Original taken from opera_1974 in "Chinese? - No, Russian... Judas? - No, Ukrainian." 1942
“A general was admitted to our hospital. He was placed in a separate room at the school, in the courtyard under the windows there was a car in which the driver and adjutant were constantly on duty.
During the next bombing, I heard the general shouting into the telephone receiver: "Where are the Yaks, where are the Yaks?" The planes really were not visible in the sky, presumably they were shot down by enemy fighters.
Once they announced: in the courtyard of the hospital at lunchtime, a court-martial will be held, two deserters will be judged. I went to see and listen.
One of the deserters was obviously mentally ill, to all the questions of the members of the tribunal he endlessly repeated: "When the Germans began to bomb and opened surrogate fire ..." He looked to be forty years old. The second soldier, about 25 years old, spoke little, did not justify himself. Both were sentenced to death, the sentence was carried out immediately, of course, not in the hospital yard, but somewhere outside the city.
In the last days of August, when the Germans pressed our troops, the hospital moved to the city of Andriapol, but soon they had to get out of here, successively visiting Okhva, Peno, Selizharovo, Kuvshinov ...
German soldiers taken prisoner in the Velikie Luki region. Kalinin front.
I was appointed chief of staff of PPG-572 with a monthly allowance of 550 rubles. Before that, as a soldier, I was paid 8 rubles a month. I immediately sent my wife a cash certificate for 300 rubles a month, and then extended it for the whole of 1942.
Since I was in an officer's position, I was given the rank of quartermaster technician of the second rank. We lived together with the head of the financial department Poskokov for three months in the same village hut.
Until December, the hospital was in the reserve of the 22nd Ural Army. By this time, the Germans had captured Rzhev, Sychevka, Staritsa, and Kalinin for two weeks, and in the north they reached the Oktyabrskaya railway and surrounded Leningrad.
In early December, we received an order to leave for the Rzhev region. They moved in a column to the Volga River, but then it turned out that the Germans had formed a continuous front from Selizharov to Rzhev itself, blocking the exit for our units. We stopped in some small village in anticipation of a new order.
Finally, units of the Red Army broke through the front of the Nazis in this sector and, advancing through Bakhmutovo, Yeltsy and Selizharovo, liberated the city of Andriapol. Ski battalions distinguished themselves in these battles.
When you entered the city, there were many corpses of German soldiers lying on the streets, special teams took them to the square, doused them with gasoline and set them on fire.
From here the hospital went to Nelidovo, located 30 kilometers from the front line. The city itself was in the hands of the Germans, the Soviet troops made attempts to liberate it - columns of tanks, Katyushas, troops moved there. We stood in the village, took the wounded.
Dot in the Oleninsky district of the Kalinin region.
Although it was forbidden to keep records at the front, I had a diary, in which I entered everything I saw, thoughts, reflections, various episodes. Political instructor Alabuzhev enjoyed great prestige among the personnel of the hospital, he was friendly with everyone.
This was not to the liking of Commissioner Makolkin and he tried to survive him - he achieved that he was seconded to the active army. The same fate befell the chief of staff (I forgot his last name), and I was appointed in his place.
The head of the hospital, Ivanov, also behaved unworthily: in one of the villages where we were staying for several weeks, he seduced the wife of an officer who was in the army, promised to enroll her in the staff of the hospital, but deceived her and left her in the village. For such an act, I hated Ivanov. It is true that he was soon recalled from the hospital, and Bashirov was sent in his place.
Dot on the street. New in the village of Selizharovo, Kalinin region.
The chief surgeon Sterkhov lived with the nurse Nekrasova, he even wrote to his wife not to wait for him, as he was in love with another.
There was a cohabitant - Kuligin's operating sister - and the surgeon Ankudinov. Through their fault, one wounded officer was transfused with the wrong blood type, and he died. A doctor from a higher organization came to investigate this case. The perpetrators were transferred to the front line, to the medical battalion.
My diary entries somehow ended up with Commissioner Makolkin. I paid for it, of course. In the morning a messenger came to me and gave the order to report to the commissar. I thought anxiously: why? He, without prior explanation, handed me a package with five wax seals and said that I was being transferred to 231 spare rifle regiment standing near Nelidovo.
Dot on emb. Kirov in the village of Selizharovo, Kalinin region.
I got to the city in a passing car. It was badly damaged, chimneys stuck out instead of houses. In the center of the city there was a monument to Lenin without a head.
The regiment was quartered in the village. Shizderovo. His commander listened to me, did not ask a single question, sent me to the head of the financial department, Abramov.
The depressed state of the regiment commander was not accidental. With the onset of spring, the Germans stepped up fighting on this sector of the front, intending to capture Nelidovo and encircle a large grouping of our army here.
The regiment was poorly armed, mainly with rifles and a few machine guns. In the neighboring regiments there were Katyushas. The grouping of our troops was commanded by General Maslennikov.
Lenin tent. Kalinin front, summer 1942
Thus began my new service. The situation on the front was becoming more and more alarming. One day, our elderly mistress of the house reported that the Germans had occupied the neighboring village of Aleksandrovka and were moving towards ours.
Finally, we received an order to leave the village and move with the whole regiment towards the Bukovsky forest. The chief financial officer and I loaded all the property of the unit onto the wagon and set off. When leaving Shizderovo we came under heavy mortar fire, which, as we were told, was fired by a tank unit of the Hungarians.
Then a plane appeared in the air, it began to fire at people running towards the forest. And then the shelling of the field and forest resumed. In short dashes, hiding in the hollows, he ran to the forest, took cover in a shell crater.
I spent the whole night in the funnel. At dawn, our plane appeared at a low altitude - a maize plant, it landed on the edge of the forest, a man got out of it, headed towards the forest. At the same moment, a mine exploded near the plane, then the second ...
Over the next two days, the Germans intensively shelled the forest, and also dropped leaflets from aircraft, urging Soviet soldiers and officers to stop resisting and surrender.
Move into position. Kalinin front, summer 1942
Through vill. Sinitsino is dragging a tank. Kalinin front, summer 1942
Only on the third day it became relatively calm. Dozens of horses in saddles wandered around the forest, many of them had iron mouthpieces in their mouths. It is clear that their riders - Soviet cavalrymen - died.
In the forest, I saw a lot of corpses of military and civilian, broken wagons with various cargoes, there were horse corpses right there. In some places bonfires were smoking - these were the surviving soldiers, among whom there were many wounded, they were preparing food, in particular, they were boiling horse meat.
He took off a machine gun from a dead soldier and approached one of the groups by the fire. It turned out to be officers of a broken cavalry unit. We got talking. They discussed the question of how to cross the front line, to connect with their own. I agreed to go with them.
In the liberated village of Pogoreloye Gorodishche. 1942
Cars on one of the roads of the front, May 1942. Kalinin Front.
We set off on the road at night, keeping the path to the northeast, towards Rzhev. Often we ran into German posts, which from time to time fired flares that gave us a reliable guide, and we safely avoided ambushes.
However, the Germans did not leave alone those who came out of the Bukovsky forest alive - they fired at them. Somehow, another automatic burst hit the stump behind which I was hiding. Pressing close to the ground, I was already counting the seconds when the explosive bullets would touch my body. But everything went well.
Among the retreating, I recognized a fellow villager, it was a handsome guy from Petropavlovsk named Frolov. We spoke reluctantly. I knew him as a Komsomol activist who had an unkind attitude towards our brother - the dispossessed.
Soviet soldiers at the dugout. Positions on the Kalinin Front in 1942.
Preparing a sled for the evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield. Kalinin Front 1942
We went out to the big road. Cars and motorcycles rushed along it, horse teams moved slowly, German was heard.
After conferring, they decided to attack the enemy convoy in order to capture food and ammunition. The ambush was set up at a sharp turn. Three lined up on one side, the rest on the other. Everything had to be done quickly, in 2-3 minutes. I had a PPSh assault rifle with a full disk of cartridges and two grenades.
Two motor vehicles with boxes in their bodies rushed by at high speed, then a motorcyclist slipped through. Then a group of wagons appeared from around the corner, on each sat a rider with a machine gun, several soldiers walked behind.
I was ready for the operation, when suddenly two more carts appeared, accompanied by four soldiers. We waited until they caught up with us, and then, at the signal of the elder, they opened fire.
I must admit that I was a little confused - I ran out onto the road and did not know where to shoot. My more experienced comrades quickly dealt with the guards, rushed to the wagons.
I followed them, collected millet groats, several cans of canned food in a field bag and ran back into the forest. There they all gathered together again.
Captured Germans. Kalinin Front, 1942
We knew that the Germans, having heard the shooting, would rush to look for us. So it was. A group of German soldiers soon arrived at the scene of the attack and began randomly shelling the forest with machine guns and mortars. But now it's quiet again. We did not suffer losses, we again began to decide where to move on.
I was ashamed in front of my comrades for being the last to enter the fray, not firing a single shot, but on the other hand, I was the first to rush to the wagon, pick up food and quickly run into the forest. After all, I went to war untrained, and my companions, in misfortune, were career officers, graduated from college and managed to fight - in a word, they had experience.
Perhaps they understood my confusion and therefore did not reproach me. Having calmed down, we first had a good lunch. By the way, as trophies we came across German bread in a pastry wrapper from 1939.
Staying in the forest was dangerous. It was a hot July day. They carefully left the forest, and in the distance on the slope they saw a man and a woman who were mowing the grass, a village was visible to their right, as they later learned, Zheltavtsy.
My companions said that there must be a minefield here, laid back in 1941, when the front line passed here. They laid mines and the Germans and ours. Two were sent out to investigate. They soon returned.
Local residents told them that, indeed, horses and cattle were blown up in the field, but according to them, there was a safe path through the minefields. It was decided to once again go to the village of Zheltavtsy and find out in more detail where that path was. The choice fell on me.
Personnel training. Graduates military school pass rifles to cadets. 1942 Kalinin front.
When the mowers reappeared, I approached them. They were not in the least afraid of a man with a machine gun, they said that there were many such wandering around here. The peasants reported that there was a German headquarters in neighboring Ivanovka, and that the Germans appeared in their village from time to time.
The mowers showed me where the trail begins through the minefield. I went there and, indeed, I saw traces of people, trampled grass. So they go here. I returned to my group and told them what I had learned. We decided to go at night.
The night was clear and starry. I went first, the rest kept a distance of 7-8 meters from each other. Nothing seemed to bode well. It began to get light, houses appeared in the distance, a little more - and we were out of danger.
My companions were clearly in a hurry, violated the distance. Yes, and I was worried, I wanted to go to the edge of the field as soon as possible, where you could see rye. I thought: if the Germans find out, we will hide in the rye ... Suddenly, behind me, it flashed like a flash of lightning, and immediately crashed. I fainted...
Outdoor shower. 55th Guards Rifle Regiment. Kalinin front.
When I came to my senses, I did not immediately understand what was happening to me, where I was. I felt myself. Dried blood on face and hands. Under my head was my field bag. He lifted his head and immediately lowered it. She was very sick, there was noise and ringing in her ears, it seemed to me that the walls of the hut (I clearly saw them) were either leaning or rising - in a word, it was rocking, like on a ship at sea.
Realizing that I was in a hut, I thought about how I got here and where my six companions were. Maybe they died from the explosion? Obviously, one of them kicked the tensioner of an anti-tank mine, it worked and exploded. But who brought me here?
I turned my head to the side - an elderly woman was standing next to me, saying something, I did not understand her. Then she served some cakes, and I was thirsty. She understood and brought water in a soldier's cauldron.
I took to drinking several times, then wet my handkerchief and wiped the blood and dirt from my face. It got a little easier. And I felt my hopelessness. Without outside help, of course, I can’t get up, I won’t be able to walk. I remembered the house, the wife, the little son. Then I began to think, where are my comrades? What's up with them? And where am I - among my own or?
After some time, a girl with a white bandage on her sleeve entered the hut, looked at me attentively and suspiciously for a long time, then quickly left and soon returned ... along with a German machine gunner. "Betrayed!"
Then a German jumped up to me, then a girl came up. They helped me to my feet and took me outside. I decided that they would shoot me now. Stopped. A platoon of soldiers stood on the road and an officer was sitting on horseback near them. I was taken to him. He asked me in broken Russian:
- Officer?
I replied that I was a quartermaster technician of the second rank.
- Where did you serve? asked the translator. - Division? Regiment?
- In the field hospital.
“Hospital, hospital,” muttered the officer.
The translator then asked:
- Doctor?
I lied that the doctor. And that, I think, saved my life. I was taken to the village of Ivanovka, to the headquarters of the German unit. Convoyed, obviously, a soldier - a Czech or a Slovak.
Captured Red Army soldiers. Operation Seidlitz, Kalinin Front. July 1942
During Operation Seidlitz, the Soviet troops of the Kalinin Front suffered a major defeat. An important and advantageous foothold in the depths of the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping of the enemy was lost, which increased its stability in defense. The enemy restored traffic along the shortest roads from Smolensk to Olenino, significantly improving the supply of his 9th Army.
For the night I was placed, probably, with a German sergeant major. He did not know the Russian language and therefore showed signs that I should wash, even led me to the washstand himself, and then ordered the soldier to bring me dinner - porridge with meat, a piece of bread and a glass of some sweet liquid.
The sergeant-major warned me not to go outside without permission, otherwise I might be shot. The next day they took me for interrogation to the hauptmann (captain) - the commander of the unit.
The translator, judging by the pronunciation, was also a Czech. The questions were the same as the German officer had asked the day before. I added to my story that our field hospital was destroyed in the Bukovsky forest near the village of Shizderovo.
- Did your father take part in the First World War on the German front?
- Did not participate.
- Maybe your father was a Cossack and served in the cavalry?
I explained that my father was The only son from his father - mother and, according to the laws of that time, he was exempted from military service.
- Where are you from?
I said that I was born in Siberia.
The officer perked up.
- Sibiren, Sibiren! And what are the frosts?
Then they asked if the railway to the Urals was electrified, or about something else. At the end of the interrogation they offered me a cigarette. I refused, saying I don't smoke.
On July 18, 1942, I was escorted to a prisoner of war camp at the Olenino station. From the same day began the countdown of my life as a prisoner of the German camps.
Operation Seidlitz. Summer 1942
From Olenino we were transferred to the city of Rzhev, where transit point. Here they began to sort by nationality. Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars were offered to join the German army, the volunteers were promised uniforms and rations. Some have taken this bait.
Since the units of the Red Army launched an offensive against Rzhev from the northeast, the city was under fire. Once one of the shells hit a group of Kazakh prisoners of war who had gathered for lunch, many were killed and wounded. Soon we were sent to Orsha, where we were only 22 days.
Upon arrival, they lined up in one line, a smartly dressed German officer with a cane came and, moving along the line, looked at everyone in the face. He stopped near one, shouted:
- Hinose? (Chinese?).
The prisoner replied that he was Russian. The interpreter accompanying the officer asked the "Chinese" for his last name.
- Dzhusunbaev, - he answered.
- Where are you from?
- From Jambul.
Came up with the following:
- Judas?
- No, I'm Ukrainian.
Having learned his last name, the officer continued on his way. In a word, several people were put out of action then, at night they were shot. The Germans were looking for Jews and Red Army commissars. They even promised the prisoners a reward if they indicated the Jews and the commissars.
Soviet prisoners of war in the Zeithain camp.
+++++++++++++++++
It was a few months before the Victory. We were taken out of the barracks, lined up and announced that an officer of the Vlasov Army (ROA) would speak with us.
And here he is in front of us. He spoke about the successes of the ROA, in which there are supposedly millions of former Soviet soldiers, and which will soon defeat the Red Army, free all the peoples of Russia and other republics from communist oppression.
In the end, he called us to join the Russian Liberation Army and told us about himself. He is a Muscovite, graduated from the capital's university, even gave his Moscow address (all this did not stay in my memory).
He reminded us that Stalin does not recognize prisoners of war, he considers all of them traitors to the Motherland, and if he wins, he will send us all to the Urals and Siberia. We were promised German rations and uniforms, various benefits.
However, no one took the confusing speech seriously, no one wanted to join the ranks of the ROA. Realizing that the action was failing, we were sent to the barracks, and then they began to call us one by one or in small groups to the camp office and continued to agitate there. Threats and violence were used. But this did not give the desired results, and Vlasov's representative left with nothing.
Up to five thousand captured officers visited our camp, of which at least 3,500 died of starvation, by Victory Day up to 1,500 people survived, of which 400 were not walking, exhausted, exhausted to an extreme degree. For example, I weighed only 47 kilograms - a little more than half of my usual, normal weight. - from the memoirs of V.M. Belyashov.
Operation Seidlitz July 2 - 23, 1942 defensive operation) - offensive 9th german army Army Group Center, part of the Battle of Rzhev. Seydlitz was the latest in a series of operations to eliminate penetrations formed as a result of the offensive of the Red Army in the winter of 1941-1942. The main goal of the operation was to defeat the 39th Army of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov and the 11th Cavalry Corps of Colonel S.V. Sokolov, who occupied the front in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area.
At 03:00 on July 2, 1942, after a short artillery and aviation preparation, the German offensive began with two strike groups: from the north, from the Olenino area, the 23rd Army Corps of Infantry General Albrecht Schubert advanced (2 tank divisions, 2 infantry divisions, cavalry brigade). A separate group of Ezebek (tank and infantry divisions) advanced from the south from the Bely region. In the first days of the operation, Soviet troops put up stubborn resistance, and only a deep detour along the forest roads of the German cavalry brigade with access to the rear of the defending troops allowed the enemy to succeed.
During Operation Seidlitz, the Soviet troops of the Kalinin Front suffered a major defeat. An important and advantageous foothold in the depths of the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya enemy grouping was lost, which increased its stability in defense. The enemy restored traffic along the shortest roads from Smolensk to Olenino, significantly improving the supply of his 9th Army.
The losses in people and equipment were very great. However, on this issue, the few information of domestic and Western historians differ significantly from each other. So, A. V. Isaev cites the following data in his work: the total losses of the 22nd, 39th, 41st armies and the 11th cavalry corps amounted to 61,722 people, of which 4,386 were killed and 47,072 were missing . Among the dead were Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov, Major Generals P. S. Ivanov, A. D. Berezin, P. P. Miroshnichenko (Chief of Staff of the 39th Army), Brigadier Commissar Yusim (member of the Military Council of the 39th th army). The tank brigade lost all 43 tanks. All Katyushas were blown up. Similar data are given by S. A. Gerasimova.
According to German data, in total, up to 50,000 prisoners were captured during the operation, 230 tanks, 58 aircraft, 760 guns of all kinds were destroyed or captured.
According to official domestic data, the total losses in this operation were determined at 20360 people, of which irretrievable - at 7432 people, sanitary - at 12928 people ("Military History Journal" No. 2 for 1999, G. F. Krivosheev). Given the nature of the battle, these data are considered clearly underestimated.
The losses of the German side are unknown and are not published even in the works of German historians. Of course, they are much less than the losses of the Soviet troops. But most likely, they were quite significant, and this did not allow the Army Group Center to take part in the summer offensive of the Wehrmacht in 1942. All units of the 9th German Army withdrawn to the reserve remained in the Rzhev ledge and were involved in the course of the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation.
In Soviet historical science, this unsuccessful operation was hardly mentioned or studied.
Comments:
USSR, Smolensk and Kalinin regions
The last operation to eliminate the penetrations formed as a result of the winter offensive of the Red Army was Operation Seidlitz. The operation was carried out by Army Group Center in July 1942. The purpose of the operation was the troops of the 39th Army of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov and the 11th Cavalry Corps of Colonel S.V. . As early as February 12, 1942, an “Order on the conduct of hostilities on the Eastern Front at the end of the winter period” was issued to restore a continuous front line, which specifically stated:
“When choosing the frontiers where the front line will pass, it is of decisive importance to ensure the safety of supply routes for front-line units and important road communications (railways and highways) from enemy influence, as well as from various kinds of sabotage” (Dashichev V.I. Decree. cit., p.317).
The troops of I.I. Maslennikov and S.V. Sokolov were dangerously close to several important communications at once: the Smolensk-Vyazma highway and railway and the Rzhev-Sychevka railway. By the beginning of the summer of 1942, Soviet troops occupied an area abounding in forests, swamps, rivers and streams at the junction of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions with an area of almost 5 thousand square kilometers. On June 2, the 39th Army included the 21st Guards Rifle, 252nd, 256th, 357th, 373rd and 381st Rifle Divisions. The 11th Cavalry Corps included the 18th, 24th, 36th and 82nd Cavalry Divisions. The cavalry corps took up defense on a broad front on the southern face of the hill-zhirkov ledge.
The position of the army of I.I. Maslennikov and the cavalry corps of S.V. Sokolov was in many respects similar to the position of the 2nd shock army in the Luban ledge. The counteroffensive of the 9th Model Army in the winter of 1942 interrupted the main communications of the 39th Army. However, the successful advance of the 4th Shock Army on Toropets made it possible to supply the 39th Army through the Nelidovo region in the corridor between the German-held towns of Olenino and Bely. At its narrowest point, the width of the corridor was 27-28 km. Just as in the case of the 2nd shock army, the commanders of two different armies were responsible for the communications of the troops of Maslennikov and Sokolov. The northern and southern "walls" of the corridor were defended respectively by the 22nd and 41st armies of the Kalinin Front. The first one is already well known to us, it participated in the battles from July 1941. The second was a novice in the summer battles of 1942. Major Berzarin. The commander of the 249th Infantry Division G.F. Tarasov, who had proven himself well in the Toropetsko-Kholmskaya operation of the 4th shock army, led the army.
Holding the penetration perimeter of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps required the allocation of significant forces of the 9th Army. The German command estimated the number of Soviet troops in the rear of Army Group Center at 60 thousand people. Such a large grouping, which occupied a bridgehead in the immediate vicinity of the main communications of the army group, could not but cause concern for the German command. Since the spring of 1942, a large-scale operation was being developed to clear the Kholm-Zhirkov ledge. The operation was codenamed Seidlitz.
However, Operation Seidlitz was not destined to tarnish Walter Model's reputation as a "genius of defense" with a successful offensive on a large scale. On May 23, 1942, during the next flight to the troops in the Bely region, his Fiziler "Storch" was fired from the ground, and the commander of the 9th Army was wounded in the lung. The pilot of the Storch was also wounded, but was able to land the aircraft. The plan of operation "Seidlitz" Model reported to the commander of Army Group "Center" in the Smolensk hospital. On June 2, the command of the 9th Army was temporarily taken over by General tank troops von Vietinghoff. Later, the command of the 9th Army, at the direction of General von Vietinghoff, was taken over by the commander of the XLVI Panzer Corps, General Scheel.
Despite the relatively small width of the corridor between Olenin and Bely, negligible by the standards of a maneuverable "blitzkrieg", the operation did not promise to be easy. The northern "wall" of the corridor ran along the valley of the river surrounded by dense forests. Luchesa. Anticipating battles in wooded areas poor in roads, the command of the 9th Army organized special unit- von der Meden's cavalry brigade. Colonel Karl Friedrich von der Meden was an old cavalryman who joined the tank forces in the mid-30s. During the period of the events described, he commanded a motorized infantry regiment of the 1st Panzer Division. In 1942, he had to remember his youth and lead the formation, officially called Kavallerie Brigade zbV beim Armeeoberkommando 9 (Special Purpose Cavalry Brigade of the 9th Army Command). The brigade consisted of three regiments of four or five squadrons each. The squadrons were of mixed composition: out of thirteen squadrons, six were on bicycles, and the rest were on horseback. The brigade was full automatic weapons: in three regiments there were more than 30 easel and 72 light machine guns, the privates were armed with submachine guns in the maximum possible quantities. The rear of the brigade was motorized, the sappers moved on bicycles, the communications units were partially motorized. Each regiment was given six light field howitzers. The regiments were trained for four to six weeks and at the end of June 1942 concentrated south of Olenin in the area of the Luchesa valley. The cavalry brigade was also given 14 tanks.
In addition to the cavalry brigade, ten infantry and four tank divisions (1st, 2nd, 5th and 20th) were involved in Operation Seydlitz. The tank regiments of three of these four divisions (1st, 2nd and 20th) remained in a single battalion, since the first tank battalions were withdrawn from them to reinforce the tank and motorized divisions involved in the summer offensive of 1942. In the 2nd tank division on June 20, there were 22 Pz.II, 33 Pz.38 (t), 20 Pz.III, 5 Pz.IV and 2 command tanks, in the 20th on June 30 - 8 Pz.II, 39 Pz.38 (t ), 20 Pz.III, 13 Pz.IV and 7 command tanks. For the 1st Panzer Division, there are data for July 15: 2 Pz.II, 10 Pz.38(t), 26 Pz.III, 7 Pz.IV and 4 command tanks. The only tank division with two tank battalions in a tank regiment was the 5th tank division, which on June 25 had 26 Pz.II, 55 Pz.III, 13 Pz.IV and 9 command tanks. All Pz.III and Pz.IV tanks in these four divisions were of the old types, they did not receive a single tank of these types with long-barreled guns.
The thoroughness of the preparation of the operation is evidenced by the fact that German reconnaissance aircraft carried out aerial photography of an area of 3300 square meters. km. Command post The 9th Army was moved to Olenino, closer to the place of the upcoming battle.
It cannot be said that the German offensive was a complete surprise for the command of the Kalinin Front. As early as June 29 and 30, in a conversation over a direct wire with I.I. Maslennikov and S.V. Sokolov, the front commander I.S. "(VIA, No. 8 (23), p. 26). The commander of the 39th Army said:
“I am preparing to fight in the most unfavorable situation, that is, to fight in encirclement without the right to withdraw the army. For this, only ammunition and food are needed” (ibid., pp. 26-27).
With such samurai sentiments, the Soviet command of the 39th Army met the beginning of Seidlitz.
The German offensive began at 03:00 on July 2, 1942, after a short artillery preparation and an air strike by Yu-87 bombers. From the north, General Schubert's XXIII Army Corps advanced in two groups from the Olenino region. The western group consisted of units of the 1st Panzer, 110th and 102nd Infantry Divisions, the eastern group consisted of the 5th Panzer Division and von der Meden's Cavalry Brigade. They were opposed by units of the 185th and 380th rifle divisions of the 22nd Army and the 21st Guards Rifle Division of the 39th Army. Ezebek's group consisting of the 2nd Panzer and 246th Infantry Divisions launched an offensive from the Bely region to the east. Later they. were to turn north towards XXIII Corps. Opposed two German divisions 17th Guards rifle division 41st Army.
The greatest resistance was met by the 1st Panzer Division in the area locality Old women on the banks of the Luchesa. To assist her, the 102nd Infantry Division was ordered to attack the Soviet troops from the flank. A regiment of the 14th motorized division was also advanced from the reserve of the 9th Army to this direction. The 5th Panzer Division advanced rather slowly along the Olenino-Bely road. The choice of this highway as the axis of attack was quite predictable, and anti-tank obstacles and concrete fortifications were erected by the Soviet troops. If in the northern sector of the offensive the German troops met a stubborn defense, then in the area of Bely, a maneuver with a strike first to the east, followed by a turn to the north, was initially successful. However, here the Soviet troops quickly switched to active opposition to the attackers. Already in the evening of the first day of the operation, a counterattack with the participation of the 21st Tank Brigade against the flank of the 2nd Tank Division followed. The repulse of the counterattack continued on 3 July.
Von der Meden's cavalry played an important role in Seydlitz's success. Moving parallel to the 5th Panzer Division through the forests, on July 3 the cavalry brigade went to the rear of the units of the 256th Rifle Division defending on the highway. The front in this direction was broken through, and the 5th Panzer Division reached the village of Shizderevo on the river. Obsha. Reinforced by the 102nd Infantry Division and receiving air support, the 1st Panzer Division also began to push forward more confidently. Heavy fighting gradually depleted the strength of the defenders. For example, the 355th Rifle Division, which was defending its front to the north, by July 4 had up to 40% losses in personnel and was forced to withdraw. The final success of the German offensive was achieved on Sunday, July 5, 1942, when the 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions met near the village of Pushkari on the Bely - Olenino highway. All units and formations of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps, as well as formations of the 41st (17th Guards Rifle, 135th Rifle Divisions, 21st Tank Brigade) and 22nd (355 -I, parts of the 380th and 185th rifle divisions) armies.
Here again, one should once again note the weakness of the Soviet military transport aviation, which did not allow organizing effective air supply for even a relatively small group of troops. The outer and inner fronts of the encirclement of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps were separated by a narrow strip of territory occupied by the enemy along the Bely - Smolensk railway. The territory occupied by Soviet troops in the hill-Zhirkov ledge was large enough to organize several landing sites. In the case of organizing an "air bridge", the army of I.I. Maslennikov could hold out until the start of the Pogorelo-Gorodishchenskaya operation in August 1942, which gave a chance to release a strike from the east. Without air supplies, the encircled were quickly left without ammunition and food, and the "cauldron" lost the ability to provide organized resistance.
Simultaneously with the closure of the encirclement along the Olenino - Bely highway, the Germans delivered a blow that cuts the "cauldron" in half from the eastern face of the hill-Zhirkov ledge. On July 4, at 1.45 XLVI Panzer Corps, with the forces of the 20th Panzer, 328th and 86th Infantry Divisions, launched an offensive in the western direction. On July 5, the command of the 39th Army made a decision to withdraw troops from the Kholm-Zhirkov ledge. This decision was already hopelessly overdue. Literally within two days, the “cauldron” was cut into northern and southern parts, each of which could break through from the encirclement through a narrow section of the Olenino-Bely highway. The situation was aggravated by the dehydration of dirt roads after heavy rains, which slowed down the marches of the troops of I.I. Maslennikov and S.V. Sokolov. The divisions retreating to the neck of the ledge were also forced to abandon and destroy the stuck equipment. The troops that had withdrawn from their positions and stretched out along the roads turned into an excellent target for enemy aircraft. On July 8, the 11th Cavalry Corps was subordinated to the 39th Army. The retreat and air strikes led to the loss of communications. Already late in the evening of July 8, the radio stations of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps stopped responding to calls from the front headquarters. The front headquarters delegates sent by plane did not return. Communication was restored only a few days later.
One of the participants in the events, communications officer of the 17th Guards Rifle Division V. Polyakov, described the situation of those days as follows:
“The atmosphere of calm doom reigned in the headquarters. It was felt that people had done everything possible in their power, and now, by inertia, by the ingrained habit of duty, they were carrying their burden to the end, to the exhaustion of their last strength ... "
During July 7-9, units of the 41st Army made their way out of the encirclement. About 1000 people left the 135th Rifle Division, 1759 people from the 17th Guards Division and the 21st Tank Brigade (without tanks). In the same period, individuals and units of the 24th and 46th cavalry divisions, 357th, 355th and 262nd rifle divisions came out.
Successful attempts to break through and increasing pressure from outside are forcing the German command to pull up all reserves to the captured corridor. The exit from the southern pocket is blocked by the 427th regiment of the 129th infantry division, which is immediately attacked by coordinated attacks from inside and outside the pocket.
July 12 is considered by the Germans as the official completion date for the Seydlitz. The official message of the German command of July 13, 1942 read:
“The broad German offensive that began on July 2 southwest of Rzhev, effectively supported by aviation units, led, after breaking through the system of enemy positions in heavy forest battles, to the encirclement and destruction of several rifle and cavalry divisions, as well as one tank brigade. In this 11-day battle, over 30,000 prisoners of war were taken, 218 tanks, 591 guns, 1,301 machine guns and mortars, as well as a large number of other weapons and military equipment of all kinds, were captured or destroyed. Enemy losses are serious. The number of prisoners of war and trophies continues to grow.”
However, organized resistance and breakout attempts did not end on 12 July. By July 17, a group of about 1,500 people gathered in the northern "cauldron" under the leadership of the commander of the 18th cavalry division, Major General P.S. Ivanov. Approximately 8,000 people gathered in the southern pocket, led by the headquarters of the 39th army. Member of the Military Council of the Army, Brigadier Commissar Yusim and Chief of Staff Major General P.P. Miroshnichenko died.
On the night of July 18-19, nine U-2 aircraft landed in the “cauldron”, which were supposed to take command of the 39th Army. The slightly wounded commander of the 39th Army, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov, flew off on one of these aircraft, and the deputy commander, Lieutenant General I.A. Bogdanov, remained with the troops. Sometimes this episode is reproached to I.I. Maslennikov. However, as mentioned above, the general in this case is not the master of his own destiny. He is a person in the public service, and he is obliged to take advantage of the planes sent for him. Staying with your troops to the end is an understandable, but not always expedient decision from the point of view of the long term. In the same way, for example, K.K. Rokossovsky could have stayed with the administration of the 16th Army in the Vyazma "cauldron" in October 1941 instead of organizing defense in the Volokolamsk direction.
The last major attempt to release the encircled 39th Army was made on the evening of 21 July. Towards a group of troops of the 39th Army under the command of I.A. Bogdanov, a blow was struck by the 185th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army. Already by 23.00 on June 21, 3,500 people left the encirclement at the division site. During the fighting to ensure the corridor for the exit of troops, General Bogdanov was wounded, taken by plane to the hospital, where he died on July 24, 1942. On the battlefield on the evening of July 21, the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division P.S. Ivanov died, he was on July 22 buried by the Germans with military honors. Deputy commander of the 22nd Army A.D. Berezin died in an attempt to break through the encirclement.
On July 23, 1942, reports on the state of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps disappear from the combat log of the Kalinin Front. This day can be considered the actual date of completion of the Seidlitz operation to eliminate the penetration of Soviet troops in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area. In early August 1942, the 11th Cavalry Corps was disbanded. Saved battle flags the remnants of the 373rd, 381st, 256th and 252nd rifle divisions were withdrawn for reorganization. The 39th Army was re-formed by renaming the directorate of the 58th Army, created in June 1942. The army was led by Lieutenant General A.I. Zygin.
During Operation Seidlitz, a major defeat was inflicted on the troops of the Kalinin Front. Formed as a result of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation in the winter of 1942, the penetration of Soviet troops in the area north of Vyazma was surrounded and destroyed. Thus, an advantageous springboard for an offensive against Army Group Center was eliminated, the front line was shortened and traffic was restored along the highway from Smolensk to Olenino, which improved the supply of the 9th Army as a whole.
The encirclement of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps was carried out according to the scheme typical of the Wehrmacht's spring-summer counteroffensive on the Eastern Front. The strongholds held during the winter battles at the base of the Soviet breakthrough did not allow the expansion of the breakthrough and made it vulnerable to attacks in converging directions. The city of Bely and the Olenino region, attached to the 9th Army, became such "shverpunkts". Even the solid defense of the walls of the "corridor" along which the Soviet troops that had broken through into the depths of the enemy's defenses were supplied, did not ensure the successful retention of communications.
Plan:
Introduction
- 1 Prerequisites 2 Planning of the operation 3 Countermeasures of the Red Army 4 Progress of the operation 5 Losses of the sides
- 5.1 Red Army 5.2 Wehrmacht
- 6.1 Red Army 6.2 Wehrmacht
Notes
Literature
Introduction
Operation Seidlitz(German Unternehmen "Seydlitz"; July 2 - July 1, 1942) - the operation of the German troops to eliminate the Kholm-Zhirkovsky speech. As a result of the operation, the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps of the Red Army were surrounded and destroyed, and the total losses of the Soviet troops exceeded 61 thousand people.
In Soviet historical science, the battles of July 1942 at the Kholm-Zhirkovsky performance were known as Defensive operation in the Bely area or Kholm-Zhirkovska defensive operation.
1. Background
In early January 1942, the Red Army by the forces of Kalininsky and Western fronts launched an operation to eliminate the Rzhev-Vyazemsky group of German troops.
The underestimation of the forces of the Wehrmacht led to the fact that in the area of the village of Kholm-Zhirkovsky, the 39th army of I. Maslennikov and the 11th cavalry corps were in a semi-encirclement. At the beginning of the summer of 1942, the troops of Maslennikov and Sokolov occupied an area of 5 thousand km 2. They were supplied through the Nelidovo region in the corridor between the German troops who held the cities of Olenino and Bely. At its narrowest point, the width of the corridor was 27-28 km.
The maintenance of the Soviet troops in the ring required the allocation of significant forces of the 9th German Army, since the command of Army Group Center estimated the number of surrounded by 60 thousand people. In addition, Soviet troops were in close proximity to important communications: the highway and railway lines Smolensk - Vyazma and the railway line Rzhev - Sychevka. In the spring of 1942, the German command began preparations for the operation to clear the Kholm-Zhirkovsky uprising. The operation was codenamed Seidlitz.
2. Operation planning
Planning for the operation began in May 1942. The German offensive was to be led by the commander of the 9th Army, Major General Walter Model, but on May 23, during an air flight to the Belyi region, his plane was shot down by Soviet partisans. The model was taken to the hospital with a lung injury. Already in the Smolensk hospital, Model reported to the commander-in-chief of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Kluge, the preliminary plan of the operation. On June 2, 1942, the command of the 9th Army, further planning and conduct of the operation was entrusted to General of the Tank Forces Heinrich von Vietinghoff.
The 9th Army of von Vietinghoff included the 6th, 23rd, 27th and 41st Army Corps, as well as the Esebek Army Group and the Raus Army Group. Especially for the Seidlitz operation, the headquarters of the 9th Army formed a special-purpose cavalry brigade under the command of Colonel K. F. von der Meden
The operational plan for Operation Seydlitz was as follows: First, by attacking from the north of the western flank of the 23rd "corridor". Then squeeze the Soviet troops from the east, split them into separate parts, surround them and destroy them. The offensive from east to west, entrusted to the 27th Army Corps under the command of General Zorn, was to begin 2 days later than the western oncoming offensive. According to the plan of the headquarters of the 9th Army, this would make it possible to avoid a premature withdrawal of the Red Army units to the west and thereby make it difficult to deliver a counter strike.
From the north, from the Olenino region, General Schubert's 23rd Army Corps advanced in two groups. The western group included the 1st Panzer, 110th and 102nd Infantry Divisions, while the eastern group included the 5th Panzer Division and von der Meden's Cavalry Brigade. From the Bely region to the east, the offensive was launched by Yesebek's group as part of the 2nd Panzer and 246th Infantry Divisions. On all directions of the offensive, units of the Wehrmacht met active opposition from the Red Army, and in some areas German attacks were even repelled.
The German 1st Panzer Division found itself in a difficult situation. In the area of the village of Starukhi, she came across Soviet do. To support the offensive in this area, the command of the 9th Army brought infantry and motorized divisions into battle.
By the end of the first day of the operation, the 2nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht was counterattacked. Flanking 30 Soviet tanks the Germans managed to recapture only on July 3 with the support of aviation.
The 5th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht also achieved minor successes. Its advance was hampered by anti-tank barriers and minefields.
Von der Meden's cavalry did quite well. Moving through the forest parallel to the 5th Panzer Division, it managed to reach the rear of the Soviet troops and break through the front.
In total, as of July 3, the course of the operation was characterized by the Wehrmacht command as "quite slow", and the success "single".
July 4 at 1-45 by the forces of the 46th tank corps, 86th and 328th Infantry and 20th Panzer Divisions began the second stage of the German operation - an offensive from east to west. On the right wing, they immediately managed to capture the village of robbery, where the headquarters of the 39th Army was located.
On July 5, 1942, at 11:00 a.m., the German 2nd Panzer Division captured the village of Pushkari from the south. At 16-20, from midnight, the 1st Panzer Division approached Pushkari - the ring closed. All units and formations of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps, as well as formations of the 41st (17th Guards Rifle, 135th Rifle Divisions, 21st Tank Brigade) and 22nd (355- a, parts of the 380th and 185th rifle divisions) armies. Attempts by Soviet troops with 12 tanks to the north of Bely and 20 to the west of Starukhi to restore the passage ended in failure.
The broad offensive of the German units, which began on July 2 to the west of Rzhev, was effectively supported by aviation units, and after breaking through the system of enemy positions in heavy forest battles, led to the encirclement and destruction of several rifle and cavalry divisions, as well as one tank brigade. In this 11-day battle, more than 30,000 prisoners of war were taken, 218 tanks, 591 guns, 1,301 machine guns and mortars, as well as a large number of other weapons and military equipment of all kinds, were captured or destroyed. Enemy losses are serious. The number of prisoners of war and trophies continues to grow
Message from the Wehrmacht dated 01.01.01
On July 13, the High Command of the German Fascist Army broke out with yet another fraudulent lie? special message" about the next "encirclement" and "destruction" of Soviet troops ...
Between July 2 and 13, battles really took place in the area west of Rzhev ... During the fighting, our troops lost up to 7,000 killed and wounded and 5,000 missing, a significant part of which formed partisan detachments operating behind enemy lines, 80 tanks, 85 guns, 200 machine guns.
During the same period of fighting west of Rzhev, the Germans lost more than 10,000 soldiers and officers only killed, over 200 tanks, more than 70 guns, at least 250 machine guns and mortars, 30 armored vehicles and 50 aircraft ...
From the operational report of the Sovinformburo dated 01.01.01
On July 5, Maslennikov decided to withdraw troops from the Kholm-Zhirkovsky speech. In the evening of the same day, formations of the 39th Army left their positions and retreated with fighting, first to the Belaya River, and then to the Obshaya River. On the morning of July 6, units of the 11th Cavalry Corps moved to meet the 39th Army. Due to heavy rains, extremely poor road conditions, lack of fuel and tractors, a large number of heavy equipment and weapons had to be destroyed during the transition. On July 7, the main forces of the encircled Soviet troops met near the village of Yegorye. Here the German troops, reinforced by units removed from other sectors of the front, attacked the defensive positions of the Red Army, cut through the encircled and formed two boilers - "Southern" and "northern".
On July 9, in a large ("southern") pocket, the main forces of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps subordinate to it on July 8 made several attempts to seize the crossing over the Obsha in order to get out of the encirclement near the village of Nesterov. The possibility of a breakthrough forced the Germans to pull up reserve units to the area of the "southern" boiler. Already on July 10, units of the Wehrmacht captured the strip between the Belaya and?? Obshaya rivers and forced the Soviet troops to withdraw into the forests. Without food, medicines and ammunition, having lost radio contact with the command of the Kalinin Front, the surrounded Soviet army was gradually losing its defense capability. On July 11, another organized attempt was made to break through the German ring, but it ended in vain. After that, the Wehrmacht troops began cleaning the boilers.
On July 12, 1942, the command of the 9th Army reported to the headquarters of Army Group Center on the successful completion of Operation Seidlitz. On July 13, an official message from the Wehrmacht appeared, which the next day was refuted by the Soviet Information Bureau with the wording "Fraud report of the Nazi command".
However, the organized resistance of the encircled did not end on 12 July. On July 17, a group of about 1,500 people gathered in the northern pocket under the leadership of the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, Major General. Approximately 8,000 Red Army men gathered in the southern pocket under the command of the headquarters of the 39th Army. On the night of July 18-19, the commander of the 39th Army was wounded by a U-2 plane and was evacuated to the rear, command was taken over by his deputy lieutenant general. On the night of July 21-22, with the support of the 22nd Army, Bogdanov managed to withdraw a group of 7362 people from the encirclement. He himself was seriously wounded and died on 24 limes at the hospital. On the line Biliy - Dukhovshchina in the smuga of the 41st army, the Radyansk partisans led more than 6,000 soldiers.
On June 23, 1942, there are still records from the combat journal of the Kalinin Front about the camp of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps. This day can be taken as the actual date of the completion of the Seydlitz operation.
5. Spend the parties
5.1. Red Army
Vtrati Kalininskogo front (linden 1942)
Army or Corps | Wounded | the appearance of obscurity | 3 other reasons | Ill, evacuated in the hospital | ||
22nd army | ||||||
39th army | ||||||
41st army | ||||||
11th Cavalry Corps | ||||||
In a pouch |
5.2. Wehrmacht
Although there are no specific figures about the expenditure of German troops in the operation "Seydlitz", and the data of the Radinformburo are rather vague, the Russian historian, relying on the help of the participants in the silent marches from the side of the German side, blatantly on the significant losses of the Wehrmacht, especially in the armies.
6. Results
disc"> The Chervona Army has spent a viable foothold for offensive battles against the "Center" army group. Having used the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge, the radian command did not only change the reserves, but it was also a term to reinvigorate the whole row of military formations.
6.2. Wehrmacht
- Army Group "Center" hastened the line of the front and wielded units for the other workers of the front. The Wehrmacht troops took control of the Smolensk-Olenino highway, which significantly reduced the supply of the 9th Army. Behind the German tributes, 226 tanks, 58 letaks, 763 artillery pieces, 1995 machine guns, and also a large number of arrows were destroyed or buried.
Notes
1. Z 8 linden at the warehouse of the 39th army
2. ^ a B C Sovinformburo: operational summary for July 14, 1942 - www. victory. *****/war/sib/index. html (Russian)
3. ^ a b c d e f f defensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin Front in July 1942 (VIA, No. 8 (23)) - ***** / seydlitz. html
4. ^ a B C D Horst Grossman. Rzhev is the cornerstone of the Eastern Front. Summer battle between Rzhev and Bely "Seidlitz"-*****/grossman/g5.html
5. According to the entry in Halder's diary dated 01.01.01
7. The number of fighters who left the encirclement:
§ 135th Rifle Division - 1000
§ 17th Guards Rifle Division - 1759 (also 2 82mm mortars, 2 heavy and 8 light machine guns, 800 rifles, 2 anti-tank rifles, 3 PPSh, 60 revolvers)
§ Twenty-first tank brigade (without materiel - 43 tanks)
§ as well as individual fighters and units of the 24th cd, 46th cd, 357th, 355th and 262nd sd
Literature
- Halder F. War diary. Daily records of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces - militera. *****/db/halder/index. html. - M.: Military publishing house, . (Rus.)
defensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin Front in July 1942 - ***** / seydlitz. html. - Military Historical Archive No. 23. - S. 18-56. (Rus.) Grossman H. Rzhev - the cornerstone of the Eastern Front - *****/grossman/grossman. html. - Rzhev: "Rzhevskaya Pravda", 19s. - ISBN 2 (Rus.)
Short course WWII history. The offensive of Marshal Shaposhnikov - militera. *****/h/isaev_av4/index. html. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 20s. - ISBN -X (Rus.) Von Klaus Christian Richter Unternehmen "Seydlitz". Ein ungew? hnliches Beispiel milit? rischer Improvisation - www. freundeskreis-panzergrenadiere. de/pzgrenadier/artikel_heft_22_2.pdf. - Der Panzergrenadier 22/07. (German)
July 1942 |
|
Smolensk and Kalinin regions |
|
Wehrmacht victory |
|
Opponents |
|
Germany |
|
Commanders |
|
I. I. Maslennikov |
G. von Kluge |
S. V. Sokolov |
G. von Vietinghoff |
Side forces |
|
About 60,000 people |
unknown |
4,386 killed, 47,072 missing (data vary) |
1819 killed, 6853 wounded, 253 missing combat losses of the 9th Army in July |
(July 2 - 23, 1942; German. Unternehmen "Seydlitz"; in domestic historical science - "Defensive operation near the town of Bely", "Defensive operation near Kholm-Zhirkovsky", Kholm-Zhirkovskaya defensive operation listen)) is an offensive operation of the 9th German Army of the Army Group Center, part of the Battle of Rzhev. Operation Seydlitz was the last in a series of operations to eliminate the penetrations formed as a result of the offensive of the Red Army in the winter of 1941-1942. The main goal of the operation was to defeat the 39th Army of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov and the 11th Cavalry Corps of Colonel S.V. Sokolov, who occupied the front in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area.
Position of the parties
The 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps stood in an area on the border of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions, which abounded in forests, swamps and rivers. This area was located near the highway and railways Smolensk - Vyazma and Rzhev - Sychevka, which played an important role in supplying Army Group Center. For this reason, the Soviet group, estimated by the Germans to be 60 thousand people, worried the Wehrmacht command. Starting in the spring of 1942, he developed an operation to eliminate the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge, which received the code name Seidlitz.
As a result of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation of 1942, the Soviet troops of the 39th Army (21st Guards Rifle, 252nd, 256th, 357th, 373rd and 381st Rifle Divisions, an artillery regiment, three divisions of guards mortars , a tank battalion, two engineering battalions (commander - Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov)) and the 11th Cavalry Corps (18th, 24th, 46th and 82nd Cavalry Divisions (commander - Colonel S. V. Sokolov)) of the Kalinin Front (commander - Colonel General I. S. Konev) occupied a vast ledge in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area. This ledge, in turn, was located on the western face of the German Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge in close proximity to the enemy's main communications (highway and railway
Smolensk - Vyazma, railway Rzhev - Sychevka). Total population Soviet troops in the ledge was estimated by the Germans at 60 thousand people. Soviet troops experienced an acute shortage of ammunition. Attaching great importance to their Rzhev-Vyazemsky grouping, the German command could not ignore such a threat, and immediately after the end of the spring battles in the Vyazma and Rzhev regions, they began preparing an operation to destroy the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge.
Plans and forces of the parties
The location of the troops favored the German plan for an encirclement operation: a huge ledge (up to 5,000 square kilometers) connected with the main forces of the Kalinin Front through a narrow "corridor" (maximum width - 28 kilometers) in the Nelidovo area. The territory held by the Soviet troops inside the salient was an impenetrable wooded and swampy area with numerous rivers, but rare dirt roads. Along the edges of the corridor, German troops held the cities of Olenino and Bely, turned into exceptionally strong defensive areas. The management of the Soviet troops was very unsuccessful: the forces inside the ledge were not united under a single leadership, and the most vulnerable lines - the borders of the "corridor" were defended by other armies (the northern border - the 22nd army under the command of General V. A. Yushkevich, the southern border - 41 th Army under the command of Major General G. F. Tarasov).
According to the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev, I.V. Stalin showed the greatest concern for the fate of our troops in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge, who at one of the meetings proposed to withdraw the troops from there himself. I. S. Konev spoke out against it, motivating this by attracting a significant number of German troops to the ledge and fearing, after the evacuation, that they would be withdrawn to the reserve to form new strike groups. G.K. Zhukov supported him, and J.V. Stalin withdrew his proposal. Further development of the situation showed that I. V. Stalin in this situation assessed the situation more realistically than his generals.
The operation was planned by the commander of the 9th German Army, Colonel-General V. Model. However, on May 23, he was wounded by Soviet anti-aircraft fire while flying to the troops and was in the hospital. The duties of the army commander were performed by the commander of the 46th Panzer Corps, General of the Panzer Troops G. von Vietinghoff. Significant forces were involved in the operation "Seidlitz" and quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Soviet troops was ensured. Ten infantry and four tank divisions participated in the operation (321 tanks, not counting tanks and self-propelled guns in infantry units). A separate cavalry brigade was also formed, consisting of 3 regiments with 14 tanks (commander Colonel Karl von der Meden).
Soviet command received intelligence information about the concentration of German troops and, on the whole, correctly assessed the plans of the enemy, but failed to organize proper opposition.
Operation start
On July 2, 1942, at 03:00, after a short artillery and aviation preparation, the German offensive began with two strike groups: from the north, from the Olenino area, the 23rd Army Corps of Infantry General A. Schubert advanced (2 tank divisions, 2 infantry divisions, cavalry brigade). A separate group of Ezebek (tank and infantry divisions) advanced from the south from the Bely region. In the first days of the operation, Soviet troops put up stubborn resistance, and only a deep detour along the forest roads of the German cavalry brigade with access to the rear of the defending troops allowed the enemy to succeed.
Only on July 5, German tank divisions from the northern and southern groups met near the village of Pushkari, cutting off the Bely - Olenino highway. The encirclement ring around the Soviet troops closed. It included the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps in full strength, as well as two rifle divisions and a tank brigade from the 41st Army, a full rifle division and separate units of two divisions of the 22nd Army.
The Germans understood that in the vast territory of the “boiler” with airfields located inside, the surrounded Soviet units had the opportunity to defend themselves for a long time and successfully (which the Soviet troops had already demonstrated in the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation in the spring of 1942. Therefore, without waiting for the completion of the encirclement, on July 4 from the eastern front Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge, the third strike group (1 tank and 2 infantry divisions) delivered a deep cutting blow in the western direction... Having received information about this, on July 5, front commander I. S. Konev realized the hopelessness of resistance inside the ledge and gave the order to break through all the encircled forces from the encirclement ring, but the enemy did not allow this: on July 6, the encirclement ring was cut in two and two encircled groups formed.Moving to the breakthrough lines along bad dirt roads (due to the past rains, off-road movement became impossible), Soviet troops were constantly subjected to German air strikes and suffered heavy losses.
A large number of military equipment was abandoned due to the impossibility of its transfer. Communication between the front command and the headquarters of the 39th Army was lost for several days.
Unlike the battles of 1941, the Soviet troops showed considerable stability and controllability in critical situations. By July 9, almost all units of the 41st Army, which was located closest to the rest of the troops of the front, broke out of the encirclement (two divisions and a tank brigade without tanks, over three thousand people, greatly thinned). To the north, units and entire units from five divisions at once also successfully broke through. To prevent the exit of Soviet troops from the encirclement, the German command was forced to bring into battle in the area of the former "corridor" the last remaining reserves that were being prepared for this operation. Nevertheless, on July 11, a group of more than one thousand people, led by the commander of the 381st Infantry Division, broke through, on July 13 - a group of 300 soldiers, led by the commander of a cavalry regiment. Attempts to break through and smaller groups did not stop, while the Soviet soldiers suffered significant losses.
On July 12, the command of the 9th German Army reported the completion of Operation Seidlitz. In the official report of the German command of July 13, 1942, it was reported about the complete destruction of the entire encircled group, the capture of over 30 thousand prisoners, the capture and destruction of 218 tanks, 591 guns, 1301 machine guns and mortars.
In fact, the organized resistance of the encircled Soviet troops and their attempts to break through continued. By July 17, a group of about 1,500 people fought in the northern "cauldron" under the leadership of the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, Major General P. S. Ivanov, in the southern "cauldron" the headquarters of the 39th Army and about eight thousand people. On the night of July 19, U-2 aircraft took out part of the command of the 39th Army and its slightly wounded commander, Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov. The deputy commander of the 39th Army, Lieutenant-General I.A. Bogdanov, remained in command of the troops, who organized the exit of his troops from the encirclement: on the evening of July 21, counter attacks were delivered from inside and outside (185th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army). On the night of July 21, 7362 people broke through in an organized manner, while in a fierce bloody battle, about 460 fighters died and 172 were captured. Among the dead were the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, Major General P.S. Ivanov, the deputy commander of the 22nd Army, Major General A.D. Berezin. Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov himself was in the attacking line and broke through to his own, but already in the depths of the defense of the 22nd Army he was mortally wounded during shelling, taken by plane to the hospital in the city of Bely and died there on July 24, 1942.
The final resistance inside the encirclement ceased on July 23, 1942. In total, up to 20 thousand people broke through the encirclement.
Operation results
During Operation Seidlitz, the Soviet troops of the Kalinin Front suffered a major defeat. An important and advantageous foothold in the depths of the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping of the enemy was lost, which increased its stability in defense. The enemy restored traffic along the shortest roads from Smolensk to Olenino, significantly improving the supply of his 9th Army.
In Soviet historical science, this unsuccessful operation was hardly mentioned or studied.
Losses
the USSR
On the issue of determining the level of losses, the few information of Russian and Western historians differ significantly from each other. So, A.V. Isaev cites the following data in his work: the total losses of the 22nd, 39th, 41st armies and the 11th cavalry corps amounted to 61,722 people, of which 4386 were killed and 47,072 were missing lead. Among the dead were Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov, Major Generals P. S. Ivanov, A. D. Berezin, P. P. Miroshnichenko (Chief of Staff of the 39th Army), Brigadier Commissar Yusim (member of the Military Council of the 39th Army). The tank brigade lost all 43 tanks. All Katyushas were blown up. Similar data are given by S. A. Gerasimova.
According to German data, up to 50 thousand prisoners were captured during the operation, 230 tanks, 58 aircraft, 760 guns of all kinds were destroyed or captured.
According to the considered official data presented by G.F. Krivosheev, the total losses in this operation were determined at 20,360 people, of which 7,432 people were irretrievable, and 12,928 sanitary people. Given the nature of the battle, these data are considered clearly underestimated.
Germany
The losses of the German side are unknown and are not published even in the works of German historians. It is assumed that they were much less than the losses of the Soviet troops, but at the same time quite significant, since this did not allow the Army Group Center to take part in the summer offensive of the Wehrmacht in 1942. All units of the 9th German Army withdrawn to the reserve remained in the Rzhev ledge and were involved in the course of the Rzhev-Sychev operation.
