Forms of alternative integration.
Integration processes in the CIS countries.
Formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Formation of relations between the Russian Federation and the CIS countries.
Lecture 7. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
The result was the signing of the Alma-Ata Declaration on December 21, 1991, which set out the goals and principles of the CIS. It established the provision that the interaction of the organization’s participants “will be carried out on the principle of equality through coordinating institutions, formed on a parity basis and operating in the manner determined by agreements between the participants of the Commonwealth, which is neither a state nor a supranational entity.” The unified command of military-strategic forces and unified control over nuclear weapons were also preserved, the parties’ respect for the desire to achieve the status of a nuclear-free and (or) neutral state, and a commitment to cooperation in the formation and development of a common economic space were recorded. The organizational stage ended in 1993, when on January 22, in Minsk, the “Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States”, the fundamental document of the organization, was adopted. According to the current Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States founding states organizations are those states that, by the time the Charter was adopted, had signed and ratified the Agreement on the Creation of the CIS of December 8, 1991 and the Protocol to this Agreement of December 21, 1991. Member States The Commonwealth is those founding states that assumed the obligations arising from the Charter within 1 year after its adoption by the Council of Heads of State.
To join the organization, a potential member must share the goals and principles of the CIS, accepting the obligations contained in the Charter, and also obtain the consent of all member states. In addition, the Charter provides for categories associate members(these are the states participating in certain types activities of the organization, on the terms determined by the agreement on associated membership) and observers(these are states whose representatives may attend meetings of Commonwealth bodies by decision of the Council of Heads of State). The current Charter regulates the procedure for the withdrawal of a member state from the Commonwealth. To do this, the Member State must notify the depositary of the Statute in writing 12 months before withdrawal. At the same time, the state is obliged to fully fulfill the obligations that arose during the period of participation in the Charter. The CIS is based on the principles of sovereign equality of all its members, therefore all member states are independent entities international law. The Commonwealth is not a state and does not have supranational powers. The main goals of the organization are: cooperation in political, economic, environmental, humanitarian, cultural and other fields; comprehensive development of the member states within the framework of a common economic space, interstate cooperation and integration; ensuring human rights and freedoms; cooperation in ensuring international peace and security, achieving general and complete disarmament; mutual legal assistance; peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts between states of the organization.
The areas of joint activity of the member states include: ensuring human rights and fundamental freedoms; coordination of foreign policy activities; cooperation in the formation and development of a common economic space and customs policy; cooperation in the development of transport and communication systems; health and environment; issues of social and migration policy; fight against organized crime; cooperation in the field of defense policy and protection of external borders.
Russia declared itself the successor of the USSR, which was recognized by almost all other states. The remaining post-Soviet states (with the exception of the Baltic states) became the legal successors of the USSR (in particular, the USSR's obligations under international treaties) and the corresponding union republics.
Under these conditions, there was no other way out than strengthening the CIS. In 1992, over 250 documents were adopted regulating relations within the Commonwealth. At the same time, the Agreement on collective security signed by 6 countries out of 11 (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan).
But with the beginning of economic reforms in Russia, the Commonwealth experienced its first serious crisis in 1992. Russian oil exports fell by half (while to other countries increased by a third). The CIS countries have begun to leave the ruble zone.
By the summer of 1992, individual subjects of the Federation increasingly insistently proposed transforming it into a confederation. During 1992, financial subsidies to the republics that set a course for secession continued, despite the refusal to pay taxes to the federal budget.
The first serious step towards preserving the unity of Russia was the Federative Treaty, which included three similar agreements on the division of powers between federal authorities state authorities and bodies of the subjects of the Federation of all three types (republics, territories, regions, autonomous regions and districts, the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg). Work on this agreement began back in 1990, but progressed very slowly. However, in 1992, a Federal Treaty was signed between the subjects of the Federation (89 subjects). Agreements were later signed with some entities on special conditions that expanded their rights; this began with Tatarstan.
After the August 1991 events, diplomatic recognition of Russia began. The head of Bulgaria Zh. Zhelev arrived for negotiations with the Russian president. At the end of the same year, B.N.’s first official visit took place. Yeltsin abroad - to Germany. On recognition of the sovereignty of Russia, on the transfer of rights and obligations to it former USSR declared the countries of the European Community. In 1993-1994 partnership and cooperation agreements were concluded between EU states and the Russian Federation. The Russian government has joined the Partnership for Peace program proposed by NATO. The country was included in the International currency board. She managed to come to an agreement with largest banks West on deferment of payments for debts of the former USSR. In 1996, Russia joined the Council of Europe, which was responsible for issues of culture, human rights, and environmental protection. European states supported Russia's actions aimed at its integration into the world economy.
The role of foreign trade in the development of the Russian economy has noticeably increased. The destruction of national economic ties between the republics of the former USSR and the collapse of the Council Economic Mutual Assistance caused a reorientation of foreign economic relations. After a long break, Russia was granted most favored nation treatment in trade with the United States. Permanent economic partners were the states of the Middle East and Latin America. As in previous years, thermal and hydroelectric power plants were built in developing countries with Russian participation (for example, in Afghanistan and Vietnam). Metallurgical plants and agricultural facilities were built in Pakistan, Egypt and Syria.
Trade contacts have been preserved between Russia and the countries of the former CMEA, through whose territory gas and oil pipelines ran to Western Europe. The energy resources exported through them were also sold to these states. The counter trade items were medicines, food and chemical products. Share of countries of Eastern Europe in the total volume of Russian trade decreased by 1994 to 10%.
The development of relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States occupied important place in the foreign policy activities of the government. In 1993, the CIS included, in addition to Russia, eleven more states. At first, the central place in relations between them was occupied by negotiations on issues related to the division of property of the former USSR. Borders were established with those countries that had introduced national currencies. Agreements were signed that determined the conditions for the transportation of Russian goods through their territory abroad. The collapse of the USSR destroyed traditional economic ties with the former republics. In 1992-1995. Trade turnover with the CIS countries fell. Russia continued to supply them with fuel and energy resources, primarily oil and gas. The structure of import receipts was dominated by consumer goods and food. One of the obstacles to the development of trade relations was the financial debt of Russia from the Commonwealth states that had formed in previous years. In the mid-1990s, its size exceeded six billion dollars. The Russian government sought to maintain integration ties between the former republics within the CIS. On his initiative, it was created Interstate Committee Commonwealth countries with its headquarters in Moscow. An agreement on collective security was concluded between six (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, etc.) states, and the charter of the CIS was developed and approved. At the same time, the Commonwealth of countries did not represent a single formalized organization.
Interstate relations between Russia and the former republics of the USSR were not easy. There were heated disputes with Ukraine over the division of the Black Sea Fleet and ownership of the Crimean Peninsula. Conflicts with the governments of the Baltic states were caused by discrimination against the Russian-speaking population living there and the unresolved nature of some territorial issues. Russia's economic and strategic interests in Tajikistan and Moldova were the reasons for its participation in armed clashes in these regions. The relationship between the Russian Federation and Belarus developed most constructively.
After the formation of new sovereign states that set a course for the formation of an open market economy, the entire post-Soviet space was subject to deep economic transformation. In the methods and purposes of carrying out economic reforms, the following general directions can be distinguished.
1. Privatization and resolution of property and other issues civil rights, creation of a competitive environment.
2. Agrarian reform - moving the center of gravity of agricultural production to non-state and private farms, changing the forms of ownership on collective and state farms, their disaggregation and clarification of the production profile.
3. Reducing the sphere government regulation in sectors of the economy and sectors of activity of economic entities. This is primarily the liberalization of prices, levels wages, foreign economic and other types of activities. Structural restructuring of the real sector of the economy, carried out in order to increase its efficiency, increase production volumes, improve the quality and competitiveness of products, discard ineffective production units, convert the defense industry, and reduce commodity shortages.
4. Creation of banking and insurance systems, investment institutions and stock markets. Ensuring the convertibility of national currencies. Creation of a distribution network in both wholesale and retail trade.
During the reforms, the following were created and ensured: a mechanism for bankruptcy and antimonopoly regulation; measures for social protection and regulation of unemployment; anti-inflationary measures; measures to strengthen the national currency; ways and means of integrated economic development.
By 1997, the process of establishing the national monetary systems of the Commonwealth countries was completed. In 1994, in almost all countries of the Commonwealth there was a decline in the exchange rates of national currencies against the Russian ruble. During 1995, there was a steady upward trend in the exchange rates of national currencies against the Russian ruble in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova. By the end of 1996, the upward trend in the exchange rates of national currencies against the Russian ruble continued in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova; the exchange rates of Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine increased. There have been significant changes in the structure of financial resources.
In most Commonwealth countries, the share of resources accumulated in the state budget has decreased, and the share of funds held by business entities and the population has increased. In all CIS countries, the functions and structure of state budgets have changed significantly. In the composition of state budget revenues in most countries, the main source was tax revenues, which in 1991 accounted for 0.1-0.25 of the total budget revenues, and in 1995 they amounted to about 0.58 parts. The bulk of tax revenue comes from VAT, income tax, income tax and excise taxes. In Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, since 1993, there has been a tendency for a slight decrease in the share of taxes in state budget revenues.
Attraction of foreign direct investment into the CIS countries occurred with varying degrees of intensity. In 1996, their share in the total volume of investments was 0.68 in Kyrgyzstan, 0.58 in Azerbaijan, 0.42 in Armenia, 0.29 in Georgia, 0.16 in Uzbekistan, and 0.13 in Kazakhstan. At the same time, these indicators are insignificant in Belarus – 0.07, Moldova – 0.06, Russia – 0.02, Ukraine – 0.007. The desire to reduce investment risks prompted the US government to extend government programs to stimulate and protect national capital to American companies operating in the CIS countries.
In the process of carrying out agrarian reforms, the formation of new organizational and legal forms of ownership of agricultural producers continues. The number of collective and state farms has decreased significantly. Most of these farms have been converted into joint stock companies, partnerships, associations, cooperatives. By the beginning of 1997, 786 thousand peasant farms with an average plot of 45 thousand m2 were registered in the CIS. A common negative aspect in the implementation of agrarian reforms was the lack of deeply developed programs, complexity and consistency of reform, as well as the weakening or almost complete withdrawal of the state from its regulatory functions and protectionist support Agriculture. All this, combined with the breakdown of traditional ties, led to an intensification of the agrarian crisis, a decline in production, and an increase in social tension in the countryside.
An important element in the formation of a common labor market in the CIS countries is labor migration. During the period 1991-1995, the population of Russia increased due to migration from the CIS and Baltic countries by 2 million people. Such a significant number of refugees and internally displaced persons increases tension on the labor market, especially considering their concentration in certain regions of Russia, and requires large costs for the construction of housing and social facilities. Migration processes in the CIS countries represent one of the most complex socio-demographic problems. Therefore, the Commonwealth countries are working to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements aimed at regulating migration processes.
There is a noticeable decrease in the number of students arriving to study from some CIS countries to others. Thus, if in 1994 there were 58,700 students from neighboring countries studying at Russian universities, then in 1996 there were only 32,500.
Legislative acts in the field of education are intertwined with laws on languages adopted in almost all countries of the Commonwealth. Declaring the language of the titular nation as the only state language, introducing a mandatory exam for knowledge of the state language, translating office work into this language, narrowing the scope higher education in the Russian language objectively created difficulties for a significant part of the population of non-titular nationalities living in these countries, including Russian speakers. As a result, many independent states managed to become so isolated that difficulties arose with the academic mobility of applicants and students, the equivalence of educational documents, and the study of educational courses of students' choice. Therefore, the formation of a common educational space will be the most important condition implementation of positive integration processes in the CIS.
The significant fundamental and technological resources available to the Commonwealth states, highly qualified personnel, and a unique scientific and production base remain largely unclaimed and continue to degrade. The prospect that the Commonwealth states will soon be faced with the problem of their inability to meet the needs of their countries’ economies with the help of their national scientific, technical and engineering potentials is becoming increasingly real. This will inevitably strengthen the tendency to solve internal problems through the massive purchase of equipment and technology in third countries, which will put them in long-term technological dependence on external sources, which ultimately risks undermining national security, increasing unemployment and reducing the standard of living of the population.
With the collapse of the USSR, the geopolitical and geo-economic situation of the Commonwealth countries changed. The ratio of internal and external factors of economic development has changed. The nature of economic relations has also undergone significant changes. Liberalization of foreign economic activity has opened the way to the foreign market for most enterprises and business structures. Their interests began to act as a decisive factor, largely determining the export-import operations of the Commonwealth states. The greater openness of domestic markets to goods and capital from non-CIS countries led to their saturation with imported products, which entailed a decisive influence on world market conditions on prices and the structure of production in the CIS countries. As a result, many goods produced in the Commonwealth countries turned out to be uncompetitive, which caused a reduction in their production and, as a result, significant structural changes in the economy. The development of industries whose products are in demand in the markets of countries outside the CIS has become characteristic.
As a result active development These processes resulted in a reorientation of the economic relations of the Commonwealth states. In the early 1990s, trade with the current Commonwealth countries reached 0.21 of their total GDP, while in the countries of the European Community this figure was only 0.14. In 1996, trade between the CIS countries amounted to only 0.06 of total GDP. In 1993, in the total volume of export operations of the CIS countries, the share of these countries themselves was 0.315 parts, in imports - 0.435. In export-import operations of EU countries, the share of exports to EU countries was 0.617 parts, the share of imports was 0.611. That is, the trend of economic ties that has manifested itself in the CIS contradicts the global experience of integration.
In almost all CIS countries, the growth rate of trade turnover outside the Commonwealth exceeds the growth rate of trade turnover within the CIS. The exceptions are Belarus and Tajikistan, whose foreign trade is characterized by a steady trend of strengthening trade relations with the CIS countries.
The directions of reorientation of economic relations within the Commonwealth and structural changes in foreign trade relations of the CIS countries led to the regionalization of trade relations and disintegration processes throughout the Commonwealth as a whole.
The structure of imports from CIS countries shows a focus on current consumer needs. The main place in imports of CIS countries is occupied by food, agricultural raw materials, products light industry, Appliances.
Formation of alternative integration options in the CIS countries. The CIS as a supranational entity has too few “points of contact” between its members. As a result of this, regionalization of the economic space of the CIS occurred and could not help but occur. The regionalization process has received organizational form. The following integration groups were formed: Union State of Belarus and Russia (SBR). Customs Union (CU). Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC). The unification of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova (GUUAM). Triple Economic Alliance (TEU). Several organizations with more specific common goals and problems have formed in the CIS space:
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. The task of the CSTO is to coordinate and unite efforts in the fight against international terrorism and extremism, trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Thanks to this organization, created on October 7, 2002, Russia maintains its military presence in Central Asia.
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)- Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. In 2000, on the basis of the CU, its members were established. This is an international economic organization endowed with functions related to the formation of common external customs borders of its member states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), the development of a unified foreign economic policy, tariffs, prices and other components of the functioning of the common market. Priority areas of activity are increasing trade turnover between participating countries, integration in the financial sector, unification of customs and tax laws. Moldova and Ukraine have observer status.
Central Asian cooperation(CAS, originally CAES) - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia (since 2004). The creation of the community was caused by the inability of the CIS to form an effective political-economic bloc. Organization of Central Asian economic cooperation(CAEC) was the first regional economic cooperation organization for Central Asian countries. The agreement on the establishment of the CAC organization was signed by the heads of state on February 28, 2002 in Almaty. However, the CAEC was unable to create a free trade zone and, due to low efficiency, the organization was liquidated, and the CAEC was created on its basis. The agreement on the establishment of the CAC organization was signed by the heads of state on February 28, 2002 in Almaty. The stated goals are interaction in the political, economic, scientific and technical, environmental, cultural and humanitarian spheres, providing mutual support in preventing threats to the independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity of the CAC member states, pursuing a coordinated policy in the field of border and customs control, implementing agreed efforts in the gradual formation of a single economic space. On October 18, 2004, Russia joined the CAC. On October 6, 2005, at the CAC summit, a decision was made, in connection with the upcoming entry of Uzbekistan into the EurAsEC, to prepare documents for the creation of a united organization of the CAC-EurAsEC - that is, in fact, it was decided to abolish the CAC.
Shanghai organization cooperation(SCO) - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, China. The organization was founded in 2001 on the basis of a previous organization called the Shanghai Five, which existed since 1996. The organization's tasks mainly relate to security issues.
Common Economic Space (SES)- Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine. An agreement on the prospect of creating a Common Economic Space, in which there will be no customs barriers, and tariffs and taxes will be uniform, was reached on February 23, 2003, but the creation was postponed until 2005. Due to the lack of interest of Ukraine in the Common Economic Space, the implementation of the project is currently suspended, and the majority integration tasks are developing within the framework of the EurAsEC.
Union State of Russia and Belarus (SBR). This is a political project of the union of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus with a single political, economic, military, customs, currency, legal, humanitarian, cultural space being gradually organized. The agreement on the creation of the Union of Belarus and Russia was signed on April 2, 1997 on the basis of the Community of Belarus and Russia, created earlier (April 2, 1996) to unite the humanitarian, economic and military space. On December 25, 1998, a series of agreements were signed that allowed for closer integration in the political, economic and social spheres, which strengthened the Union. Since January 26, 2000, the official name of the Union is the Union State. It is assumed that the current confederal Union in the future should become a soft federation. A member state of the United Nations that shares the goals and principles of the Union and assumes the obligations provided for by the Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia of April 2, 1997 and the Charter of the Union can become a member of the Union. Accession to the Union is carried out with the consent of the member states of the Union. When a new state joins the Union, the issue of changing the name of the Union is considered.
In all of these organizations, Russia actually acts as a leading force (only in the SCO does it share this role with China).
On December 2, 2005, the creation of the Commonwealth of Democratic Choice (CDC) was announced, which included Ukraine, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Macedonia, Slovenia and Georgia. The initiators of the creation of the Community were Viktor Yushchenko and Mikheil Saakashvili. The declaration of the establishment of the community states: “Participants will support the development of democratic processes and the creation of democratic institutions, exchange experiences in strengthening democracy and respect for human rights, and coordinate efforts to support new and emerging democratic societies.”
Customs Union (CU). The agreement on the creation of a single customs territory and the formation of a customs union was signed in Dushanbe on October 6, 2007. On November 28, 2009, the meeting of D. A. Medvedev, A. G. Lukashenko and N. A. Nazarbayev in Minsk marked the activation of work to create a single customs space in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan from January 1, 2010. During this period, a number of important international agreements on the Customs Union were ratified. In total, in 2009, about 40 international treaties, which formed the basis of the Customs Union. After receiving official confirmation from Belarus in June 2010, the customs union was launched in a trilateral format with the entry into force of the Customs Code of the three countries. From July 1, 2010, the new Customs Code began to be applied in relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, and from July 6, 2010 - in relations between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. By July 2010, the formation of a single customs territory was completed. In July 2010, the customs union came into force.
Organization for Democracy and economic development- GUAM - regional organization, created in 1999 (the organization’s charter was signed in 2001, the charter in 2006) by the republics of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (from 1999 to 2005 the organization also included Uzbekistan). The name of the organization is formed from the first letters of the names of its member countries. Before Uzbekistan left the organization it was called GUAM. The idea of creating an informal union of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova was approved by the presidents of these countries during a meeting in Strasbourg on October 10, 1997. The main goals of the creation of GUAM: cooperation in the political sphere; combating ethnic intolerance, separatism, religious extremism and terrorism; peacekeeping activities; development of the transport corridor Europe – Caucasus – Asia; integration into European structures and cooperation with NATO within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program. The goals of GUAM were confirmed in a special Statement signed on April 24, 1999 in Washington by the presidents of five countries and which became the first official document of this association (“Washington Declaration”). Characteristic feature GUAM initially became oriented toward European and international structures. The initiators of the union acted outside the CIS framework. At the same time, opinions were expressed that the immediate goal of the union was to weaken the economic, especially energy, dependence of the states included in it on Russia and to develop the transit of energy resources along the Asia (Caspian) - Caucasus - Europe route, bypassing the territory of Russia. The political reasons cited were the desire to resist Russia’s intentions to revise the flank restrictions of conventional armed forces in Europe and fears that this could legitimize the presence of Russian armed forces in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, regardless of their consent. The political orientation of GUAM became even more noticeable after Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan withdrew from the CIS Collective Security Treaty in 1999. In general, Russian media tend to assess GUAM as an anti-Russian bloc, or “organization of orange nations”, backed by the United States ( Yazkova A. GUAM summit: intended goals and possibilities for their implementation // European security: events, assessments, forecasts. - Institute of Scientific Information on social sciences RAS, 2005. - V. 16. - P. 10-13.)
TPP includes Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan. In February 1995, the Interstate Council was formed as the highest body of the TPP. Its competence includes resolving key issues of economic integration of the three states. To financially support the activities of thermal power plants, the Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development was established in 1994. His authorized capital amounts to 9 million dollars and is formed through equal contributions from the founding states.
Currently, there are two parallel collective military structures within the CIS. One of them is the Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS, created in 1992 to develop a unified military policy. Under it there is a permanent secretariat and the Headquarters for the Coordination of Military Cooperation of the CIS (SHKVS). The second is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Within the framework of the CSTO, collective rapid deployment forces have been created consisting of several battalions of mobile troops, a helicopter squadron, army aviation. In 2002-2004, cooperation in the military field developed mainly within the framework of the CSTO.
Reasons for the decrease in the intensity of integration processes in the CIS countries. Among the main factors that determined the qualitative decline in the level of Russian influence in the CIS countries, it seems important to us to name:
1. The rise of new leaders in the post-Soviet space. The 2000s became a period of activation of international structures alternative to the CIS - primarily GUAM and the Organization of Democratic Choice, which are grouped around Ukraine. After the Orange Revolution of 2004, Ukraine became a center of political gravity in the post-Soviet space, alternative to Russia and supported by the West. Today she has firmly outlined her interests in Transnistria (“road map” of Viktor Yushchenko, blockade of the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldavian Republic in 2005-2006) and in the South Caucasus (Borjomi Declaration, signed jointly with the President of Georgia, claims to the role of peacemaker in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone and in Nagorno-Karabakh). It is Ukraine that is increasingly beginning to claim the role of the main mediator between the CIS states and Europe. Our “key Eurasian partner” - Kazakhstan - became the second alternative center to Moscow. Currently, this state is increasingly declaring itself as the main transformer of the Commonwealth. Kazakhstan is rapidly and very effectively participating in the development of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and is initiating integration processes both at the regional level and throughout the CIS. It is the leadership of Kazakhstan that persistently pursues the idea of stricter discipline within the CIS and responsibility for jointly made decisions. Gradually, integration institutions are ceasing to be Russian instruments.
2. Increased activity of non-regional players. In the 1990s. Russian dominance in the CIS was almost officially recognized by American and European diplomacy. Subsequently, however, the United States and the EU rethought the post-Soviet space as a sphere of their direct interests, which manifested itself, in particular, in the direct military presence of the United States in Central Asia, in the EU policy of diversifying energy delivery routes in the Caspian region, in the wave of pro-Western velvet revolutions, in the process of systematic expansion of NATO and the EU.
3. Crisis of the instruments of Russian influence in the CIS. Among the main factors of this crisis, the most often and deservedly mentioned is the shortage and/or lack of demand for qualified diplomats and experts capable of providing Russian politics in post-Soviet regions at a high quality level; lack of a full-fledged policy of support for compatriots and Russia-centric humanitarian initiatives; refusal of dialogue with the opposition and independent civil structures, focusing exclusively on contacts with top officials and “parties in power” in foreign countries. This last feature is not only technical, but partly ideological in nature, reflecting Moscow’s commitment to the values of “stabilization” of power and nomenklatura solidarity of senior officials. Today, such scenarios are being implemented in relations with Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and, to a lesser extent, with Armenia, Azerbaijan and unrecognized states. The Kremlin does not work with the second and third echelons of power in these states, which means it deprives itself of insurance in case of a sudden change in top leadership and loses promising allies among supporters of modernization and political change.
4. Wearing out the “nostalgic resource”. From its very first steps in the post-Soviet space, Moscow actually relied on the Soviet margin of safety in relations with the newly independent states. Maintaining the status quo has become the main goal of Russian strategy. For some time, Moscow could justify its special importance in the post-Soviet space as an intermediary between the world's largest centers of power and the newly independent states. However, this role quickly exhausted itself due to the reasons already mentioned (the activation of the United States and the EU, the transformation of individual post-Soviet states into regional centers of power).
5. The priority of global integration over regional integration, professed by the Russian ruling elite. The single economic space of Russia and its allies could be viable as a project similar and alternative to pan-European integration. However, it was precisely in this capacity that it was not accepted and formulated. Moscow, at all stages of its relations, both with Europe and with its neighbors in the CIS, directly and indirectly emphasizes that it views post-Soviet integration exclusively as an addition to the integration process in “ greater Europe"(in 2004, in parallel with the declarations on the creation of the Common Economic Space, Russia adopted the so-called concept of “road maps” for the creation of four common spaces of Russia and European Union). Similar priorities were identified in the negotiation process on accession to the WTO. Neither “integration” with the EU nor the process of accession to the WTO were successful in themselves, but they quite successfully torpedoed the post-Soviet integration project.
6. Failure of the energy pressure strategy. The reaction to the obvious “flight” of foreign countries from Russia was a policy of raw materials egoism, which they sometimes tried to present in the guise of “energy imperialism,” which is only partly true. The only “expansionist” goal pursued by gas conflicts with the CIS countries was to establish control by Gazprom over the gas transportation systems of these countries. And in the main directions this goal was not achieved. The main transit countries through whose territory Russian gas reaches consumers include Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia. The basis of these countries' reaction to Gazprom's pressure is the desire to eliminate their dependence on Russian gas as quickly as possible. Every country does this different ways. Georgia and Ukraine - through the construction of new gas pipelines and transportation of gas from Turkey, Transcaucasia and Iran. Belarus - through diversification of the fuel balance. All three countries oppose Gazprom's control over the gas transportation system. At the same time, the possibility of joint control over the gas transportation system was most harshly rejected by Ukraine, whose position on this issue is most important. As for the political side of the issue, here the result of energy pressure is not zero, but negative. This equally applies not only to Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, but also to “friendly” Armenia and Belarus. The increase in the price of Russian gas supplies to Armenia, which took place at the beginning of 2006, has already significantly strengthened the Western vector of Armenian foreign policy. Russian raw material egoism in relations with Minsk has finally buried the idea of the Russian-Belarusian Union. For the first time in more than 12 years of his stay in power, Alexander Lukashenko at the beginning of 2007 praised the West and harshly criticized Russian policy.
7. The unattractiveness of the internal development model of the Russian Federation (nomenclature and raw materials project) for neighboring countries.
In general, it can be noted that at present, effective economic, political, and social integration in the post-Soviet space is taking place less intensively due to the lack of genuine interest in it from the CIS countries. The CIS was founded not as a confederation, but as an international (interstate) organization, which is characterized by weak integration and a lack of real power among the coordinating supranational bodies. Membership in this organization was rejected by the Baltic republics, as well as by Georgia (it joined the CIS only in October 1993 and announced its withdrawal from the CIS after the war in South Ossetia in the summer of 2008). However, according to most experts, the unifying idea within the CIS has not completely exhausted itself. It is not the Commonwealth as such that is experiencing a crisis, but the approach to organizing economic interaction between member countries that was dominant during the 1990s. The new integration model must take into account the decisive role of not only economic, but also other structures in the development of economic relations within the CIS. At the same time, the economic policies of states, institutional and legal aspects cooperation must change significantly. They are intended to contribute, first of all, to the creation of the necessary conditions for successful interaction between economic entities.
Reintegration in the post-Soviet space takes place within the framework of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was created in 1991. The CIS Charter, signed in 1992, consists of several sections: goals and principles; membership; collective security and military-political cooperation; conflict prevention and peaceful resolution of disputes; cooperation in economic, social and legal spheres; Commonwealth bodies, interparliamentary cooperation, financial issues.
The CIS member states are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
The basis of the economic mechanism of the CIS is the Treaty on the Establishment of an Economic Union (September 24, 1993). On its basis, a number of stages were envisaged: a free trade association, a customs union and a common market.
Goals creations of the Commonwealth were:
· Cooperation in political, economic, environmental, humanitarian and cultural fields;
· Promoting comprehensive and balanced economic and social development of member states within the framework of a common economic space, as well as interstate cooperation and integration;
· Ensuring human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law and OSCE documents;
· Implementation of cooperation between member states in order to ensure international peace and security, take effective measures to reduce weapons and military expenditures, eliminate nuclear weapons and other types of weapons mass destruction, achieving general and complete disarmament;
· Peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts between member states.
Currently operating political bodies CIS - Council of Heads of State and Council of Heads of Government (CHG). Functional bodies have been formed, including representatives of the relevant ministries and departments of the states that are members of the Commonwealth. These are the Customs Council, the Railway Transport Council, and the Interstate Statistical Committee.
Let us take a closer look at the institutional structure of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Council of Heads of State is supreme body Commonwealth. It considers and makes decisions on the main issues of the activities of member states. The Council meets twice a year; and extraordinary sessions may be convened at the initiative of any member state. The presidency of the Council is carried out alternately by heads of state.
Council of Heads of Government coordinates cooperation between executive authorities of the member states in economic, social and other areas. Meetings of the Council of Heads of Government are held four times a year. Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government are made on the basis of consensus.
Council of Foreign Ministers coordinates the activities of member states in the field of foreign policy, including their activities in international organizations.
Coordination and Advisory Committee- a permanent executive and coordinating body of the CIS, consisting of permanent authorized representatives (two from each state) and the coordinator of the Committee. It develops and presents proposals for cooperation in political, economic and other fields, promotes the implementation of economic policies of member states, and deals with the creation of common markets for labor, capital and securities.
Council of Defense Ministers deals with issues related to military policy and the structure of the armed forces of member states.
Economic Court ensures the fulfillment of economic obligations within the Commonwealth. Its competence also includes resolving disputes arising in the process of fulfilling economic obligations.
Interstate Bank deals with issues of mutual payments and clearing settlements between CIS member states.
Human Rights Commission is a consultative body of the CIS that monitors the implementation of human rights obligations assumed by member states of the Commonwealth.
Interparliamentary Assembly consists of parliamentary delegations and ensures inter-parliamentary consultations, discussion of issues of cooperation within the CIS, and develops joint proposals regarding the activities of national parliaments.
CIS Executive Secretariat is responsible for organizational and technical support for the work of CIS bodies. Its functions also include a preliminary analysis of issues submitted for consideration by heads of state, and legal examination of draft documents prepared for the main bodies of the CIS.
The activities of CIS bodies are financed by member states.
Since the creation of the Commonwealth, the main efforts of the member states have been focused on developing and deepening cooperation in such areas as foreign policy, security and defense, economic and financial policy, developing common positions and pursuing a common policy.
The CIS countries have great natural and economic potential, which gives them significant competitive advantages and allows them to take their rightful place in international division labor. They have 16.3% of the world's territory, 5% of the population, 25% of reserves natural resources, 10% - industrial production, 12% - scientific and technical potential, 10% - resource-generating goods. Among them are those in demand on the world market: oil and natural gas, coal, timber, non-ferrous and rare metals, potassium salts and other minerals, as well as fresh water reserves and land masses suitable for agriculture and construction.
Other competitive resources of the CIS countries are cheap labor and energy resources, which are important potential conditions to boost the economy (10% of the world's electricity is produced here - the fourth place in the world in terms of its production).
In short, the CIS states have the most powerful natural, production, scientific and technical potential. According to foreign experts, the potential market capacity of the CIS countries is approximately $1,600 billion, and they estimate the achieved production level to be within $500 billion. Reasonable use of the entire complex of favorable conditions and opportunities opens up real prospects for economic growth for the Commonwealth countries, increasing their share and influence on the development of the world economic system.
Currently, economic integration at different speeds is observed within the CIS. There are such integration groups as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, Central Asian Cooperation (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), the Eurasian Economic Community (Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), the alliance of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova - “GUAM” ").
Decay Soviet Union and ill-conceived economic reforms had the most detrimental effect on the economies of all CIS countries. Throughout the 1990s. the fall in industrial production reached tens of percent per year.
The share of CIS countries in Russian foreign trade turnover decreased from 63% in 1990. up to 21.5% in 1997. If in 1988-1990. inter-republican (within the borders of the former USSR) trade turnover involved about a quarter of the gross internal product, then by the beginning of the new century this figure had dropped to almost one tenth.
The highest intensity of Russia's trade turnover remained with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which accounted for more than 85% of Russian exports and 84% of imports with the Commonwealth countries. For the entire Commonwealth, trade with Russia, despite the sharp decline, is still of paramount importance and accounts for over 50% of their total foreign trade turnover, and for Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus - more than 70%.
There was a tendency towards a reorientation of the Commonwealth countries towards solving their economic tasks outside the CIS, with the expectation of the possibility of significantly expanding relations with non-CIS countries.
For example, the share of their exports to non-CIS countries compared to the total export volume in 2001 was:
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in Azerbaijan - 93% versus 58% in 1994; |
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in Armenia - 70% and 27%, respectively; |
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in Georgia - 57% and 25%; |
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in Ukraine - 71% and 45%. |
There was a corresponding increase in their imports from non-CIS countries.
IN sectoral structure industry of all CIS countries, the share of products from the fuel, energy and other raw materials industries continued to increase and the share of products from manufacturing industries, especially mechanical engineering and light industry, continued to decrease.
In such a situation, preferential prices for Russian energy resources for CIS countries remained as practically the only integration factor. At the same time, the interests of energy-exporting and energy-importing CIS countries began to diverge significantly. The processes of privatization and reconstruction development in the Commonwealth countries took place in significantly different forms and with different dynamics. And if, within the framework of the general organization of the Commonwealth of Independent States, it was possible to preserve the common heritage that remained from the Soviet Union, then integration models common to all countries, although accepted, turned out to be unworkable.
Therefore, in the mid-1990s. a model of multi-speed rather than simultaneous integration was adopted. New associations began to form, which created countries that had the political and economic prerequisites for closer interaction. In 1995, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan adopted an agreement to create a Customs Union, and in 1996 they signed an Agreement on Deepening Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields. In 1999, Tajikistan joined the Treaty, and in 2000 it was transformed into a full-fledged international organization-- Eurasian Economic Community (Eurasian Economic Community). In 2006, Uzbekistan joined the Eurasian Economic Community as a full member, which once again confirmed the effectiveness and prospects of this integration project.
The principle of multi-speed integration was extended to the military-political area. Signed back in 1992, the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO) was extended in 1999 by six states: Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan did not renew its participation in the CSTO at that time, but returned to the Organization in 2006.
One of the significant reasons for the slowdown in integration processes in the CIS space is the contradictory and inconsistent position of the leadership of such a key country as Ukraine.
It is worth noting that for 15 years, the Ukrainian parliament has not ratified the CIS Charter, despite the fact that one of the initiators of the creation of this organization was the then President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk. This situation has arisen because the country remains deeply divided in relation to its geopolitical orientation along geographical lines. In the East and South of Ukraine, the majority favors close integration with Russia within the framework of the Common Economic Space. The west of the country is striving to join the European Union.
In these conditions, Ukraine is trying to play the role of an alternative integration center to Russia in the CIS space. In 1999, the regional organization GUUAM was created, which included Ukraine, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In 2005, Uzbekistan left the organization (which is why it is now called GUAM), accusing it of becoming purely political. GUAM cannot, despite the best will of its members, become an economic organization in the foreseeable future for the reason that mutual trade turnover is insignificant (for Ukraine, for example, it is significantly less than 1% of its total trade turnover).
CONTROL WORK ON DISCIPLINE
"Economy of the CIS countries"
Introduction
1. Conditions and factors for the development of integration processes in the post-Soviet space
2. Accession of the CIS countries to the WTO and prospects for their integration cooperation
Conclusion
List of sources used
Introduction
The collapse of the USSR led to a severance of economic ties and destroyed the huge market into which the national economies of the union republics were integrated. The collapse of the single national economic complex of the once great power led to the loss of economic and social unity. Economic reforms were accompanied by a deep decline in production and a decline in the standard of living of the population, pushing new states to the periphery of world development.
The CIS was formed - the largest regional association at the junction of Europe and Asia, a necessary form of integration of new sovereign states. The processes of integration in the CIS are affected by the different degrees of preparedness of its participants and their different approaches to carrying out radical economic transformations, the desire to find their own path (Uzbekistan, Ukraine), take on the role of a leader (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan), and avoid participating in a difficult contractual agreement. process (Turkmenistan), receive military-political support (Tajikistan), solve their internal problems with the help of the Commonwealth (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia). At the same time, each state independently, based on the priorities of internal development and international obligations, determines the form and scope of participation in the Commonwealth and in the work of its bodies in order to make maximum use of it to strengthen its geopolitical and economic positions.
One of interesting questions It is also expected that the CIS member states will join the WTO. These issues relevant to modern economics will be considered and analyzed in this work.
1. Conditions and factors for the development of integration processes in the post-Soviet space
Integration between the Commonwealth countries began to be discussed in the very first months after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And this is no coincidence. After all, the entire economy of the Soviet empire was built on planned and administrative connections between production and industries, on a narrow division of labor and specialization of the republics. This form of ties did not suit the majority of states, and therefore it was decided to build integration ties between the newly independent states on a new, market basis 1 .
Long before the signing (in December 1999) of the agreement on the creation of the Union State, the CIS was formed. However, throughout its entire existence, it has not proven effective either economically or in military-political terms. The organization turned out to be amorphous and loose, unable to cope with its tasks. Former Ukrainian President L. Kuchma spoke about the crisis of the Commonwealth in a conversation with Russian journalists: “At the CIS level, we often gather, talk, sign something, then leave - and everyone has forgotten... If there are no common economic interests, what is it for? need to? There is only one sign left, behind which there is little. Look, there is not a single political or economic decision that was made at a high level in the CIS and would be implemented” 2.
At first, the CIS certainly played a positive historical role. It was largely thanks to him that it was possible to prevent the uncontrolled disintegration of a nuclear superpower, localize interethnic armed conflicts and, ultimately, achieve a ceasefire, opening up the opportunity for peace negotiations 3 .
Due to crisis trends in the CIS, a search began for other forms of integration, and narrower interstate associations began to form. A Customs Union emerged, which at the end of May 2001 transformed into the European Economic Community, which included Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Another interstate organization appeared - GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova). True, the functioning of these associations is also not very effective.
Simultaneously with the weakening of Russia’s position in the CIS countries, many centers of world politics have actively joined the struggle for influence in the post-Soviet space. This circumstance greatly contributed to the structural and organizational demarcation within the Commonwealth. The states grouped around our country are Armenia, Belarus. Kaakhstan. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan retained their membership in the Collective Security Treaty (CST). At the same time, Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova created a new association - GUUAM, which relied on outside support and aimed primarily at limiting Russia’s influence in the Transcaucasus, the Caspian and Black Sea zones.
At the same time, it is difficult to find a rational explanation for the fact that even countries that distanced themselves from Russia received and continue to receive from it through CIS mechanisms material subsidies that are tens of times greater than the amount of assistance coming from the West. It is enough to mention the repeated write-offs of multibillion-dollar debts, preferential prices for Russian energy resources, or the regime of free movement of citizens within the CIS, which allows millions of residents of the former Soviet republics to go to work in our country, thereby relieving socio-economic tensions in their homeland. At the same time, the benefits from the use of cheap labor for the Russian economy are much less sensitive.
Let us name the main factors generating integration trends in the post-Soviet space:
a division of labor that could not be completely changed in a short period of time.
In many cases, this is generally impractical, since the existing division of labor largely corresponded to the natural, climatic and historical conditions of development;
the desire of the broad masses of the population in the CIS member countries to maintain fairly close ties due to the mixed population, mixed marriages, elements of a common cultural space, the absence of a language barrier, interest in the free movement of people, etc.;
technological interdependence, uniform technical standards, etc. Indeed, the CIS countries together have the richest natural and economic potential, an extensive market, which gives them significant competitive advantages and allows them to take their rightful place in the international division of labor. They account for 16.3% of the world's territory, 5% of the population, 25% of natural resources, 10% of industrial production, 12% of scientific and technical potential. Until recently, the efficiency of transport and communication systems in the former Soviet Union was significantly higher than in the United States. An important advantage is geographical position
The CIS, through which the shortest land and sea (via the Arctic Ocean) route from Europe to Southeast Asia passes. According to World Bank estimates, income from the operation of the Commonwealth's transport and communication systems could amount to $100 billion. Other competitive advantages of the CIS countries - cheap labor and energy resources - create potential conditions for economic recovery. 10% of the world's electricity is produced here (the fourth place in the world in terms of its production) 4 .
However, these opportunities are used extremely irrationally, and integration as a method of joint management does not yet allow us to reverse the negative trends in the deformation of reproductive processes and use natural resources, effectively use material, technical, research and human resources for the economic growth of individual countries and the entire Commonwealth. However, as noted above, integration processes also encounter opposite trends, determined primarily by the desire of the ruling circles in the former ah to strengthen the newly acquired sovereignty, to strengthen our statehood. They considered this as an absolute priority, and considerations of economic feasibility receded into the background if integration measures were perceived as a limitation of sovereignty. However, any integration, even the most moderate one, presupposes the transfer of some rights to the unified bodies of the integration association, i.e. voluntary limitation of sovereignty in certain areas. The West, which met with disapproval any integration processes in the post-Soviet space and viewed them as attempts to recreate the USSR,” first covertly and then openly began to actively oppose integration in all its forms. Considering the growing financial and political dependence of the CIS member countries on the West, this could not but hinder integration processes.
Of no small importance for determining the real position of countries in relation to integration within the CIS were the calculations of Western assistance in the event that these countries did not “hurry” with integration. The reluctance to properly take into account the interests of partners and the inflexibility of positions, so often found in the policies of new states, also did not contribute to the achievement of agreements and their practical implementation.
The readiness of the former Soviet republics and integration varied, which was determined not so much by economic as by political and even ethnic factors. From the very beginning, the Baltic countries were against participation in any CIS structures. For them, the desire to distance themselves from Russia and their past as far as possible in order to strengthen their sovereignty and “enter Europe” was dominant, despite the high interest in maintaining and developing economic ties with the CIS member countries. A restrained attitude towards integration within the CIS was noted on the part of Ukraine, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and a more positive attitude was noted on the part of Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
Therefore, many of them viewed the CIS, first of all, as a mechanism for “civilized divorce,” striving to implement it and strengthen their own statehood in such a way as to minimize the inevitable losses from breaking existing ties and avoid excesses. The task of real rapprochement between countries was relegated to the background. Hence the chronic unsatisfactory implementation of decisions made. A number of countries tried to use the mechanism of the integration group to achieve their political goals.
From 1992 to 1998 About a thousand joint decisions were made in the CIS bodies in various areas of cooperation. Most of them “remained on paper” for various reasons, but mainly due to the reluctance of the member countries to make any restrictions on their sovereignty, without which real integration is impossible or has an extremely narrow framework. The bureaucratic nature of the integration mechanism and its lack of control functions also played a certain role. So far, not a single major decision (on the creation of an economic union, a free trade zone, a payment union) has been implemented. Progress was achieved only in certain parts of these agreements.
Criticism of the ineffective work of the CIS became especially heard in last years. Some critics generally doubted the viability of the very idea of integration in the CIS, and some saw bureaucracy, cumbersomeness and poor functioning of the integration mechanism as the reason for this ineffectiveness.
The main obstacle to successful integration was the lack of an agreed upon goal and sequence of integration actions, as well as the lack of political will to achieve progress. As already mentioned, some of the ruling circles of the new states still have hopes of obtaining benefits by distancing themselves from Russia and integrating within the CIS.
Nevertheless, despite all the doubts and criticism, the organization has maintained its existence, since it is needed by the majority of CIS member countries. We cannot discount the widespread hopes among broad sections of the population of these states that intensifying mutual cooperation will help overcome the serious difficulties that all post-Soviet republics have faced in the course of transforming their socio-economic systems and strengthening their statehood. Deep family and cultural ties also encouraged the preservation of mutual ties.
However, as the formation of their own statehood took place, fears among the ruling circles of the CIS member countries that integration could entail an undermining of sovereignty diminished. The possibilities of increasing hard currency earnings through further reorientation of fuel and raw materials exports to third-country markets have gradually been exhausted. The growth of exports of these goods was now possible mainly due to new construction and expansion of facilities, which required large investments and time.
Integration trends in the post-Soviet space are generated by the following main factors:
A division of labor that could not be completely changed in a short period of time. In many cases, this is generally impractical, since the existing division of labor largely corresponded to the natural, climatic and historical conditions of development;
The desire of the broad masses of the population in the CIS member countries to maintain fairly close ties due to the mixed population, mixed marriages, elements of a common cultural space, the absence of a language barrier, interest in the free movement of people, etc.;
Technological interdependence, common technical standards.
Despite this, tendencies towards disengagement clearly prevailed in the first year of the Commonwealth's functioning. There was a massive break in traditional economic ties; administrative and economic barriers, tariff and non-tariff restrictions were erected on the routes of trade flows; Failure to fulfill obligations accepted at the state and grassroots levels has become widespread.
During the existence of the Commonwealth, about a thousand joint decisions were made in the CIS bodies in various areas of cooperation. Economic integration is expressed in the formation of interstate associations from CIS member countries. The dynamics of development are presented as follows:
Ø Agreement on establishment Economic Union, which included all CIS countries, with the exception of Ukraine (September 1993);
Ø Agreement on the creation of a free trade zone, signed by all CIS member countries (April 1994);
Ø Agreement on the creation of the Customs Union, which by 2001 included 5 CIS countries: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan (January 1995);
Ø Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia (April 1997);
Ø Treaty on the creation of the Union State of Russia and Belarus (December 1999);
Ø Treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which included Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, designed to replace the Customs Union (October 2000);
Ø Agreement on the formation of the Common Economic Space (SES) of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine (September 2003).
However, these and many other decisions remained on paper, and the potential for interaction has so far been unclaimed. Statistics confirm that legal mechanisms have not become effective and sufficient for the integration of the economies of the CIS countries. And if in 1990 the share of mutual supplies of 12 CIS countries exceeded 70% of the total value of their exports, then in 1995 it amounted to 55%, and in 2003 – less than 40%. At the same time, the share of highly processed goods is primarily reduced. At the same time, in the EU the share of domestic trade in total exports exceeds 60%, in NAFTA - 45%.
Integration processes in the CIS are affected by the different degrees of preparedness of its member countries and their different approaches to carrying out radical economic transformations, the desire to find their own path (Uzbekistan, Ukraine), take on the role of a leader (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan), and avoid participation in a difficult negotiated process (Turkmenistan), receive military-political support (Tajikistan), and solve their internal problems at the expense of the Commonwealth (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia).
At the same time, each state independently, based on the priorities of internal development and international obligations, determines the form and scope of its participation in the Commonwealth and in the work of its general bodies in order to use it to the maximum extent in the interests of strengthening its geopolitical and economic positions. The main obstacle to successful integration was the lack of an agreed upon goal and consistency of integration actions, as well as the lack of political will to achieve progress. Some of the ruling circles of the new states still have hopes of obtaining benefits by distancing themselves from Russia and integrating within the CIS.
Along the paths of independent and separate economic management, subregional political alliances and economic groupings arose, caused by a multi-vector foreign strategy. Today, the following integration associations exist in the CIS:
1. Union State of Belarus and Russia (USBR);
2. Euro-Asian Economic Community (EurAsEC): Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan;
3. Common Economic Space (SES): Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan;
4. Central Asian Cooperation (CAC): Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan.
5. Unification of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova (GUUAM);
Unfortunately, over the entire period of its existence, none of the regional entities has achieved significant success in the declared integration. Even in the most advanced SGBR and EurAsEC, the free trade zone is not fully operational, and the Customs Union is in its infancy.
K.A. Semyonov lists the obstacles that stand in the way of the process of creating a single integration space on a market basis between the CIS countries - economic, political, etc.:
Firstly, a serious barrier to the formation of a single economic space was the deep difference in the economic situation in individual CIS countries. For example, in 1994, the range of government budget deficit indicators in most Commonwealth countries ranged from 7 to 17% of GDP, in Ukraine – 20, and in Georgia – 80%; Wholesale prices for industrial products in Russia increased 5.5 times, in Ukraine – 30 times, and in Belarus – 38 times. Such diversity of important macroeconomic indicators was obvious evidence of the deep demarcation of the post-Soviet republics, the disintegration of the previously common national economic complex.
Secondly, economic factors that do not contribute to the development of integration processes in the post-Soviet space include, of course, differences in the implementation of economic reforms. In many countries, there are different speeds of movement towards the market; market transformations are far from complete, which hinders the formation of a single market space.
Thirdly, the most important factor hindering the rapid development of integration processes within the CIS is political. It is the political and separatist ambitions of the ruling national elites, their subjective interests that do not allow creating favorable conditions for the functioning of enterprises in a single inter-country space different countries Commonwealth.
Fourthly, leading world powers, which have long been accustomed to adhering to double standards, play an important role in slowing down integration processes in the post-Soviet space. At home, in the West, they encourage the further expansion and strengthening of such integration groups as the EU and NAFTA, but with regard to the CIS countries they take the exact opposite position. Western powers are not really interested in the emergence of a new integration group in the CIS that will compete with them on world markets.
