Soviet troops on the march. Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow. The tank is covered with winter camouflage, all fighters are in camouflage suits.
On December 5, the troops of the Kalinin Front (Colonel-General I. S. Konev), and on December 6, the Western Front (Army General G. K. Zhukov) and the right wing of the South-Western Fronts (Marshal S. K. Timoshenko) launched a counteroffensive. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, Soviet troops numbered more than 1 million soldiers and officers.
On December 8, Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht A. Hitler signed Directive No. 39 on the transition to defense on the entire Soviet-German front.
During the Soviet counter-offensive near Moscow, the Kalinin, Klinsko-Solnechnogorsk, Narofominsko-Borovskaya, Yeletskaya, Tula, Kaluga and Belevsko-Kozelskaya offensive operations were carried out.
The counteroffensive of the troops of the right wing of the Western and the troops of the Kalinin fronts (the course of hostilities from December 5-6 to December 16, 1941):
Kalinin offensive operation
In early December 1941, a strike group consisting of five rifle divisions of the 31st Army and three rifle divisions of the 29th Army was concentrated in the Kalinin area. These armies did not receive freshly formed divisions and were fighting with formations thinned in the battles for Moscow.
The formations of the left flank of the 29th Army, Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov (since December 12 - Major General V. I. Shvetsov) went on the offensive on December 5, but could not break through the defenses of the infantry divisions of the 9th Army.
The troops of the 31st Army of Major General V. A. Yushkevich, after stubborn three-day battles, broke through the enemy defenses, advanced 15 km by the end of December 9 and created a threat to the rear of the enemy grouping in the Kalinin area.
Simultaneously undertaken by the 30th Army Western front the offensive threatened to reach the rear of the German 9th Army in the Kalinin direction. On the night of December 16, the command of the 9th Army ordered a retreat from the Kalinin region. On the morning of December 16, the troops of the 31st and 29th armies resumed their offensive. The city was taken on 16 December.
In the twentieth of December, the fresh 39th Army (Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov) was introduced into the junction of the 22nd and 29th armies. By the end of December, the troops of the Kalinin Front in the zone of the 39th Army broke through the enemy defenses to the entire tactical depth. During the fighting on January 2-7, 1942, the troops of the front on the right wing reached the line of the river. The Volga, in the center, broke through a new line of defense organized by the enemy along the right bank of the Volga, and captured Rzhev from the west and southwest.
The Soviet ski battalion moves to the front line during the Battle of Moscow.
Klinsko-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation
The idea of the operation was to cut through the main forces of the German 3rd and 4th tank groups in the area of Klin, Istra, Solnechnogorsk and create favorable conditions for the further development of the offensive to the west.
The troops of the 30th Army (Major General D. D. Lelyushenko), who launched an offensive on December 6, broke through the front of two enemy motorized divisions defending against them. By the end of the day on December 7, they advanced 25 km. The 1st Shock Army (Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov) concentrated its main efforts on the right flank and in the center, in the Yakhroma region.
The most difficult was the transition to the counteroffensive of the 20th (Major General A. A. Vlasov) and the 16th armies (Lieutenant General K. K. Rokossovsky). Only on December 9 did the opposing 16th Army of the German troops begin to withdraw in the northwestern and western directions.
The main battles on the right wing of the Western Front unfolded around Klin. By the evening of December 13, the Klin grouping of the enemy was in a semi-encirclement. On the night of December 15, units of the 30th Army entered Klin. After the end of the fighting on December 16, 1941, the 30th Army was transferred to the Kalinin Front.
At this time, the 16th and 20th armies were moving west. At the turn of the Istra Reservoir, German troops tried to put up serious and prolonged resistance to our troops. The water from the reservoir was drained, the ice sank several meters and was covered with a layer of water of 35-40 cm near the western shore. However, on December 15, the exit of two Soviet flank groups north and south of the reservoir forced the German command to quickly retreat to the west. Thus, the enemy defense at the turn of the Istra reservoir was broken through.
In the second decade of December, the 5th Army (Lieutenant General L. A. Govorov) joined the offensive of the right wing of the Western Front. She ensured the entry into battle of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, Major General L. M. Dovator.
On December 20, German troops were driven out of Volokolamsk. On the same day, the right-flank units of the 1st shock army, developing the pursuit of the enemy, reached the river. Lame. An attempt by the 1st Shock, 16th and 20th armies to break through the enemy defenses on the move did not produce significant results. The fighting on this frontier took on a protracted character.
Cavalrymen of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of the 16th Army of the Western Front, in the center with a map in their hands - Commander of the Guards Corps, Major General Lev Mikhailovich Dovator
Narofominsko-Borovskaya operation
On December 16, the command of the Western Front set the task of pursuing the enemy to all the armies that were part of it. However, the enemy offered stubborn resistance, and the Soviet troops had to literally "bite" into the German defenses. Nevertheless, the 33rd Army (Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov) liberated Naro-Fominsk on December 26, and Borovsk on January 4.
The 43rd Army (Major General K. D. Golubev) occupied the Balabanovo station on December 28 and drove the enemy out of Maloyaroslavets on January 2.
To the south, the 49th Army (Lieutenant General I. G. Zakharkin) took Tarusa on December 19 and reached the Maloyaroslavets-Kaluga line by the end of December.
German soldiers freezing in the snow near Moscow.
Changes in the German command
Hitler's order to suspend the retreat, transmitted to the command of the army group on December 16, forbade the withdrawal of large formations of the land army over large areas. The army group was tasked with drawing up all reserves, eliminating breakthroughs and holding the line of defense.
... hold the front to the last soldier ... Commanders, commanders and officers, personally influencing the troops, do everything possible to force them to hold their positions and provide fanatically stubborn resistance to the enemy who has broken through on the flanks and rear. It is only by this kind of tactic that one can buy the time necessary for the transfer of reinforcements from Germany and from the Western Front, which I have already ordered. Only when the reserves arrive at the cut-off positions, it will be possible to think about withdrawing to these lines ...
Hitler's "stop order" received mixed reviews. Chief of Staff 4th german army G. Blumentritt wrote:
“Hitler believed that he alone could save his army from the catastrophe that inevitably approached Moscow. And to be honest, he really achieved this. adverse conditions, was definitely correct. Hitler instinctively realized that any retreat over snow and ice in a few days would lead to the collapse of the entire front, and then the German army would suffer the same fate as Grand Army Napoleon…"
As a result of the retreat from Moscow, on December 19, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch, was removed from his post, and Hitler personally took command of the army. On the same day, Field Marshal F. von Bock was removed from the post of commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal G. von Kluge, who previously commanded the 4th Army, was appointed in his place. General of the mountain troops L. Kübler was appointed commander of the German 4th Army.
The counteroffensive of the troops of the left wing of the Western and right wing of the Southwestern Fronts (the course of hostilities from December 6 to December 24, 1941):
Yelets offensive operation
The offensive of the right flank of the Southwestern Front began on December 6 with a strike by the group of Major General K. S. Moskalenko (from the 13th Army) around Yelets from the north. December 7 on the offensive south of the city the front-line cavalry-mechanized group of Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko crossed.
After stubborn fighting, the meeting of two mobile groups and the completion of the encirclement of parts of the German 45th and 134th Infantry Divisions west of Yelets took place on December 14th. On the night of December 15, the commander of the 134th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General von Kochenhausen, shot himself. During December 15, the encircled parts of two German divisions were split into several parts, and on December 16 they were destroyed.
As a result of the operation, Soviet troops defeated the German 2nd Army and liberated the cities of Yelets and Efremov.
On December 24, the Bryansk Front was recreated (commanded by Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko). The 3rd and 13th armies were subordinated to him, the front was reinforced by the fresh 61st army. In the second half of December, the troops of the Bryansk Front advanced 30-110 km. However, by the end of December, they were stopped by organized resistance and enemy counterattacks and went on the defensive.
After the battle in the Moscow region. These are the positions of the German troops - four ZB vz light machine guns are visible. 26 of Czech production, which were in service with the Wehrmacht.
Tula offensive operation
The Soviet command planned with the forces of the fresh 10th Army (Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov) to deliver a powerful blow to the extended flank of the enemy’s 2nd Panzer Army, where the German 10th Motorized Division was defending on a wide front.
The offensive of the 10th Army began on December 6, by the morning of December 7 Mikhailov was captured. The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, Major General P. A. Belov, liberated Venev on December 9, and by December 10 was on the outskirts of Stalinogorsk.
On December 14, the 49th Army began the offensive. For three days of fighting, her troops advanced 10-20 km, liberated the city of Aleksin and captured bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. Oka.
The 50th army of I.V. Boldin, which did not receive reinforcements, advanced more slowly. Only on December 17, her troops managed to capture Shchekino, but by this time the enemy had already managed to withdraw his troops in a southwestern direction.
As a result of the operation, the enemy troops were pushed back 130 km to the west. At the same time, prerequisites were created for the further development of operations in the direction of Kaluga and Sukhinichi.
Heinz Wilhelm Guderian (German Heinz Wilhelm Guderian; June 17, 1888 - May 14, 1954) - Colonel General of the German Army (1940), military theorist.
Kaluga operation
As a result of the counteroffensive near Tula, the integrity of the construction of G. Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army was lost: the main forces of the army retreated in a southwestern direction to Orel, while the left-flank 53rd Army Corps retreated to the west. By the evening of December 17, the gap between them reached 30 km.
By order of the commander of the Western Front, G.K. Zhukov, a mobile group was created as part of the 50th Army under the command of the deputy army commander, Major General V.S. Popov. Without getting involved in battles with the enemy, by the end of December 20, Popov's group secretly approached Kaluga from the south. On the morning of December 21, she captured the bridge over the river. Oka, broke into Kaluga and started street fighting with the garrison of the city.
Meanwhile, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps reached Odoev south of Kaluga. The German units fighting on the Kaluga-Tula highway were deeply encircled from the south.
Taking advantage of this, divisions of the 50th Army began to carry out a roundabout maneuver. At the same time, the left-flank divisions of the 49th Army hung over the enemy's Kaluga grouping from the north.
The enemy held Kaluga to the end. Only on the night of December 30, the Germans were driven out of the city and retreated to Yukhnov.
Soviet fighting dogs in winter coats.
Belevsko-Kozelskaya operation
Continuing the offensive, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps took Kozelsk on December 28.
A few days before, on December 25, the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, G. Guderian, was removed from his post and expelled to the reserve. The troops of the 2nd Panzer Army and the 2nd Field Army were united in the army group of General tank troops R. Schmidt.
On December 27, the Soviet 10th Army launched an offensive against Belev. December 31 Belev was taken. The rifle divisions of the 10th Army headed for Sukhinichi. Here they encountered a fresh German division. It was not possible to knock her out of Sukhinichi, and she was blocked in the city by January 5.
Captured German motorcycles captured by Soviet troops during the Battle of Moscow.
The results of the December counter-offensive
The main result of the counteroffensive undertaken by the Red Army in December 1941 is the elimination of the immediate threat to the capital of the USSR - Moscow. Apart from political significance, Moscow was the largest hub of all types of communications, the loss of which could adversely affect the conduct of hostilities and the work of industry.
An important consequence of the Soviet counter-offensive was the temporary deprivation of the German command of effective instruments of warfare - motorized corps. The advance of the Soviet troops led to significant losses of equipment and a decrease in the strike capabilities of the German troops.
On the fields of the Moscow region, the first major defeat of the German army in World War II was inflicted, the myth of its invincibility was dispelled. The Soviet command assessed the results of the counteroffensive in such a way that the Red Army wrested the initiative from the enemy and created the conditions for a general offensive.
The offensive of the Kalinin and the right wing of the Western fronts on January 9-25, 1942:
Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation
The operation began on January 8 with a breakthrough of the 39th A of the enemy defenses west of Rzhev. On January 9, the 3rd and 4th Shock A North-West went on the offensive. front. On January 22, these armies were transferred to the Kalinsk Front. By the end of January, the troops of the front reached the approaches to Vitebsk, Smolensk, Yartsev, deeply enveloping Army Group Center from the north-west, and also broke through to Vyazma and surrounded about 7 enemy divisions in the Olenino area. The troops of the left wing of the Western Front (43rd, 49th and 50th A) by January 10 bypassed the Yukhnovskaya enemy grouping from S. and Yu., which allowed the 33rd A to the north of Yukhnov, and the 1st Guards. kav. corps south of it to break through to the rear of the enemy, to develop a blow to Vyazma. The 10th A reached the approaches to the cities of Kirov and Lodinovo. On January 10-20, the troops of the right wing of the front (1st Shock, 20th, 16th and 5th A, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) broke through the enemy defenses and liberated Lotoshino, Shakhovskaya and Mozhaisk.
On February 1, the post of commander-in-chief of the western direction was restored, to which General of the Army G.K. Zhukov was appointed, who retained the post of commander of the Western Front. The Stavka demanded to complete the defeat of the main forces of Army Group Center. At the same time, the German command brought up reinforcements, which, in cooperation with aviation, repulsed the attacks of Soviet troops on Vyazma. At the same time, the enemy launched strong counterattacks against the communications of the 33rd, 39th and 29th armies that had moved forward, whose troops were forced to go on the defensive in early February. During the second half of February and March 1942, the 43rd Army unsuccessfully tried to break through the corridor to the 33rd Army. On April 14, the 50th Army of the Western Front advanced towards the breaking through units of the Belov group. But already on April 15, when no more than 2 kilometers remained to the encircled army of Efremov, the Germans threw back parts of the 50th Army, and the offensive bogged down. Since the evening of April 13, all communication with the headquarters of the 33rd Army has been lost. The army ceases to exist as a single organism, and its separate units make their way to the east in scattered groups. On April 17 or 18, the wounded M. G. Efremov committed suicide.
In late March - early April, the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts made another attempt to defeat the Rzhev, Olenin and Vyazma groups and unite with the troops operating behind enemy lines in the Vyazma region, but again without success.
The battles of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps in the encirclement continued until mid-July 1942, when they were finally defeated (Operation Seydlitz). The commander of the 39th Army, Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov, was evacuated, his deputy, Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov, died surrounded.
The offensive of the armies of the center of the Western Front in the Mozhaisk and Vyazma directions and part of the forces of the left wing of the front in the Yukhnov direction from January 8-9 to January 30-31, 1942:
Results of the Moscow battle
During the battle, the German troops suffered a tangible defeat. As a result of the counter-offensive and the general offensive, they were driven back 100-250 km. The Tula, Ryazan and Moscow regions, many districts of the Kalinin, Smolensk and Oryol regions were completely liberated.
At the same time, the Wehrmacht forces were able to maintain the front and the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead. Soviet troops failed to defeat Army Group Center. Thus, the issue of ownership strategic initiative was postponed until the summer campaign of 1942.
Soviet officers inspect captured weapons in front of a line of captured German soldiers. Battle for Moscow.
Kalinin region, USSR |
|
Tactical draw strategic victory of the USSR |
|
Opponents |
|
Germany |
|
Commanders |
|
I. S. Konev |
B. Model |
V. A. Yushkevich |
G. Reinhard |
I. I. Maslennikov |
A. Strauss |
V. I. Shvetsov |
O.-V. Forster |
V. N. Dolmatov |
|
P. A. Rotmistrov |
|
Side forces |
|
192,000 infantry |
unknown |
27,343 irretrievable casualties |
unknown |
The offensive operation of the Soviet troops of the Kalinin Front during the Great Patriotic War, carried out on December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942 during the Battle of Moscow. It began after the end of the Kalinin defensive operation.
Story
In early December 1941, a strike group consisting of five rifle divisions of the 31st Army and three rifle divisions of the 29th Army was concentrated in the Kalinin area. These armies did not receive newly formed divisions and fought with formations that had thinned out in the battles for Moscow.
The formations of the left flank of the 29th Army, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov (from December 12 - Major General V.I. Shvetsov) went on the offensive on December 5, but could not break through the defenses of the infantry divisions of the 9th Army.
The troops of the 31st Army of Major General V. A. Yushkevich, after stubborn three-day battles, broke through the enemy defenses, advanced 15 km by the end of December 9 and created a threat to the rear of the enemy grouping in the Kalinin area.
At the same time, the offensive launched by the 30th Army of the Western Front threatened to reach the rear of the German 9th Army in the Kalinin direction. On the night of December 16, the command of the 9th Army ordered a retreat from the Kalinin region. On the morning of December 16, the troops of the 31st and 29th armies resumed their offensive. The city was taken on 16 December.
In the twentieth of December, the fresh 39th Army (Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov) was introduced into the junction of the 22nd and 29th armies. By the end of December, the troops of the Kalinin Front in the zone of the 39th Army broke through the enemy defenses to the entire tactical depth. During the fighting on January 2-7, 1942, the troops of the front on the right wing reached the line of the Volga River, in the center broke through a new line of defense organized by the enemy along the right bank of the Volga, and captured Rzhev from the west and south-west.
Operation progress
On December 1, 1941, an order was received for the troops of the Kalinin Front, according to which the 31st Army, reinforced by rifle divisions and heavy artillery regiments, regrouped on left wing for the attack on Kalinin.
On December 4, the 57th pontoon-bridge battalion arrived at the disposal of the 31st Army, the purpose of which was to equip ferry crossings across the Volga. However, it turned out that at a stable temperature of about -25 it is impossible to organize a ferry crossing. It was decided to transport the tanks along the pontoons by two routes, the main one near the village of Orshino and 200 meters above the main one with an ice thickness of 20-25 cm; the length of each track was 350 meters.
On December 5, by order of the Supreme Commander, a big battle began in the area of the city of Kalinin. The task assigned to the front command was not only to occupy Kalinin, to defeat the Kalinin group of Germans, but also to go to the rear of the enemy units operating against Moscow.
The main blow in the center - across the Volga was delivered by the 256th, 119th and 5th rifle divisions, the density of artillery - only 45 guns per 1 km of the breakthrough front. At 11 o'clock on December 5, units of General Maslennikov, occupying the defense northwest of Kalinin, went on the offensive. At 1300, an offensive began from the northeast of General Yushkevich's units. The Germans responded to the attack of the Soviet troops with heavy mortar and machine-gun fire. An hour and a half after the start of the offensive, a group of our troops, breaking through the German defenses, captured the outskirts of the village of Staraya-Konstantinovka. The formations of General Goryachev, concentrating on the left bank of the Volga, crossed the river during the day, silenced the coastal enemy guns and broke into the village of Pasynkovo, the Vlasyevo state farm, thereby cutting the Moscow-Leningrad highway, east of Kalinin.
In fierce battles on December 5, the troops of the 31st Army, overcoming enemy resistance, broke through the front line of defense of the Nazis, blocked the Moscow-Klin highway and advanced 4-5 km. They came close to the line of the October railway, liberated 15 settlements, creating a threat to the communications of the 9th German army.
To stop the advance of the troops of the 31st Army, the enemy transferred two infantry divisions to this direction. Intense bloody battles began with varying success. The losses of personnel grew, but despite the increased resistance, the 119th division liberated the Chupriyanovka station on December 8.
In the meantime, by the morning of December 7, the crossings across the Volga were ready. The tanks of the 143rd and 159th tank battalions were transported along them, after the crossing they entered the battle for Emmaus.
At the same time, the units of General Maslennikov had as their task to drive the Germans out of the villages occupied by them on the left bank of the Volga from the River Tma to Kalinin, break the German defenses on the right bank of the Volga and reach the Staritsky highway, which was the enemy's main communication line. The implementation of this task would create a threat of complete encirclement of the enemy's Kalinin grouping. In order to prevent encirclement, the German command sent the 129th and 251st infantry divisions to Kalinin.
The troops of the 29th Army were unable to break through the enemy defenses and liberate Kalinin. In this regard, I. S. Konev turned part of the forces of the 31st Army - the 256th, 247th Rifle Divisions and the 54th Cavalry Division to the northwest with the task of encircling the enemy grouping in Kalinin and in cooperation with the 29th Army take over the city.
On December 13, the 937th regiment stormed the village of Koltsovo, and then the settlements of Small and Bolshoi Peremerki, Bobachevo, Bychkovo, and by the end of the day on December 15 reached the eastern outskirts of Kalinin. Reconnaissance of the front line of the enemy managed to clarify that the Germans, hiding behind barrier groups, were preparing for a hasty retreat.
On December 14, units of the 31st Army bypassed Kalinin from the southeast, cutting off the Volokolamsk and Turginovskoye highways. With the entry of the troops of the 31st Army to the Volokolamsk Highway, the fate of the Kalinin grouping of the enemy was decided. The fascist troops had one road Kalinin - Staritsa, on which units of the 29th Army broke through. In addition, the exit of the troops of the 30th Army of the Western Front to the line of the river. Lama created a real threat to the rear of the 9th Nazi Army. The Germans began to hastily retreat from Kalinin.
Already in the evening of December 15, the Small Peremerki, set on fire by the enemy, flared up, fires broke out in many places in Kalinin. On the night of December 16, the Nazis blew up the railway bridge and highway bridges across the Volga.
Overcoming the resistance of the enemy rearguards, units of the 243rd rifle division By 3 o'clock on December 16, the 29th Army occupied the northern part of the city, and by 9 o'clock they reached the area of the Kalinin railway station. By 11 o'clock, the right-flank units of the 256th Infantry Division broke into Kalinin from the southeast, and units of the 250th Infantry Division of the 31st Army approached the city from the south. By 13 o'clock the city was completely liberated from the Nazi troops.
The further development of the counteroffensive took place in an atmosphere of fierce enemy resistance, in the difficult conditions of a harsh winter, with a general lack of weapons and military equipment among our troops. The Soviet Army did not yet have large tank and mechanized formations and formations, which made it impossible to break up the enemy's operational formation to a great depth and quickly complete the encirclement and destruction of his groupings. The offensive was frontal. Shock groups were not created everywhere. The pace of advance of the troops was low.
After the liberation of Kalinin, the front was given the task of continuing the vigorous pursuit of the enemy in the direction of Staritsa, getting in the way of the retreat of the Kalinin grouping, encircling and destroying it. Fulfilling the assigned task, the troops of the front, reinforced by the 30th Army from the Western Front and the 39th Army from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, on January 1, 1942, liberated the regional center of the Kalinin Region - Staritsa, and by January 7 they reached approaches to Rzhev and Zubtsov and occupied an advantageous covering position from the north in relation to the main forces of Army Group Center.
During the operation, the troops of the Kalinin Front advanced 60-70 km in the Torzhok-Rzhev direction, and 100-120 km in the Kalinin-Rzhev direction. The 9th German Army was defeated, but the Soviet troops failed to encircle and destroy it. From January 7, 1942, she held the Rzhev area, preventing the Soviet troops from advancing further. Only on March 3, 1943, the city of Rzhev was liberated from the Nazi troops.
KALININ OFFENSIVE OPERATION (5.12 1941 - 7.1 1942)
As in the defensive phase of the battle for Moscow, the fighting in the Kalinin region became an independent part of the battle, indirectly influencing the general situation. The task of the Soviet troops at the initial stage of the operation was the encirclement and destruction (in case of refusal to surrender) of German troops in the area of the city of Kalinin. A promising task was to reach the rear of the 3rd Panzer Group and destroy it in cooperation with the Western Front.In contrast to the battles of October-November, in December there were no tank divisions in the German troops in this direction. Parts of the XLI motorized corps, which had been delayed for a long time in Kalinin, departed for Moscow at the end of November 1941. The enemy of the advancing Soviet troops were only the infantry divisions of the German 9th Army.
In early December 1941, the forces of the troops of the Kalinin Front along total strength did not outnumber the forces of the 9th Army of the enemy that opposed them, but as a result of the regrouping carried out on the left wing of the front in the Kalinin region, a strike group consisting of five rifle divisions of the 31st Army and three rifle divisions of the 29th Army was concentrated. In terms of the number of people in the divisions, the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front had approximately one and a half superiority over the enemy grouping defending against them, consisting of a little more than three infantry divisions. But in artillery, superiority in this sector of the front continued to remain on the side of the German troops.
However, the troops of the Kalinin Front operated under conditions fundamentally different from attacks on the extended flanks of an offensive grouping of two tank groups. They were opposed by the infantry, who managed to equip positions. To the objective factors that did not contribute to the successful actions of the troops subordinated to I.S. Konev, subjective factors were added - incorrect operational solutions to the tasks of breaking through the enemy's defenses. So, the formations of the left flank of the 29th Army, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov, went on the offensive on December 5. But instead of delivering a single blow, they launched an offensive simultaneously on three sectors of the front, separated from each other by 7-8 km. Each of the three advancing rifle divisions of the 29th Army delivered a strike on a 1.2-1.5-kilometer section of the front with two rifle regiments echeloned one after the other. These strike groups wedged into the enemy's defenses, but, being shot through by fire from both flanks, were forced to stop, and by the evening of December 5, the strike group of the right-flank rifle division was pushed back by the enemy to its original position.
Over the next eight days, army troops made unsuccessful attempts to break through the defenses of the German 9th Army. Only on December 14, after Major General V.I. Shvetsov (appointed on December 12), took command of the 29th Army, the troops achieved little tactical success - they captured several settlements on the southern bank of the Volga. However, on the evening of December 15, the enemy launched a counterattack against units of the 29th Army and forced them to retreat to the river. In many respects, the failures of the Kalinin Front are explained by the fact that the 29th and 31st armies did not receive freshly formed divisions and fought with formations thinned in the battles of the defensive phase of the battle for Moscow.
The failures of the 29th Army largely blurred the success of the 31st Army, which, in cooperation with the troops of I.I. Maslennikov, was supposed to surround Kalinin. The troops of the 31st Army of Major General V.A. Yushkevich, after stubborn three-day battles, broke through the enemy defenses, by the end of December 9, advance units advanced 15 km and cut the Kalinin-Turginovo highway (south of Negotino), creating a threat to the rear of the enemy grouping in the Kalinin area . Since the 29th Army was never able to advance towards the troops of V.A. Yushkevich, the commander of the Kalinin Front ordered the commander of the 31st Army to create a strike force for a deep detour maneuver. It consisted of four rifle divisions, one cavalry division, two tank battalions, two artillery regiments and two rocket artillery divisions. The forces of this grouping, together with the troops of the 29th Army, were supposed to complete the encirclement of the enemy in the Kalinin area.
The situation that had become a stalemate was changed by the offensive of the 30th Army of the Western Front, whose advance threatened to reach the rear of the 9th Army in the Kalinin direction. On the morning of December 16, the troops of the 31st and 29th armies resumed their offensive, striking at. converging directions with the aim of encircling the enemy in the city of Kalinin. But on the night of December 16, the command of the 9th Army ordered a retreat from the Kalinin region. The city was taken on December 16, and on the same day the 30th Army was transferred to the Kalinin Front.
Starting on December 16, the 30th Army began to pursue the slowly retreating enemy. By the end of December 25, the armies of the left wing of the Kalinin Front reached the Vysokoye, Kaznakovo, Lotoshino line, where they were temporarily detained by the enemy at a defense line prepared in advance by him.
However, it was during this period that the concentration of the 39th Army, transferred to the front from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, took place in the Torzhok area. Like other fronts, the Kalinin Front received a freshly formed army at its disposal. Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov was appointed commander of the 39th Army. The army was deployed between the 22nd and 29th armies at the end of December. Even before the concentration of all formations assigned to the 39th Army, it went on the offensive. On December 22-25, the troops of the 39th Army, advancing with forces of slightly more than two divisions, wedged into the enemy defenses for 3-6 km. At the end of December, the troops of the Kalinin Front in the zone of the 39th Army broke through the enemy defenses to the entire tactical depth.
With the introduction of the main forces of the 39th Army into battle, things went much better for the Kalinin Front. During the fighting on January 2-7, 1942, the troops of the front on the right wing reached the line of the river. The Volga, in the center, broke through a new line of defense organized by the enemy along the right bank of the Volga, and captured Rzhev from the west and southwest. The left-flank divisions of the 39th Army, the 29th, 31st and 30th Armies were detained by the enemy at a defensive line prepared in advance by him in the Rzhev region and north of Lotoshino.
Operation results
As a result of the Kalinin operation carried out in December 1941 and early January 1942, the troops under the command of I.S. Konev advanced 60-70 km in the Torzhok-Rzhev direction, and 100-120 km in the Kalinin-Rzhev direction. The main result of the operation was the liberation of the city of Kalinin, the most important communications hub. The Soviet command received at its disposal a powerful railroad - the railway line and the Bologoye - Kalinin - Moscow highway.
Isaev A. A short course in the history of the Great Patriotic War. The offensive of Marshal Shaposhnikov. — M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005. — 384 p. / Circulation 8000 copies. isbn 5-699-10769-X.
The 29th Army with its rifle divisions held the line of the river. Rachayny and r. Darkness from Martynovo to Tukhin. The 54th Cavalry Division was in the army reserve in the area of Simonkovo and Medukhovo.
Occupying the indicated line, the troops of the Kalinin Front continued to hang over the left wing and rear of the German Army Group Center and, therefore, were in an advantageous operational position in relation to the enemy grouping.
In total, as of December 1, the Kalinin Front had fourteen and a half divisions, including: rifle divisions - thirteen, cavalry - one and one motorized rifle brigade.
The operational density of the defense was low. Each division accounted for an average of 16 1/2 km of the front of defense.
Despite the work done in November great job on the resupplying of divisions with people and military equipment, the average staffing of divisions did not exceed 60%. In addition to rifle divisions, the front included eleven artillery regiments of the reserve of the Supreme High Command.
There were no tank units in the front on December 1. The 8th and 21st tank brigades during the period of defensive operations were transferred by order of the Headquarters to the Western Front.
By the beginning of December, the air forces of the front consisted of one bomber regiment, three fighter aviation regiments, and one assault aviation regiment. In total, they numbered 16 bombers, 52 fighters and 20 attack aircraft.
The general plan of the counteroffensive of the Soviet Army near Moscow, developed under the direct supervision of Stalin, provided for simultaneous powerful strikes against the enemy by the troops of the Western Front in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin and the right wing of the Southwestern Fronts in order to defeat the main enemy strike groups operating north and south Moscow. Subsequently, it was planned to launch an offensive in a general direction to the west in order to complete the defeat of the main forces of Army Group Center.
Despite the fact that the troops of the Kalinin Front did not have a general numerical superiority in forces and means over the opposing 9th Army of the enemy, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command considered it possible to launch an offensive operation on the Kalinin Front as well. In making this decision, the Headquarters took into account that the troops of the Kalinin Front occupied an exceptionally advantageous operational position, deeply enveloping enemy troops advancing north of Moscow from the north. It was also taken into account that the German 9th Army did not have operational reserves, and its divisions were deployed in one line on a wide front and were all drawn into the battle.
In the offensive operation of the Kalinin Front, the front troops were faced with the task of destroying the opposing enemy and reaching the flank and rear of his units advancing from Klin to Dmitrov and Moscow. With their offensive, the troops of the front were supposed to help the Western Front in destroying the enemy’s northern strike group (3rd and 4th tank groups and part of the forces of the 4th German army) and in disrupting the enemy’s further attack on Moscow.
To achieve this goal, the Kalinin Front, in accordance with the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of December 1, was to concentrate a strike group of at least five to six rifle divisions in the area of Poddubye, Tinishkino, Shestino, together with a neighbor on the left - the 30th by the army of the Western Front - to strike in the general direction to the south and reach the line of Mikulino Gorodishche, Turginovo.
The Stavka ordered to include in the strike group the 119th, 246th, 250th and 256th rifle divisions, a separate motorized rifle brigade and the 54th cavalry division, as the most combat-ready, as well as most of the artillery of the High Command reserve, all installations rocket artillery and tanks transferred for this purpose from Moscow.
To reinforce the Kalinin Front, the following were transferred to its composition: the 5th Rifle Division - the right-flank division of the 30th Army of the Western Front - and the 262nd Rifle Division, which was transferred by rail to the Likhoslavl region from the North-Western Front. In addition, the front included the 143rd and 159th separate tank battalions, which had a total of 50 tanks.
The depth of the operation was 40–50 km. The direction of the further development of the offensive depended on the specific situation that could have developed by the time the front troops reached the line.
Considering real opportunities Kalinin Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command instructed him to deliver one powerful blow on a relatively narrow section of the front. The blow had to be of such force as to ensure the penetration of the entire depth of the enemy’s defense southeast of Kalinin and the output of the strike force of the Kalinin Front to the line, which made it possible to attack the Klin group of the enemy from the rear and thereby assist the troops of the Western Front.
On December 2 and 3, the 29th Army, consisting of 183, 174, 246, 252, 243 divisions, continued to stubbornly defend in the Torzhok and Meden directions.
From the morning of December 4 246, 252, 243 divisions, in cooperation with 31 armies, were ordered to advance in the direction of Danilovskoye, capture Kalinin and further advance in the direction of Turaevo.
The specific task of the 246th Rifle Division was:
246 rifle division without 908 rifle regiment, with the 29th cavalry regiment, 2/432 GAP with two regiments to advance in the direction of Shcherbovo, Danilovskoe. The immediate task is to capture Shcherbovo, the final Danilovskoe.
On the night of December 4, the division concentrated in the forests northwest of the mouth of the Darkness.
On the morning of December 5, a 30-minute artillery preparation began on the entire front. Under its cover, parts of the division went on the offensive, by 14 o’clock they had overcome thin ice Volga, reached the road Krasnov - Migalovo but, met by strong enemy fire, were forced to lie down, and then again retreat to the left bank.
The enemy from the Oparino region offered strong fire resistance. Despite this, by the end of the day, the division captured Krasnovo and continued its attack on Danilovskoye, pushing the retreating enemy.
Bloody battles continued. The division counterattacked the enemy, but was driven back to the northern bank of the Volga. As a result of this failure, Krasnovo had to be abandoned.
It is worth noting that it was for Krasnovo that the division fought most fiercely. This confirms the fact that the settlement many times in a short period passed from one hand to another.
In connection with the failure of the 246th division, the army commander decided to transfer the main blow to the offensive zone of the 252nd division, where some success was indicated in the direction of Borikhin.
On the night of December 7, the 246th division concentrated in the forest north of Cherkasy for an offensive jointly with the 252nd division in the direction of Migalov and Palkin. In the morning, the 915th regiment broke through the enemy defenses, crossed the Kalinin-Migalovo tram line in the middle of the day, but then was counterattacked and stopped. Introduced into battle from the second echelon, the 914th regiment also could not advance further than the tram line.
By the evening of the same day, under the influence of enemy counterattacks from the front and flanks, strong artillery and mortar fire, parts of the division retreated to the northern bank of the river. Volga, where they put themselves in order and prepared for the offensive from the next morning.
But already on December 8, after a powerful fire raid, the enemy counterattacked parts of the division from Migalov. The 914th and 915th regiments were forced to withdraw again to the left bank of the river.
The current situation did not suit the command in any way, so the 246th rifle division launched an offensive with two regiments with the task of capturing Mamulino. Unfortunately, the launched offensive was not successful.
After heavy fighting, it took time to rest. For three days, the division put the units in order, replenished ammunition, and intensively conducted reconnaissance.
On December 10, the army commander, General I. I. Maslennikov, decided to temporarily reassign the 908th and 915th regiments of the 252nd rifle division, which was advancing on Derevyanishche and Mikulino, with the task of capturing the southwestern part of Kalinin in the future. The task of the 914th regiment remained the same: to take Krasnovo.
On December 11, the 246th, 252nd and 243rd divisions continued the offensive and part of the forces of the 246th and 252nd divisions crossed to South coast R. Volga. The enemy offered strong fire resistance.
The 914th regiment fought off numerous counterattacks. Due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, the regiment was once again forced to leave Krasnovo and return to their original positions.
The division was regrouped. In addition, it was reinforced with two howitzer divisions. The 644th corps artillery regiment supported the division with fire.
On the night of December 14, the division broke through the enemy defenses. The 914th regiment again captured Krasnov and entrenched itself in it. The 908th and 915th regiments went around the village from the east and west and went to Deshevkino and Danilovskoe. By evening, units broke into these settlements, but they could not develop success in the direction of Nikulin. In Danilovsky, the 915th regiment defeated the headquarters of a German infantry regiment.
On December 13, the 246th division was preparing for the offensive and at 16:30 went on the attack in the direction of Danilovskoye, covering the Obmenovskoye-Shcherbovo sector with units of the 29th regiment.
The exit of the 246th Infantry Division to the Danilovskoye area created a dangerous situation for the Kalinin group of Nazi troops, jeopardizing the only road that connected it with the rear. But the position of the 246th Rifle Division, stretching out towards Danilovskoye in a narrow wedge with both flanks open, in turn, could not be considered stable either.
On December 14, the enemy unsuccessfully tried to return Krasnov. During the day, the 914th and 924th regiments fought off six counterattacks. On December 15, the division was ordered to continue the attack on Nikulino. On the left, the 252nd division advanced on Migalovo and Borikhino. However, by the morning of December 15, the Nazis pulled up reserves and counterattacked parts of the division along the entire front. The 908th and 915th regiments, which had suffered significant losses in previous battles, fought back to Krasnov, where the 914th and 924th regiments were firmly entrenched.
The division suffered heavy losses in the December battles. But, despite the large shortage, the connection completed its tasks.
On December 14, the division continued its offensive and by 18:00 reached the edge of the forest northwest of Danilovskoye and entered Danilovskoye.
The next day, with two battalions of the 174th division and one battalion of the 187th division, repelling an enemy attack from Motavino to RebeevoThe 246th division held Krasnovo and prepared for a phased attack on Danilovskoye.
By the end of December 16, the enemy grouping was basically defeated, and its remnants randomly retreated in the direction of Staritsa.
On December 16, the 246th division, continuing the offensive with two regiments, fought for Deshevkino and Danilovskoye. The remaining parts firmly hold Krasnovo.
Having replaced parts of the 174th division, on December 18 the division went on the defensive at the line of Struzhnya, Semenovskoye, the northern bank of the river. Darkness, Dmitrovskoe.
As a result of the retreat of the enemy, the division liberated many settlements: Motavino, Priudishche, Mukhino-Gorodishche, Borki, old and new Knyazevo.
By order of the command, the regiments received a new direction of attack.
The villages of Besmenino, Lopatino, Dudrovo, Zarechye, Negoshkino and Buskatovo and many others were liberated by the 246th division from the invaders from December 24 to 31.
Continuing the offensive, the division cut offto the enemy's escape route along the highway to Rzhev and facilitating the capture of the city of Staritsa by the 252nd division.
During the offensive, the division inflicted heavy damage on units of the 6th and 26th German infantry divisions. According to the testimonies of the prisoners, out of 600 people of the 2nd battalion of the 78th infantry regiment of the 26th infantry division, about 120 survived, and even then half of them were frostbite. During the 12 days of the offensive, the 246th Rifle Division advanced 70 km , liberated 94 settlements. 50 guns, 29 mortars, 112 machine guns, about 500 rifles, 57 vehicles and tractors, a lot of ammunition and communications equipment were captured. About a hundred enemy soldiers and officers were taken prisoner.
Having completed the task, it was withdrawn to the second echelon of the 29th Army and concentrated in the area of Korenicheno, Gvozdev, Old and New Praskovino, where it put itself in order for two days, replenished with people.
Already in the evening of January 4, an order was received from the commander: to advance to the area of \u200b\u200bNovoselye, Neklyudovo, Lednikovo, from where to advance in the second echelon of the army behind the 243rd Infantry Division.
At the previously prepared line of Klipunovo, Gridino, Gushchino, Kruptsovo, Sevostyanovo ( 20 km northeast of Rzhev) the enemy put up fierce resistance to the troops of the army. On January 6, the 908th and 914th regiments went on the offensive with the task of capturing Gridin, an important stronghold in the enemy's defenses on the outskirts of Zubtsov and Rzhev.
The attack was not successful. Parts of the division were withdrawn to the starting lines.
This was the end of the participation of the 246th Infantry Division in the Kalinin operation. A regrouping of forces began for a new, Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation.
The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow was the first major offensive operation in the Great Patriotic war(1941-1945). By the beginning of December 1941, the groupings of German troops rushing to the capital of the USSR in fierce battles with the forces of the Western, Southwestern, Kalinin fronts suffered significant losses, were stretched out on a wide front and, as a result, lost their strike power.
So on December 1, 1941, the commander of the Army Group Center, von Bock, sent a report to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, von Brauchitsch, in which he said that there were not enough forces for a larger enveloping maneuver. The fighting of the past two weeks has shown that the assumption that "the enemy is 'close to defeat' has turned out to be an illusion." Army Group Center was forced to hold a front of approximately 1,000 km and had only one weakened division as a reserve. The German commander wrote that with such a balance of forces on the Eastern Front, when the troops suffered heavy losses in the officer corps, and the combat effectiveness of the troops fell, the Wehrmacht was not able to conduct more or less planned offensive operations. Due to failures in the work of the railway, the command also does not have the opportunity to prepare troops widely along the front for defensive operations and to ensure the full supply of forces during such battles.
Von Bock suggested that if Army Group Center had to go on the defensive at the current lines for the winter of 1941-1942, then with the current balance of forces at the front, this "is possible only if large reserves are allocated" that will be able to block possible strikes enemy, front breakthroughs. And to allow one by one to withdraw for rest and replenishment the divisions of the first echelon, weakened in battles. And for this, the army group will additionally need at least 12 divisions. The next prerequisite, according to the German Field Marshal, was the order and reliable operation of railway transport. This made it possible to regularly supply German troops and create the necessary supplies (ammunition, ammunition, food, etc.). If it is not possible to reinforce the army group with reserves and restore order in the supply, then it is necessary to immediately select an advantageous and less extended line in the rear for the forces of the Eastern Front. The new frontier must be prepared for defense by appropriate forces, the necessary rear communications must be built so that, upon receipt of the corresponding order from the supreme command, it can be occupied within a short time.
Soviet side
For Soviet command the Kalinin operational area was a big surprise. It appeared because of the catastrophe that occurred during the first stage of the October battle on the distant approaches to the capital Soviet Union. Then, as a result of the encirclement of four Soviet armies (19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd) of the Western Front, the formation of the so-called. "Vyazemsky cauldron" Hitler's troops were able to move unhindered deep into the USSR on the right wing of the Western Front.
In the end, I had to Kalinin defensive operation (October 10 - December 4, 1941). The active actions of the commander of the troops of the Western Front, General Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, who replaced Ivan Stepanovich Konev, the creation of a special group of troops as part of the troops of the left wing of the Western Front and the operational group of the North-Western Front under the command of N. F. Vatutin, and then the Kalinin Front to act on Kalinin direction averted a catastrophe. Although Kalinin himself had to be given away on October 14. By October 16, Soviet troops fought back across the Volga River and fortified at the Selizharovo-Staritsa line. With the capture of the city of Kalinin, the Wehrmacht got the opportunity to develop an offensive around Moscow from the north and northeast, as well as to the rear of the North-Western Front. On October 17, an order was given to form the Kalinin Front from 4 armies: 22nd, 29th, 30th, 31st and a number of separate units. The Germans, and the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group were advancing in this direction, had superiority in manpower and equipment (1.9 times in infantry, 3.5 times in tanks, 3.3 times in guns, machine guns - 3.2 times), they could not develop the offensive.
A few more days there was a battle for the city of Kalinin. Parts of the 256th Rifle Division under General S. G. Goryachev and the Kalinin detachment of the people's militia under the command of Senior Lieutenant Dolgoruk held the northwestern part of the city. The task force of N. F. Vatutin repelled an attempt by the 41st motorized corps of the 3rd tank group to break through to the rear of the North-Western Front. We repulsed the blow in the Torzhok direction. After continuous and bloody battles, which, although they did not bring significant territorial successes to the Red Army, the Wehrmacht units were exhausted and suffered significant losses in people and equipment. The Kalinin Front, by active defense and constant counterattacks, pinned down 13 enemy divisions and did not allow them to be transferred to the Moscow direction, where the decisive battle was going on. By December 4, the front troops were firmly entrenched on the line east of Selizharov, north of Martynov, west, north and east of Kalinin, the left bank of the Volga, the Volga reservoir. The Kalinin Front occupied an enveloping position in relation to the northern flank of Army Group Center, which was advantageous for launching a counteroffensive.
Preparation of the offensive
In the course of planning a general offensive near Moscow, a decision was made to attack the Kalinin Front. On December 1, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General A.M. Vasilevsky, informed the commander of the Kalinin Front, Colonel-General I.S. Konev, about the "exclusively advantageous operational position" of the front and the need to "collect literally everything in order to hit the enemy."
On December 1, 1941, the balance of power in this sector of the Soviet-German front was as follows: the Soviet forces were opposed by the 9th German Army under the command of Colonel-General Adolf Strauss, consisting of 12 infantry divisions, the 1st security division and the 1st cavalry brigade of troops "SS". Its number was about 153 thousand people, the Germans had about 2200 guns and mortars, tanks - 60. In the Kalinin Front there were about 200 thousand people, about 1000 guns and mortars, 17 tanks. The ratio in manpower was 1.5:1 in our favor, in terms of guns, mortars, we were inferior - 1:2.2, in tanks - 1:3.5.
On December 1, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SVGK) issued a directive on the offensive operations of the front. The headquarters ordered the creation of an attack group consisting of at least 5-6 divisions within the next 2-3 days and strike from the Kalinin, Sudimirka front in the direction of Mikulino Gorodishche and Turginovo. The shock group was supposed to go to the rear of the Klin group of the Wehrmacht and thereby contribute to its destruction by the troops of the Western Front.
On the morning of December 1, Lieutenant-General A. M. Vasilevsky arrived at the front to clarify the situation. It turned out that I. S. Konev, given his limited strength and means, decided instead of an operation with a decisive goal, which included the victory over the right wing of Army Group Center in cooperation with the Western Front, to conduct a local operation to liberate the city of Kalinin. A. M. Vasilevsky was able to convince the front commander that the Stavka's plan was real. Konev only asked to strengthen the front.
By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the forces of the Kalinin Front were regrouped. The 31st Army under the command of Major General V. A. Yushkevich gave a significant part of the front line (including the city of Kalinin) to the 29th Army. All units of the 31st Army were concentrated in a 30-kilometer strip - from Kalinin to Sudimirok. On December 2, 1941, the front commander Konev, in accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, gave the troops a combat order. The front was to deliver two blows. The first forces of the 31st Army from the east and southeast of Kalinin. The second formations of the 29th Army under the command of Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov, bypassing Kalinin from the west. The 29th Army was also supposed to defend the Torzhok direction.
The offensive operation was planned to be carried out in 2 stages. At the first stage of the connection of the 29th and 31st armies, they were supposed to break through the German defenses and capture Kalinin on the first day of the offensive. Then the advancing troops of the armies were to enter the line: Danilovskoye, Negotino, Stary Pogost, Kozlov. At the second stage, the troops of the front were to develop success in the southern direction and reach the line of the Shoshi River with a shock group.
The commander of the 31st Army, Major General V. A. Yushkevich, decided to deliver the main blow on a 6-kilometer sector by units of the 119th (Major General A. D. Berezin) and 250th (Colonel P. A. Stepanenko) rifle divisions in the direction of Stary Pogost, Pushkino. For the development of a breakthrough in the reserve of the 31st Army was the 262nd Rifle Division (Colonel M. S. Tereshchenko). At the same time, in order to distract the attention of the German command, it was planned to carry out two auxiliary attacks: the 256th Infantry Division advanced on Bolshie Peremerki with its right flank, and the 5th Infantry Division hit Smolino Gorodishche. Thus, the 31st army of Yushkevich, having rather limited forces - the army did not receive new divisions in its composition and conducted an offensive with formations thinned in previous battles, inflicted not one blow, but three. In addition, it was not possible to suppress the German defenses with strong artillery fire: the density of artillery in the direction of the main attack of the 31st Army was only 45 units per 1 km of the front.
Within a very short period of time, the front carried out a rather significant regrouping of forces. All troop movements were carried out at night, observing careful camouflage. The Germans, apparently, were so confident in their power that they overlooked the preparation of the front for a counteroffensive, and, as the prisoners later said, the offensive of the Soviet troops was completely unexpected for them.
The Germans had a fairly strong defense, a chain of trenches and long-term protected firing points stretched along the Volga. In some places, the river bank was steeply cut and watered. Therefore, it was almost impossible to climb under enemy fire on an ice-covered slope. The Germans turned the villages on the front line and in the depths of their defense into strong strongholds, and the stone and most powerful wooden buildings into long-term firing points with all-round fire. The gaps between the strongholds were covered by minefields and two or three lines of barbed wire. In the city of Kalinin itself, the enemy created a continuous line of defense from trenches, bunkers and dugouts.
Due to the fact that the 262nd Rifle Division did not have time to reach its original positions in time and the rear did not have time to catch up, the start of the front offensive was changed and postponed from December 4 to December 5, 1941.
Adolf Strauss (right) commander of the 9th Army
Offensive
On December 5, the armies of the Kalinin Front launched a counteroffensive. Following them on the morning of December 6, the shock groups of the Western Front and the right wing of the Southwestern Front went on the offensive. Fierce fighting unfolded on a front of more than 1000 km (from Kalinin to Yelets).
At 3 am on December 5, the assault battalions of the divisions of the shock group of the 31st Army moved across the ice to the right bank of the Volga in order to capture bridgeheads in the settlements of Peremerka, Gorokhovo, Staro-Semenovskoye and thereby ensure that the main forces of the army overcome the water line. The battalions of the 119th and 5th rifle divisions by 10 o'clock captured the bridgeheads at Gorokhov and Staro-Semenovsky.
At 13:00, after a 45-minute artillery preparation and air strikes, the main forces of the army went on the offensive. From the very beginning, the battle took on a fierce character. The rifle companies, which were advancing virtually without the support of armored vehicles, were able to overcome the Volga with one throw, but on the other side they came under heavy enemy fire. But, despite the deadly fire of the Germans, the Red Army boldly rushed to capture the settlements of Gorokhove, Gubino, Emmaus, Staraya Vedernya, Aleksino. Grenades were used, and it came to hand-to-hand fights, when bayonets, butts, and knives were used. In fierce battles, by the end of December 5, formations of the 31st Army were able to break through the first line of defense of the 9th German Army, cut the Moscow-Kalinin highway. Soviet troops advanced 4–5 km forward, advanced units came close to the Oktyabrskaya railway. In total, 15 settlements were captured on the first day of the fighting. But the troops of the 31st Army could not fully fulfill the task set by the front commander.
At 11 o'clock on December 5, in the general direction of Danilovskoye, units of the 29th Army, Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov, went on the attack. The troops of the 246th (Major General I. I. Melnikov) and the 252nd (Colonel A. A. Zabaluev) rifle divisions crossed the Volga by 2 p.m. and reached the Krasnovo-Migalovo road. The 243rd Rifle Division (Major General V.S. Polenov) reached the northern outskirts of the city, meeting strong German resistance. The divisions could not do more. The Wehrmacht, fearing for its rear, offered fierce resistance to units of the 29th Army, constantly turning into counterattacks. Therefore, formations of the 246th and 252nd rifle divisions were forced to retreat to the left bank of the Volga. And even by the end of the fifth day, the battles actually remained at the same line from which the offensive began. The 243rd Rifle Division received an order not to get involved in heavy street fighting in the city of Kalinin and limit itself only to reconnaissance in battle and firing artillery and mortar fire at the German defensive positions.
The offensive of the 31st Army almost failed. On December 6-7, units of the army fought fierce battles on the achieved lines. Already on the night of December 5-6, the German command transferred significant reserves to the breakthrough site and in the morning the Nazis launched strong counterattacks, as a result, the Germans managed to recapture the settlements of Myatlevo, Oshchurkovo, Emmaus. And the formations of the 250th Infantry Division, which achieved the greatest success on December 5, were forced to retreat to the left bank of the Volga. The main reason for this failure was the mistakes of the commanders and the lack of reliable communications in the division. On the morning of December 6, one of the battalions of the 922nd Infantry Regiment was deployed to repel an attack by a German group that threatened the flank of the neighboring 5th Division. The 916th and 918th regiments considered that this was a retreat from Kuzminsky, faltered and began to retreat. The panic began. The command of the Wehrmacht took advantage of this oversight and threw its formations into a counterattack. Control was lost in our retreating regiments. The unorganized mass retreat led to significant losses (about 1.5 thousand people were killed, wounded and missing). The command of the division lost control of the situation.
To restore the situation, the commander of the 31st Army brought into battle on the afternoon of December 6 a reserve - the 262nd Infantry Division. The command of the retreating regiments was punished: a military tribunal sentenced the commander and commissar of the 918th regiment, the commissar of the 916th regiment to death, the commander of the 916th regiment to 10 years in prison for unauthorized withdrawal from their positions.
With the help of the 57th pontoon-bridge battalion, two pontoon crossings were created near the village of Orshino, they were laid directly on the ice, because it was impossible to organize a ferry crossing due to severe frosts. All day on December 6, there were stubborn battles for crossing the river. With the help of aviation, the Germans managed to destroy the crossing near Orshino, but near Poddubye on the night of December 6-7, part of the RVGK artillery and 6 T-34 tanks were able to transport to the captured bridgehead.
On December 7, after a 15-minute artillery preparation, the offensive was continued. After a fierce battle, the troops of the 31st Army again occupied Emmaus, which was an important stronghold on the Moscow-Kalinin highway. And on December 8, Soviet troops reached the Klin-Kalinin railway and recaptured the Chupriyanovka railway station. On the right flank of the army, units of the 256th Infantry Division also reached the railroad.
It should be noted that from the very beginning of the offensive there was a severe frost - 30–33 °. And on the morning of the 8th, heavy snow began to fall, which covered all the paths and roads. If the field guns could be moved because sledges were prepared for them in advance, then the vehicles got stuck. And the formations had to bring ammunition, fuel, food, fodder. In this regard, the local population provided great assistance, which provided support with horses and sledges. The German command, given the weather conditions, which fettered the possibilities for maneuver, concentrated all their forces on the defense of settlements, which had previously been turned into fortified areas.
On December 9, troops of the 31st Army on their right flank captured the Koltsovo stronghold. In the central direction, Kuzminskoye was liberated. By the end of the day, the 256th Rifle Division cut the Turginovo-Kalinin highway 1.5 km east of Mozzharin. For 5 days of heavy offensive battles, the army troops advanced 10–12 km and practically broke through the entire tactical defense zone of the German army.
But it cannot be said that everything went well - parts of the 29th Army could not free Kalinin. The 31st Army, reinforced by one rifle division and the 1st Cavalry Division, advanced slowly. The German command understood that the rapid movement of parts of the Kalinin Front in a southwestern direction could eventually lead to disaster for its 3rd and 4th tank groups, which at that time were retreating under pressure from the troops of the Western Front. Therefore, the 129th Infantry Division was transferred to Kalinin, which was removed from the Moscow direction, as well as the 110th and 251st Infantry Divisions (they acted against the troops of the right wing of the front).
Order of the Headquarters of the VKG, reinforcement of the front
Due to the slow movement of the troops of the Kalinin Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command ordered to turn part of the formations of the 31st Army around Kalinin from the southeast and, in cooperation with the 29th Army, immediately recapture the city, and the rest of the forces of the 31st Army to develop an offensive to the southwest and, together with parts of the Western Front, defeat the enemy.
The liberation of the city made it possible to release the forces connected in this area and send them to strike at the rear of the Wehrmacht grouping retreating from the capital. In addition, this step made it possible to resume railway communication on the Moscow - Bologoe - Malaya Vishera section, which was of strategic importance.
Taking into account the large role of the units of the Kalinin Front in the course of the further development of the offensive operation near Moscow, the Supreme Command Headquarters took significant measures to strengthen it. To strengthen the front, the 359th and 375th rifle divisions were transferred. On December 12, parts of these divisions began to arrive at the Kulitskaya railway station (15 km northwest of the city of Kalinin). At the same time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command informed Konev about the transfer of the 39th Army (comprising 6 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions) to the Kalinin Front to bring it into battle in the Rzhev or Staritsa directions.
Further fights. Liberation of Kalinin
To complete the encirclement of the Germans, the commander of the 31st Army created a strike group. It included the 250th and 247th divisions, 2 regiments of the 119th rifle division, 2 tank battalions, 2 artillery regiments of the RGK (high command reserve), and other units. But she could not strike right away - during December 13, the strike force had to repel strong German counterattacks at the same line. Up to 6 German battalions with four tanks broke through to the rear of the 247th Rifle Division and attacked its headquarters. The division commander was wounded. As a result, control of parts was lost for some time. The army headquarters restored control, and the German battalions that had broken through were destroyed.
By the end of December 14, for the third time during the offensive, units of the 246th Infantry Division of the 29th Army were recaptured from the Germans locality Krasnovo. The 31st Army developed the offensive, the Volokolamsk highway was cut. In the center and on the left flank of the army, Soviet troops also successfully advanced. The 262nd Infantry Division, having repulsed up to six German counterattacks, captured the strong fortified points of Baksheyevo and Stary Pogost by the end of the day. The 5th Infantry Division entered the line: Trunovo, Mezhevo. The 46th Cavalry Division was advanced to the Trunov area for a raid on the German rear. To build up the offensive of the army, the 359th rifle division was transferred.
After the formations of the 31st Army cut the Volokolamsk highway, the fate of the Kalinin group of the Wehrmacht was decided. The German troops had only one way to retreat: Kalinin - Staritsa. In addition, the withdrawal of the troops of the 30th Army of the Western Front to the line of the Lama River created a great threat to the rear of the 9th German Army. Therefore, realizing that the city could not be defended, the Germans began to prepare for withdrawal - on the evening of the 15th, arson began, on the night of the 16th, the Germans destroyed the highway and railway bridges across the Volga.
Breaking the resistance of the rear units of the Nazis, formations of the 243rd Infantry Division of the 29th Army liberated the northern part of Kalinin by 3 o'clock on December 16, and by 9 o'clock they made their way to the railway station area. By 13 o'clock the city was completely liberated from the Germans.
Results of the first stage of the operation
During 12 days of offensive battles, the forces of the left flank of the Kalinin Front defeated 5 Wehrmacht infantry divisions, which accounted for almost half of all troops of the German 9th Field Army. During the period of December 5 - 16, more than 7 thousand German soldiers and officers were destroyed by formations of the Kalinin Front. 14 tanks, 200 vehicles, 150 guns and mortars were captured.
Kalinin suffered heavy destruction, the Germans destroyed 70 factories, plants and workshops, the best city buildings were destroyed or burned: the regional and city councils, the regional and city committees of the party, the drama theater, the theater of the young spectator, cinemas, 50 schools, 7.7 thousand residential buildings , more than a hundred shops, 25 canteens. Significant damage was received to power plants and the railway junction, water supply and sewer network, tram lines, telephone communication, etc.
The victory at Kalinin was a major operational success for the Red Army. This success ensured the movement of the troops of the right wing of the Western Front. More favorable conditions were created for the continuation of the offensive operation of the Kalinin Front in the southwestern direction. The formations of the left flank of the front made their way forward 10 - 22 km. The rate of advance of the troops of the front was relatively slow. The reasons for this were quite understandable: the almost complete absence of armored vehicles (especially at the beginning of the offensive), the lack of artillery, ammunition, transport and other means of logistical support for the troops. The formations of the advancing armies were not replenished and reinforced with fresh units before the offensive. There were also shortcomings in the command and control of troops, and in the field of communications. During the offensive of the armies of the Kalinin Front, the interaction of formations was disrupted, the assignment of tasks often exceeded the potential capabilities of the divisions, frontal attacks were used on strong points and fortified positions of the Germans, instead of bypassing and blocking them. We must also take into account the fierce resistance of the 9th German Army.
Completion of the Kalinin offensive operation
By the end of December 16, formations of the left flank of the Kalinin Front reached the line: Motavino - Kurkovo - Maslovo - Boldyrevo.
The further development of the offensive took place in the conditions of fierce resistance of the Nazis and the harsh winter, with a general lack of military equipment and transport among the Soviet troops. The Kalinin Front did not have large tank and motorized formations that could build on success, enter the operational space, crush the formations of the German army to a great depth and quickly complete their encirclement, and then the liquidation of its groups. The offensive of the Soviet units was of a frontal nature, shock groups were not created everywhere. The pace of movement of the troops of the front was low. The German command managed to withdraw most of the troops.
After the liberation of Kalinin, the front was given the task of continuing the vigorous pursuit of the Nazis in the direction of Staritsa, getting in the way of the retreat of the Kalinin group of the Wehrmacht, surrounding and liquidating it.
Fulfilling this task, the troops of the Kalinin Front (and it was reinforced by the 30th Army from the Western Front and the 39th Army from the reserve of the Supreme Command), on January 1, 1942, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the Germans, liberated Staritsa - the regional center of the Kalinin region. Then the Soviet troops reached the approaches to Rzhev and Zubtsov, and by January 7 they took advantageous lines in relation to the Rzhev group of the Wehrmacht. Thus was completed the Kalinin offensive operation.
