heavy machine-gun and mortar fire and were repulsed. The neighbor on the right - the 97th cavalry regiment of the 18th KD fought in the Kulikovo area for mastering the highway. On the left, the 2nd GMSD fought in the school area, 1 km northeast of Yakushkino. The weather was clear, which allowed German reconnaissance aircraft to fly over the areas where the divisions were located.

March 25, Thursday, the 11th cavalry corps, with the forces of the 18th cavalry division, entered the Minsk highway at the crossroads northeast of the village of Vysotskoye and secured itself at the occupied line; The 24th Cavalry Division advanced on Izyalovo, Leontievo; 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division in two detachments - on Yakushkino, Pletushovo. Leontievo that day was stormed by the 70th, 46th cavalry regiments and two squadrons of the 18th command post. In view of the deep snow, the squadrons reached the edge of the forest southwest of Leontievo by 0700, after which they advanced on the western and southwestern outskirts of the village. The enemy met the advancing units with strong machine-gun fire from Zheludkov, Serezhan, Leontiev, mortar and artillery fire from Serezhan. Moving forward was difficult. Digging into the snow, the squadrons stubbornly moved forward. It was possible to take Leontievo only on the second attempt, already in the evening at 21.15.

Leontievo, April 2016

Immediately after the capture of Leontiev, the units went over to a stubborn defense, fortifying themselves in dugouts and trenches dug in the snow. Snigiryov's squadron was given the task of cutting the route west of Zheludkovo, where he set out. The defense of Leontiev was personally led by the chief of staff of the 70th command post, Major Gulkov.

Very young local boys, who had recently joined the ranks of the 11th KK, took part in the attack on Leontievo, including Ivan Vladimirov from the village of Ulyanovo. From the memoirs of Ivan Vladimirovich Vladimirov:

“On March 25, we advanced on the village of Leontievo. In the afternoon we went to our starting positions at the edge of the forest. There was a German in Leontievo, and we were at the edge of the forest. The whole forest was occupied by ours. They took us to the starting line, and for a day we lay in the snow. It was March 25, and the snow was very deep. It got dark in the evening, we began to advance on the village. I was not the only one, there were hundreds of boys like me: in all their clothes, among real soldiers. We took the tree. True, a lot of ours were killed.

We took the village, and the Germans began to attack us at night. In fact, a German rarely fought at night. It was about two o'clock in the morning. From Zheludkovo and from Serezhan, where the church is now broken, he attacked us from two sides. The battle lasted two hours. The fight was terrible. We had both the wounded and the dead.

In every house in Leontievo there were bunk beds - the Germans built them. Man-sized trenches were dug through the village. I did not reach the top of the trench to shoot. The roofs of the huts in the village were thatched. The German set fire to three huts. What ignited, I don’t know, I didn’t understand then. I saw that some kind of fireball was flying, and the hut was on fire. As the huts caught fire, I see the Germans crawling into the village. They were already three hundred or four hundred meters away from us.

I crawled out of the trench under a tree. Our guys next to me were in the trench. One, I remember, was Pertsov, Novoduginsky - the same kid as me. I don't remember the other name. There were three of us in contact with the political instructor and the squadron commander. Maybe for half an hour I stayed under the tree. I fired from a rifle, something in my hand - “kick”. In battle, you don’t notice pain ... Look, my fingers of my left hand were beaten off! Explosive bullet probably hit. The guys shout to me: “We told you, don’t climb there! "".

After being wounded, Ivan Vladimirov first reached his native village of Ulyanovo, where a medical battalion was located right in his house, and then was sent to the rear through the city of Andriapol with other slightly wounded soldiers. Sergei Pertsov died on March 29 near the village of Ulyanovo (Ivan Vladimirovich made a mistake in his memoirs - he was not Novoduginsky, but from the village of Koshkino, Kholm-Zhirkovsky district). His name is among those reburied in mass grave No. 6 in the village of Alferovo. He was born in 1924.

On March 25, at 0300, reinforcements arrived in the 24th KD unit - 6 marching squadrons, with a total number of 650 people, who were distributed in parts. Replenishment was armed with rifles, well equipped, but poorly prepared. The command staff was fully staffed, but the command staff was young - after 6 months of school for the first time at the front.

Active fighting for mastering the highway at the turn of Golochelovo, Izyalovo, Khozhaevo, Serezhan, Kuleshovo, Yakushkino, Pletushovo, the next four days continued. During the night of March 26, the Germans made 4 attacks on Leontievo from Zheludkovo, Serezhan and Izyalovo. At 19.30, the German offensive began with forces of up to 500 people. The first attack was repulsed. Having regrouped forces and received new reinforcements, at 21.00, the enemy, with a total number of up to 700 people with machine guns and machine guns, launched a second attack on Leontievo, knocking out parts of the cavalry corps, which retreated to the southwest with a fight, taking up defense at the edge of the forest. The losses of the regiment amounted to 100 people killed and wounded (these data are not available in the Memorial OBD). At this time, the 18th CP was fighting to capture Izyalovo. Attacks were repulsed by machine-gun fire from the enemy, who did not let the attackers get closer than 150 meters to the outskirts of the village.

For the fighters of the 11th Cavalry Corps, the war has already become a familiar job. After the battle, the Red Army soldier Yeskin collected 3,000 incendiary cartridges and used them from captured machine guns on the enemy, while teaching other fighters how to handle them.

The communication between the regiments was telephone and worked flawlessly throughout the battles, despite the fact that the line was often torn from the explosion of mines and artillery shells. The merit in this was the telephone operators under the direct supervision of the chief of communications, Major Kolodezhnov and senior lieutenant Vdovenko.

Meanwhile, the squadron of Snigiryov Nikolai Ivanovich (now a senior lieutenant) was performing the task of blocking the Moscow-Minsk highway. For four days he held the Moscow-Minsk highway near the village of Zheludkovo. In front of the front of the 24th division on the highway there was an enemy up to a company with four tanks, in Zheludkovo - up to 700 people with mortars and cannons, Leontyevo and Izyalovo were defended by two enemy battalions. The tanks continuously cruised along the highway at the Yakushkino-Vysotskoye section and fired at the dug-in squadron of Snigirev with methodical fire, preventing the task of mining the route. Red Army soldier Kazakov shot down an enemy transport aircraft over the highway with an anti-tank rifle.

For the operation to successfully block the highway, Snigirev was again presented for an award by the commander of the 24th KD, Lieutenant Colonel Gagua, to the Order of Lenin, but the second Order of the Red Banner was approved.

"Squadron comrade. Snigirev was singled out in a separate group, on March 27, 1942 at 23.00 squadron commander comrade. Snigirev received the task of riding the Moscow-Minsk highway 28 kilometers west of the mountains. Vyazma, fortify on it and stop the movement of enemy vehicles along the highway. Using the darkness of the night, the squadron of senior lieutenant Snigirev, camouflaged, imperceptibly for the enemy bypassed vill. Zheludkovo along the western outskirts of the edge of the forest and by 9.00, having shot down the enemy's outposts, went out onto the highway, immediately began to dig trenches, without revealing himself. The next night, sappers, together with a group of scouts under the direct supervision of Comrade. Snigirev mined the track, at the same time repelling enemy attacks with heavy machine guns and anti-tank guns, covering the work of sappers. At dawn on March 29, 1942, the route was intercepted and traffic on it was interrupted. The enemy tried with all his might to restore movement and to throw the squadrons off the route. Snigirev. Tanks were launched up to an infantry battalion. Within four days, the squadron Comrade. Snigireva fought stubborn battles, repelling enemy attacks, holding the highway. Having lost hope of knocking the squadron off the road with blows, the enemy decided to bypass it from the rear and encircle it. On the night of March 31, 1942, having engulfed the squadron from the flanks, the enemy threw a group of 100 people with the task of outflanking and hitting the squadron from the rear. This maneuver was revealed by the scouts of Comrade. Snigirev, setting up an ambush and throwing out light machine gunners and submachine gunners to cut off the retreat of the enemy, comrade. Snigirev allowed the enemy to go around from the rear, close and destroyed 60 people with heavy machine gun fire, the rest began to retreat to Zheludkovo in a panic, but were met by light machine gunners and submachine gunners. Only a small part of this enemy group survived. Being in continuous battle, cut off from the rear, the squadron of comrade. Snigirev fulfilled the task with honor. On their hands in deep snow, the fighters transferred an anti-tank gun to the track, dismantling it into pieces. During the period of fighting, holding the highway for four days, a squadron of comrade. Snigireva destroyed 14 vehicles with infantry and military cargo, two passenger vehicles with officers, one armored vehicle on the highway, two tanks were hit by 45-mm anti-tank guns, and one enemy transport aircraft was shot down. Destroyed up to 200 German soldiers and officers. Trophies were captured: two mortars, two machine guns, up to 50 rifles, a large amount of ammunition, valuable documents and orders from the German headquarters were captured.

The actions of the Snigiryov detachment are described in detail in the combat log of the 24th KD. When two groups of Germans of 30 people each tried to cut off Snigiryov's detachment, they were completely destroyed by machine-gun and automatic fire of Snigiryov's fighters who bypassed them. It is written in the JBD:

“The platoon commander Kalinin Fyodor Makarovich always keeps machine gunners in the first place, he knows the machine gun well, teaches this art, his machine guns work flawlessly in battle in any frost, in any weather, and this time the machine gun did not let him down. Having cut off the escape route for the Germans, Comrade Kalinin himself lay down behind a machine gun and destroyed 45 Germans with fire from it, in the same battle Kazakov's team distinguished itself with anti-tank guns. Kazakov himself, a brave and skillful scout with a Red Army soldier Obukhov and three other Red Army soldiers, continued to actively operate on the highway, firing at point-blank range from anti-tank rifles at tanks and vehicles throwing up enemy infantry. In this operation, two trucks with enemy infantry and cargo were set on fire. Bogatkin, a Red Army soldier, distinguished himself in this battle by shooting 7 Germans at close range and capturing 2. Red Army soldier Mitrokhin, a brave scout, leading a group of sappers, mined the track under fire, placing 15 anti-tank mines, which cost a lot of work, since the track has a stone surface, they had to gouge it under enemy fire, without having an improvised tool. Despite all the difficulties, Mitrokhin honorably fulfilled combat mission. The PTO commander, Red Army soldier Yamygin, bravely acted with his own calculation: he carried a disassembled gun in deep snow, placing it near the highway, destroying vehicles with fire and repulsing enemy tank attacks. The fire of tanks and machine guns of the enemy fell on the anti-tank guns. Skillfully changing the OP, being under hurricane fire, the combat crew under the command of Yamygin did not stop firing. Anti-tank fire destroyed 5 vehicles and knocked out one enemy tank. Orderly - Red Army soldier Sovetnikov Nikolai Ivanovich for two days of fighting in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe route carried out 24 wounded from the battlefield, giving them first aid and sending them to the PPM. Acting under fire, risking his life, Sovetnikov saved the lives of wounded comrades. The cook of the squadron, Red Army soldier Denisenko, despite the age of 42, gave all his strength to feed the squadron with hot food. He delivered hot food uninterruptedly on time, carrying thermoses under enemy fire, crawling over open places.

At this time, the neighbor of the 24th KD on the right - the 97th KP of the 18th KD, was fighting with opponents in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe highway (in the Kulikovo area, at mark 18), and the neighbor on the left - units of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division - were fighting 1 km north of Yakushkino and repelled enemy counterattacks in the Pletushovo area.

The area, 1 km north of Yakushkino, where the 2nd SME of the 2nd GMSD went on the offensive against Yakushkino and Serezhan from the Vyazma River

According to the order of the corps headquarters, the 2nd GMSD was to capture Yakushkino and Pletushovo on March 24. Having taken their starting positions along the eastern bank of the Kitaika stream, by 12.00 they went on the offensive - the 2nd SME through the school on Yakushkino (on the map, the letters “SHK” marked the manor house on the Yershino estate, which belonged to the Mezentsov family before the revolution), and the 120th MSP - through a height of 242.3 on Pletushovo. The attackers were forced to stop at the edges of the groves, not having reached the goal, as they were met by strong machine-gun fire from the side of Serezhan (a German machine gun was installed on the bell tower of the Serezhan church), from the bushes southeast of Serezhan, from the school and from height 242.3. In addition, a group of enemy infantry advanced from Pletushovo and launched a counterattack.

Attempts to occupy Yakushkino and Pletushovo continued until March 28. The 2nd SME performed the task, having 40 people in its composition, and the 120th SME - 46 people. On March 26, 1942, the commander of the division, Chanchibadze, signed order No. OP / 07, in which he criticized the activities of the units of the 2nd GMSD, pointing out the indecisiveness of the actions of commanders of all degrees and the inept fight against tanks:

The battles that took place over the course of two days to seize the highway revealed a number of major shortcomings in the combat activities of the unit's units.

The following shortcomings:

1. Indecisiveness of actions of commanders of all degrees. Easy attitude to the implementation of combat orders of both senior commanders and their own.
2. The disorganization of the work of the headquarters (2 SMEs), the unsatisfactory management of the battle processes.
3. Poor reconnaissance of the enemy's fire system, exaggeration of his combat power, fear of fire (120 MSP).
4. Inability to block separate fortified centers. The desire to push, rather than destroy the enemy, as a result of which the latter leaves the blocked points with impunity (2 SMEs).
5. Poor organization of the destruction of firing points pr-ka. There is no direct escort of artillery, its direct fire is not used (120 MSP), hand grenades are not used at all (143 TP).
6. Fear of tanks, instead of a bold and organized use of means to combat them (anti-tank guns, anti-tank guns, anti-tank guns, anti-tank guns, bundles of grenades) - 2 SMEs. Anti-tank rifles are used to destroy manpower, which shows illiteracy in their use.
7. Instead of truthful information, which makes it possible to correctly navigate and respond flexibly to the course of hostilities - criminal lies, incorrect reports as a cover for their ignorance, inactivity and helplessness (especially 2 SMEs).

Chanchibadze believed that there were enough opportunities to complete the task assigned to the division, and she was obliged to complete it. His opinion about the inept and disorganized actions of the soldiers of the 2nd GMSD does not fit well with the description of their exploits in the award lists. To counter the numerical superiority of the enemy could only be personal courage. So, on March 26, when columns of Germans began to move along the highway, the gunner Razboynikov (2nd SME) pulled the cannon into an open position and began to shoot them with direct fire. The Germans opened heavy fire on his gun. 4 tanks, a mortar battery and several heavy and light machine guns took part in the suppression. Mines and shells exploded around Razboinikov's guns, showering the calculation with fragments, but he continued to work until he knocked out three cars and forced the rest of the column to turn back. The gunner Razboynikov Vasily Yegorovich had already distinguished himself in battles for the Moscow-Minsk highway. On March 4, an award sheet was signed on the presentation of Razboinikov to the Order of the Red Banner for disrupting the Nazi offensive by opening rapid fire from his anti-tank gun at an enemy tank and knocking it out.

Attention is drawn to the fact that the order of Chanchibadze No. OP / 07 is close in spirit and content to Konev's order of January 16, 1942, which was sent to the commander of the 29th Army, General Shvetsov. In particular, it stated:

All these shortcomings take place only because:

1. The commanders of the units and battalions themselves have not yet understood the great strategic importance of the task that we were ordered to solve and which we must solve. through thick and thin.
2. Ignoring the tremendous combat experience we gained during the 9 months of the war, as a result of all this, shameful trampling on the spot, having in front of him as an opponent rabble from various parts and connections, most of them are not organized and not trained.

I categorically demand from commanders, commissars and chiefs of staff and subunits serious attitude to carry out combat orders, to organize the battle and lead it to the end. To explain to the political apparatus of the units and to the entire command staff the special importance of the task we are performing and that this task is quite feasible for us.

From threats and exhortations, the political apparatus and the command staff switched to repressive actions. On March 27, near the village of Pletushovo, a deserter was sentenced to capital punishment and shot - a fighter of the 2nd SME, who left combat positions without an order. He was from the village of Bukhvalovo, Yartsevo District. Apparently, it was an encirclement, re-mobilized by the 11th Cavalry Corps. Finally, overcoming strong enemy fire resistance, on March 28, a detachment of the 120th SME managed to reach the line 250-300 meters north of Pletushovo and take the highway under strong control. On this day, over-ice water appeared on the Vyazma River, which meant that additional measures had to be taken to strengthen the ice in order to be able to transport people and materiel from strongholds in Kozulino and Artyomovo to the battlefields. The sappers of the 99th engineer battalion managed to mine a section of the highway on March 29. In the morning, the German cars following along the highway were blown up. Artillerymen fired on the highway, destroying vehicles and wagons with cargo, machine gunners shot the Germans following the wagons. But more could not be achieved.

As of March 30, a comparison was recorded in the combat log of the 2nd GMSD combat strength enemy and division. Against the three regiments of this division were seven regiments of the enemy. 512 soldiers of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division opposed 1280 Germans. At the same time, the German units had: 28 mortars, 1 jet mortar, 21 guns and 4 tanks. The 2nd GMSD had 17 mortars (there were no rocket launchers), 11 guns and not a single tank, but there were 5 anti-tank rifles.

On March 31, units of the 24th KD continued to firmly defend the occupied line, blocking the enemy in Izyalovo, Leontyevo from the north and northwest, in Zheludkovo from the northwest and west, in Khozhaevo from the east and northeast. Snigiryov's detachment kept the highway under fire, defending on the edge of the forest at elevation 234.8. On this day, the enemy moved to active operations. German artillery and mortars from 10.00 to 12.30 fired heavily at the battle formations of the corps. The artillery of the armored train fired intensively at Trofimovo, Ulyanovo and the edge of the forest at elevation 203.5, two aircraft from 10.30 to 11.30 fired at and bombed the 18th and 70th command posts. The neighbor on the right of the 97th command post was driven out by the enemy from Kulikovo and fought 0.5 km south of the intersection of the Kulikovo and Golochelovo roads. On April 1, the 97th Cavalry Regiment went over to the defense of the Ulyanovo-Ostashkovo line.

Ulyanovo and Trofimovo villages, April 2016

Restoration of the status quo by the Germans

In enemy tactics in battles in last days March, the desire for a deep coverage of the entire grouping of troops of the 11th cavalry corps began to be felt. From the end of January, the Germans tried by all means to push back parts of the 11th Cavalry Corps from the highway further north, but in winter conditions they were not able to launch an offensive along the entire sector of the front. Therefore, they were looking for weak spots in defense, groped for joints between parts of the hull. From the German side, the sequence of events looked like this:

“The Russian 1st Guards Cavalry Corps (Belov), after crossing the highway west of Yukhnov in late January, turned northwest and reached the Smolensk-Vyazma highway, about 50 kilometers west of Vyazma. There the corps acted hand in hand with the partisans and airborne troops(parts of the 1st and 8th airborne brigades), already entrenched in the area. He also established radio contact with Sokolov's cavalry corps, which broke through from the north of Rzhev and entrenched itself northwest of Vyazma. Their joint attack on Vyazma was organized. At this time, the German 4th Panzer Army began to systematically clear its communications zone. V Corps received this task on 6 February. For this purpose, several divisions (the 5th Panzer Division, the 3rd Motorized Division, and later the 106th Infantry Division, the 15th Infantry Division and units of the 23rd Infantry Division) were attached to V Corps. The Russian forces in the deep forested regions were gradually compressed into individual sacks by these German troops. The bags were of different sizes (some of them included 60 villages). The V Corps then tried to attack one bag after another and restore the status quo. Deep snowdrifts, which required every road to be cleared before even the tanks could move forward, were delayed by these measures and increased the difficulties involved. However, by the end of March the first big bag west of Vyazma had been cleared. Under this pressure, Belov's cavalry corps retreated south again and, apparently, tried to establish contact with the airborne corps.

March 31 - April 3, the Germans, having concentrated up to two infantry divisions and over a battalion of tanks, undertook an operation to encircle and destroy parts of the corps. In the area of ​​​​Zhukovka, Gorodishche, 150 vehicles with infantry and 30 enemy tanks were concentrated. In order to withdraw units of the 11th KK from under attack, the corps commander, Colonel Sokolov, ordered the abandonment of the occupied lines and the organization of a new defense center.

Parts of the 18th and 24th KD were withdrawing from the battle during April 1. Covering the exit from the battle of units of the 18th KD, the Red Army soldier Shalom distinguished himself. Seeing that a detachment of the 97th CP under the command of Lieutenant Prim was surrounded, the Red Army soldier of the 3rd squadron of the 18th CP Shalom, disguised, made his way close to the Germans and at point-blank range with machine gun fire suddenly fell into the back of the Germans' heads, who fled in panic, leaving killed and wounded. Part of Lieutenant Prim, meanwhile, actively pushed back the pressing enemy and left the encirclement. Comrade Prima returned to his unit with a note:

“To the commander of the 18th command post, the commander of the 3rd squadron, Lieutenant Shurupov. To present the Red Army soldier Shalom for the government award, I kissed him. He took me out of a difficult environment, saved the lives of more than 100 people, 6 heavy machine guns, 4 RP. I'm sorry I delayed him. Lieutenant 97 KP Prima. 1.4.42"

In the OBD "Memorial" it was not possible to find documents on the awarding of the Red Army soldier Shalom.

The Germans directed the main blow against the defense of the 211th command post, throwing here up to three battalions of full strength and 8 tanks. The 211th cavalry regiment had up to 250 active fighters in this sector, held back the enemy for three days, waging fierce battles. The squadron under the command of senior lieutenant Nikolai Yegorovich Zhukov repelled repeated attacks on the village of Voeykovo for 10 hours on March 31. The Germans managed to push back parts of the 82nd KD, which covered the left flank of the 2nd GMSD, and occupy Rozhnovo, Voeykovo, Naryshevo. On April 1, they launched an offensive from Voeikovo and Rozhnovo in the direction of Strukovo, Godunovo, captured Chizhovo. The garrison defending in Strukovo was completely killed. In addition, by the end of the day Leontievo was completely occupied by them.

On April 2, the Germans tried to capture Artyomovo from the direction of Proletarsky. Artyomovo was defended by a group of the 143rd tank regiment of 52 people, armed with 2 heavy machine guns, 8 light machine guns, 13 machine guns, 28 rifles. The attack was repulsed.

I.S.Konev

Simultaneously with the attack on Artyomovo, the Germans attacked Kostino from the direction of Lysovo. By 18.00 on April 2, they occupied Naryshevo, Fedorovka, Orlyanka, Bogoroditskoye, Martyukhi, Lepeshkino and continued to move to the north-west, crowding parts of the 82nd KD.

The 2nd GMSD, in accordance with the order of the corps commander, on the night of April 3, withdrew to the line of Mitino, Yamnovo, Stepankovo, Lopatkino. The left flank of the division remained in place in the area of ​​Kievo, Bukhonovo, Lomakino, serving as a barrier for the Germans, and was subjected to fierce attacks from them. Having completed their task, these garrisons also withdrew in an organized manner.

On the night of April 4 (Saturday), the 11th Cavalry Corps regrouped and took up defense in the areas of Barkovo, Staroe Selo, Zyablovo, Lavrovo, Barsuki, Khmelita, Pokhodino. The enemy, continuing to develop a decisive offensive, went to the front: Yufanovo, Chashchevka, Lomy and advanced along the Vyazma-Bely highway.

Finally, the higher command acknowledged the futility of attempts to cut the Moscow-Minsk highway. In the report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction, Colonel-General I.S. Konev noted that:

For two and a half months, the 11th Cavalry Corps has been conducting continuous fierce battles for mastering the highway, drawing on parts of three enemy divisions. Only in the last battles, the corps destroyed up to 3 thousand German soldiers and officers, 150 vehicles with cargo, and so on. However, all attempts by the corps to cut the freeway have been unsuccessful, and it works almost normally. In recent days, the Germans, having thrown up to one fresh division with tanks, with the support of powerful artillery and aviation, launched a decisive offensive from Vyazma, trying to cover the flanks of the corps and throw it back from the highway to the north.

The corps is in dire need of urgent replenishment of people, horse and material resources ... Food is provided intermittently. The horse stock is small and extremely depleted.

In order to preserve the cavalry corps and use it with the greatest benefit, I consider it expedient: a) to withdraw the cavalry corps to the border of the river. Dnieper, cut the highway at the Novo-Ivanovskoye, Gorodok section (60-64 km west of Vyazma) and take up defense in separate nodes on the western bank of the river. Dnieper to the mouth of the river. Vyazma (33 km north of the highway). To have the main forces of the corps in Vadino (62 km west of Vyazma) to organize raids to disrupt enemy communications; b) in the interests of the front, it is desirable to withdraw the cavalry corps to the line of Volochek, Andreevskoye (now Dneprovskoye, 28 km southwest of Sychevka) in order to connect with the right flank of the 39th Army and secure it.

April 4, Saturday, the 2nd SME fought a fierce battle in Zyablovo. And again, the artistic inspiration that visited on this day the officer who filled out the combat log of the 2nd GMSD, gives us the opportunity to clearly see the past:

“Having taken Zyablovo and the surrounding areas in a semicircle, the Germans launched an offensive with a force of 650-700 people with 12 tanks. Hurricane fire brought down the enemy on the 2nd battalion, which consisted of about 80 people in the ranks. Mines and shells dug up all the snow around, tanks fired from cannons and machine guns, moved to the village in iron formation, submachine gunners followed the tanks and fired, pouring lead on the positions of the battalion, light and heavy machine guns of the enemy worked continuously. In general, the Germans used everything to frighten the defenders, to deprive them of their will and resistance, but our people remained in their places, now faithful to the tradition of the guardsmen not to retreat. Tanks were encountered first. The anti-tank gunners worked calmly and distinctly... the fascist tank broke the bushes, throwing up clouds of snow dust, burst into firing positions... a shot, another, and the heavy colossus stops. The smoke is barely noticeable at first, then more and more escapes from under the blinds. Tank is on fire. Another shot. Mines are exploding all around. The fragments fall asleep to the calculations of the guns. Gunner wounded, castle wounded. The head of artillery Ivanenko appears at the gun. He loads and shoots himself. German tanks. Here is another one of them, clanging its caterpillars, bursting into artillery positions. Point-blank shot. The tank, helplessly rushing to the side, stops, but the rest of the tanks, met by the fire of our guns, come in from the flanks and rear. They are nearby and fall with all their weight on our guns. The iron clanks. Breaks min. Smoke from a burning tank. Over the battlefield becomes impenetrable. Our soldiers are still fighting ahead. They let the tanks through and cut off the infantry. Here at the machine gun is Junior Lieutenant Shutaev, he pressed the German chains to the ground with fire and shoots them calmly and methodically. Our machine gunners and shooters help him. The tanks, having defeated the artillery, felt safe, they break into the village, breaking everything in their path. The flanks of the German infantry close in, forming a ring around a handful of our fighters. Only at the last minute, having gathered into a fist, they break out of this ring and leave, carrying the wounded, to a new line of defense. The fight is over. It lasted 4 hours. After this, the regiment withdrew to Lavrovo.

Without God's help

Sunday 5 April was the feast of Easter. For the first time, the military commandant's office of Moscow allowed walking around the city all Easter night, although on ordinary days from 24.00 to 5.00 it was forbidden to walk around the city without special passes. Masses of believers went to worship. Up to 75 thousand people gathered in thirty functioning Moscow churches, and up to 85 thousand in 124 churches of the Moscow region. This day coincided with historical date the victory of Prince Alexander Nevsky over the German knights in the Battle of the Ice in 1242, which gave special solemnity to Easter Day.

Road from Serezhanskaya Church to Izyalovo, April 2016

While for Muscovites Easter 1942 acquired a special significance, for the former parishioners of the Serezhansky Church this day was full of grief and sadness. As soon as the Germans managed to push back parts of the cavalry corps from the highway and re-occupy the villages of Leontievo and Izyalovo (this was on February 11), they drove all the inhabitants out of their houses and drove them to the destroyed church. It was winter, it was cold, and there was a lot of snow.

Winter road to Serezhanskaya church from Izyalov and Leontiev

Women, children and the elderly were driven along the road to the church, and around were killed and wounded Red Army soldiers. The children walking past them under escort remembered terrible pictures for the rest of their lives: some of the wounded had pink blood from their mouths and throats, and someone waved his hand on the field, praying for help ... But there was nowhere for them to expect a miracle and salvation in this a place where the ringing of bells had long ceased. The inhabitants themselves did not know where and why the Germans were driving them. Feared the worst. Having driven to the church, the people were lined up in a row. Then they brought in a tank. Among those awaiting death was the wife of the headman of the village of Izyalovo, Nikolai Nikolaevich Kozlov, shot by the NKVD, with her six orphaned children. The youngest was 3 years old. She told the children: "Move closer to me, now they will shoot us all." The Germans hurried to pull off the felt boots from the eldest son of the headman (he was seventeen years old), obviously disdaining to remove things from the dead later and fearing that they would be spoiled with blood. He remained barefoot in the snow. The elder's wife took off a large scarf from her head, tore it up and twisted her son's legs.

Road to the Serezhanskaya Church, April 2016

How long the residents stayed like this is unknown. It is not known why the Germans let everyone go home. It can be assumed that there was no longer a need for a human shield, since the German troops were able to keep the highway behind them, then repulsing the 11th cavalry corps two kilometers deep from the highway beyond Izyalovo. Ulyanovo remained behind parts of the corps until March 29. The battles were very close, they bombed, artillery hit the village. In February, the Germans needed the inhabitants more alive in order to then clean the roads and remove the corpses. When everyone returned to their villages, they found that new guests had already settled in their houses - German soldiers who were hosting in search of food. From the furnaces, cast irons were taken out with horsemeat that had not yet cooled down, which was cooked for themselves by the cavalrymen of the 24th KD who had surrendered these positions. They say that those who do not want to feed their own army will feed someone else's. This thesis did not work in relation to the inhabitants of the Smolensk region. They had to feed both armies, and in turn.

For several years after its closure in 1938, the Serezhanskaya church met the day of Holy Easter lonely, without people and church hymns. But this year without faith was the most terrible - among the battlefield, littered with uncleaned corpses. Corps losses for the period from March 31 to April 5 in killed and wounded amounted to 2 thousand people.

Not becoming heroes

The famously launched large-scale operation was inexorably moving towards its denouement. In fact, already April 17 the operation undertaken by the Germans to defeat the group of Lieutenant General Efremov was completed, and the western grouping of the 33rd Army ceased to exist. The 11th Cavalry Corps at that time occupied the lines already much north of the Minsk highway. On the battlefields near the villages of Izyalovo, Ulyanovo, the corpses of his soldiers remained lying, while the Germans buried their dead immediately. From the story of Praskovya Nikolaevna Semenova (daughter of Nikolai Nikolaevich Kozlov, who was shot by the NKVD):

“The field near the village of Izyalovo was full of our beaten soldiers. The Germans built them from machine guns. Our partisans were advancing from the forest, and the Germans from our village of Izyalovo were shooting at them. Spring came, the stench went, the corpses began to decompose. They had to be buried. My elder brother cleaned up these corpses. There were trenches dug. They took skapysh - a tool that was used to remove manure, clung to the overcoat and dragged the corpses into the water, into the trenches. Later, we built this field on oxen: either a piece of the overcoat stretches out, or the belt catches on the harrow ... They were not reburied, so they remained in these ditches. When the corpses were removed, tablets were found there, bloody money (they were laundered later), notebooks with poems - there were young people ... Then it all burned down when the Germans burned our village. My father's brother even collected and kept posthumous medallions - tubes like that. He said that as soon as the war was over, he would write to his relatives. But everything burned down, nothing survived ... "

Approximately at the same time, the cleaning of corpses began in the fields near Bogoroditsky and Martyukhov, who had been lying there since October 1941. There were so many dead here that the cleaning took about a month.

But they didn't remove all of them. Already in December 1942, Viktor Filippovich Sergeev had a chance to spend the night in a barn on the banks of the Vyazma River. This shed was called Gruzdov's shed. Surname Sergeeva was among the seven young guys from the village of Azarovo, prepared to be sent to Germany. All of them were warned in time by a teacher who worked as an interpreter for the Germans. At night, she led them to the partisans across the Vyazma River in the direction of Kochetov, where units of the 11th Cavalry Corps had recently fought. Viktor Filippovich recalled:

“My legs were frostbitten. I had German boots - they have very tight insteps, my legs rubbed. I couldn't walk, my legs hurt. They left me in Gruzdovoy shed. There was harvested flax in the barn. The rest moved to Kochetovo, where the partisans were. I spent the night alone in the barn. I tossed and turned - it was cold, everything hurt and hurt me ... It turned out that there were two corpses under me - our soldiers were dead. And when the partisans came for me in the morning, they looked - and there were two corpses under the flax ... ".

What else do you need to know about war in order to understand: war is grief, horror, death, stench and human meanness?!

Among those killed on the battlefields, those who, at the cost of their lives, covered the retreat of the 11th Cavalry Corps in the first days of April, remained lying, allowing the rest to escape and retreat in a northwestern direction. Some of the fighters hardened in previous battles managed to hold back the advancing Germans for a while, and then catch up with their units, while others stayed here forever. Many, as follows from archival documents, were presented for government awards, including the title hero Soviet Union .

Award list of Senior Lieutenant Zhukov Nikolai Yegorovich on the nomination for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union

Documents on awarding this high rank were filled in for a senior lieutenant Nikolay Egorovich Zhukov(commander of the bullet squadron of the 211th command post of the 82nd KD, which held back the Germans near the village of Voeykovo for 10 hours), junior lieutenant Kirill Vasilyevich Feoktistov(commander of the 1st squadron of the 206th command post of the 82nd KD, which on April 3, as part of the regiment, for 3 hours held back the five times superior enemy forces near the village of Bukhonovo), senior sergeant Andrei Ivanovich Tomilov(platoon commander of the 3rd squadron of the 211th command post of the 82nd KD, who died near the village of Rozhnovo), senior sergeant Nikifor Ivanovich Tarasov(commander of the pulvzvoda of the 211th command post of the 82nd KD, who died on March 27 in a battle in the village of Vyrykino) and deputy. political instructor Petr Artyomovich Los(platoon commander of the 2nd squadron of the 135th command post of the 18th KD, who died on April 1 near the village of Prigolovki, holding back the offensive of a numerically superior enemy with a handful of fighters).

Award list of Junior Lieutenant Kirill Vasilyevich Feoktistov on the nomination for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union

Award sheet of senior sergeant Andrey Ivanovich Tomilov on the nomination for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union

Award list of senior sergeant Tarasov Nikifor Ivanovich on the nomination for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union

Award list of the deputy political officer Los Petr Artyomovich on the nomination for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, filled out on a German form (was awarded posthumously with the Order of the Red Banner)

For none of them, the application for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was granted. All award documents were revised by the command in August 1942, when the 11th Cavalry Corps had already been disbanded. Apparently, their heroic deeds in the memories of their comrades who owe them their lives have already faded against the background of what the corps soldiers had to endure in July 1942, when they were surrounded during the German operation Seidlitz. In addition, some of those presented for awards were captured by the Germans, such as Senior Lieutenant Zhukov, who ended up in Stalag IX A (he managed to survive until the end of the war).

Operation Seidlitz

The 11th Cavalry Corps, fighting in a semi-encirclement, continued fighting behind enemy lines until July 1942, holding a ledge, which is sometimes called Kholm-Zhirkovsky. Communication with the front, replenishment and ammunition were delivered to them through the “corridor” between the cities of Nelidovo and Bely (it was through this “corridor” that Ivan Vladimirov, after being wounded near the village of Leontievo, went to the city of Andriapol with other lightly wounded soldiers). In this area north of Kholm-Zhirkovsky at the junction of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions there were huge swampy dense forests, swamps, peat bogs, many rivers and streams.

The beginning of the end of the 11th Cavalry Corps was marked by the active development by the German command of a large-scale operation, called "Seidlitz". Its goal was to eliminate the penetrations formed as a result of the winter offensive of the Red Army. In May, when units of the 11th Cavalry Corps were still fighting in the area of ​​Kholm-Suminsky, Khanyutin and Ordylev, thorough preparations for the operation were already underway. It was directed against the troops of the 39th Army, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov and the 11th Cavalry Corps S.V. Sokolov.

Early in the morning of July 2, 1942, German troops launched an offensive in the narrowest part of the "corridor" - between Bely and Olenino. For the commander of the Kalinin Front, Colonel General Ivan Stepanovich Konev, the German offensive was not a surprise. It is known that Maslennikov, the commander of the 39th Army, told him, as it was supposed to be said to the commander: “I am preparing to fight in the most unfavorable situation, that is, to fight in encirclement without the right to withdraw the army. For this, only ammunition and food are needed. But it was precisely with ammunition and food that Konev was unable to provide either the now encircled troops or the 11th Cavalry Corps, which had previously fought for the Moscow-Minsk highway. And history repeated itself: the troops again found themselves in a "cauldron", although not as large-scale as in October 1941, when Western Front under the command of Zhukov and Konev, he suffered one of the worst defeats in the entire war in the Vyazemsky disaster. Then the losses of the troops of the front only by those who were taken prisoner amounted to 673 thousand people. And since the ranks of the 11th Cavalry Corps were replenished at the expense of the surviving encirclement from the "Vyazemsky boiler", the same people had to visit both "boilers" created under the command of Konev. Among them were the teacher of the Golochelovskaya school, Pavel Mikhailovich Erastov, and the cook, a native of the village of Yakushkino, Fedor Yakovlevich Semyonov. Both survived, but their fates were different.

P.S. Ivanov

The German offensive began on July 2, and on July 12 an official message from the German command followed that several Russian rifle and cavalry divisions had been surrounded and destroyed, over 30,000 prisoners of war had been taken, and a large amount of military equipment of all kinds had been captured or destroyed. After heavy rains, the dirt roads along which the troops made their way from the encirclement became limp, the weak Soviet military transport aviation was not able to organize an effective supply by air. Surrounded quickly left without ammunition and food. However, organized attempts to break through still continued. By July 17, a group of about 1,500 people gathered under the leadership of the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, Major General P.S. Ivanova. There is evidence that he died on July 21 on the battlefield and was buried by the Germans with military honors. Lightly wounded commander of the 39th Army, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov flew out on the night of 18/19 July in one of the nine U-2 planes that had landed in the "cauldron" to take command. As early as July 5, Maslennikov, contrary to his initial determination to fight "encircled without the right to withdraw the army," made a hopelessly belated decision to withdraw troops from the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge, but after the start of the "Seidlitz" it could no longer change anything in the fate of those who were surrounded, as well as in October 1941 near Vyazma.

In early August 1942, the 11th Cavalry Corps was disbanded.

Such different fates

Semyonov Fedor Yakovlevich

The cook of the 97th cavalry regiment of the 18th cavalry division failed to get out of the next encirclement Fedor Yakovlevich Semyonov . He was a prisoner in Germany until April 1945. It is not known what trials fell on him before and after his release from German captivity. Ultimately, he ended up in Sverdlovsk region, where he started a family and worked as a foreman of a dairy factory. It can be assumed that Fyodor Yakovlevich acquired the specialty of a dairy plant master while working before the war at a dairy plant opened in the former premises of the Serezhansky Church. Fedor Yakovlevich avoided the topic of war all his life, did not tell his children anything about being in captivity, never returned to his homeland in Yakushkino and Staroe Selo, did not communicate with relatives. Only the military ID kept by his grandchildren is a documentary evidence of that period of his life.

Former teacher of chemistry at the Golochelovskaya school Pavel Mikhailovich Erastov , apparently, also avoided memories of the period of service in the 11th Cavalry Corps, where he was accepted as a former encirclement and employee of the German commandant's office. And, as is clear from the documents, the special department of the NKVD of the 11th Cavalry Corps performed its duties with particular zeal. How he managed to get out of the next environment remains unknown. Since 1944, Erastov served as the head of intelligence of the 3rd division of the 57th artillery regiment of the 95th rifle Verkhnedneprovskaya Red Banner Order of Suvorov division, which was part of the 49th army. On January 14, 1945, on the second day of the start of the East Prussian operation, in which the 49th Army participated, he was seriously wounded. Since 1945, Pavel Mikhailovich worked as a chemistry teacher at Moscow school No. 212 (now a department of Gymnasium No. 1576), and in the 1950s. became the director of this school.

Award sheets of Anatoly Yakovlev from Golochelovo

They did not die, but continued to take revenge on the Germans until the end of the war as part of the active army, two students of Pavel Mikhailovich, who voluntarily joined the ranks of the 11th cavalry corps and became real soldiers: a native of the village of Ulyanovo Ivan Vladimirov and Anatoly Yakovlev from the village of Golochelovo. Both were promoted: Yakovlev became a junior sergeant, and Vladimirov became a senior sergeant. The combat path of Anatoly Yakovlev remained connected with the cavalrymen until the end of the war - he finished it as part of the 8th Guards Cavalry Division in Slovakia, acting as commander of the intelligence section of the 16th Separate Guards Air Defense Division. He fought boldly and decisively, for which he was awarded more than once, including the Order of the Red Star. Ivan Vladimirov, after being wounded, returned to the front near Sychevka, became a mortar operator - the commander of a mortar crew, then his part was transferred near Kharkov. Here he was again wounded, as a result of which he almost died and, in an unconscious state, again ended up in the territory occupied by the Germans. Vladimirov managed to return to the unit, fought for Kyiv, crossed the Dniester, passed through Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, reached Lake Balaton. Finished the war in the Romanian city of Cluj at a school for officers.

Once surrounded, he went missing on July 7, 1942, assistant chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 24th KD senior lieutenant Vladimir Nikolaevich Nochevkin , who kept a combat log of the 24th KD. Political instructor of the 24th KD Andrey Vysotin managed to get out of the way. From his diary entries, which he continued to keep, making his way to his own, one can understand the difficult situation in which the encircled units found themselves:

June 29. Intelligence reports a large concentration of Nazis. Skirmishes began. The Nazis are trying to encircle us. An order has been received - to withdraw in an organized manner.

3 July. Head of the political department comrade Premilov sent me to the 70th Cavalry Regiment, which was tasked with covering the retreat of the cavalry corps. We made a small throw (20 km) and took up defense near the village of Stepankovo. We are fighting. Artillery is doing well.

4th of July. Enemy advance has been halted. All attacks are repulsed, the village is in our hands. I walk through the units that have taken up defensive positions in hastily dug trenches. In moments of calm, I talk with the fighters. Arranging delivery of ammunition.

5'th of July. An order was received to withdraw to the village of Krapivnoe, where to take up defense. The regiment is removed by squadron, retreats. The enemy fires from artillery, bombs from aircraft. But the losses are minor. The headquarters of the regiment stopped in the village of Yegorye. Received a message: Krapivnoye is occupied by the enemy. The passage is closed. We are surrounded. Conducted a meeting with the staff. They took up an all-round defense. We work in divisions. The mood of the people is good.

July 6th We hold the defense in the area of ​​three villages. Enemy aircraft hangs in the air, bombing, firing machine guns. Artillery and mortars fire. Tanks appeared. We unravel the plan of the Nazis: they want to cut us off from the forest. Artillerymen entered into single combat with enemy tanks. We organize a trip to the forest. Saved all material. Great merit in this worker of the headquarters of the regiment senior lieutenant Troinikov.

July 7th In the forest they took up a circular defense. Scouts distinguished themselves. Sergeant Nochevkin, leading a group of fighters, destroyed an enemy anti-aircraft battery. Fascist submachine gunners are combing the forest. We are fighting.

July 8. At night they tried to break through the road Bely - Nelidovo.The Nazis met with heavy fire. I had to go into the forest.

July 9th We are standing in the forest. We bring the regiment in order. Some offer to stay in the rear, switch to partisan methods of struggle. We have conversations in departments.

10 July. Out of stock products. We have to kill horses for meat. The Nazis are shelling the forest. We are fighting machine gunners.

July 11th. I organize an amateur concert. I sing "Letter to Moscow" with the guitar. Captain Saprykin sings ditties. The great thing is the song. The mood of the fighters is fighting.

July, 12. The whole day they fought with submachine gunners who tried to squeeze the ring. They fire mines. We have losses. I met a school friend from Krasnoyarsk Sasha Gupalov. He is a pilot. Came for a wounded general.

July 13. There is no connection. The regiment commander decided to leave the encirclement in groups.

the 14 th of July. A group of 18 people formed around me, including two commanders - Senior Lieutenant Shevchenko, wounded in the arm, and veterinary assistant Kattyubeev, a countryman, served together in the veterinary hospital. We go deeper into the forest. How disgusting horse meat without salt: grass and grass.

July 15. The deputy commander of the regiment, Captain Bagryantsev, joined our group. He says that Commissar Stankevich died.

July 16. The Nazis surrounded the entire forest. We decide to seep into another forest, which is obviously not blocked. Damp, mosquitoes, midges. You can’t make a fire, there’s water in your boots. Violent pains in the abdomen: horsemeat makes itself felt without bread and salt. We are moving east.

July 17th. They went through the night. In the morning we went to a country road. The Nazis are wandering, cars are coming. You won’t cross during the day, we are waiting for the night. We are lying with Kattyubeev, watching the Nazis.

18 July. They crossed the road at night. We don't see enemy submachine gunners. People are getting weaker. Mugs of blueberries and strawberries fall - pasture. He climbed a pine tree and looked around. I am weak too. He lost weight, as after typhus. Anosov feels very bad. Such a hefty guy and weakened.

July 19. We are moving in the direction of the Bely - Rzhev highway. Surroundings go along the way with us and towards us. Information about the exit routes is contradictory. Fighting is heard in the west.

July 20. The rumble of cars is heard ahead, obviously, we are approaching the highway. I'm sending Brichkin for reconnaissance. A stream fell. Everyone washed up. The meat spoils. Light a fire, roast it.

21 July. If only to stumble upon the partisans. It's a shame, someone is fighting, and we ... We went to the highway. A continuous stream of German vehicles and tanks towards Bely. With the onset of darkness, they crossed the highway.

22 July. They killed the last horse. We shared the meat with a group of foot soldiers. They walked towards us. They say that there is a large concentration of Nazis along our route. Where are they not? Anosov is completely weak, he cannot walk. Vetfeldsher Kattyubeev decided to take the fighter to the nearest village free from the Germans: do not leave the guy in the forest. We can't carry it on our hands.

23 July. They came out of the surrounded forest. We crossed the river Luchesu, crossed an open field. We went deep into another forest area, along which we were supposed to get to our own. We cook meat. Getting ready for a responsible transition. But ahead are two highways and the Bereza River.

July 24th. We crossed the Bely - Olenino highway. Huge grass. Dew. Soaked to the skin. Drying off.

July 25th. The meat is running out. Mushrooms, berries, sorrel fall. We passed a clearing where the enemy camp was set up. Fresh tracks. Ahead is some road guarded by the enemy. We've been noticed. They fired. They got into the swamp. We spent the day up to our necks in a quagmire. The Nazis combed the forest, but they did not find us.

26 July. We went to the edge of the forest. The village is visible. Met a woman. She was carrying bread from somewhere. Hungry guys eagerly looked at the bag. Everyone would have enough for a small piece ...

We stumbled upon three soldiers lying under a pine tree. They can't walk, they're completely weak. They would rather die of starvation than surrender...

July 27th. Hard day. At night they left the forest. When dawn broke, we saw that we were in a small peg. Around the open area, German speech is heard. Lie down, ready for battle. We will not give our lives away. Mines and shells are exploding not far from us, machine-gun and automatic shots are heard. Apparently, ours are close. No matter how they cover their own with a spark. At dusk they got out of the ring.

July 28th. The meat is all eaten, we eat nothing the second day. They lay down on the road. We study the movement of the Germans. Two people came to us - the commander and the fighter. They reported that at the Bereza River - ours. The commander is coughing. This is dangerous: the Nazis are always nearby, they can discover ...

July 29. We went deep into the forest. Gathered some mushrooms, caught a hedgehog. We cooked mushrooms with a hedgehog in a pot. A piece of hedgehog meat resembles pork fat. It's disgusting without salt, but you need to eat. I'm going to explore. Scouted for 500-1000 meters, I'm coming back for the guys. All wet. Legs and arms are cramping. And the guys ask: “You know how to walk through the forest, you move like a cat, you don’t hear the crunch of knots. Move on, there's not much left."

July 30th. All day they poked in all directions, around the Nazis. In the evening they went to the German battery. I had to fight. Several fascists were destroyed, the rest fled. Well, now they'll pinch us. No matter what, you have to break through!

July 31st. At night, they crawled over the road and the forest blockage. Apparently, the line of defense. Russian speech is heard. Our defense or prisoners?

Individuals and subunits of the 24th Cavalry Division made their way out of the encirclement and out of the cauldron. Among those who left the encirclement was the commander of the 24th cavalry division, lieutenant colonel, and then Colonel Vasily Georgievich Gagua . He died at the very end of the war: he reached Czechoslovakia, commanding the 9th Guards Cavalry Division, was wounded on April 19, 1945 and died the next day in the hospital. He was buried in the city of Nitra in Slovakia on the town square.

S.V.Sokolov

Commander of the 11th Cavalry Corps Colonel Sokolov managed to break through to join his troops in the area of ​​​​the city of Nelidovo, for which he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and received the rank of major general. He finished the war in Czechoslovakia with the rank of lieutenant general, then continued to serve in the army, retiring in 1959. He wrote memoirs, but they were not published.

Iosif Grigorievich Factor , the author of memoirs of a five-month raid on the deep rear of the enemy of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, General Belov, ended the war in Berlin. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner and many medals. His chief, the commander of the 41st Cavalry Division, Colonel Mikhail Iosifovich Glinsky, together with Factor, safely left the raid for his own, then successfully led the cavalry units until the end of the war, had many awards, including the Order of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner and the Order Suvorov II degree. He died in 1991 in Moscow.

Junior Lieutenant Snigirev also remained in service until the end of the war. In January 1945, with the rank of major, he commanded a regiment in the battles for the Polish cities of Krakow and Wieliczka. In the year of the 40th anniversary of the Victory, he was awarded the Order Patriotic War I degree.

Monument on the grave of P. G. Chanchibadze at the Novodevichy cemetery

Colonel Porfiry Georgievich Chanchibadze continued to command the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division, which, before the start of the battle for Rzhev on July 25, 1942, was part of the 30th Army of the Kalinin Front. Unsuccessfully storming the village of Galakhovo (apparently, in the same way as earlier the village of Pletushovo), it suffered huge losses, almost ceasing to exist. In the last days of August and early September, she fought for Rzhev, in October she was assigned to resupply. Chanchibadze served until the end of the war, received the rank of lieutenant general, commanded the army during the assault on Königsberg. In April 1945, Lieutenant General Porfiry Georgievich Chanchibadze was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for his skillful command and control of the enemy during the defeat of the Zemland grouping of the enemy. On June 24, 1945, Lieutenant General Chanchibadze participated in the Victory Parade in Moscow. He died in 1950 and was buried at the Novodevichy Cemetery.

Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is always an orphan. It just so happened that the area to the east and north of the Serezhansky Church became the scene of two major defeats for the Red Army in the first and most tragic year of the war. First, it ended up on the retreat path of the armies that ended up in the Vyazemsky Cauldron in October 1941, and then grandiosely conceived, but unsuccessful battles for the Moscow-Minsk highway unfolded here. The desire to overpower and defeat the enemy "by all means" was very great. But it was not the efforts that were evaluated, but the result. The commanders of the units that fought for the highway, who lived to see the victory and became generals, did not take active steps to ensure that the fighting in January-April 1942 of the 11th Cavalry Corps became a well-known page of the Great Patriotic War. The deeds of the heroes were forgotten, and their names were lost facelessly among other names on memorial plaques or did not get there at all. For the locals, these were terrible memories that could not be forgotten, but it was unbearable to return to them. After all, mothers had to look for their dead sons in the fields among the dead soldiers of the cavalry corps and bury them themselves. Therefore, the sad ruins of the Serezhansky Church have been standing lonely and lonely for more than 70 years, not being a place of worship for those who fell here in fierce battles. And only a small home-made stone slab, lost in the tall grass on the site of the no longer existing village of Ulyanovo, persistently appeals to the memory of descendants, testifying to the events that took place here. With great difficulty you can read on it:

“The Limonovs Ivan Mikhailovich, born in 1928, were born and died here during the battle on March 25, 1942. and Alexei Mikhailovich, born in 1936 Their father Limonov Mikhail Andreevich died near the city of Rzhev.

Memorial plate at the site of the death of children in the village of Ulyanovo

War is a huge tragedy, which is woven from millions of small tragedies.

	July 1942
	Smolensk and Kalinin regions
	Wehrmacht victory
Opponents
	Germany
Commanders
I. I. Maslennikov	G. von Kluge
S. V. Sokolov	G. von Vietinghoff
Side forces
About 60,000 people	unknown
4,386 killed, 47,072 missing (data vary)	1819 killed, 6853 wounded, 253 missing combat losses of the 9th Army in July

(July 2 - 23, 1942; German. Unternehmen "Seydlitz"; in domestic historical science - "Defensive operation near the town of Bely", "Defensive operation near Kholm-Zhirkovsky", Kholm-Zhirkovskaya defensive operation listen)) is an offensive operation of the 9th German Army of the Army Group Center, part of the Battle of Rzhev. Operation Seydlitz was the last in a series of operations to eliminate the penetrations formed as a result of the offensive of the Red Army in the winter of 1941-1942. The main goal of the operation was to defeat the 39th Army of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov and the 11th Cavalry Corps of Colonel S.V. Sokolov, who occupied the front in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area.

Position of the parties

The 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps stood in an area on the border of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions, which abounded in forests, swamps and rivers. This area was located near the highway and railways Smolensk - Vyazma and Rzhev - Sychevka, which played an important role in supplying Army Group Center. For this reason, the Soviet group, estimated by the Germans to be 60 thousand people, worried the Wehrmacht command. Starting in the spring of 1942, he developed an operation to eliminate the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge, which received the code name Seidlitz.

As a result of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation of 1942, the Soviet troops of the 39th Army (21st Guards Rifle, 252nd, 256th, 357th, 373rd and 381st Rifle Divisions, an artillery regiment, three divisions of guards mortars , a tank battalion, two engineering battalions (commander - Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov)) and the 11th Cavalry Corps (18th, 24th, 46th and 82nd Cavalry Divisions (commander - Colonel S. V. Sokolov)) of the Kalinin Front (commander - Colonel General I. S. Konev) occupied a vast ledge in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area. This ledge, in turn, was located on the western face of the German Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge in close proximity to the enemy's main communications (highway and railway

Smolensk - Vyazma, railway Rzhev - Sychevka). Total population Soviet troops in the ledge was estimated by the Germans at 60 thousand people. Soviet troops experienced an acute shortage of ammunition. Attaching great importance to their Rzhev-Vyazemsky grouping, the German command could not ignore such a threat, and immediately after the end of the spring battles in the Vyazma and Rzhev regions, they began preparing an operation to destroy the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge.

Plans and forces of the parties

The location of the troops favored the German plan for an encirclement operation: a huge ledge (up to 5,000 square kilometers) connected with the main forces of the Kalinin Front through a narrow "corridor" (maximum width - 28 kilometers) in the Nelidovo area. The territory held by the Soviet troops inside the salient was an impenetrable wooded and swampy area with numerous rivers, but rare dirt roads. Along the edges of the corridor, German troops held the cities of Olenino and Bely, turned into exceptionally strong defensive areas. The management of the Soviet troops was very unsuccessful: the forces inside the ledge were not united under a single leadership, and the most vulnerable lines - the borders of the "corridor" were defended by other armies (the northern border - the 22nd army under the command of General V. A. Yushkevich, the southern border - 41 th Army under the command of Major General G. F. Tarasov).

According to the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev, I.V. Stalin showed the greatest concern for the fate of our troops in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge, who at one of the meetings proposed to withdraw the troops from there himself. I. S. Konev spoke out against it, motivating this by attracting a significant number of German troops to the ledge and fearing, after the evacuation, their withdrawal to the reserve for the formation of new strike groups. G.K. Zhukov supported him, and J.V. Stalin withdrew his proposal. Further development of the situation showed that I. V. Stalin in this situation assessed the situation more realistically than his generals.

The operation was planned by the commander of the 9th German Army, Colonel-General V. Model. However, on May 23, he was wounded by Soviet anti-aircraft fire while flying to the troops and was in the hospital. The duties of the army commander were performed by the commander of the 46th Panzer Corps, General of the Panzer Troops G. von Vietinghoff. Significant forces were involved in the operation "Seidlitz" and quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Soviet troops was ensured. Ten infantry and four tank divisions participated in the operation (321 tanks, not counting tanks and self-propelled guns in infantry units). A separate cavalry brigade was also formed, consisting of 3 regiments with 14 tanks (commander Colonel Karl von der Meden).

Soviet command received intelligence information about the concentration of German troops and, on the whole, correctly assessed the plans of the enemy, but failed to organize proper opposition.

Operation start

On July 2, 1942, at 03:00, after a short artillery and aviation preparation, the German offensive began with two strike groups: from the north, from the Olenino area, the 23rd Army Corps of Infantry General A. Schubert advanced (2 tank divisions, 2 infantry divisions, cavalry brigade). A separate group of Ezebek (tank and infantry divisions) advanced from the south from the Bely region. In the first days of the operation, Soviet troops put up stubborn resistance, and only a deep detour along the forest roads of the German cavalry brigade with access to the rear of the defending troops allowed the enemy to succeed.

Only on July 5, German tank divisions from the northern and southern groups met near the village of Pushkari, cutting off the Bely - Olenino highway. The encirclement ring around the Soviet troops closed. It included the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps in full strength, as well as two rifle divisions and a tank brigade from the 41st Army, a full rifle division and separate units of two divisions of the 22nd Army.

The Germans understood that in the vast territory of the “boiler” with airfields located inside, the surrounded Soviet units had the opportunity to defend themselves for a long time and successfully (which the Soviet troops had already demonstrated in the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation in the spring of 1942. Therefore, without waiting for the completion of the encirclement, on July 4 from the eastern front Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge, the third strike group (1 tank and 2 infantry divisions) delivered a deep cutting blow in the western direction... Having received information about this, on July 5, front commander I. S. Konev realized the hopelessness of resistance inside the ledge and gave the order to break through all the encircled forces from the encirclement ring, but the enemy did not allow this: on July 6, the encirclement ring was cut in two and two encircled groups formed.Moving to the breakthrough lines along bad dirt roads (due to the past rains, off-road movement became impossible), Soviet troops were constantly subjected to German air strikes and suffered heavy losses.

A large number of military equipment was abandoned due to the impossibility of its transfer. Communication between the front command and the headquarters of the 39th Army was lost for several days.

Unlike the battles of 1941, the Soviet troops showed considerable stability and controllability in critical situations. By July 9, almost all units of the 41st Army, which was located closest to the rest of the front troops, broke out of the encirclement (two divisions and a tank brigade without tanks, over three thousand people, greatly thinned). To the north, units and entire units from five divisions at once also successfully broke through. To prevent the exit of Soviet troops from the encirclement, the German command was forced to bring into battle in the area of ​​​​the former "corridor" the last remaining reserves that were being prepared for this operation. Nevertheless, on July 11, a group of more than one thousand people, led by the commander of the 381st Infantry Division, broke through, on July 13 - a group of 300 soldiers, led by the commander of a cavalry regiment. Attempts to break through and smaller groups did not stop, while the Soviet soldiers suffered significant losses.

On July 12, the command of the 9th German Army reported the completion of Operation Seidlitz. In the official report of the German command of July 13, 1942, it was reported about the complete destruction of the entire encircled group, the capture of over 30 thousand prisoners, the capture and destruction of 218 tanks, 591 guns, 1301 machine guns and mortars.

In fact, the organized resistance of the encircled Soviet troops and their attempts to break through continued. By July 17, a group of about 1,500 people fought in the northern "cauldron" under the leadership of the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, Major General P.S. Ivanov, in the southern "cauldron" the headquarters of the 39th Army and about eight thousand people. On the night of July 19, U-2 aircraft took out part of the command of the 39th Army and its slightly wounded commander, Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov. The deputy commander of the 39th Army, Lieutenant-General I.A. Bogdanov, remained in command of the troops, who organized the exit of his troops from the encirclement: on the evening of July 21, counter attacks were delivered from inside and outside (185th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army). On the night of July 21, 7362 people broke through in an organized manner, while in a fierce bloody battle, about 460 fighters died and 172 were captured. Among the dead were the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, Major General P.S. Ivanov, the deputy commander of the 22nd Army, Major General A.D. Berezin. Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov himself was in the attacking line and broke through to his own, but already in the depths of the defense of the 22 Army he was mortally wounded during shelling, taken by plane to the hospital in the city of Bely and died there on July 24, 1942.

The final resistance inside the encirclement ceased on July 23, 1942. In total, up to 20 thousand people broke through the encirclement.

Operation results

During Operation Seidlitz, the Soviet troops of the Kalinin Front suffered a major defeat. An important and advantageous foothold in the depths of the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping of the enemy was lost, which increased its stability in defense. The enemy restored traffic along the shortest roads from Smolensk to Olenino, significantly improving the supply of his 9th Army.

In Soviet historical science, this unsuccessful operation was hardly mentioned or studied.

Losses

the USSR

On the issue of determining the level of losses, the few information of Russian and Western historians differ significantly from each other. So, A.V. Isaev cites the following data in his work: the total losses of the 22nd, 39th, 41st armies and the 11th cavalry corps amounted to 61,722 people, of which 4386 were killed and 47,072 were missing lead. Among the dead were Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov, Major Generals P. S. Ivanov, A. D. Berezin, P. P. Miroshnichenko (Chief of Staff of the 39th Army), Brigadier Commissar Yusim (member of the Military Council of the 39th Army). The tank brigade lost all 43 tanks. All Katyushas were blown up. Similar data are given by S. A. Gerasimova.

According to German data, up to 50 thousand prisoners were captured during the operation, 230 tanks, 58 aircraft, 760 guns of all kinds were destroyed or captured.

According to the official data presented by G. F. Krivosheev, the total losses in this operation were determined at 20,360 people, of which 7,432 people were irretrievable, and 12,928 sanitary people. Given the nature of the battle, these figures are considered clearly underestimated.

Germany

The losses of the German side are unknown and are not published even in the works of German historians. It is assumed that they were much less than the losses of the Soviet troops, but at the same time quite significant, since this did not allow the Army Group Center to take part in the summer offensive of the Wehrmacht in 1942. All units of the 9th German Army withdrawn to the reserve remained in the Rzhev ledge and were involved in the course of the Rzhev-Sychev operation.