The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation became one of the largest offensives of the Red Army at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. It took place in the most difficult conditions.
As a result of the failure of the operation, the problems of the Soviet army and navy were exposed, which made it possible to avoid future mistakes. Until the Allied landing in Normandy, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was considered one of the largest.
Background
The occupation of Crimea began in 1941. By the beginning of autumn, the Wehrmacht captured almost the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR. After the fall of Kyiv, hope for a counteroffensive was lost. Since most of the combat-ready armies of the entire front found themselves in the “cauldron”. The retreat to the East began. In September, the Germans were already on the outskirts of Crimea. The importance of the peninsula was well understood by both sides. Firstly, it ensured control over most of the Black Sea. Especially because of the hesitant Turkey. Which, although it supported the Third Reich, did not enter the war.
The peninsula was also a good air base. It was from it that Soviet bombers took off and carried out strategic air strikes on the Romanian oil wells. Therefore, on September 26, the Wehrmacht went on the offensive on the isthmus. Less than a month later, the peninsula was almost completely captured. Soviet units retreated to Taman. Only Sevastopol remained, whose heroic defense was still ongoing. At this time, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was born at the Supreme Command Headquarters.
Preparation
As a result of the withdrawal from Crimea the only place Sevastopol became resistance. The city held a heroic defense, despite complete blockade from land and only partial supplies by sea. The Germans launched several assaults, but all of them were unsuccessful. Therefore, the commander of Army Group Manstein decided to begin a siege. Almost all the armies were needed to surround the huge agglomeration. At the same time, the Kerch crossing was defended by only one Wehrmacht division.
The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was developed by General Kozlov. To implement it, two armies were brought in. Within two weeks, under the leadership of General Kozlov, they developed possible ways disembarkation Due to a lack of reserves, an entire army was withdrawn from the border with Iran. As a result, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was scheduled for the twenty-sixth of December. The plan involved a simultaneous attack on Feodosia and the strait. Soviet troops were supposed to drive the Germans out of the city, and then surround the entire enemy group. The command was counting on a quick victory, since the main German forces were concentrated near Sevastopol. At the same time, Kerch was covered only by a small German garrison and several Romanian armies. Already at that time, the Headquarters knew that the Romanian formations were extremely unstable to massive attacks and could not conduct a long-term defense.
If successful, the Red Army would be able to destroy the enemy group in the peninsula area. This would make it possible to freely transport new units to the coast from Taman. After this, Soviet troops could quickly advance west and hit the rear of the German troops besieging Sevastopol. According to Kozlov’s plan, after the city was released, a large-scale offensive could be launched in Crimea.
First hit
The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of 1941-1942 began on December twenty-sixth. The "auxiliary" blow was struck first. He not only fettered the enemy’s forces, but distracted his attention from the main goal - Feodosia. With the support of the Black Sea Fleet, Soviet troops secretly approached the shore. After the artillery barrage, the landing began.
The landing took place in extremely difficult conditions. The shore was unsuitable for mooring ships and barges. The Germans also managed to start shelling the attackers. Therefore, the soldiers had to jump into the water as soon as the depth was sufficient to walk. That is, on a cold December day, the Red Army soldiers were up to their necks in ice water. As a result, there were large sanitary losses due to hypothermia. But a few days later the temperature dropped even more, and the strait froze. Therefore, the remainder of the 51st Army advanced across the ice.
The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of 1941-1942 on the main direction began on the twenty-ninth. Unlike the landing in Kerch, the landing in Feodosia took place directly at the port. The soldiers landed on the shore and immediately rushed into battle. In total, on the first day, about 40 thousand people were landed in both directions. The German garrison of the city numbered three thousand people. Their resistance was crushed by the end of the day. After landing in Feodosia, the threat of complete encirclement loomed over the Nazis. In Kerch, the line was held by only one German division and Romanian mountain riflemen.
Retreat
Headquarters almost immediately learned about the results that the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation brought. The forces of the parties in the Kerch region were unequal. Soviet troops outnumbered German ones several times. Therefore, General von Sponeck decided to begin a retreat to the west. The order began to be executed instantly. The Nazis retreated to avoid the connection of two landing armies. However, at the front, Manstein categorically prohibited any retreat. He feared that if the Soviet troops retreated, they would be able to catch up with the German and Romanian armies and destroy them.
This was the plan of the Soviet leadership. The defeat of the Kerch garrison would lead to a shortage of German forces.
The road to Sevastopol would have been open to the Red Army. However, the landing force did not begin to advance rapidly. Instead of a quick push west, the Forty-Fourth Army moved towards Kerch to meet the Fifty-First Army. This delay allowed the Germans to gain a foothold on the new line of defense near Sivash. Reserves and heavy weapons were brought there. In Berlin they immediately began to take retaliatory measures as soon as they learned that the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation had begun. The 1st stage allowed Soviet troops to gain a foothold on the coast. However, the hardest part was yet to come.
Difficult position
After the defeat of the Germans in Feodosia and Kerch, the Red Army units were extremely exhausted. This is primarily due to the extreme landing conditions. Ice water, low temperature air and other things had a bad effect on the well-being of the soldiers. There was not a single hospital on the captured bridgeheads. Therefore, wounded soldiers could only rely on first aid. After that, they were delivered to Kerch and from there, across the sea, to the mainland. The seriously wounded were not always able to travel such a long distance.
It was also not possible to establish a crossing due to constant attacks by German aircraft. Facilities air defense were not delivered on time. Therefore, in fact, the planes did not encounter any resistance. As a result, many warships were seriously damaged.
Kerch-Feodosia landing operation: 2nd stage
In less than a week, the Red Army soldiers recaptured the entire coast. Fascist resistance was suppressed quite quickly. Due to uncertainty in the Romanian units, the Wehrmacht introduced regular German officers into their ranks. The defense along Sivash was strengthened by a reserve infantry regiment.
The main direction of impact for Soviet troops there was a railway that supplied the 11th Army of the Wehrmacht. Taking into account the weakness of the Nazi troops, the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters ordered an immediate attack to the west. According to the plan, Kozlov was supposed to go to the rear of the Germans besieging Sevastopol and defeat them. After this, it was planned to launch another large-scale offensive and liberate all of Crimea. However, the general hesitated too long. He believed that there were still not enough resources for the throw. It would seem that the successful Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of the Soviet troops brought severe disappointment. The Nazis counterattacked.
The following month, forty-two, a new large-scale offensive was being prepared. To support it, an additional corps was landed in Sudak. Ammunition and reinforcements arrived by sea and ice. However, one of the best generals of the Third Reich was ahead of Kozlov. In mid-January, the Nazis unexpectedly began their offensive. The main blow fell on the poorly fortified front line at the junction of the two armies. Three days later the Germans reached their original positions. By the end of January 18, Feodosia had fallen. The troops recently landed in Sudak put up desperate resistance. For almost two weeks, the Red Army soldiers fought heroically and almost completely gave up their lives in battle. Cargo ships carrying supplies were destroyed. After the loss of their only port, Soviet troops could only be transported to Kerch by ice.
Preparing for a new attack
After this, the command created a separate front in Crimea.
It included armies already operating on the peninsula and new formations. Soldiers of the 47th Army were removed from the Iranian border. The command transported a significant amount of equipment. A special commissioner was sent from Headquarters. Preparations for the offensive began. It was scheduled for the end of February. The goal was the enemy grouping near Sevastopol; in fact, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was developed to destroy it. The Crimean front was reinforced with artillery regiments and heavy tanks throughout the month.
On the twenty-seventh of February the offensive began. It was planned to concentrate the main attack in Kerch. However, weather conditions interfered with the plans. It began to thaw and it rained heavily. Mud and mud prevented the advance of heavy equipment. Tanks, especially heavy ones, could not keep up with the infantry. As a result, the Germans were able to withstand the attack of the Red Army. Only on one sector of the front was it possible to break through the defense line. The Romanian army could not withstand the onslaught. But nevertheless, the Soviet troops were unable to build on their initial success. Manstein understood that a breakthrough threatened the Red Army soldiers entering the flank of his armies. Therefore, I sent the last reserves to hold the line, and this yielded results. Stubborn fighting continued until the third of March. But it was not possible to make serious progress.
The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of the Crimean Front troops continued in mid-March. Eight rifle divisions, with the support of two tank brigades, launched an offensive. At the same time, the Primorsky Army struck from besieged Sevastopol. But they failed to break through to their own people. The Germans repelled ten attacks per day. But the Nazi defenses were never broken through. Some units achieved some success, but were unable to maintain their positions. After this, the front stabilized and the intensity of hostilities decreased.
German advance
By the end of March, Soviet troops had lost one hundred and ten thousand people since the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation began. The 3rd stage began with the German offensive.
It was planned carefully and for a long time. As a result of the unsuccessful attack of the Red Army, a front ledge (the so-called arc) was formed in the place where the Romanian division was defeated. The main forces of the Soviet army were concentrated here. While in the south, only three divisions occupied the defense.
Manstein decided to make a maneuver, striking precisely to the south. For this purpose, significant reinforcements were sent to Crimea. consisting of one hundred and eighty vehicles, arrived on the outskirts of Sevastopol. The Germans conducted a thorough reconnaissance and identified the weaknesses of the Soviet defense. The Nazis intended to use air power to support the planned offensive. For this, on Hitler’s personal order, an air corps was sent to the peninsula. Planes also arrived from Romania. However, the pilots of all the aircraft were exclusively Germans.
Soviet troops were located too close to the front. Many eyewitnesses of those events recall this. According to historians, it was the inept command of Kozlov and Mehlis that led to the subsequent tragedy. Instead of leaving divisions in the rear, where they would be out of the range of artillery fire, they were constantly driven forward.
Fatal defeat
The offensive began on May 7th. The ground attack was preceded by air preparation. The Luftwaffe attacked previously identified targets. As a result, Soviet troops suffered losses in many directions. The headquarters of one of the armies was destroyed. As a result of this, command passed to Colonel Kotov.
The next day the infantry offensive began. With the support of heavy tanks, the Germans broke through the front seven kilometers deep. The sudden attack in this area could not be repelled. Troops also landed behind the Red Army lines. Its numbers were small, but the sudden attack from the sea caused panic among the Soviet soldiers. By May 9, Manstein brought another of his divisions into battle. The Germans managed to finally break through the front and defeat almost the entire southern group. Immediately after this, the Wehrmacht began to turn north, threatening to attack the remaining forces of the Crimean Front on the flank.
Taking into account the catastrophic situation, on the night of the tenth of May a personal conversation between Stalin and Kozlov took place. It was decided to retreat to a new line of defense. But the army left without a commander after the German air raid could no longer advance. New blow was launched in the direction of the Cimmerian Wall, which was assigned the role of a new line of defense. The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of the Soviet troops failed. A German landing force from the air helped to finally break through the defenses. On May 14, the evacuation of Red Army soldiers from Crimea began. A day later, the Germans began their assault on Kerch. The city's garrison fought until it was left without ammunition, after which the city's defenders retreated to the quarries.
Kerch-Feodosia landing operation: results
The landing in Kerch initially brought success. A new front was formed, and the opportunity arose for one of the first large-scale offensives. However, inept command of the troops led to tragic consequences. Over several months of heavy fighting, the Germans managed not only to hold their positions, but also to go on the offensive. As a result, the Wehrmacht delivered a strategically thought-out blow, which led to defeat, which ended the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. The battles are briefly described in the diaries of Kozlov and Manstein.
Despite the failure of the operation, it became a harbinger of the already victorious offensive on the peninsula in 1944.
Second attack
Two years after the tragic defeat, a new landing force landed in the Kerch port. 1944 was the year of the liberation of Crimea. When planning the offensive on the peninsula, the command considered all the details of the first operation. The Azov Fleet was used to deliver troops. The landing party was supposed to seize a bridgehead for a further large-scale offensive.
At this time, a large-scale offensive. Therefore, attacks were launched from two directions. On January 22, about one and a half thousand Red Army soldiers boarded ships and set off for Kerch. To cover up the upcoming operation, soviet artillery began a massive shelling of the coast. In this case, the greatest fire was applied not at the landing site in order to disorient the enemy. Several boats also simulated a landing.
Closer to the night of January twenty-second, troops landed in the Kerch port. 1944 was not nearly as cold as 42, so the Marines did not suffer significant losses from hypothermia. Immediately after landing, the paratroopers rushed into battle and achieved significant success. A significant part of the city was captured. However, the army advancing from the other side was unable to break through the German defenses. Therefore, the paratroopers had to break through to their own forces on their own. During the battles, one of the battalions managed to capture 170 German soldiers. A few days later, having suffered significant losses, the Marines broke through the encirclement and linked up with the advancing units. In essence, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of 1941-1942 was repeated, only much more successful.
The myth of the Crimean disaster of May 1942
The myth of the defeat on the Kerch Peninsula, which the troops of the Crimean Front suffered in May 1942, boils down to the fact that the main culprit of the defeat was a representative of the Headquarters, the head of the Main Political Directorate L.3. Mehlis, who took over the front command, but was unable to repel the German offensive.
To ease the situation of besieged Sevastopol, on December 26, 1941, the Soviet command landed troops in Kerch. By that time, there was only one German infantry division and two Romanian infantry brigades. The commander of the Transcaucasian Front, General Dmitry Kozlov, intended to simultaneously land troops in the Kerch region and in the Feodosia port in order to encircle and destroy the enemy’s Kerch group. Then Soviet troops had to release the blockade of Sevastopol and completely liberate Crimea. The main blow was delivered in the Feodosia region by the 44th Army of General Alexei Pervushin, and the auxiliary blow was delivered by the 51st Army of General Vladimir Lvov in the Kerch region. They numbered 82,500 men, 43 tanks, 198 guns and 256 mortars. Three more rifle and one cavalry divisions were in reserve on Taman. For the landing, 78 warships and 170 transport ships were used, including 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 52 patrol and torpedo boats from the Black Sea Fleet of Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky and the Azov Flotilla of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. The actions of the paratroopers were supported by more than 700 combat aircraft.
On December 26, the landing force landed near Kerch, and on December 30 - in the port of Feodosia. There were more than 40 thousand people in the first wave of landings. In Feodosia, paratroopers landed right at the port and drove out a small German garrison from the city. In Kerch we had to land on an unequipped coast. The paratroopers walked chest-deep in icy water under fire from German batteries and suffered heavy losses. But a few days later frost hit, and the main forces of the 51st Army were able to cross the ice of the Kerch Strait. On December 29, the commander of the 42nd Army Corps, General Count Hans von Sponeck, fearing encirclement, ordered the German-Romanian troops to withdraw to the Parchap positions. The order was immediately canceled by Manstein, but the corps headquarters radio station was moving to a new location and was unable to receive a new order. On the Kerch Peninsula, the 46th Infantry Division abandoned its heavy weapons, and its commander, General Kurt Himmer, was killed. Sponeck was put on trial and sentenced to death, commuted to 6 years of imprisonment in a fortress. After the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944, Sponeck was accused of participating in a conspiracy and executed.
Since the Soviet troops advanced too slowly, the German-Romanian units managed to create a barrier at the turn of the Yayla spur - the coast of Sivash west of Ak-Monai. Due to the narrowness of the front, the attackers were unable to fully exploit their overwhelming numerical superiority. There was not a single hospital on the bridgehead. Many wounded died without waiting for help during transport to Taman. Therefore, losses, especially irrevocable ones, during the landing were especially great: more than 40 thousand people, of which about 32 thousand were killed, frozen and missing, as well as 35 tanks and 133 guns and mortars. The paratroopers did not have anti-aircraft guns, which made them defenseless against the Luftwaffe. On January 4, German bombers sank five transports and heavily damaged the cruiser Red Caucasus. This made it difficult to deliver ammunition and other supplies to the beachhead.
On January 5, 1942, the Black Sea Fleet also carried out a landing in the port of Yevpatoria with a battalion of marines, but it was completely destroyed.
On January 15, the Germans, having transferred part of their troops from Sevastopol, launched a counter-offensive, striking at the junction of the 44th and 51st armies in the Vladislavovka area. On this day, the headquarters of the 44th Army was destroyed by an air raid and the army commander was seriously wounded. On January 18, the Germans recaptured Feodosia. The troops of the Caucasian Front retreated beyond the Akmanai Isthmus. On January 28, the Crimean Front was formed under the command of General Kozlov. At the beginning of February, the front was reinforced by the 47th Army of General Konstantin Kalganov. On February 27, Soviet troops went on the offensive on the Kerch Peninsula. They were attacked by the Primorsky Army, which, however, failed to break through the siege ring. Army Commissar 1st Rank Lev Mehlis was appointed representative of the Headquarters on the Crimean Front. However, the offensive was unsuccessful and was stopped on March 19. On April 9, the Crimean Front launched its final offensive with 160 tanks, which was stopped after two days.
On May 8, the German counteroffensive began, codenamed “Hunting for the Bustard.” It was carried out by five German infantry and one tank divisions, as well as two Romanian infantry divisions and one Romanian cavalry brigade. Manstein hoped to destroy the main forces of the defenders during the breakthrough, so as not to give them the opportunity to use their numerical superiority. The main Soviet headquarters were knocked out by powerful air raids. So, on May 9, the CP of the 51st Army was destroyed. General Lvov was killed. The main blow was delivered in the south, and a roundabout maneuver was undertaken in the north. At the headquarters of the Crimean Front, the German offensive came as a complete surprise. On May 8, Mehlis complained to Stalin about Kozlov, who allegedly did not listen to his warnings about the upcoming German offensive. Stalin did not like this attempt to relieve himself of responsibility, and on May 9, without hiding his irritation, he telegraphed Mehlis: “You are holding the strange position of an outside observer who is not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very convenient, but it is completely rotten. On the Crimean Front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct command errors on the spot. You, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If “the whole situation showed that the enemy would advance in the morning,” and you did not take all measures to organize a resistance, limiting yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. This means that you still do not understand that you were sent to the Crimean Front not as State Control, but as a responsible representative of Headquarters. You demand that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you cannot help but know that we do not have Hindenburgs in reserve.”
The main forces of the Crimean Front retreated to Kerch in disarray and ceased resistance on May 18.
The total losses of Soviet troops in May 1942 on the Kerch Peninsula amounted to more than 300 thousand people, including 170 thousand prisoners, as well as 258 tanks, 417 aircraft and 1133 guns. By May 20, 116.5 thousand military personnel, including the wounded, were evacuated to the Taman Peninsula, as well as 25 guns, 27 mortars and 47 PC installations. The losses of the 11th German-Romanian Army did not exceed 10 thousand people.
Stalin declared the main culprit of the defeat on the Kerch Peninsula to be the representative of the Headquarters Mehlis, the commander of the Crimean Front Kozlov and his chief of staff General Peter Vechny. They were demoted in ranks and positions. On June 4, 1942, a GHQ directive stated that they, as well as the army commanders, “discovered a complete misunderstanding of the nature modern warfare" and "tried to repel the attacks of enemy strike forces, saturated with tanks and supported by strong aviation, linear construction defense - by consolidating the first line troops by reducing the depth of the defense battle formations.” Mehlis and the leadership of the Crimean Front were accused of failing to provide camouflage command posts and organize reliable communications and interaction of troops, as well as the fact that the withdrawal of troops was two days late. However, these shortcomings were characteristic of almost all Soviet commanders of fronts and armies, and not only Mehlis and Kozlov. More than 20 years after the Kerch events, General Kozlov also ranked the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky, among the culprits of the disaster. Indeed, Philip Sergeevich, having command of the sea and significant aviation forces, was unable to organize the evacuation of the troops of the Crimean Front through the narrow Kerch Strait. Also undoubted is the guilt of Kozlov, Vechny and Mehlis, who failed to organize defense on a narrow front against an enemy that was significantly inferior to the Crimean Front in men and equipment and provided at least equality of forces in aviation. However, the main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in Crimea were systemic in nature and were caused by the general vices of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Crimean Front was opposed by one of the best commanders of the Wehrmacht, who managed to impose a maneuverable fight on the enemy, for which he was not prepared, and took full advantage of the Luftwaffe's air supremacy. The leaders of the Crimean Front were preparing for the offensive without paying due attention to defense. But the reasons for the loss of a number of other battles by the Red Army, in particular Vyazemsky, were approximately the same.
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Special project "Hero Cities". Chronicle of Kerch.
The chronicle of the Great Patriotic War includes the exploits of the defenders of Adzhimushkai, who from May to October 1942 held the defense in quarries behind enemy lines, the heroism of the paratroopers of the Kerch-Feodosia operation of 1941 and the Eltigen operation of 1943.
April 11, 1944 Kerch was liberated.
During the fighting in Kerch, more than 85% of the buildings were destroyed, the liberators were met by just over 30 residents of the city out of almost 100 thousand residents in 1940. For the heroism, courage and merits of the population and the exploits of soldiers in the Great Patriotic War, the city of Kerch was awarded the title of hero city.
In November 1941, Kerch was occupied by fascist troops.
Partisan bases were created in the Adzhimushkay and Starokarantinsky quarries. On December 30, 1941, Soviet troops liberated Kerch during the first offensive landing operation of the Kerch-Feodosia operation in the entire war.
Kerch-Feodosia operation 1941 was the largest amphibious assault operation in the Great Patriotic War. The occupiers were in control for only a month and a half for the first time, but the consequences were monstrous. "Bagerovsky Ditch" - here the Nazis shot 7 thousand people.
It was from here that the Soviet Commission for the Investigation of Fascist Crimes began its work. The materials of this investigation were presented at the Nuremberg trials.
During February-April 1942. The troops of the Crimean Front, with the support of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla, fought offensive battles. On May 19, 1942, our troops left Kerch. Part of the troops in the combined detachment of Colonel P.M. Yagunova descends into the Adzhimushkai quarries.
In Small Quarries, the underground garrison was headed by Senior Lieutenant M.G. Important. From May to the end of October, thirsty, gassed, hungry, in damp and cold, the garrison soldiers fought.
On October 31, 1943, the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation began.
In the forty-day battle on the Tierra del Fuego of Eltigen, more than 60 warriors became Heroes Soviet Union. On the night of November 3, the main landing began in the Gleika-Zhukovka-Opasny area. The front stood here for five and a half months. 58 soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union.
And only on April 11, 1944 the city was completely liberated.
In total, in the battles for Kerch, 137 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 21 units and formations were given the honorary name Kerch.
“Kerch lay in ruins. Its famous metallurgical plant was destroyed as mercilessly as the Stalingrad tractor plant. Its neighborhoods resembled the ruins of a city excavated by archaeologists,”- wrote one of the eyewitnesses - writer P. Pavlenko. The exploits of the defenders of Adzhimushkai.
The feat of the Adzhimushkai fighters casts a special light on the harsh military fate of Kerch: this is one of the heroic and at the same time tragic pages of the Great Patriotic War. For hundreds of years, shell limestone was mined in Adzhimushkai, from which the city was built. As a result, underground labyrinths of great length were formed.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Adzhimushkai quarries became the base of the partisan movement. The legendary feat was accomplished by the warriors of the underground garrisons of the Big (Central) and Small Adzhimushkay quarries.
In May 1942, the Nazis, having superiority in military equipment, especially in aviation, broke through the defenses of our troops in the Ak-Monai positions. Exhausted by continuous fighting, the troops of the Crimean Front retreated to Kerch.
Particularly fierce fighting broke out in the Adzhimushkaya area on May 14 and 15. The defenders had almost no artillery and lacked ammunition. On May 16-17, the combined detachment of Colonel P.M. Yagunov found himself surrounded by the enemy. Without an order to retreat, the detachment made its way to the Adzhimushkai quarries. On May 19, 1942, the defense of the city ended.
Two separate underground garrisons arose in the quarries: in the Big ones - numbering approximately 10 thousand people, in the Small ones - up to 3 thousand. Severe trials awaited the heroes of the dungeon. After all, the quarries were not prepared for defense in advance, so there were no special reserves of weapons, ammunition, food, or medicine.
Strict standards had to be established for the distribution of food. It was especially difficult with water. The wells were outside, and water could only be obtained in battle. The situation of the soldiers in the Big (Central) quarries was complicated by the fact that there were more than 500 wounded soldiers and officers in them; thousands of women, children and old people - residents of the city and adjacent villages - also took refuge here.
The Nazis blew up the entrances and exits from the dungeons. Explosions of great force brought down the roof of underground mines. They threw smoke bombs into the dungeon and pumped in poisonous gas with compressors. Many soldiers and commanders died in the days of the first gas attacks, but when the Nazis tried to push into the catacombs, believing that the underground garrison had been broken, they, as before, were met with fire.
The words of a radiogram signed by Colonel P.M. spread to the mainland. Yagunov: `Everyone! Everyone! Everyone! To all the peoples of the Soviet Union! We, the defenders of the defense of Kerch, are suffocating from the gas, dying, but not surrendering! On the night of July 8-9, everyone who could hold a weapon in their hands and who had the strength to throw a grenade went into battle. The enemy garrison in the village of Adzhimushkai was defeated. However, the success was overshadowed by the tragic death of Colonel P.M. Yagunova. The underground garrison was headed by Colonel G.M. Burmin.
In July 1942, the most difficult trials for the soldiers of the underground garrison began. I was overcome by hunger and illness. The garrisons of the Big and Small quarries of Adzhimushka fought with the enemy for 170 days and nights. The garrison understood how unreliable water sources located outside the underground were. It was decided to dig wells inaccessible to the enemy inside the catacombs.
In early July, having gone deeper by more than 14 m, we reached the aquifer. One surviving well can still be seen today when visiting the Adzhimushkai underground museum. A little away from the well, on a hill near the road, there is a mass grave. On the obelisk there is an inscription: `Eternal glory to the partisan heroes civil war who died in battles for the Soviet Motherland in 1919.
And nearby, in the greenery of the trees, rises an obelisk on a mass grave Soviet soldiers who fell in battles for the city during the Great Patriotic War. Eltigen operation In the fall of 1943, the troops of the 18th Army (commander - Lieutenant General K.N. Leselidze) were tasked, in cooperation with the 56th Army, to seize a bridgehead in the area of the fishing village of Eltigen, expand it, take control of the Kamyshburun port and then advance deeper into the Kerch Peninsula, bypassing Kerch.
On the night of November 1, 1943, overcoming a strong storm and minefields, the ships of the Novorossiysk naval base (commander - Rear Admiral G.N. Kholostyakov) headed towards Eltigen. The Kerch Strait had to be crossed in the widest part: in the place where its width exceeds 16 km.
On the first night, more than 2,500 fighters landed ashore. The Nazis, having pulled up reserves, attacked the defenders of the bridgehead, trying to throw them into the sea at any cost. On the first day, the paratroopers repelled up to fifteen attacks and held the bridgehead, despite the enemy's multiple superiority in manpower and equipment. As darkness fell, ships arrived with reinforcements.
For thirty-six days, under conditions of a naval blockade, under constant enemy fire, the Eltigen paratroopers fought. While the fighting was going on south of Kerch, in the Eltigen area, units of the Separate Primorsky Army managed to land and gain a foothold northeast of Kerch.
The German command set the primary task of eliminating the Eltigen bridgehead. The enemy concentrated around the Eltigen "patch" (along the front - 3 km, 1.5-2 km in depth) two divisions, 16 artillery and 8 mortar batteries, up to 30 tanks.
By that time the landing force numbered a little more than 4,500 people and could rely mainly on weapon And anti-tank rifles. On the morning of December 4, after heavy artillery barrage and bombing, the enemy launched a decisive offensive. Over the next three days, the Nazis managed to push back battle formations Eltigenians.
The inequality in power became more and more noticeable. The ranks of paratroopers were melting, ammunition was running out. At this moment, it was decided to make a breakthrough towards Kerch, to try to connect with the forces of the Separate Primorsky Army. The breakthrough group consisted of about 1,800 people, and there were 200 wounded who were able to move independently.
About a hundred fighters remained in cover. The Eltigen raid behind enemy lines began on the night of December 7, 1943. At dawn, the paratroopers occupied Mount Mithridates and part of the coast near the city embankment. They fought for four days in Kerch.
On the night of December 9-10 and December 10-11, the remnants of the Eltigen landing were removed from the shore by ships of the Azov military flotilla. The feat of the landing participants marked the beginning of the liberation of Kerch and the entire Crimea. For the battles on the Eltigen bridgehead, 61 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
During the occupation of Kerch, the Nazis killed 15 thousand civilians and drove more than 14 thousand to Germany. The atrocities of the fascists in Kerch were so monstrous that materials about them appeared at the Nuremberg trial of the main war criminals of fascist Germany.
Romania
von Sponeck,
Gimer,
von Richthofen
- 47th Army
- KV and T-34 battalions
- artillery RGK
1100 guns, 250 tanks;
Kerch landing operation- a major landing operation of Soviet troops in initial period Great Patriotic War . It took place from December 26 to May 20. Despite initial success, the operation ended in major failure: three Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated. Total losses amounted to more than 300 thousand people, including about 170 thousand prisoners, as well as a significant amount of heavy weapons. The defeat of the landing party had a serious impact on the fate of besieged Sevastopol and made it easier for the Wehrmacht to launch a summer offensive in the Caucasus.
Previous Events
Stage 1: landing
Strengths of the parties
Soviet troops The landing force included 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades, 2 mountain rifle regiments - a total of 82,500 people, 43 tanks, 198 guns and 256 mortars:
To support them, 78 warships and 170 transport ships were involved, a total of over 250 ships and vessels, including 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 52 patrol and torpedo boats:
- Black Sea Fleet (Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky)
- Azov Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov)
As of December 20, the air forces of the Transcaucasian Front and the armies operating on the Taman Peninsula totaled about 500 aircraft (excluding air defense fighter aircraft); the Black Sea Fleet had approximately 200 aircraft.
German troops: The protection of the Kerch Peninsula was carried out by:
- Part of the troops of the 46th Division (42nd Army Corps of the 11th Army)
- 8th Romanian Cavalry Brigade
- 4th Mountain Infantry Brigade
- 2 field regiments and 5 anti-aircraft artillery divisions
Landing
Monument to participants of the Kerch-Feodosia landing in Feodosia
At this moment, the enemy forces on the Kerch Peninsula were represented by one German division - the 46th Infantry and the Romanian regiment of mountain riflemen guarding the Parpach ridge area. The landing forces in Kerch were many times greater than the Wehrmacht forces in the area; in addition, the landing in Feodosia threatened encirclement, so the commander of the 42nd Corps, Gen. von Sponeck immediately gave the order to withdraw. Later, Manstein received an order to hold the line, but it was no longer possible to carry it out. The German troops retreated, thus avoiding encirclement, but at the same time leaving behind all their heavy weapons. For a formal violation of the order, von Sponeck was removed from command and put on trial.
results
As a result of the landing, the position of German troops in Crimea became threatening. The commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein, wrote:
If the enemy took advantage of the created situation and quickly began to pursue the 46th [infantry division] from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would have been created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerged sector... It would have been decided the fate of the entire 11th Army.
However, the 51st Army advancing from Kerch did not advance fast enough, and the 44th Army from Feodosia moved with its main forces not to the west, but to the east, towards the 51st Army. This allowed the enemy to create a barrier at the turn of the Yayla spur - the coast of Sivash west of Ak-Monai. The defense of the line was held by the 46th Wehrmacht Division, reinforced by an additional infantry regiment, and Romanian mountain units. To strengthen the combat effectiveness of the Romanian units, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the rear units were included in their composition German army, including from the army headquarters.
Planning errors
Significant miscalculations were made when planning the operation:
- there was not a single one on the bridgehead medical institution, the nearest hospital was in Kuban. The wounded soldiers, having received initial dressings in the regimental medical service, were transported from positions to Kerch, from there they independently traveled by steamship to Novorossiysk.
- Air defense systems were not delivered to the port of Feodosia in a timely manner. As a result, until January 4, 5 transports were killed by enemy aircraft: “Krasnogvardeets”, “Zyryanin”, etc.; The cruiser "Red Caucasus" received heavy damage.
Losses
During the landing, the losses of Soviet troops amounted to more than 40 thousand people, of which about 32 thousand were killed, frozen and missing, 35 tanks, 133 guns and mortars.
Stage 2: battles for the Parpach ridge
In the first days of January 1942, the way to the vital artery of the 11th Army, the Dzhankoy-Simferopol railway, was actually opened for the troops that landed at Feodosia and approached from Kerch. The weak security front that we managed to create could not withstand the onslaught large forces. On January 4, it became known that the enemy already had 6 divisions in the Feodosia area.
However, the commander of the landing forces, D.T. Kozlov, postponed the offensive, citing insufficient forces and means.
Loss of Feodosia
Despite the loss of the port in Feodsia, the Soviet command retained the ability to deliver reinforcements across the ice of the Kerch Strait.
Crimean Front
This time, 8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades attacked in the first echelon. Of the latter, 136 tanks were knocked out during the first three days of the offensive. However, a critical situation was created in a number of areas. How stubborn the fighting was is evidenced by the fact that the regiments of the 46th [Infantry Division], in whose zone the main attack was carried out, repelled from 10 to 22 attacks during the first three days.
Despite all efforts, it was not possible to achieve decisive success this time either.
