On this day:
The holiday was established in 1994 by presidential decree. Russian Federation.
August 22 - Day of the State Flag of the Russian Federation.
The holiday was established in 1994 by decree of the President of the Russian Federation.
State flag of the Russian Federation as official state symbol approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 2126 of December 11, 1993 "On the State Flag of the Russian Federation". It is a rectangular panel of three equal horizontal stripes: the top one is white, the middle one is blue and the bottom one is red. Historically, the "tricolor" was the trade or commercial flag of the Russian Empire.
In Article 6 of the Marine Charter approved by Peter the Great on January 13, 1720, it was said: "Russian merchant ships are obliged to have a flag of three striped colors: white, blue, red." In 1885, the white-blue-red flag was confirmed by Emperor Alexander III as the flag of commercial ships: "The flag for commercial ships consists of three horizontal stripes, counting from above: white, blue and red." Other colors prevailed in the state symbols of the Russian Empire. Created in 1696, the coat of arms of Peter I was red with a white border. In 1742, in connection with the upcoming coronation of Elizabeth Petrovna, a new state banner of the Russian Empire was created (which was one of the state regalia along with the crown, scepter, seal and was used at solemn ceremonies, coronations, burials of emperors). It consisted of a yellow cloth with a black double-headed eagle on both sides, surrounded by oval shields with 31 coats of arms, symbolizing the kingdoms, principalities and lands mentioned in the imperial title. The flag was also used as a symbol of Russian statehood. from the state colors of black-yellow-white combination. Yeltsin and his entourage chose the commercial tricolor as a symbol of modern Russia.
One-legged Admiral Ivan Isakov
Ivan Stepanovich ISAKOV was born on August 22, 1894 (died 10/11/1967), Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union. At the age of 20, he began his naval service. During the First World War, he served as midshipman on the destroyer Izyaslav. After the revolution, he held a number of leading command and staff positions in the fleets, as well as in the central apparatus of the Navy, commanded the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.
One-legged Admiral Ivan Isakov
Ivan Stepanovich ISAKOV was born on August 22, 1894 (died 10/11/1967), Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union. At the age of 20, he began his naval service. During the First World War, he served as midshipman on the destroyer Izyaslav. After the revolution, he held a number of leading command and staff positions in the fleets, as well as in the central apparatus of the Navy, commanded the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.
In 1938 he was appointed deputy People's Commissar Navy. In 1939 he joined the Communist Party. The outstanding abilities of Admiral Isakov as a naval commander and a major military leader were especially revealed during the years of the Great Patriotic War, whom he met at the post of First Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy. In July 1941, when a difficult situation arose for our troops and fleet in the Baltic states, I.S. Isakov was appointed deputy commander-in-chief of the North-Western direction for the marine part. With the formation of the North Caucasian direction in April 1942, I. S. Isakov was appointed deputy commander in chief and a member of the Military Council of this direction. The organizational talent of Ivan Stepanovich played a big role in uniting the efforts of the troops operating in Sevastopol, on the Kerch Peninsula and on the Caucasian coast. He paid much attention to the combat operations of the Azov Flotilla, the Kerch Naval Base and other parts of the Black Sea Fleet. On October 4, 1942, during the next trip to the front lines near Tuapse, in the area of the Goyth pass, I.S. Isakov was seriously wounded. His leg was amputated. For three months the struggle for his life continued. In winter, Isakov, without leaving the chamber, began to work, and in May 1943 he returned to Moscow. Having become an invalid, Ivan Stepanovich did not lose his composure and courage. He was appointed Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, subsequently holding a number of other responsible positions in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, six Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Ushakov, 1st Class, Orders of the Patriotic War, 1st Class and the Red Star, many medals, as well as orders of a number of foreign countries. I. S. Isakov died in 1967. He is buried at the Novodevichy cemetery.
Return of Port Arthur
On August 22, 1945, Soviet paratroopers liberated Port Arthur and Dalniy (Dairen) from the Japanese invaders.
Return of Port Arthur
On August 22, 1945, Soviet paratroopers liberated Port Arthur and Dalniy (Dairen) from the Japanese invaders.
August 13, 1945 - US President Harry Truman gave the order to occupy the port of Dalniy before the Russians landed there. The Americans were going to do this on ships. The Soviet command decided to get ahead of the United States: while they sailed to the Liaodong Peninsula, they would land Russian troops on seaplanes.
On August 22, 1945, 27 aircraft of the 117th Aviation Regiment of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet took off and headed for the port of Dalniy. On board each of them were 36 people. In the bay of the port, the Dalniy landing party landed and occupied the city. Then together with parts
The 6th Guards Tank Army and units of the 39th Army liberated the entire Liaodong Peninsula along with Port Arthur. He returned to Russia again. The Supreme Commander Joseph Stalin assessed this fact as follows: “Japan began its aggression against our country back in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese war ... As you know, Russia was then defeated in the war with Japan. It was clear that Japan set itself the task of wresting all of its Far East from Russia.... But the defeat of the Russian troops in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War... was a black stain on our country. Our people believed and expected that the day would come when Japan would be defeated and the stain would be eliminated. For forty years we, the people of the old generation, have been waiting for this day.”
On August 22, 1989, Alexander Sergeevich Yakovlev (b. 1906), an aircraft designer, winner of six Stalin Prizes, the Lenin Prize and the State Prize of the USSR, the creator of the Yak series aircraft, died.
Aircraft designer Alexander Yakovlev
On August 22, 1989, Alexander Sergeevich Yakovlev (b. 1906), an aircraft designer, winner of six Stalin Prizes, the Lenin Prize and the State Prize of the USSR, the creator of the Yak series aircraft, died.
Under the leadership of Yakovlev, OKB 115 produced over 200 types and modifications of aircraft, including more than 100 serial ones. Since 1932, OKB aircraft have been continuously in large-scale production and operation. A total of 70,000 Yak aircraft were built. During the Great Patriotic War, 40,000 Yak aircraft were built for the front. 74 world records were set on Yakovlev Design Bureau aircraft.
Information exchange
If you have information about any event related to the subject of our site, and you want us to publish it, you can use the special form:Fulfilling the allied obligations taken to the USA and Great Britain, as well as in order to ensure the security of its Far Eastern borders, the USSR entered the war against Japan on the night of August 9, 1945, which was a logical continuation of the Great Patriotic War.
With the defeat of Germany and its allies in Europe, the Japanese did not consider themselves defeated, their stubbornness caused an increase in pessimistic assessments of the American command. It was believed, in particular, that the war would not end before the end of 1946, and the loss of allied troops during the landing on the Japanese islands would amount to more than 1 million people.
The most important element of the Japanese defense was the fortified areas of the Kwantung Army stationed in the territory of occupied Manchuria (Northeast China). On the one hand, this army served as a guarantee of the unimpeded supply of Japan with strategic raw materials from China and Korea, and on the other hand, it performed the task of pulling Soviet forces out of the European theater of war, thereby helping the German Wehrmacht.
Back in April 1941, the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact was concluded, which somewhat reduced tension between Japan and the USSR, but, simultaneously with the preparation of a strike against the Anglo-American troops in the Pacific, the Japanese command was developing a plan of military operations against the Red Army under the code called "Kantokuen" (Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army). The danger of war on the Far Eastern borders of the USSR persisted throughout the subsequent time. On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty.
By the summer of 1945, the Japanese had 17 fortified areas in Manchuria, 4.5 thousand pillboxes and bunkers, numerous airfields and landing sites. The Kwantung Army had 1 million men, 1.2 thousand tanks, 1.9 thousand aircraft, and 6.6 thousand guns. To overcome strong fortifications, not only courageous, but also experienced troops were needed. Soviet command at the beginning of the war on Far East transferred here additional forces released in the west after the victory over Nazi Germany. By the beginning of August, the total number of Red Army formations in the Far Eastern theater of operations reached 1.7 million people, 30 thousand guns and mortars, 5.2 thousand tanks, more than 5 thousand aircraft, 93 ships. In July 1945, the High Command of the Soviet troops in the Far East was formed, it was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevsky.
On August 8, 1945, in Moscow, the Soviet government handed over to the Japanese ambassador a statement stating that in connection with Japan's refusal to stop hostilities against the USA, Great Britain and China, the Soviet Union considers itself in a state of war with Japan from August 9, 1945. On that day, the offensive of the Red Army in Manchuria began in all directions almost simultaneously.
The high rate of advance of the Soviet and Mongolian troops in the central part of Manchuria put the Japanese command in a hopeless situation. In connection with the success in Manchuria, the 2nd Far Eastern Front part of its forces went over to the offensive on Sakhalin. The final stage of the war against Japan was the Kuril landing operation, carried out by part of the forces of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts and the Pacific Fleet.
The Soviet Union won a victory in the Far East in the shortest possible time. In total, the enemy lost over 700 thousand soldiers and officers, of which 84 thousand were killed and more than 640 thousand were captured. Soviet losses amounted to 36.5 thousand people, of which 12 thousand were killed and missing.
On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay, on board the American battleship Missouri, the Japanese rulers, in the presence of plenipotentiaries of the USSR, the USA, China, Great Britain, France and other allied states, signed the Act of Japan's unconditional surrender. Thus ended the second World War that lasted six long years.
YALTA SECRET AGREEMENT OF THE THREE GREAT POWERS ON THE FAR EAST, February 11, 1945
The leaders of the three great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and Great Britain—agreed that two or three months after the surrender of Germany and the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on the condition that:
1. Maintaining the status quo of Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic).
2. Restoration of the rights belonging to Russia, violated by the perfidious attack of Japan in 1904, namely:
a) the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of about. Sakhalin and all adjacent islands,
b) the internationalization of the commercial port of Dairen with the provision of the predominant interests of the Soviet Union in this port and the restoration of the lease on Port Arthur, as a naval base of the USSR,
c) joint operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, which gives access to Dairen, on the basis of organizing a mixed Soviet-Chinese Society with the provision of the predominant interests of the Soviet Union, while it is understood that China retains full sovereignty in Manchuria.
3. Transfer to the Soviet Union of the Kuril Islands. It is assumed that an agreement regarding Outer Mongolia and the aforementioned ports and railways will require the consent of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. On the advice of the Marshal, the President will arrange for such consent to be obtained.
The heads of the governments of the Three Great Powers agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unconditionally satisfied after the victory over Japan.
For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China with the National Chinese Government for rendering assistance to it with its armed forces in order to liberate China from the Japanese yoke.
Franklin Roosevelt
Winston Churchill
Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War. T. 3. M., 1947.
JAPANESE SURRENDER ACT, September 2, 1945
(extract)
1. We, acting on the orders and in the name of the Emperor, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Staff, hereby accept the terms of the Declaration issued on July 26 at Potsdam by the Heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain, subsequently acceded to by the Soviet Union, which four Powers shall later known as the Allied Powers.
2. We hereby declare the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Imperial Japanese General Staff, all Japanese military forces and all military forces under Japanese control, no matter where they are located.
3. We hereby order all Japanese troops, wherever located, and the Japanese people to immediately cease hostilities, preserve and prevent damage to all ships, aircraft and other military and civilian property, and comply with all demands that may be made by the supreme Commander of the Allied Powers or organs of the Japanese government on his instructions.
4. We hereby order the Japanese Imperial General Staff to immediately issue orders to the commanders of all Japanese troops and troops under Japanese control, wherever they may be, to surrender unconditionally in person, and also to secure the unconditional surrender of all troops under their command.
6. We hereby undertake that the Japanese Government and its successors will honestly carry out the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, issue such orders and take such actions as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers or any other representative appointed by the Allied Powers, in order to implement this declaration, requires.
8. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to govern the state shall be subordinated to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, who shall take such steps as he deems necessary to carry out these terms of surrender.
Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. M., 1947. T. 3.
The Far Eastern grouping of Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War consisted of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces of the country's territory. Organizationally, they were part of the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts. Pacific Fleet, Red Banner Amur Flotilla. Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal air defense zones of the country. Land and sea borders were guarded by border troops.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, taking into account the real danger of aggression from imperialist Japan, during almost the entire war was forced to keep in the Far East from 32 to 59 calculated divisions of the ground forces, from 10 to 29 aviation divisions and up to 6 divisions and 4 brigades of the Air Defense Forces of the country's territory total strength more than 1 million soldiers and officers, 8 - 16 thousand guns and mortars, over 2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, from 3 to 4 thousand combat aircraft and more than 100 warships of the main classes. In total, this amounted to 15 to 30 percent of the combat forces and means of all Soviet Armed Forces in different periods of the war (475) . Combat and strength of the Far Eastern grouping in 1941 - 1945. shown in tables 5 and 7.
Table 6. The combat composition of the Soviet troops in the Far East in 1941 - 1945 (476)
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In the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, from the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts, the Headquarters used 12 rifle, 5 tank and motorized divisions on the Soviet-German front - a total of over 122 thousand people, more than 2 thousand guns and mortars, 2209 light tanks , over 12 thousand cars, 1500 tractors and tractors. The Japanese high command closely followed the course of hostilities on the Soviet-German front and the grouping of Soviet troops in the Far East, trying to determine the most favorable moment for an attack on the USSR. This is evidenced by a document sent to the troops in the early days of December 1941, when the German fascists stood at the walls of Moscow: “To complete the continuous preparations for operations against the Soviet Union, not only the Kwantung Army, but also every army and first-line formations must make every effort efforts to ensure that, observing the gradually occurring changes in the military situation of the Soviet Union and Mongolia, to be able at any moment to establish the true situation. This applies especially to the present conditions, when it becomes more and more necessary to quickly establish the signs of a turning point in the situation” (481). Considering the threat of attack, the Headquarters used the Far Eastern forces and means on the Soviet-German front only in the most minimal quantities. From December 5, 1941 to April 30, 1942, only two rifle divisions were transferred there from the Trans-Baikal Front, and a cavalry regiment from the Far East. In the summer and autumn of 1942, when the Wehrmacht fiercely rushed to the Volga and the Caucasus, the Japanese command again prepared to strike at the Soviet Far Eastern border. It was during that period that the military operations of his armed forces were not active either in the Pacific Ocean or in China. Meanwhile, the offensive of the Nazi troops required new reserves. From May 1 to November 19, the Stavka transferred 10 rifle divisions, on the Bryansk Front - 4 rifle brigades with a total strength of about 150 thousand people, over 1600 guns and mortars, a large number of other weapons and military equipment. In the winter of 1942/43, only 1 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, 6 howitzer artillery brigades and 3 mortar regiments with a total number of about 35 thousand people, 557 guns and mortars, 32 light tanks and other weapons were transferred from the Far East to the Stavka reserve. In 1943, only 8 howitzer artillery brigades, formed in March - May, with a total number of about 9 thousand people, more than 230 large-caliber field guns, were transferred from the Far East to the Soviet-German front. The last regrouping of Soviet troops from the Far East was carried out during the summer-autumn campaign of 1944. These were an airborne brigade and four high-capacity howitzer artillery regiments. During the war years, 39 divisions, 21 brigades and 10 regiments were redeployed to the Headquarters reserve from the ground forces of this group. Their total number was about 402 thousand people, over 5 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks (482). An important role in the defeat of Nazi Germany belongs to the sailors of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla. In 1941, 12 naval rifle brigades were formed from their composition. More than 140,000 Pacific sailors fought in the ground forces on the Soviet-German front (483). In 1941 - 1944 the active Northern and Black Sea fleets were replenished with warships, as well as well-trained sailors and pilots of the Pacific Fleet (484). Thus, the Soviet Supreme High Command, constantly taking care of strengthening the borders in the Far East, practically during the first three years of the war used the Far Eastern grouping as one of the sources of replenishment of the troops operating against Nazi Germany, creating new units and formations. During the war years, the transfer of combat forces and means, weapons and military equipment from one theater of operations to another clearly testifies to the great contribution of the Far Eastern troops to achieving victory over Nazi Germany. The main part of these forces and means was sent by the Headquarters to the Soviet-German front in the most difficult and crucial moments of the war against Germany. In the second half of 1943, when a radical change took place on the Soviet-German front in favor of the Soviet Union, and Italy fell out of the fascist bloc, it became clear to the whole world that sooner or later Germany and Japan would fall after her. The successes of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces changed the course of the entire Second World War and enabled the United States and Great Britain to intensify operations in the Pacific. From that time on, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command almost did not attract the combat forces and means of the Far Eastern grouping to the Soviet-German front and began to carry out measures for its development. In August 1943, the Primorsky Group of Forces was formed as part of the Far Eastern Front (1st and 25th combined arms armies, all formations and units located in Primorye, as well as the 9th Air Army, operationally subordinate to it). Gradually, the combat and numerical strength of the Far Eastern group increased, the troops were saturated with automatic and conventional small arms. Artillery, tank and aircraft fleets were replenished with new types of guns and vehicles, their logistics improved. In 1944, 11 rifle divisions, a mechanized corps headquarters, a mechanized brigade, several mechanically driven artillery regiments, and a field-type fortified area (485) were deployed. In February 1945, the General Staff, the central and main departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense were intensively working to prepare plans for the deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East, as well as to concentrate the necessary amount of material and technical means there (486) . Calculations have shown that military-political goals can be achieved in a short time only if there are three powerful offensive groupings in the Far Eastern theater of operations and a significant superiority over the enemy in manpower and equipment. To do this, it was necessary to sharply increase the combat and numerical strength of the Far Eastern formations. The strategic deployment of troops in the Far East differed from the preparation offensive operations in Europe by the fact that it was carried out in advance and had two stages (initial and final), at each of which various tasks were solved. The initial stage, completed in the main in the autumn of 1941, was carried out in order to reliably secure the state border from possible Japanese aggression. On the territory of the two former border military districts, deployed in fronts, only covering troops were concentrated, but also forces and means capable of delivering an immediate retaliatory strike. Throughout the war with fascist Germany, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command systematically improved the defensive power of the Far Eastern group, almost doubling the number of its personnel. The final stage of the strategic deployment, in which both the troops stationed in this theater and those concentrated as a result of the regrouping, took part during the immediate preparation of the offensive campaign against Japan. Its goal was to create a new strategic front of armed struggle in a new theater of operations. Such important problems as ensuring the secrecy of the regrouping and concentration of troops in the corresponding strategic directions, covering their deployment, command and control of troops, and their comprehensive material and technical support were solved. At the end of February - March 1945, the General Staff approved plans for the deployment of troops in the Far East and their logistics (487) . On March 14, the State Defense Committee decided to strengthen the air defense of the Far East and Transbaikalia (488) . By a directive of March 19, the Stavka detached from the Far Eastern Front and subjugated the Primorsky Group of Forces, creating a third strategic direction for the deployment of troops (489). On March 26, the Supreme Command Headquarters assigned new tasks to the Far Eastern Front and the Primorsky Group of Forces to cover the deployment of troops (490). Considering the important role armored forces in the forthcoming campaign, in March 1945, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command began to upgrade the material of the tank formations of the Far East, which were armed only with obsolete light slippers T-26 and BT throughout the war. In all tank brigades, the first battalions were armed with T-34 tanks. The first tank regiments of the 61st and 111th tank divisions were transferred to the same armament. In total, it was planned to send 670 T-34 tanks (491) to the Far East. At the same time, a list of measures for the medical support of the Far Eastern campaign was approved. It was necessary to transfer 348 different medical units and institutions, create a reserve of personnel, stocks of materials and funds for medical care (492) . In view of the fact that the main part of the troops and cargo was planned to be transported by rail, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin instructed the People's Commissariat of Railways to prepare the eastern and Far Eastern railways for mass transportation. In February 1945, a check was made of the mobilization readiness of a number of highways of the Far East to ensure a wide flow of military traffic, and measures were outlined to increase their throughput (493) . At the beginning of 1945, the operational and technical condition of the eastern railways did not fully meet the requirements of the situation. There were many rotten sleepers on the Trans-Siberian Railway, more than 11 thousand pieces of worn or burst rails, which significantly limited the throughput of many sections. The subgrade on some lines needed to be strengthened, especially in the section along the shore of Lake Baikal, where even before the war work had begun, but not completed, on the construction of retaining walls and the repair of emergency tunnels (494) . Meanwhile, in the difficult days of the war, all stocks of rails, sleepers, turnouts, a significant part of the locomotive fleet were sent to the western roads. There was also a shortage of skilled workers who were mobilized into the military operational departments and special formations of the People's Commissariat of Commissariat for Service to service the western roads. Despite the measures taken to return specialists, by the beginning of hostilities against militaristic Japan, about 20 thousand of them were missing on the railway lines of the Far East (495) . In the spring of 1945, the capacity of the Tomsk and Omsk railways and some lines of the Far East was increased. On April 13, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution "On measures to improve the operation of the railways of the Far East (Krasnoyarsk, East Siberian, Trans-Baikal, Amur, Far Eastern and Primorskaya)". In order to improve the management of the activities of these highways, the Special District of the Far East Railways was created, headed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Railways V. A. Garnyk. General A.V. Dobryakov became the authorized representative of the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the BOSO under the district. For some sections, it was necessary to increase the capacity from 12 to 38 pairs of trains. The People's Commissariat of Railways was charged with increasing the number of locomotives on the railways of the Far East: by May 1, 1945 - up to 2708, by July 1 - up to 2947, and by September 1 - up to 3107. To replenish the locomotive fleet of these roads from other highways and from the reserve 800 locomotives (496) were distilled. Of the 240 steam locomotives of the GKO reserve and 360 steam locomotives of the NKPS reserve, it was required to form 20 locomotive columns. The GKO resolution provided for the creation of significant coal reserves by reserving reserves, as well as replenishing the railways of Siberia and the Far East with qualified personnel. During the second quarter of 1945, it was planned to increase the number of skilled workers by 30 thousand people, including machinists by 2373, assistant machinists by 2916, locomotive mechanics by 3155, conductors by 2074, track workers by 8816 people (497). From April, units of three operational railway regiments and three operational departments from Poland and Romania began to enter the Special District of the Far East Railways; all special forces were returning from the southwestern highways. In total, there were over 14 thousand people (498) in these parts. At the disposal of the NKPS came 8,000 conscripts, recognized for health reasons as limited fit for military service. Two railway brigades and several special units were sent for restoration work (499) . These works demanded enormous effort from the railroad workers. The main military transportation, both centralized and interfrontal, was carried out by rail in May - July, but they were most intensive in June. By August 9, their total volume amounted to 222,331 wagons (in terms of two-axle), including 127,126 wagons arrived in the Far East from the central regions of the country. Of this number, 74,345 wagons were received for the Trans-Baikal Front. 1st Far East - 31,100, 2nd Far East - 17,916, and 81,538 wagons were used for delivery military units and connections (operational transport) (500) . According to the types of troops, transportation was distributed as follows: 29.8 percent - for rifle troops, 30.5 percent - for artillery and armored vehicles, 39.7 percent - for aviation, engineering and other formations and units. The following facts testify to the intensity of the work of the railway: on average, in June - July, from 13 to 22 railway echelons arrived daily. Significant intra- and inter-front transportation was carried out through internal rail, water and highway-unpaved communications. The transfer of troops along them was carried out in a combined way: by transport and on foot. In May-August, 95,205 wagons passed by rail, about 700,000 tons of cargo were transported by water, 513,000 tons were transported along unpaved highways, and 4,222 tons were transferred by air. The main task of the railway units of the Trans-Baikal Front was the preparation of the main communications of the front - the single-track line Karymskaya - Borzya - Bayan-Tumen (Choibalsan). To do this, only in the weakest section of Borzya - Bayan-Tumen in June 1945, 13 sidings were built by the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front, the BOSO and railway workers. This made it possible to increase the capacity of the section from 7 to 18 pairs of trains per day (501) . The 3rd railway brigade arrived at the disposal of the 1st Far Eastern Front from Czechoslovakia, which launched work on the Primorskaya Railway to develop stations, a water supply system and strengthen the upper structure of the track. In the 2nd Far Eastern Front, the 25th railway brigade increased the capacity of the Amur and Far Eastern railways from 25 to 30 pairs of trains per day by the start of hostilities. Since the arriving forces turned out to be insufficient, about 80 more various recovery trains and flyers were formed, serviced by brigades of railway workers on the Amur, Primorskaya and Far Eastern roads (502). In total, in the spring and summer months of 1945, up to a million Soviet soldiers and officers (503), tens of thousands of artillery pieces, tanks, vehicles and many thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, food, uniforms were on the communications routes of Siberia, Transbaikalia and the Far East and other cargo. Throughout the entire length from Irkutsk to Vladivostok, the Trans-Siberian Railway was transferred to the operational group of the Logistics Directorate of the Soviet Army under the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. The fronts, on the other hand, used branches from the main highway leading to the borders of Manchuria and Korea. Their total length was 2700 km. The Trans-Baikal Front had 12 railway sections (504) for basing, the 2nd Far East - 9 and the 1st Far East - 8. In addition, more than 800 km of narrow-gauge railways built before the war on the territory of the MPR were used. Borzya station with a branch at Bayan-Tumen station (for the Trans-Baikal Front), Svobodny station with a branch in Khabarovsk (for the 2nd Far Eastern Front), Guberovo and Voroshilov stations (Ussuriysk) with a branch at Manzovka station ( for the 1st Far Eastern Front). The greatest load was planned for the line in the Trans-Baikal Front. Meanwhile, the capacity of the railway sections Karymskaya - Borzya, Borzya - Bayan-Tumen could not provide the required speed of movement. In this regard, the front command decided to send motorized units and mechanized artillery from the Karymskaya station under its own power. To do this, special groups of officers arrived in Irkutsk and Karymskaya, who distributed units on the spot to follow on their own and by rail (505) . Troops were delivered to Primorye by the Khabarovsk-Vladivostok railway, passing in separate sections 3-6 km from the state border. Therefore, the command of the 1st Far Eastern Front attached particular importance to the secrecy of transportation. Here, more often than on other fronts, in order to misinform the enemy, false transports of troops were carried out and false concentration areas were equipped. A huge volume of transportation could not be carried out only by railroads: it was necessary to build and repair unpaved highways. As a result, by August 9, the length of only military highways in the Far East exceeded 4.2 thousand km, of which it reached 2279 km on the Trans-Baikal Front, 1509 km on the 1st Far East, and 485 km on the 2nd Far East ( 506) . This greatly increased the ability to maneuver manpower and military equipment at the beginning of hostilities. In the prewar period, aviation in the Far East was not widely developed. During the war years, the length of overhead lines increased from 12 thousand km in 1941 to 18 thousand km in 1945, that is, 1.5 times; from July 1, 1941 to May 31, 1945, over 66 thousand passengers, 7 thousand tons of cargo and about 2 thousand tons of mail were transported. During the period of hostilities, the crews of the Far Eastern Civil Aviation Administration made 439 sorties and transported more than 360 tons of defense cargo, as well as a significant number of passengers (507) . In preparation for the war with Japan, a large proportion of traffic fell on the Far Eastern Shipping Company. The tasks of the fleet were determined by the GKO decree of April 30, 1945. The People's Commissariat of the Navy needed to ensure the transportation of 123 thousand tons of cargo in May through the Far Eastern water basin, including coal - 40.6 thousand tons, fish - 10.3 thousand tons, salt - 10.7 thousand tons from Sakhalin Island, imported cargo from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky to Vladivostok - 18 thousand tons and various cargoes of Dalstroy - 17 thousand tons (508). The implementation of measures to ensure the concentration and deployment of troops in the Far East allowed the Soviet command to proceed with a direct regrouping of troops. Although the State Defense Committee decided on a broad transfer of units only on June 3, 1945 (509), in fact, it began even before the end of the final campaign in Europe. In April, the reserve front department of the former Karelian Front arrived in the Far East, which was entrusted with the command of the Primorsky Group of Forces (510). Until May 9, two field-type fortified areas (511) were sent from the Stavka reserve. From May 9 to May 31, the field administration of the 5th Army arrived there, three directorates of rifle corps with four rifle divisions (512). As a source of strategic deployment in the Far East, the Headquarters used the troops of four fronts that had completed combat operations on the Soviet-German front. The bulk of the regrouped troops were the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front: the directorate of the 5th and 39th combined arms armies, 6 directorates of rifle corps, 18 rifle and 2 anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 8 artillery and 2 rocket artillery brigades, or 60 percent of the total number formations of ground forces that arrived in the Far East. Front and 2 army directorates, 6 directorates of rifle, tank and mechanized corps, 10 rifle and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 15 brigades of the main military branches were sent from the 2nd Ukrainian Front; from the Leningrad Front came the management of the breakthrough artillery corps and the mechanized corps, 6 divisions and 17 brigades of various branches of the ground forces. The rest of the formations came from the 1st Belorussian Front (three rocket artillery brigades), the Moscow Military District (two tank brigades) and directly from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (reserve front management, three brigades and two fortified areas) (513) . A large number of rear units and institutions arrived in the Far East from other military districts. Such formations and formations were sent to the Far East that could successfully solve offensive tasks in the specific conditions of a theater of military operations. Determination of the expediency of using one or another connection depended on the experience and combat qualities accumulated in battles on the Soviet-German front. Thus, formations and units of the 5th and 39th armies, which participated in breaking through the fortified defensive zones in East Prussia, were intended to break through in the main directions of the border fortified areas. The first - in the offensive zone of the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the second - on the Trans-Baikal Front. Formations of the 6th Guards Tank and 53rd combined arms armies, which had extensive experience in operations in the mountain-steppe terrain, were included in the Trans-Baikal Front for an offensive in the wide desert expanses and mountainous wooded massifs of Manchuria. The regrouping of such significant forces and means in a short time and over vast distances required its careful organization both on the part of higher authorities and directly at the places of deployment of troops. Since the Japanese held large forces on the border with the Soviet Union, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures in advance to reliably cover the lines of communication, areas of concentration and deployment of troops from possible strikes (514) . To ensure the secrecy of mass rail transportation, the admission of persons to their planning, control and accounting both in the General Staff and in the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Soviet Army was limited; it was forbidden to conduct correspondence and negotiations related to the redeployment of troops, the stations for unloading and servicing echelons were numbered; the transmission of reports on the movement of echelons was strictly controlled by the VOSO officers. Military equipment on railway platforms was camouflaged (515) . The troops were unloaded, as a rule, at night, after which they were immediately withdrawn to the area of concentration. The deployment of strike groups was carried out so covertly that at the beginning of the Manchurian operation, complete surprise was achieved. The command of the Kwantung Army knew about the movements of Soviet troops that began in the spring, but they did not expect that the Soviet Union would complete this major regrouping of the Armed Forces so soon (516) . Data on the number of forces and means of the ground forces that arrived in the Far East from May to August 8, 1945, are shown in Table 8. The table shows that the strategic regrouping of troops reached its highest limit in July, when 51.1 percent of the ground forces, 52.2 percent of artillery and 58 percent of armored weapons arrived in the Far East from the ground forces. In three months, the number of settlement divisions increased from 59.5 to 87.5, that is, 1.5 times, and the number of personnel of the entire group of troops - from 1,185,000 to 1,747,000 people. Table 8. The number of ground forces regrouped from the west during the period of strategic deployment in the Far East (517)
In total, during the period of strategic deployment, 2 front and 4 army directorates, 15 directorates of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 36 rifle, artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 53 brigades of the main branches of the ground forces and 2 fortified areas were regrouped, which amounted to a total complexity of 30 settlement divisions. In addition, the management of the 6th bomber aviation corps and 5 aviation divisions arrived. The air defense of the Far East received 3 air defense corps of the country's territory. The average staffing of units and formations was about 80 percent (518). The troops that joined the Far Eastern group were armed with more than 600 rocket launchers, as well as 900 heavy, medium tanks and self-propelled guns. The importance and expediency of the regrouping carried out to achieve victory in the war in the Far East in 1945 is evidenced by a well-known historical example. One of the reasons for the defeat of tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. was the inability of the Russian command to transfer in a short time to the Far East the necessary human reserves, weapons, ammunition and other types of materiel. The growth of combat forces and assets in the Far East, as well as the remoteness of this theater of operations, required the improvement of the strategic organs of the military leadership of the Far Eastern grouping of troops. In order to coordinate the actions of the troops and the navy, as early as May 1945, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to create the High Command in the Far East, the Military Council and headquarters under it. At the end of June, a group of generals and officers headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky left for the Far East. This group launched work in Chita (519). By a decision of July 30, the Headquarters formalized the creation of a special body top management- the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, and by the directive of August 2 - the headquarters of the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, which have actually been operating since the beginning of July. Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky was appointed commander-in-chief, General I.V. Shikin was appointed a member of the Military Council, and General S.P. Ivanov (520) was appointed chief of staff. Coordination of the actions of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla with the troops was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov. Air operations were led by the commander Air Force Air Chief Marshal A. A. Novikov. Under the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, an operational logistics group was created, headed by the Deputy Chief of the Logistics of the Soviet Army, General V. I. Vinogradov. It included a group of rear headquarters officers, representatives of the Central Directorate of Military Communications, the Main Automobile Directorate, the Main Road Directorate, the fuel supply, food and clothing supply departments, the Main Military Sanitary Directorate and the Main Trophy Directorate (521). On August 5, 1945, the Supreme Command Headquarters renamed the Primorsky Group of Forces into the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the Far Eastern Front into the 2nd Far Eastern (522). At the same time, the coastal and Far Eastern directions (523) that existed as part of the operational department of the General Staff were also renamed. By August 9, 1945, the Trans-Baikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts were deployed in the Far East, with the troops of which the 9th, 10th and 12th air armies, as well as the forces of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur military flotilla, were to interact. air defense carried out by the Primorsky, Amur and Trans-Baikal air defense armies of the country's territory. Border Troops of Primorsky. For the first time in their history, the Khabarovsk and Trans-Baikal border districts were supposed to perform tasks unusual for them: participating in front-line operations, liquidate enemy border cordons and posts, destroy its fortified strongholds, and subsequently take an active part in the pursuit of enemy troops and protect communications, headquarters, important facilities and rear areas. The Transbaikal Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, a member of the Military Council, General A. N. Tevchenkov, chief of staff, General M. V. Zakharov, consisted of the 17th, 36th, 39th and 53rd combined arms (commander generals L I. Danilov, A. A. Luchinsky, I. I. Lyudnikov, I. M. Managarov), 6th Guards Tank (commanded by General A. G. Kravchenko), 12th Air (commanded by General S. A. Khudyakov) of the armies and the cavalry-mechanized group of the Soviet-Mongolian troops (commander General I. A. Pliev, his deputy for the Mongolian troops, General Zh. Lkhagvasuren). The anti-aircraft cover of the troops of the front was carried out by army and divisional anti-aircraft artillery, as well as the Trans-Baikal Air Defense Army of the country's territory (commander General P. F. Rozhkov). By the beginning of hostilities, the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front consisted of 13 directorates of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 39 divisions and 45 brigades (rifle, airborne, cavalry, artillery, mortar, rocket artillery, tank, mechanized, anti-aircraft and self-propelled artillery), 2 fortified areas and 54 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, 2 directorates of bomber aviation corps, 6 bomber divisions, 2 assault, 3 fighter, 2 transport and 7 separate aviation regiments. Horse-mechanized formations and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army consisted of 4 cavalry and aviation divisions, a motorized armored brigade, tank, artillery regiments and a communications regiment with a total strength of about 16 thousand people, 128 guns and mortars and 32 light tanks (524). In the Trans-Baikal Air Defense Army of the country there were 3 air defense divisions, 2 separate anti-aircraft artillery air defense regiments of railway echelons and a fighter aviation division. In total, the Trans-Baikal grouping of troops consisted of 648 thousand people, or 37.1 percent of the number of Soviet troops in the Far East. It was armed with 9668 guns and mortars, 2359 tanks and self-propelled guns, 369 rocket launchers and 1324 combat aircraft (525). The total length of the Trans-Baikal Front along the state border was 2300 km (526). The 1st Far Eastern Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov, a member of the Military Council General T. F. Shtykov, chief of staff General A. N. Krutikov, included the 1st Red Banner, 5th, 25th and 35th combined arms armies (commanded by Generals A.P. Beloborodov, N.I. Krylov, I.M. Chistyakov, N.D. Zakhvataev), the Chuguev task force (commanded by General V.A. Zaitsev), the 10th mechanized corps (commander General I. D. Vasiliev) and the 9th Air Army (commanded by General I. M. Sokolov). The troops of the Primorsky Air Defense Army of the country's territory were stationed on the territory of the front (commander General A.V. Gerasimov). By August 9, the front command had control of 10 rifle and mechanized corps, 34 divisions, 47 brigades and 34 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, 14 fortified areas, a bomber aviation corps, 3 bomber, 3 fighter, 2 assault air divisions and 6 separate aviation regiments. The coastal air defense army of the country's territory included the directorate of the air defense corps, 2 air defense divisions, an anti-aircraft artillery division, and an anti-aircraft artillery brigade. 2 anti-aircraft artillery regiments and a fighter aviation division. In total, the coastal grouping had about 589 thousand people (33.7 percent), 11,430 guns and mortars, 274 rocket launchers, 1,974 slippers and self-propelled guns, and 1,137 combat aircraft (527). The length of the 1st Far Eastern Front was 700 km (528). The 2nd Far Eastern Front, commanded by General M.A. Purkaev, a member of the Military Council, General D.S. Leonov, the chief of staff, General F.I. Shevchenko, included the 2nd Red Banner, 15th and 16th combined arms ( Commanding Generals M. F. Terekhin, S. K. Mamonov, L. G. Cheremisov) and the 10th Air Army (commander General P. F. Zhigarev), the 5th Separate Rifle Corps (commander General I. Z. Pashkov ). The Amur Air Defense Army of the country's territory (commanded by General Ya. K. Polyakov) was also located within the front. The front included the directorates of 2 rifle corps, 12 rifle and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 4 rifle, 9 tank and 2 anti-tank brigades, 5 fortified areas, 34 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, the command of the mixed aviation corps, bomber, 2 assault , 3 fighter and 2 mixed aviation divisions, 9 separate aviation regiments. The Amur Air Defense Army of the country's territory consisted of directorates of 2 air defense corps, 2 air defense divisions, 2 anti-aircraft artillery brigades, 2 separate anti-aircraft artillery regiments and a fighter aviation division. This grouping included 333,000 people (19.1 percent), 5,988 guns and mortars, 72 rocket launchers, 917 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,260 combat aircraft. The length of the 2nd Far Eastern Front reached 2130 km (529). The Pacific Fleet, commanded by Admiral I. S. Yumashev, a member of the Military Council, General S. E. Zakharov, and the chief of staff, Vice Admiral A. S. Frolov, had 2 cruisers, a leader, 12 destroyers, 19 patrol ships, 78 submarines, 52 minesweepers, 49 submarine hunters, 204 torpedo boats(530) . The aviation of the fleet consisted of 1618 aircraft, of which 1382 were combat. The number of personnel is about 165 thousand people, the fleet had 2550 guns and mortars, as well as other weapons (531). The Pacific Fleet was based at Vladivostok, as well as Sovetskaya Gavan and Petropavlovsk. The Red Banner Amur Flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral N.V. Antonov, a member of the Military Council Rear Admiral M.G. Yakovenko, the chief of staff, Captain 1st Rank A.M. Gushchin, had in service 8 monitors, 11 gunboats, 7 mine boats, 52 armored boats, 12 minesweepers, 36 minesweepers and a number of support vessels (532). Its aviation consisted of 68 combat aircraft. In addition, all patrol boats of the border guard on the Amur and Ussuri, as well as ships of the civil river shipping company, were subordinate to the commander of the flotilla. The flotilla included 12.5 thousand people, 199 anti-aircraft guns and mortars (533). The Red Banner Amur military flotilla was based at Khabarovsk, Malaya Sazanka on the Zeya River, Sretensk on the Shilka River and Lake Khanka. So, by August 9, 1945, 11 combined arms, tank and 3 air armies, 3 air defense armies of the country's territory, a fleet and a flotilla were deployed against the Japanese armed forces in the Far East. They included directorates of 33 corps, 131 divisions and 117 brigades of the main branches of service. The land border of the USSR was covered by 21 fortified areas. The total strength of the Soviet Far Eastern group and its weapons are shown in Table 9. Table 9. The number of personnel, weapons and military equipment of the Soviet group of forces in the Far East at the beginning of the war against Japan (534)
The grouping of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East was a force capable of crushing Japanese troops in Manchuria in a short time. It was based on soldiers and officers of formations and units who were in the Far East during the war, but were well trained in the course of lengthy combat training and knew the theater of operations, the nature of the enemy’s defense and the characteristics of the Japanese army. The personnel of the armies transferred from the west had extensive experience in operating against a strong enemy. The skillful use of these features significantly increased the striking power of the grouping and in many respects predetermined the success of the entire campaign. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Under the new conditions, it became necessary to transfer commands directly to launchers, missile submarines and aviation units, bypassing all intermediate instances. It was necessary to rebuild the entire information processing system with its display on screens, to create new means of microfilming, copying and reproduction, data processing and storage.
In the realities of the new time, neither the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, nor the General Staff could, as before, exercise control from permanent locations. It was possible to ensure reliable leadership of the Armed Forces only with permanently operating, perfectly protected and technically equipped command posts that needed to be taken before the start of the war. All this and much more forced us to switch to a new structure of strategic command and control bodies, to develop other principles for their actions in a combat situation.
In the 1970-1980s. the system of leadership of all groupings of the Armed Forces in the operation of strategic nuclear forces, the strategic operation to repel an aerospace attack, and in strategic operations in ocean theaters of military operations was carefully worked out.
Management of strategic nuclear forces was supposed to be carried out strictly centrally, taking into account the specific features and various options for the possible unleashing of a nuclear missile war. The right to make a decision to put them into action belonged exclusively to the country's top political leadership, and combat missions down to each launcher, missile submarine and any crew strategic aviation developed by the General Staff. Flight tasks were calculated at the main headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Navy.
The orders of the Supreme High Command for the transfer of forces to high and full combat readiness, for the first launch of missiles and the first combat sortie of long-range aviation were supposed to be transferred from the Central Command Center of the General Staff via the automated control system of the Combat Control Center (CBU) directly to the command post of missile units and subunits, to the command post of aviation regiments ( airfields) long-range aviation and missile submarines. These orders were simultaneously received at the Central Command Center of the branches of the Armed Forces, the command post of formations and formations. The collection of information was supposed to be carried out at the same time with its issuance to the Central Command Center of the General Staff.
It was also planned to direct the repulse of the aerospace attack through the General Staff. The direct control of the formations of the country's Air Defense Forces, individual formations of anti-missile, anti-space defense and formations of missile attack warning was assigned to the commander-in-chief of the country's air defense forces, and the forces and means of air defense of the fronts and fleets - to the commanders of the fronts (fleets). The control system of the country's air defense forces was built using automated systems at all levels, from units to the Central Command Post.
The leadership of the strategic operation in the ocean theater by the Supreme High Command was supposed to be carried out through the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The deployment of forces and the delivery of the first blows were planned to be carried out centrally.
The direct command of the forces and means of the Navy during the operation was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief and the Main Staff of the Navy. At the same time, it was understood that the control of strategic submarines in combat patrol areas would be entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and they could strike only by order of the Supreme High Command with the Central Command of the General Staff.
Management of strategic air operations was planned to be carried out through the General Staff, and direct control of aviation in the conduct of these operations - through the commander-in-chief and the Air Force Main Staff. They, relying on the headquarters of the Long-Range Aviation, were supposed to direct its independent actions. The use of the Air Force in the theaters of operations was entrusted to the headquarters of the corresponding strategic directions.
The leadership of the troops of the Far East was somewhat different from other administrative structures, since the remoteness of the Far Eastern region from the center at all times of the USSR forced the creation of special higher military command bodies here much earlier.
The first time such a body under the name was created on the eve of the war with Japan on August 2, 1945, and already on September 17 of this year, after fulfilling its mission, it was sent to create the administration of the Trans-Baikal-Amur Military District. The Trans-Baikal, 2nd and 1st Far Eastern, as well as the Pacific Fleet, the North Pacific and Amur military flotillas were subordinate to him. The commander-in-chief was the Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky Alexander Mikhailovich.
Secondarily Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East existed from 05/22/1947 to 04/23/1953 with headquarters in Khabarovsk and united the Far Eastern, Primorsky and Trans-Baikal military districts, the Pacific Fleet and the Amur military flotilla were operationally subordinate: its administration was focused on the creation of a new administration of the Far Eastern Military District (II-th formations). The commander-in-chief was Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky Rodion Yakovlevich.
For the third time, such a management structure is already under the name High command of the troops of the Far East(GKVDV) in this region was created on February 8, 1979 with headquarters (military unit 65285) in Ulan-Ude. This creation was preceded by a large-scale movement of Soviet troops from west to east, which had no analogues in the post-war period ( see app. 3.4), as well as international stoppage tensions in Southeast Asia, primarily between then-USSR adversary China and Soviet Union ally Vietnam.
The troops of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern districts were subordinate to him. For the management of the GKVDV, connections and parts of the VGK were used. 130th separate airborne cadre brigade, 20th and 25th separate reconnaissance brigades of the GRU, 9th and 50th separate communications brigades, 151st mixed air regiment.
GKVDV - the second largest and combat power among the four Main Commands direction, united the troops:
- 7 combined arms armies (5th, 15th, 29th, 35th, 36th, 39th and 51st) and 2 air armies (1st Special and 23rd).
- 2 army corps (25th and 43rd).
The Red Banner Pacific Fleet (Pacific Fleet), the 30th Red Banner Air Army of the Supreme Command (based in Transbaikalia and the Far East), the 11th Red Banner Air Defense Army (in the Far East) and part of the forces of the 14th Air Defense Army (in Transbaikalia) were operationally subordinate to him. and Mongolia), as well as the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army ( see ch. 2, 30, 31).
Despite the absence of airborne divisions and a small number of tank divisions in this direction - only 12 (including training and personnel), their lack was compensated by a large number of motorized rifle divisions (47 divisions, including the only machine gun and artillery division in the Soviet Army) and fortified areas - UR (15 districts, including the 1st UR Pacific Fleet). The 55th Marine Division, the only one in the Soviet Navy, was also subordinate to the Pacific Fleet. In addition, in each of the districts there was one artillery division deployed in peacetime states. In the same direction there were 6 separate brigades(2 air assault, 4 GRU special forces). The GKVDV ceased to exist on June 30, 1992.
The leadership of the High Command of the Far East was carried out by 15 generals ( tab. 1.5.1).
Table 1.5 1
Leadership of the High Command of the Far East Troops (III Formation) in 1979-1992.
| Full Name | Military rank | Period in office | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| commander in chief | |||
| Petrov Vasily Ivanovich | army General | 00.02.1979-01.12.1980 | |
| Govorov Vladimir Leonidovich | army General | 01.12.1980-19.06.1984 | |
| Tretyak Ivan Moiseevich | army General | 19.06.1984-11.07.1986 | |
| Voloshin Ivan Makarovich | army General | 11.07.1986-05.01.1989 | |
| Kovtunov Alexander Vasilievich | colonel general | 05.01.1989-30.06.1992 | |
| Chief of Staff - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief | |||
| Meretskov Vladimir Kirillovich | colonel general | 00.03.1979-05.11.1980 | |
| Touzakov Vladimir Alexandrovich | colonel general | 09.11.1980-23.12.1983 | |
| Mikhailov Vladlen Mikhailovich | colonel general | 26.12.1983-00.02.1987 | |
| Klemenov Anatoly Nikolaevich | lieutenant general, from 02/15/1989 colonel general | 00.03.1987-00.00.1989 | |
| Chernikov Anatoly Nikolaevich | lieutenant general | 00.00.1989-00.12.1991 | |
| First Deputy Commander-in-Chief | |||
| Krivda Fedot Filippovich | colonel general | 00.03.1979-31.07.1982 | |
| Sivenok Vladimir Ivanovich | colonel general | 31.07.1982-00.08.1985 | |
| Voloshin Ivan Makarovich | colonel general, from 05/07/1986 army general | 00.08.1985-11.07.1986 | |
| Korbutov Ivan Ivanovich | lieutenant general, since 04/29/1988 colonel general | 11.07.1986-00.11.1991 | |
| Kuzmin Fedor Mikhailovich | colonel general | 00.11.1991-00.02.1992 | |
The Far Eastern grouping of Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War consisted of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces of the country's territory. Organizationally, they were part of the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts. Pacific Fleet, Red Banner Amur Flotilla. Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal air defense zones of the country. Land and sea borders were guarded by border troops.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, taking into account the real danger of aggression from imperialist Japan, during almost the entire war was forced to keep in the Far East from 32 to 59 calculated divisions of the ground forces, from 10 to 29 aviation divisions and up to 6 divisions and 4 brigades of the Air Defense Forces of the country's territory with a total number of over 1 million soldiers and officers, 8 - 16 thousand guns and mortars, over 2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, from 3 to 4 thousand combat aircraft and more than 100 warships of the main classes. In total, this amounted to 15 to 30 percent of the combat forces and means of all the Soviet Armed Forces in different periods of the war.
In the most difficult periods of the struggle of the Soviet people with the Wehrmacht, namely: during the battle of Moscow, the summer offensive of the Nazi troops in the Caucasus and the Volga in 1942, the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, the Japanese militarists fettered a large strategic grouping of Soviet troops in the Far East , which provided active and significant assistance to their partner - Nazi Germany. At the same time, the figures confirm that the Communist Party and the Soviet government, even in these difficult conditions, took decisive measures to improve the defense of the Far East. Thanks to this, during the war, the combat and numerical strength of the Far Eastern grouping not only did not decrease, but, on the contrary, systematically increased. This was facilitated by the planned organizational development of all types and arms of the Soviet grouping in the Far East, carried out taking into account the military-political situation and the experience of military operations on the Soviet-German front.
During the war years, the Far Eastern group not only fulfilled its main task - covering the borders of the USSR, but also made a worthy contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany, being a significant source of replenishment of the strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command. For example, in 1942, 125,000 conscripts arrived from the Moscow Military District alone to the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts, and 175,000 in 1943... The Stavka then sent new formations and units to the Soviet-German front.
The strategic regrouping of troops from the Far East to the western borders of the Soviet Union was carried out on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. So, in the second half of April 1941, in connection with the sharp aggravation of the military-political situation in Europe and the direct preparation of fascist Germany for an attack on the USSR, the Soviet government decided to urgently significantly strengthen the internal military districts, as well as the Far East and Transbaikalia western grouping of troops of the Soviet Armed Forces. By June 22, 1941, the field administration of the 16th Combined Arms Army, 2 rifle and mechanized corps (2 rifle, 2 tank, motorized divisions and 2 separate regiments), as well as 2 airborne brigades arrived there from the Far Eastern Front and the Trans-Baikal Military District - in total over 57 thousand people, more than 670 guns and mortars, 1070 light tanks and other forces and means. These troops took part in defensive operations in the Western and Southwestern strategic directions in the first month of the Great Patriotic War.
Great losses in people and military equipment forced, without waiting for the final deployment of new formations, to remove some personnel formations and units from the southern and Far Eastern borders. Already on June 29, the regrouping of fully equipped divisions from the Far East to the Soviet-German front began.
In the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, from the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts, the Headquarters used 12 rifle, 5 tank and motorized divisions on the Soviet-German front - a total of over 122 thousand people, more than 2 thousand guns and mortars, 2209 light tanks , over 12 thousand cars, 1500 tractors and tractors.
The Japanese high command closely followed the course of hostilities on the Soviet-German front and the grouping of Soviet troops in the Far East, trying to determine the most favorable moment for an attack on the USSR. This is evidenced by a document sent to the troops in the early days of December 1941, when the German fascists stood at the walls of Moscow: “To complete the continuous preparations for operations against the Soviet Union, not only the Kwantung Army, but also every army and first-line formations must make every effort efforts to ensure that, observing the gradually occurring changes in the military situation of the Soviet Union and Mongolia, to be able at any moment to establish the true situation. This applies especially to the present conditions, when it becomes more and more necessary to quickly establish signs of a turning point in the situation.
Considering the threat of attack, the Headquarters used the Far Eastern forces and means on the Soviet-German front only in the most minimal quantities. From December 5, 1941 to April 30, 1942, only two rifle divisions were transferred there from the Trans-Baikal Front, and a cavalry regiment from the Far East.
In the summer and autumn of 1942, when the Wehrmacht fiercely rushed to the Volga and the Caucasus, the Japanese command again prepared to strike at the Soviet Far Eastern border. It was during that period that the military operations of his armed forces were not active either in the Pacific Ocean or in China. Meanwhile, the offensive of the Nazi troops required new reserves. From May 1 to November 19, the Stavka transferred 10 rifle divisions from the Far East to the Stalingrad and Southwestern Fronts, to the Bryansk Front - 4 rifle brigades with a total strength of about 150 thousand people, over 1600 guns and mortars, a large number of other weapons and combat technology.
In the winter of 1942/43, only 1 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, 6 howitzer artillery brigades and 3 mortar regiments with a total number of about 35 thousand people, 557 guns and mortars, 32 light tanks and other weapons were transferred from the Far East to the Stavka reserve. In 1943, only 8 howitzer artillery brigades, formed in March-May, with a total number of about 9 thousand people, more than 230 large-caliber field guns, were transferred from the Far East to the Soviet-German front.
The last regrouping of Soviet troops from the Far East was carried out during the summer-autumn campaign of 1944. These were an airborne brigade and four high-capacity howitzer artillery regiments.
During the war years, 39 divisions, 21 brigades and 10 regiments were redeployed to the Headquarters reserve from the ground forces of this group. Their total number was about 402 thousand people, over 5 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks.
An important role in the defeat of Nazi Germany belongs to the sailors of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla. In 1941, 12 naval rifle brigades were formed from their composition. More than 140,000 Pacific sailors fought in the ground forces on the Soviet-German front. In 1941 - 1944. the operating Northern and Black Sea fleets were replenished with warships, as well as well-trained sailors and pilots of the Pacific Fleet.
Thus, the Soviet Supreme High Command, constantly taking care of strengthening the borders in the Far East, practically during the first three years of the war used the Far Eastern grouping as one of the sources of replenishment of the troops operating against Nazi Germany, creating new units and formations.
During the war years, the transfer of combat forces and means, weapons and military equipment from one theater of operations to another clearly testifies to the great contribution of the Far Eastern troops to achieving victory over Nazi Germany. The main part of these forces and means was sent by the Headquarters to the Soviet-German front in the most difficult and crucial moments of the war against Germany.
In the second half of 1943, when a radical change took place on the Soviet-German front in favor of the Soviet Union, and Italy fell out of the fascist bloc, it became clear to the whole world that sooner or later Germany and Japan would fall after her. The successes of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces changed the course of the entire Second World War and enabled the United States and Great Britain to intensify operations in the Pacific.
From that time on, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command almost did not attract the combat forces and means of the Far Eastern grouping to the Soviet-German front and began to carry out measures for its development. In August 1943, the Primorsky Group of Forces was formed as part of the Far Eastern Front (1st and 25th combined arms armies, all formations and units located in Primorye, as well as the 9th Air Army, operationally subordinate to it).
Gradually, the combat and numerical strength of the Far Eastern group increased, the troops were saturated with automatic and conventional small arms. Artillery, tank and aircraft fleets were replenished with new types of guns and vehicles, their logistics improved.
In 1944, 11 rifle divisions, a mechanized corps headquarters, a mechanized brigade, several mechanically driven artillery regiments, and a field-type fortified area were deployed. In February 1945, the General Staff, the central and main departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense were intensively working on preparing plans for the deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East, as well as concentrating the necessary amount of material and technical means there.
Calculations have shown that military-political goals can be achieved in a short time only if there are three powerful offensive groupings in the Far Eastern theater of operations and a significant superiority over the enemy in manpower and equipment. To do this, it was necessary to sharply increase the combat and numerical strength of the Far Eastern formations.
The strategic deployment of troops in the Far East differed from the preparation of offensive operations in Europe in that it was carried out in advance and had two stages (initial and final), each of which solved different tasks.
The initial stage, completed in the main in the autumn of 1941, was carried out in order to reliably secure the state border from possible Japanese aggression. On the territory of the two former border military districts, deployed in fronts, only covering troops were concentrated, but also forces and means capable of delivering an immediate retaliatory strike. Throughout the war with fascist Germany, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command systematically improved the defensive power of the Far Eastern group, almost doubling the number of its personnel.
The final stage of the strategic deployment, in which both the troops stationed in this theater and those concentrated as a result of the regrouping, took part during the immediate preparation of the offensive campaign against Japan. Its goal was to create a new strategic front of armed struggle in a new theater of operations. Such important problems as ensuring the secrecy of the regrouping and concentration of troops in the corresponding strategic directions, covering their deployment, command and control of troops, and their comprehensive material and technical support were solved.
At the end of February-March 1945, the General Staff approved plans for the deployment of troops in the Far East and their logistics. On March 14, the State Defense Committee decided to strengthen the air defense of the Far East and Transbaikalia. By a directive dated March 19, the Stavka separated from the Far Eastern Front and subjugated the Primorsky Group of Forces, creating a third strategic direction for the deployment of troops. On March 26, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command assigned new tasks to the Far Eastern Front and the Primorsky Group of Forces to cover the deployment of troops.
Considering the important role of the armored forces in the upcoming campaign, in March 1945, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command began to upgrade the equipment of the tank formations of the Far East, which were armed only with obsolete T-26 and BT light slippers throughout the war. In all tank brigades, the first battalions were armed with T-34 tanks. The first tank regiments of the 61st and 111th tank divisions were transferred to the same armament. In total, it was planned to send 670 T-34 tanks to the Far East. At the same time, a list of measures for the medical support of the Far Eastern campaign was approved. It was necessary to transfer 348 different medical units and institutions, create a reserve of personnel, stocks of materials and funds for medical care.
In view of the fact that the main part of the troops and cargo was planned to be transported by rail, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin instructed the People's Commissariat of Railways to prepare the eastern and Far Eastern railways for mass transportation. In February 1945, a check was made of the mobilization readiness of a number of highways of the Far East to ensure a wide flow of military traffic, and measures were outlined to increase their throughput.
At the beginning of 1945, the operational and technical condition of the eastern railways did not fully meet the requirements of the situation. There were many rotten sleepers on the Trans-Siberian Railway, more than 11 thousand pieces of worn or burst rails, which significantly limited the throughput of many sections. The subgrade on some lines needed to be strengthened, especially in the section along the shore of Lake Baikal, where even before the war, work had begun, but not completed, on the installation of retaining walls and the repair of emergency tunnels. Meanwhile, in the difficult days of the war, all stocks of rails, sleepers, turnouts, a significant part of the locomotive fleet were sent to the western roads.
There was also a shortage of skilled workers who were mobilized into the military operational departments and special formations of the People's Commissariat of Commissariat for Service to service the western roads. Despite the measures taken to return specialists, by the beginning of hostilities against militaristic Japan, about 20 thousand of them were missing on the railway lines of the Far East.
In the spring of 1945, the capacity of the Tomsk and Omsk railways and some lines of the Far East was increased. On April 13, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution "On measures to improve the operation of the railways of the Far East (Krasnoyarsk, East Siberian, Trans-Baikal, Amur, Far Eastern and Primorskaya)". In order to improve the management of the activities of these highways, the Special District of the Far East Railways was created, headed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Railways V. A. Garnyk. General A.V. Dobryakov became the authorized representative of the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the BOSO under the district.
For some sections, it was necessary to increase the capacity from 12 to 38 pairs of trains. The People's Commissariat of Communications was charged with increasing the number of locomotives on the railways of the Far East: by May 1, 1945 - up to 2708, by July 1 - up to 2947, and by September 1 - up to 3107. To replenish the locomotive fleet of these roads from other highways and from the reserve 800 locomotives were distilled. Of the 240 steam locomotives of the GKO reserve and 360 steam locomotives of the NKPS reserve, it was required to form 20 locomotive columns.
The GKO resolution provided for the creation of significant coal reserves by reserving reserves, as well as replenishing the railways of Siberia and the Far East with qualified personnel. During the second quarter of 1945, it was planned to increase the number of skilled workers by 30,000 people, including 2,373 machinists, 2,916 assistant machinists, 3,155 locomotive mechanics, 2,074 conductors, and 8,816 track workers.
From April, units of three operational railway regiments and three operational departments from Poland and Romania began to enter the Special District of the Far East Railways; all special forces were returning from the southwestern highways. In total, there were over 14 thousand people in these parts. At the disposal of the NKPS came 8,000 conscripts, recognized for health reasons as limited fit for military service. Two railway brigades and several special units were sent for restoration work. These works demanded enormous effort from the railroad workers.
The main military transportation, both centralized and interfrontal, was carried out by rail in May-July, but they were most intensive in June. By August 9, their total volume amounted to 222,331 wagons (in terms of two-axle), including 127,126 wagons arrived in the Far East from the central regions of the country. Of this number, 74,345 wagons were received for the Trans-Baikal Front. 1st Far East - 31,100, 2nd Far East - 17,916, and 81,538 cars were used to deliver military units and formations (operational transportation).
According to the types of troops, transportation was distributed as follows: 29.8 percent - for rifle troops, 30.5 percent - for artillery and armored vehicles, 39.7 percent - for aviation, engineering and other formations and units. The following facts testify to the intensity of the work of the railway: on average, in June-July, from 13 to 22 railway echelons arrived daily.
Significant intra- and inter-front transportation was carried out through internal rail, water and highway-unpaved communications. The transfer of troops along them was carried out in a combined way: by transport and on foot. In May-August, 95,205 wagons passed by rail, about 700,000 tons of cargo were transported by water, 513,000 tons were transported along unpaved highways, and 4,222 tons were transferred by air.
The main task of the railway units of the Trans-Baikal Front was the preparation of the main communication of the front - the single-track line Karymskaya - Borzya - Bayan-Tumen (Choibalsan). To do this, only in the weakest section of Borzya - Bayan-Tumen in June 1945, 13 sidings were built by the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front, the BOSO bodies and railway workers. This made it possible to increase the capacity of the section from 7 to 18 pairs of trains per day.
The 3rd railway brigade arrived at the disposal of the 1st Far Eastern Front from Czechoslovakia, which launched work on the Primorskaya Railway to develop stations, a water supply system and strengthen the upper structure of the track. In the 2nd Far Eastern Front, the 25th railway brigade increased the capacity of the Amur and Far Eastern railways from 25 to 30 pairs of trains per day by the start of hostilities. Since the arriving forces were not enough, about 80 different recovery trains and flyers were formed, serviced by brigades of the Amur, Primorskaya and Far Eastern railways.
In total, in the spring and summer months of 1945, up to a million Soviet soldiers and officers, tens of thousands of artillery pieces, tanks, vehicles and many thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, food, uniforms and other cargo were on the communications routes of Siberia, Transbaikalia and the Far East .
Throughout the entire length from Irkutsk to Vladivostok, the Trans-Siberian Railway was transferred to the operational group of the Logistics Directorate of the Soviet Army under the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. The fronts, on the other hand, used branches from the main highway leading to the borders of Manchuria and Korea. Their total length was 2700 km. The Trans-Baikal Front had 12 railway sections for basing, the 2nd Far East - 9 and the 1st Far East - 8. In addition, more than 800 km of narrow-gauge railways built before the war on the territory of the MPR were used.
Borzya station with a branch at Bayan-Tumen station (for the Trans-Baikal Front), Svobodny station with a branch in Khabarovsk (for the 2nd Far Eastern Front), Guberovo and Voroshilov stations (Ussuriysk) with a branch at Manzovka station ( for the 1st Far Eastern Front).
The greatest load was planned for the line in the Trans-Baikal Front. Meanwhile, the capacity of the railway sections Karymskaya - Borzya, Borzya - Bayan-Tumen could not provide the required traffic pace. In this regard, the front command decided to send motorized units and mechanized artillery from the Karymskaya station under its own power. To do this, special groups of officers arrived in Irkutsk and Karymskaya, who distributed units on the spot to follow on their own and by rail.
Troops were delivered to Primorye by the Khabarovsk-Vladivostok railway, passing in separate sections 3-6 km from the state border. Therefore, the command of the 1st Far Eastern Front attached particular importance to the secrecy of transportation. Here, more often than on other fronts, in order to misinform the enemy, false transports of troops were carried out and false concentration areas were equipped.
A huge volume of transportation could not be carried out only by railroads: it was necessary to build and repair unpaved highways. As a result, by August 9, the length of only military highways in the Far East exceeded 4.2 thousand km, of which it reached 2,279 km on the Trans-Baikal Front, 1,509 km on the 1st Far East, and 485 km on the 2nd Far East. This greatly increased the ability to maneuver manpower and military equipment at the beginning of hostilities.
In the prewar period, aviation in the Far East was not widely developed. During the war years, the length of overhead lines increased from 12 thousand km in 1941 to 18 thousand km in 1945, that is, 1.5 times; from July 1, 1941 to May 31, 1945, over 66 thousand passengers, 7 thousand tons of cargo and about 2 thousand tons of mail were transported. During the period of hostilities, the crews of the Far Eastern Civil Aviation Administration made 439 sorties and transported more than 360 tons of defense cargo, as well as a significant number of passengers.
In preparation for the war with Japan, a large proportion of traffic fell on the Far Eastern Shipping Company. The tasks of the fleet were determined by the GKO decree of April 30, 1945. The People's Commissariat of the Navy needed to ensure the transportation of 123 thousand tons of cargo in May through the Far Eastern water basin, including coal - 40.6 thousand tons, fish - 10.3 thousand tons, salt - 10.7 thousand tons from Sakhalin Island, imported cargo from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky to Vladivostok - 18 thousand tons and various cargoes of Dalstroy - 17 thousand tons.
The implementation of measures to ensure the concentration and deployment of troops in the Far East allowed the Soviet command to proceed with a direct regrouping of troops. Although the State Committee of Defense decided on a wide redeployment of formations only on June 3, 1945, in fact, it began even before the end of the final campaign in Europe. In April, the reserve front department of the former Karelian Front arrived in the Far East, which was entrusted with the command of the Primorsky Group of Forces. Until May 9, two field-type fortified areas were sent from the Stavka reserve. From May 9 to May 31, the field administration of the 5th Army arrived there, three directorates of rifle corps with four rifle divisions.
As a source of strategic deployment in the Far East, the Headquarters used the troops of four fronts that completed fighting on the Soviet-German front. The bulk of the regrouped troops were the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front: the directorate of the 5th and 39th combined arms armies, 6 directorates of rifle corps, 18 rifle and 2 anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 8 artillery and 2 rocket artillery brigades, or 60 percent of the total number formations of ground forces that arrived in the Far East. Front and 2 army directorates, 6 directorates of rifle, tank and mechanized corps, 10 rifle and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 15 brigades of the main military branches were sent from the 2nd Ukrainian Front; from the Leningrad Front came the management of the breakthrough artillery corps and the mechanized corps, 6 divisions and 17 brigades of various branches of the ground forces.
The rest of the formations came from the 1st Belorussian Front (three brigades of rocket artillery), the Moscow Military District (two tank brigades) and directly from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters (reserve front management, three brigades and two fortified areas). A large number of rear units and institutions arrived in the Far East from other military districts.
Such formations and formations were sent to the Far East that could successfully solve offensive tasks in the specific conditions of a theater of military operations. Determination of the expediency of using one or another connection depended on the experience and combat qualities accumulated in battles on the Soviet-German front. Thus, formations and units of the 5th and 39th armies, which participated in breaking through the fortified defensive zones in East Prussia, were intended to break through in the main directions of the border fortified areas. The first - in the offensive zone of the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the second - on the Trans-Baikal Front. Formations of the 6th Guards Tank and 53rd combined arms armies, which had extensive experience in operations in the mountain-steppe terrain, were included in the Trans-Baikal Front for an offensive in the wide desert expanses and mountainous wooded massifs of Manchuria.
The regrouping of such significant forces and means in a short time and over vast distances required its careful organization both on the part of higher authorities and directly at the places of deployment of troops.
Since the Japanese held large forces on the border with the Soviet Union, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures in advance to reliably cover the lines of communication, areas of concentration and deployment of troops from possible strikes.
To ensure the secrecy of mass rail transportation, the admission of persons to their planning, control and accounting both in the General Staff and in the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Soviet Army was limited; it was forbidden to conduct correspondence and negotiations related to the redeployment of troops, the stations for unloading and servicing echelons were numbered; the transmission of reports on the movement of echelons was strictly controlled by the VOSO officers. Military equipment on railway platforms was camouflaged. The troops were unloaded, as a rule, at night, after which they were immediately withdrawn to the area of concentration.
The deployment of strike groups was carried out so covertly that at the beginning of the Manchurian operation, complete surprise was achieved. The command of the Kwantung Army knew about the movements of Soviet troops that began in the spring, but they did not expect the Soviet Union to complete this major regrouping of the Armed Forces so soon.
The strategic regrouping of troops reached its highest point in July, when 51.1 percent of ground forces, 52.2 percent of artillery and 58 percent of armored weapons arrived in the Far East from the ground forces.
In three months, the number of settlement divisions increased from 59.5 to 87.5, that is, 1.5 times, and the number of personnel of the entire group of troops - from 1,185,000 to 1,747,000 people.
In total, during the period of strategic deployment, 2 front and 4 army directorates, 15 directorates of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 36 rifle, artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 53 brigades of the main branches of the ground forces and 2 fortified areas were regrouped, which amounted to a total complexity of 30 settlement divisions. In addition, the management of the 6th bomber aviation corps and 5 aviation divisions arrived. The air defense of the Far East received 3 air defense corps of the country's territory. The average staffing of units and formations was about 80 percent. The troops that joined the Far Eastern group were armed with more than 600 rocket launchers, as well as 900 heavy, medium tanks and self-propelled guns.
The importance and expediency of the regrouping carried out to achieve victory in the war in the Far East in 1945 is evidenced by a well-known historical example. One of the reasons for the defeat of tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. was the inability of the Russian command to transfer in a short time to the Far East the necessary human reserves, weapons, ammunition and other types of materiel.
The growth of combat forces and assets in the Far East, as well as the remoteness of this theater of operations, required the improvement of the strategic organs of the military leadership of the Far Eastern grouping of troops.
In order to coordinate the actions of the troops and the navy, as early as May 1945, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to create the High Command in the Far East, the Military Council and headquarters under it. At the end of June, a group of generals and officers headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky left for the Far East. This group launched work in Chita. By a decision of July 30, the Headquarters formalized the creation of a special body of higher command - the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, and by a directive of August 2 - the headquarters of the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, which actually operated from the beginning of July. Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky was appointed commander-in-chief, General I.V. Shikin was appointed a member of the Military Council, and General S.P. Ivanov was appointed chief of staff. Coordination of the actions of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla with the troops was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov. The actions of aviation were led by the commander of the Air Force, Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov.
Under the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, an operational logistics group was created, headed by the Deputy Chief of the Logistics of the Soviet Army, General V. I. Vinogradov. It included a group of officers of the rear headquarters, representatives of the Central Directorate of Military Communications, the Main Automobile Directorate, the Main Road Directorate, the fuel supply, food and clothing supply, the Main Military Sanitary Directorate and the Main Trophy Directorate.
On August 5, 1945, the Supreme Command Headquarters renamed the Primorsky Group of Forces into the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the Far Eastern Front into the 2nd Far Eastern Front. At the same time, the coastal and Far Eastern directions that existed as part of the operational department of the General Staff were also renamed.
By August 9, 1945, the Trans-Baikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts were deployed in the Far East, with the troops of which the 9th, 10th and 12th air armies, as well as the forces of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur military flotilla, were to interact. Air defense was carried out by the Primorsky, Amur and Trans-Baikal air defense armies of the country's territory. The border troops of the Primorsky, Khabarovsk and Trans-Baikal border districts for the first time in their history were supposed to perform tasks unusual for them: participating in front-line operations, liquidate enemy border cordons and posts, destroy its fortified strongholds, and subsequently take an active part in the pursuit of enemy troops and protect communications , headquarters, important installations and rear areas.
The Transbaikal Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, a member of the Military Council, General A. N. Tevchenkov, chief of staff, General M. V. Zakharov, consisted of the 17th, 36th, 39th and 53rd combined arms (commander generals L I. Danilov, A. A. Luchinsky, I. I. Lyudnikov, I. M. Managarov), 6th Guards Tank (commanded by General A. G. Kravchenko), 12th Air (commanded by General S. A. Khudyakov) of the armies and the cavalry-mechanized group of the Soviet-Mongolian troops (commander General I. A. Pliev, his deputy for the Mongolian troops, General Zh. Lkhagvasuren). The anti-aircraft cover of the troops of the front was carried out by army and divisional anti-aircraft artillery, as well as the Trans-Baikal Air Defense Army of the country's territory (commander General P. F. Rozhkov).
By the beginning of hostilities, the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front consisted of 13 directorates of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 39 divisions and 45 brigades (rifle, airborne, cavalry, artillery, mortar, rocket artillery, tank, mechanized, anti-aircraft and self-propelled artillery), 2 fortified areas and 54 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, 2 directorates of bomber aviation corps, 6 bomber divisions, 2 assault, 3 fighter, 2 transport and 7 separate aviation regiments.
Horse-mechanized formations and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army consisted of 4 cavalry and aviation divisions, a motorized armored brigade, tank, artillery regiments and a communications regiment with a total strength of about 16 thousand people, 128 guns and mortars and 32 light tanks.
In the Trans-Baikal Air Defense Army of the country there were 3 air defense divisions, 2 separate anti-aircraft artillery air defense regiments of railway echelons and a fighter aviation division. In total, the Trans-Baikal grouping of troops consisted of 648 thousand people, or 37.1 percent of the number of Soviet troops in the Far East. It was armed with 9668 guns and mortars, 2359 tanks and self-propelled guns, 369 rocket launchers and 1324 combat aircraft. The total length of the Trans-Baikal Front along the state border was 2300 km.
The 1st Far Eastern Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov, a member of the Military Council General T. F. Shtykov, chief of staff General A. N. Krutikov, included the 1st Red Banner, 5th, 25th and 35th combined arms armies (commanded by Generals A.P. Beloborodov, N.I. Krylov, I.M. Chistyakov, N.D. Zakhvataev), the Chuguev task force (commanded by General V.A. Zaitsev), the 10th mechanized corps (commander General I. D. Vasiliev) and the 9th Air Army (commanded by General I. M. Sokolov). The troops of the Primorsky Air Defense Army of the country's territory were stationed on the territory of the front (commander General A.V. Gerasimov).
By August 9, the front command had control of 10 rifle and mechanized corps, 34 divisions, 47 brigades and 34 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, 14 fortified areas, a bomber aviation corps, 3 bomber, 3 fighter, 2 assault air divisions and 6 separate aviation regiments. The coastal air defense army of the country's territory included the directorate of the air defense corps, 2 air defense divisions, an anti-aircraft artillery division, and an anti-aircraft artillery brigade. 2 anti-aircraft artillery regiments and a fighter aviation division. In total, the coastal grouping had about 589 thousand people (33.7 percent), 11,430 guns and mortars, 274 rocket launchers, 1974 slippers and self-propelled guns and 1137 combat aircraft. The length of the 1st Far Eastern Front was 700 km.
The 2nd Far Eastern Front, commanded by General M.A. Purkaev, a member of the Military Council, General D.S. Leonov, the chief of staff, General F.I. Shevchenko, included the 2nd Red Banner, 15th and 16th combined arms ( Commanding Generals M. F. Terekhin, S. K. Mamonov, L. G. Cheremisov) and the 10th Air Army (commander General P. F. Zhigarev), the 5th Separate Rifle Corps (commander General I. Z. Pashkov ). The Amur Air Defense Army of the country's territory (commanded by General Ya. K. Polyakov) was also located within the front. The front included the directorates of 2 rifle corps, 12 rifle and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 4 rifle, 9 tank and 2 anti-tank brigades, 5 fortified areas, 34 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, the command of the mixed aviation corps, bomber, 2 assault , 3 fighter and 2 mixed aviation divisions, 9 separate aviation regiments. The Amur Air Defense Army of the country's territory consisted of directorates of 2 air defense corps, 2 air defense divisions, 2 anti-aircraft artillery brigades, 2 separate anti-aircraft artillery regiments and a fighter aviation division. This grouping included 333,000 people (19.1 percent), 5,988 guns and mortars, 72 rocket launchers, 917 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,260 combat aircraft. The length of the 2nd Far Eastern Front reached 2130 km.
The Pacific Fleet, commanded by Admiral I. S. Yumashev, a member of the Military Council, General S. E. Zakharov, and the chief of staff, Vice Admiral A. S. Frolov, had 2 cruisers, a leader, 12 destroyers, 19 patrol ships, 78 submarines, 52 minesweepers, 49 submarine chasers, 204 torpedo boats. The aviation of the fleet consisted of 1618 aircraft, of which 1382 were combat. The number of personnel was about 165 thousand people, the fleet had 2550 guns and mortars, as well as other weapons. The Pacific Fleet was based at Vladivostok, as well as Sovetskaya Gavan and Petropavlovsk.
The Red Banner Amur Flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral N.V. Antonov, a member of the Military Council Rear Admiral M.G. Yakovenko, the chief of staff, Captain 1st Rank A.M. Gushchin, had in service 8 monitors, 11 gunboats, 7 mine boats, 52 armored boats, 12 minesweepers, 36 minesweepers and a number of support vessels. Its aviation consisted of 68 combat aircraft. In addition, all patrol boats of the border guard on the Amur and Ussuri, as well as ships of the civil river shipping company, were subordinate to the commander of the flotilla. The flotilla included 12.5 thousand people, 199 anti-aircraft guns and mortars. The Red Banner Amur military flotilla was based at Khabarovsk, Malaya Sazanka on the Zeya River, Sretensk on the Shilka River and Lake Khanka.
So, by August 9, 1945, 11 combined arms, tank and 3 air armies, 3 air defense armies of the country's territory, a fleet and a flotilla were deployed against the Japanese armed forces in the Far East. They included directorates of 33 corps, 131 divisions and 117 brigades of the main branches of service. The land border of the USSR was covered by 21 fortified areas.
The grouping of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East was a force capable of crushing Japanese troops in Manchuria in a short time. It was based on soldiers and officers of formations and units who were in the Far East during the war, but were well trained in the course of lengthy combat training and knew the theater of operations, the nature of the enemy’s defense and the characteristics of the Japanese army. The personnel of the armies transferred from the west had extensive experience in operating against a strong enemy. The skillful use of these features significantly increased the striking power of the grouping and in many respects predetermined the success of the entire campaign.
