In front of the 2nd Belorussian Front, units of the 39th tank, 27th and 12th army corps of the 4th german army consisting of six infantry and one motorized divisions.
In reserve, the Germans supposedly had up to two infantry and one motorized divisions in the Mogilev area. The operational density of the German defense was about 17 km per division.
The enemy's defense in depth in front of the 2nd Belorussian Front on the left bank of the Dnieper covered the major railway and highway junctions of Orsha and Mogilev.
The main defensive line of the Germans ran from Baevo to the south along the Kopyl, Romistvyanka and Pronya rivers to the Chausy station and further southwest to the Dnieper. This frontier had a developed system of fortifications and field-type barriers, reaching a depth of 4–5 km.
In depth, along the western bank of the Basya and Resta rivers and along the Orsha-Mogilev highway, the Germans had intermediate defense lines with trenches and communication passages, reinforced in some areas with barbed wire.
The rear defensive line of the enemy ran along the western bank of the Dnieper and had a prepared system of trenches and barriers. The system of the rear defensive line included the city of Mogilev, which represented the center of the fortified area.
The terrain in the offensive zone is characterized by the presence of river barriers, which greatly facilitated the enemy's stubborn resistance. The most serious obstacles that required special engineering support for the troops during the crossing were the Pronya and Dnieper rivers, and further into the depths, the Drut and Berezina rivers.
By the nature of the terrain and the availability of roads, the most advantageous direction for the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front was the strip along the Mstislavl, Ryasna, Mogilev road. Here, too, the starting line for the offensive was more advantageous in that there were forests adjacent to the Pronya River, which contributed to the secrecy of the concentration of troops.
According to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of May 31, the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front developed an operation plan by June 10.
The purpose of the front-line operation was to, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, defeat the Mogilev grouping of the enemy, reach the Berezina River and develop the offensive in a westerly direction.
The tasks of the front were determined by the plan as follows:
“To break through the enemy defenses, inflicting one general blow from the Dribin, Dednya, Ryasna area in the general direction to Mogilev, Belynichi.
The immediate task is to reach the Dnieper and seize a bridgehead on its western bank. In the future, force the Dnieper with the main forces, capture Mogilev and develop the offensive in the general direction to Berezino, Smilovichi.
The main blow of the front was to inflict 49th Army composed of eleven rifle divisions(united by four corps directorates - the 81st, 70th, 69th and 62nd rifle corps). This army had ten brigades and fifteen artillery regiments, two brigades and eight regiments of tanks and self-propelled guns as reinforcements. The army was supposed to break through the German defenses on the western bank of the Pronya River on a 12 km front (Khalyupy, Star. Perevoz), delivering the main blow in the direction of Zatona, Ozerye, Barsuki.
The immediate task of the 49th Army was to cross the Pronya River, break through the enemy front and, by the end of the first day of the operation, reach the Basya River with the main forces, seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the river with mobile detachments. By the end of the second day of the operation, the strike group was supposed to take possession of the Domany-Kureni line. By the end of the third day, intercept the Orsha-Mogilev highway north of Mogilev (in the Bel, Mostok sector), securing the flanks of the strike force from Orsha and Mogilev.
The further task of the 49th Army was to cross the Dnieper, by the end of the fifth day of the operation, reach the Vysokoye, Luzhki, Senkovo line with the main forces and take the city of Mogilev with a blow from the north and northwest.
Mobile front group consisting of one rifle division, two tank brigades, one anti-tank brigade and other units, had the task of reaching the strike group of the 49th Army on the Basya River with a swift throw to reach the Dnieper, force it, by the end of the third day of the operation, capture the line Vysokoye, Star . Vodva, Luzhki and hold it until the approach of the main forces of the 49th Army.
On the right wing of the front 33rd Army consisting of three rifle divisions and one fortified area, it was supposed to firmly defend the occupied line, and with the start of the offensive of the army (31st) of the 3rd Belorussian Front adjacent to the right and in cooperation with it, strike at the enemy with the forces of one division on the front of Baevo, Lenino in the general direction to Yurkov, Sava, Mikhailovichi; on the left flank, the 33rd Army, after breaking through the German defenses by the shock group of the 49th Army, was part of the forces of the 154th fortified region to reach the line of Nov. Pribuzh, Zhevan and, firmly holding it, provide the right flank of the 49th Army.
On the other front of the army, measures were envisaged to fetter the enemy by the actions of small subunits. In addition, the plan provided for the readiness of the army to move with all its might to a general offensive in the western direction to pursue the retreating enemy.
50th Army(left wing front) consisting of eight rifle divisions (united by three corps directorates - 38th, 121st and 19th), five artillery regiments, two self-propelled artillery regiments and other reinforcement units had the task of firmly holding the occupied line, preparing from each rifle regiment the first line by one rifle company to go over to active operations. In addition, the 50th Army should be ready to go on the offensive in the general direction of Kutnya, Lykovo. The commander was instructed to withdraw a rifle corps to the army reserve by June 16, meaning the introduction of this corps either in the breakthrough sector of the 49th Army for operations from the north to Chausy, or in the zone of his army from the line of Sheperevo, Golovenchitsy to Blagovichi.
The operation plan was written by the chiefs of staff of the front in one copy and announced against receipt to the commanders of the armies, as well as the commander of artillery, armored and mechanized troops of the front and other generals in the part that concerned them.
2nd Belorussian Front 2nd Formation It was formed on April 24, 1944 on the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of April 19, 1944 as part of the 33rd, 49th, 50th armies from the composition. The field administration was formed on the basis of the field administration of the 10th Army. Subsequently, the front included the 2nd shock, 3rd, 19th, 43rd, 48th, 65th, 70th armies, the 1st and 5th guards tank, 4th air armies and the Dnieper military flotilla.
In May 1944, the troops of the front fought local battles in Belarus. Participating in the Belorussian strategic operation (June 23-August 29), on June 23-28 the front carried out the Mogilev operation. His troops crossed the Dnieper in the entire offensive zone and on June 28 liberated Mogilev.
June 29-July 4, the front participated in the Minsk operation. On July 5-27, the troops of the front carried out the Bialystok operation, on July 27 they liberated Bialystok.
In August-November, in cooperation with the troops of other fronts, they liberated Western Belarus, reached the borders of Poland and East Prussia, captured the Ruzhansky bridgehead on the left bank of the Narew River, north of Warsaw.
Participating in the East Prussian strategic operation (January 13 - April 25, 1945), on January 14-26, the troops of the front carried out the Mlavsko-Elbing operation. As a result of this operation, they advanced to a depth of 230 km, captured a bridgehead on the left beret of the Vistula in the Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) region, later reached the Baltic Sea coast in the Tolkemit region and blocked the East Prussian enemy grouping from the west and southwest, cutting it off from the hinterland of Germany.
February 10-April 4, 1945, the troops of the front, together with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, participated in the East Pomeranian strategic operation, as a result of which the northern part of Poland was liberated.
April 6-May 8, the troops of the front took part in the Berlin strategic operation. During the offensive, they crossed the Oder in its lower reaches and, advancing to a depth of 200 km, defeated the enemy's Stettin grouping, ensuring the offensive of the strike group of the 1st Belorussian Front on Berlin from the north.
On May 4, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front went to Baltic Sea and to the line of the Elbe, where they established contact with the English 2nd Army.
On May 9, the 132nd Rifle Corps of the 19th Front Army took part in the liberation of the Danish island of Bornholm.
The front was disbanded on June 10, 1945 on the basis of the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of May 29, 1945. Its field administration was renamed the administration of the Northern Group of Forces.
Front commanders: interpreter general Petrov I. E. (April-June 1944); colonel general, from July 1944 - army general Zakharov G.F. (June-November 1944); Marshal Soviet Union Rokossovsky K. K. (November 1944 - until the end of the war).
Members of the Military Council of the front: Lieutenant General Mekhlis L. 3. (April-July 1944); Lieutenant General N. E. Subbotin (July 1944 - until the end of the war).
Chiefs of Staff of the Front: Lieutenant General Lyubarsky S. I. ( April May 1944); Lieutenant General, from February 1945 Colonel General A. N. Bogolyubov (May 1944 - until the end of the war).
Strike of the 2nd Belorussian Front
East Pomeranian offensive differed in that it did not have a preparatory period. The planning of the operation, the regrouping of troops and the accumulation of forces in a new direction took place during the fighting in East Prussia. Continuity of movement Soviet troops, on the one hand, did not allow the Germans to create a strong defense on the left bank of the river. Vistula, on the other hand, the power of the blow and the pace of the offensive decreased.
Following the instructions of the Headquarters, Rokossovsky strengthened the left wing of the front, which made it possible to advance without an operational pause. So even before the start of the operation, the 49th Army under the command of Ivan Grishin was transferred from the right wing of the front to the left. It was introduced into the joint between the 70th army of Vasily Popov and the 65th army of Pavel Batov. Grishin's army was reinforced by the 330th and 369th rifle divisions, which were in the reserve of the front commander. The 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was withdrawn from the battle on the right wing of the front and transferred to the left flank. The main forces of the 2nd shock army of Ivan Fedyuninsky regrouped on their left flank. An artillery breakthrough group was formed: two breakthrough artillery divisions, one division and three separate brigades rocket artillery, two anti-tank artillery brigades, two corps artillery brigades, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions and other artillery units. Regrouped mobile connections. One tank and one mechanized corps were transferred to the 70th Army. Another tank corps was in reserve. In addition, the 19th Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Corps were transferred from the Stavka reserve to Rokossovsky.
On the morning of February 10, the troops of the left wing and the center of the 2nd Belorussian Front struck from a bridgehead on the left bank of the Vistula. During the day, Soviet troops advanced 5-10 km. The advance progressed slowly. The Germans offered stubborn resistance, constantly counterattacking. In the offensive zone of the 65th Army, Soviet troops had to take two strong enemy strongholds - the cities of Shvets and Schenau. The left-flank 70th Army, which included two mobile formations, advanced the most, but even here the successes were small. The right-flank 2nd Shock Army was involved in battles with the encircled enemy garrisons in Elbing and Graudenz, and carried out a regrouping of forces, leading them into the zone of operations of the 65th Army on the left bank of the Vistula. Troops and cargo had to be transferred across the ice of the Vistula, in the conditions of the upcoming spring flood. To do this, it was necessary to strengthen the ice with all kinds of decks and prepare crossings under heavy equipment.
In the following days, the army of the front also did not achieve much success. A stubborn battle with the enemy troops continued. The 2nd Belorussian Front, repulsing the fierce attacks of the German troops, slowly advanced. In five days of fighting, the troops of the front advanced only 15-40 km in different sectors. The greatest success was achieved by Popov's 70th army, which captured the city of Chojnice, a major stronghold and communications center. The 65th and 49th armies advancing in the center advanced more slowly, advancing 15-20 km.
The right-flank army of Fedyuninsky has not yet entered the battle, since the 65th army has not yet reached the line from which the 2nd shock army was supposed to enter the battle. Only on February 16, in the Graudenz area, one of the corps of the 2nd shock army launched an offensive, striking along the left bank of the Vistula in a northerly direction.
Here the enemy had a powerful defense, which was based on strong strongholds and nodes of resistance. wooded and swampy terrain and a large number settlements with stone buildings allowed the Germans to create a strong and in-depth defense. Our infantry, which had to advance mainly along the roads, had to constantly storm enemy strongholds, which extremely slowed down the offensive.
For example, such a battle on the outskirts of the city of Meve was carried out by one of the regiments of the 86th Infantry Division. On the way of the regiment was a strong stronghold of the enemy, located in the village and the heights surrounding it. The German garrison consisted of two companies of infantry, reinforced by an artillery battalion, six mortars, two assault guns and heavy machine guns. The Germans repulsed the frontal attacks of the Soviet troops. Then the commander of the 6th company, Lieutenant Savin, carried out a roundabout maneuver. His company, reinforced by a platoon anti-tank rifles under the command of Lieutenant Reznikov, she bypassed the enemy’s positions through the forest and cut off the enemy’s main communications. A bilateral assault on German positions led to success. The Germans did not expect a blow in the back and were defeated.
A column of IS-2 tanks on a city street during a march in Eastern Pomerania
The assault on the cities of Elbing and Graudenz. On the right flank, the 2nd shock army won a big victory. Back in early February, during the offensive in East Prussia, Soviet troops blocked the fortress of Elbing. For several days there were stubborn battles. On the night of February 10, a battalion under the command of Captain Sidorov from the 381st Infantry Division crossed the canal and broke into the enemy's position, which was defending the shipyard on the opposite bank. Rush Attack Soviet soldiers temporarily paralyzed the resistance of the enemy and allowed other parts of the division to reach the opposite bank of the canal. The fate of the German garrison defending Elbing was decided. In the afternoon, Soviet troops took the city. On February 10, 1945, Moscow saluted the valiant soldiers with 21 volleys of 220 guns, and the units that distinguished themselves were given the honorary title of "Elbing".
Simultaneously with the battles for Elbing, units of the 2nd shock army stormed the Graudenz fortress (Polish Grudziadz). In early February, Soviet troops came from the east to the outer perimeter of the fortress defenses. In subsequent battles, our troops broke through the outer fortifications and reached the second belt of enemy defenses. The fortress was defended by a strong 15,000 men. the garrison, which had a significant number of fortress, field and assault guns, more than 100 mortars and a large number of faustpatrons. Graudenz had large stocks everything necessary and was prepared for a long siege. The German garrison had lines of communication with Eastern Pomerania via bridges across the river. Vistula in the city and suburbs.
At the first stage of the battle, the Soviet grouping, which attacked the German fortress, was inferior in strength to the enemy garrison. However, our troops stubbornly advanced and soon fought on the outskirts of the fortress. The commander of the troops of the 2nd shock army, Lieutenant General Fedyuninsky, decided to speed up the capture of the fortress and reinforced the assault grouping with the 142nd rifle division and entrusted the leadership of the actions to capture the city to the commander of the 98th rifle corps, Major General Anisimov. First, it was decided to completely block the fortress. Parts of the 37th division were still advancing from the east, and the 142nd division was to strike along the left bank of the Vistula in a northerly direction in order to cut the communications of the enemy garrison.
On February 10, Soviet troops went on the attack again. Assault groups were formed to conduct battles in the city. They were based on a rifle platoon, which was reinforced by sappers, machine gunners, flamethrowers, anti-tank rifle crews, guns or tanks and self-propelled guns. Stormtroopers found gaps in the enemy's defenses between garrison formations and fortified buildings, captured buildings and heights that had a dominant position in a given quarter. Then, with the support of other units, they began cleaning up the quarter.
The assault group attack scheme looked something like this. Guns, tanks or self-propelled guns suppressed enemy firing points, tried to cover individual enemy units. The sappers prepared explosions to break through the walls of buildings that were going to be stormed or completely destroyed them, blew up long-term firing structures. Flamethrowers set fire to buildings where the enemy sat down. Machine gunners and PTR crews fired on accessible and poorly protected targets, controlled the streets and alleys. The infantry went on the assault after a short fire raid. To overcome open places, smoke screens were often used, false attacks were used to wear down the enemy and dull his vigilance. When storming buildings, strike groups practiced the principle of a double strike on an object. A small group of submachine gunners and flamethrowers, under the cover of light and heavy machine gun fire, broke through to the building. The shooters fired at windows, doors, all possible firing points, flamethrowers destroyed enemy firing points located on the first floors, in the basements, or set fire to the building. The second group broke into the building itself and completed the defeat of the enemy garrison. Assault units operated both day and night, and night attacks were considered the most effective.
Soviet soldiers and commanders in these battles showed great courage, selflessness, initiative and skill. So the assault group of the 461st Infantry Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Mikhailov advanced along Schwerinstrasse. There were only 15 fighters in the group, and she cleared all the houses on the left side of the street from the enemy. In one of the quarters, Mikhailov's assault group crushed the enemy up to a battalion with a sudden blow and captured more than 100 soldiers. True, Mikhailov himself died a heroic death.
The battles went on with varying success. The Germans constantly counterattacked and in some areas regained previously lost positions. Therefore, units of the 37th Guards Rifle Division were unable to achieve decisive success. Meanwhile, the 142nd Infantry Division, advancing along the left bank of the Vistula, intercepted enemy communications in several days of fighting. This success led to the fact that the position of the German garrison was greatly complicated. Thus, the enemy fortress was completely blocked and lost external support.
Fedyuninsky offered the Germans an ultimatum - in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and destruction, he offered to lay down and surrender. However, the head of the German garrison, General Fricke, rejected this proposal. Soviet troops prepared for a decisive assault. All formations of the 98th Rifle Corps were to participate in it. From the east, the city was still to be attacked by the troops of the 37th Guards Rifle Division. From the southwest, having crossed from the left bank of the Vistula to the right, the 142nd division was to go on the offensive. From the north and northeast, the fortress was first blocked by the forces of two fortified areas, then from this direction the 381st Rifle Division, which was freed after the capture of Elbing, was supposed to storm. To exclude the possibility of the German garrison escaping across the ice of the Vistula, part of the troops besieging the fortress was transferred to the left bank.
In the second half of February active fighting resumed. Two infantry regiment The 142nd Rifle Division successfully crossed the Vistula in the area of the railway bridge and captured enemy positions with a sudden blow. Then the sappers laid special plank shields across the ice, along which they transferred the artillery of the division. Coming to their senses, the Germans organized a series of counterattacks. The fighting was extremely fierce, in some places turning into hand-to-hand combat. In order to hold the occupied positions and achieve a decisive turning point, on the third day the division commander brought the regiment of the second echelon into battle. The troops of the division broke into the southern part of the city and began to slowly move forward, repulsing the fierce German attacks.
No less heavy fighting took place in the offensive zone of the 37th Guards Rifle Division, which slowly pressed the enemy day and night. The entry into battle of units of the 381st division finally turned the tide in favor of the Soviet troops. From March 2, 1945, the German garrison was pressed from three sides, from the south, east and north. Late attempts by the German garrison to break out of the encirclement and leave the fortress failed. By March 6, the remnants of the German garrison were blockaded in the old fortress. The Soviet troops prepared for the last assault, but the Germans did not resist anymore and capitulated. About 5 thousand people surrendered, led by the head of the garrison, General Frikke.
Capture of Chojnice. The Germans also put up stubborn resistance in the Chojnitsky and Chersk directions, often turning into counterattacks. So only after stubborn battles, the Soviet troops were able to take the large strongholds and communications centers of Osh, Chersk and Chojnice. On some days, our divisions had to beat off 8-10 enemy counterattacks with forces from a battalion to an infantry regiment, supported by tanks and assault guns.
The city of Chojnice had not only tactical, but also operational significance, since 14 highways and railways converged on it. On February 15, 1945, units of the 1st Guards Tank Corps broke through the enemy defenses, broke into Chojnice and captured the station. Developing their offensive, the Soviet tankers defeated the German troops on the eastern outskirts of Chojnice, and by the end of the day they made their way to its northeastern outskirts. As a result, the guards cut off the enemy's approaching reserves, which were supposed to reinforce the city's garrison. Following the tank units, the infantry units of the 70th Army broke into the city and began to clean it up. Meanwhile, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, using the success of the tankers, bypassed the city from the west and, breaking into its western part, captured several blocks, reaching the northwestern outskirts of Chojnice.
Thus, the Soviet troops took an important stronghold of the Pomeranian group. A large role in this success was played by aviation, which dealt heavy blows to enemy troops. The capture of this city was highly appreciated at Headquarters. Moscow saluted the valiant troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front with 21 volleys of 220 guns. A number of units received the honorary titles of "Khoinitsky".
However, further the rate of advance of the Soviet troops, which was already small (5-8 km per day), fell even more. The resistance of the German army increased even more. The Soviet armies, significantly tired and weakened, could not continue the offensive without bringing fresh forces into battle. Rokossovsky already on February 15 ordered the reserve of the front - Kozlov's 19th Army and Panfilov's 3rd Guards Tank Corps to advance to the left flank. By February 19, at the turn of Meve, Chersk and Chojnice, the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front was actually stopped. The first stage of the operation was completed.
Thus, by February 19, Rokossovsky's armies advanced 50-70 km deep into the territory of Eastern Pomerania. However, it became clear that the task set by the Headquarters - to defeat the enemy's East Pomeranian grouping and clear the area on their own, they would not be able to. The front was forced to stop the offensive in order to bring up reserves and regroup forces.
T-34 of the 9th Guards Tank Corps, Pomerania, March 1945.
The situation on the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front
In the same period, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front solved the problem of eliminating the encircled enemy groups in the cities of Poznan, Schneidemühl, Deutsch-Krone and Arnswalde, and repelled German counterattacks in the Ban-Kallis sector.
In the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Schneidemuhl, which was one of the most powerful strongholds of the so-called. Pomeranian shaft and a major junction of railways and highways, in early February, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front surrounded a strong 26-30 thousand. enemy grouping under the command of Colonel Reshlinger. The enemy garrison included the 25th Motorized Regiment of the 12th Panzer Division, the 48th Motorized Infantry Regiment of the SS Netherlands Motorized Brigade, the 4th Fortress Regiment, the Hamburg Tank Battalion, the 23rd Naval Detachment, several machine-gun, sapper , reserve infantry, training battalions and five battalions of the militia and local self-defense and other units. The garrison had 18 tanks, 26 self-propelled guns, about 200 field and anti-aircraft guns, and about 100 mortars. The German command attached great importance to the Schneidemühl garrison, so with the help of transport aviation continued to help. Planes brought in reinforcements, supplies, took out the wounded.
To eliminate the enemy group, the Soviet command formed an operational group of troops under the command of General Kuzmin, consisting of three rifle divisions with reinforcement units. The Soviet troops were outnumbered by the enemy (the divisions were bled dry by previous battles), so they could not solve the problem of eliminating a powerful enemy group based on strong defenses. For twelve days, Kuzmin's troops fought the Germans on the near approaches to the city. But they could not complete the task set by the command.
However, the position of the German garrison deteriorated significantly. By February 13, units of the 60th and 260th rifle divisions were able to significantly reduce the area occupied by the enemy, deprive him of the airfield and landing sites, which greatly complicated the supply of the German garrison. Soviet troops began fighting on the outskirts of the city. In addition, other troops of the 1st Belorussian Front repelled attempts by German troops to release the Schneidemuhl garrison and advanced significantly to the west and northwest.
Therefore, the commander of the 14th Panzer Corps, General Steiner, to whom the encircled group was subordinate, on the morning of February 13 ordered Reshlinger to break through to the north along the Kyuddov River. The Germans formed five shock groups numbering 2-4 thousand soldiers and officers. Part of the garrison remained in the city, creating the appearance of defense. On the night of February 14, 1945, the Schneidemuhl group broke through the Soviet defenses and began to move north and northwest. The successful breakthrough of the German group was due to the fact that Kuzmin's troops were inferior to the enemy in strength, and the mistakes of the command, which believed that the Germans were already demoralized and incapable of a breakthrough.
On February 14, Kuzmin's group took Schneidemühl, clearing it of the remnants of the German garrison. The destruction of the enemy grouping that had broken through was entrusted to the 79th Rifle Corps. During a series of fierce battles, by the end of February 15, the German group that had broken through was again surrounded in the forests east of Jastrov. A significant part of the German group in these battles was destroyed or captured.
On February 16, the encircled German group made the last desperate attempt to break through. As a result of many hours of fierce fighting, the Germans were able to move north somewhat, creating a threat to the rear of the 23rd Guards Rifle Division, which was defending in the Landek area, with the front to the north. However, the reconnaissance and security of the division discovered the advance of the enemy in time. Measures were taken to parry the German attack. The enemy attacks were unsuccessful, then the division counterattacked and defeated the German detachment. During February 16 and 17, the remnants of the enemy columns that had broken through were eliminated. Artillery played a major role in defeating the enemy that had broken through, skillfully concentrating fire on the most important targets. Thus, the troops of the 79th Rifle Corps destroyed the Schneidemuhl grouping in stubborn battles.
T-34 of the 9th Guards Tank Corps, Pomerania
"Sherman" of the 1st mechanized corps, Pomerania
Destruction of 7 thousand. the garrison of Deutsch-Krone went much easier. Here, Soviet troops quickly captured the key strongholds of the enemy, breaking his defenses. As a result, the Germans were able to hold out for only two days. On February 11, 1945, the city of Deutsch-Krone was taken by our troops. Most of the German garrison capitulated.
Meanwhile, the troops of the 61st Army of Pavel Belov and the 2nd Guards Tank Army of Semyon Bogdanov fought stubborn battles with the enemy troops on the Ban-Kallis line. There were fierce oncoming battles. In the period from February 9 to February 25, 1945, German troops launched several strong counterattacks on this sector of the front. The Germans sought to help 20,000 encircled in the Arnswalde area. garrison and, under favorable conditions, develop an offensive to the south. The fighting here took on an extremely stubborn and fierce character, the attacks of the Soviet troops were replaced by enemy counterattacks.
Formations of the 80th Rifle Corps fought against the German group blocked in the city of Arnswalde. The city had pre-prepared positions and was a tough nut to crack. Particularly fierce battles took place northeast and northwest of the city of Arnswalde, where the troops of the 11th German Army, which consisted of selected SS tank and motorized formations, sought to break through. By the end of February 16, northeast of the city, our units were pushed back by the enemy, and the Germans joined with the garrison, creating a 6-kilometer corridor. However, the Germans could not build on the success.
Stubborn battles also took place in the area of Piritz and Ban. Here, the German troops first with strong counterattacks stopped the advance of our troops on Stargard, then the enemy tank formations pushed our units to the south and recaptured Piritz and Ban. Repeated attempts by units of Bogdanov's 2nd Guards Tank Army to break through the enemy's defensive formations were unsuccessful. Soviet and German troops crushed each other in oncoming attacks.
Thus, the situation on the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front was difficult. The German troops launched a series of strong blows, and in some areas they stopped and pressed the Soviet troops. The enemy inflicted swipe in the Arnswalde area and released the encircled group, pushing the units of the 80th Rifle Corps of the 61st Army. German troops also pressed the Soviet units in the area of Piritz and Bahn.
"Royal Tigers" of the 503rd SS heavy tank battalion. Eastern Pomerania, Arnswalde area, February 1945.
Zhukov still believed that his main task was an offensive in the Berlin direction, and that there were enough forces on the right wing to stop the enemy, defeat him and help the advance of the 2nd Belorussian Front in Eastern Pomerania. He did not want to delay the start of the Berlin operation. On February 19, the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front went on the offensive again. In the Ban-Callis section, fierce battles began again.
In the Kallis area, the offensive attack by our units coincided with the enemy's counterattack. In a difficult oncoming battle, our troops did not achieve success and left Glambek. The 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, which was supposed to reinforce the blow, was subjected to strong pressure from the enemy and barely held its position together with the infantry. In the Arnswalde region, our troops pushed the Germans back and took the city. Parts of Bogdanov's army, which were advancing in the Stargard direction, did not achieve success, repelling the counterattacks of German formations.
Thus, it became clear that those with forces on the right flank could not accomplish the task of defeating the enemy grouping. Moreover, there was a threat of German troops breaking through to the rear of the 1st Belorussian Front. According to intelligence data, the Germans had five tank divisions in this direction, not counting separate tank brigades and battalions. In addition, the German command continued to transfer new formations to Pomerania, the strike power of the 3rd Panzer and 11th Armies.
In this situation, Zhukov decided to go on the defensive with the armies of the right wing of the front. The Soviet troops had to bleed the enemy's strike formations by stubborn defensive battles and prepare for a new offensive.
Destroyed "Tigers", Pomerania, 1945
Brief results of the first stage of the operation
The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front advanced 50-70 km deep into Eastern Pomerania and took such important enemy cities and fortresses as Elbing, Graudenz and Chojnitz. However, for a number of objective reasons, Rokossovsky's armies were unable to fulfill the task set by the Headquarters. A swift offensive into the depths of Eastern Pomerania failed. To defeat the Vistula Army Group, the efforts of more powerful forces were required than were part of the 2nd Belorussian Front.
The armies of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front were able to liquidate the encircled German garrisons in Schneidemuhl and Deutsch-Kron. However, the German troops were able to temporarily stop the offensive of the Soviet troops in the Stargrad-Stettin direction and unblock the encircled Arnswalde garrison. On the other hand, the Germans failed to implement plans for a deep breakthrough into the rear of the 1st Belorussian Front. In fierce oncoming battles, both sides did not achieve decisive success.
The command of the 1st Belorussian Front had to postpone the offensive in the Berlin direction and deploy additional significant forces of the armies of the right wing of the front in the Kallis-Bahn sector to the Pomeranian direction. Now, not only the armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front, but also significant forces of the 1st Belorussian Front, were to take part in the defeat of the Vistula Army Group.
To be continued…
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2nd Belorussian Front
The strengthening of the East Prussian grouping at the expense of Kurland became one of the reasons for the stalling of the offensive of the 2nd Belorussian Front in Pomerania. As early as February 8, 1945, by directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 11021, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were ordered “on February 10 to go on the offensive west of the river. Vistula and no later than 20.02 to seize the border of the mouth of the river. Vistula, Dirschau, Berent, Rummelsburg, Neustettin. Additionally, the 19th Army of Major General G.K. was transferred from the reserve of the Headquarters to the 2nd Belorussian Front. Kozlov. Georgy Kirillovich Kozlov was the namesake of the infamous commander Crimean Front D.T. Kozlov. Rokossovsky was given the 19th Army of the Third Formation, created in 1942 as part of the Karelian Front on the basis of the Kandalaksha Operational Group. G.K. Kozlov spent the entire war in Karelia, and commanded the 19th Army from May 1943. It was transferred to the western direction from Karelia only in the autumn of 1944 as part of the general collection of forces from the flanks to the Berlin direction for a decisive battle. The 19th Army was supposed to be used in the development of the operation. In the aforementioned directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the front K.K. Rokossovsky was instructed: "to develop an offensive in the general direction of Stettin, to seize the area of Danzig, Gdynia and clear the coast from the enemy up to the Pomeranian Bay." Thus, the 2nd Belorussian Front had to go through all of Pomerania to the mouth of the Oder River and thereby secure the right flank of its neighbor, the 1st Belorussian Front. That is why G.K. On February 10, Zhukov presented the Supreme Plan of the operation to capture Berlin for consideration. It was assumed that the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front would have time to clear Eastern Pomerania, while the armies of the 1st Belorussian Front would prepare to storm Berlin. If this plan were implemented, Berlin would have been stormed on International Women's Day on March 8th.
Even before receiving the directive of the Headquarters for an offensive in Eastern Pomerania, K.K. Rokossovsky began the regrouping of troops. On his orders, the 49th Army was withdrawn from the battle on the right wing of the front and by February 4 was concentrated in the area of Deutsch-Aylau, Lyubovo, Novo-Miasto, and then transferred to the left bank of the Vistula. On the night of February 9, this army, replacing the formations of the 70th Army, was introduced into the first line on the left wing of the front at the junction between the earlier advancing 65th and 70th armies. The 330th and 369th rifle divisions, which were in the reserve of the commander of the front, were transferred to the 70th army on February 3 and entered into its zone of operations. On February 2, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was withdrawn from the battle on the right wing of the front and transferred to the left wing. On February 8, the corps, being in the reserve of the front, concentrated in the area north of Fordon. The main forces of the 2nd shock army, at the direction of the front commander, regrouped on their left flank. In order to free up the forces of the 2nd Shock Army for operations on the left bank of the Vistula, in the period from February 3 to 7, three fortified areas were transferred to it from the right-flank 50th Army with the task of taking up defense along the right bank of the river from Elbing to Graudedets.
By decision of the Headquarters, the headquarters of K.K. Rokossovsky was released from the additional managerial burden. 50th, 3rd, 48th combined arms armies and 5th guards. the tank army, which continued fighting in East Prussia, was transferred on February 9, 1945 to the neighboring 3rd Belorussian Front. In connection with the losses incurred in the battles for East Prussia, one tank corps of the 2nd Belorussian Front was withdrawn from the battle to the reserve. Instead, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps arrived from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, concentrated in the Mlava area. By the beginning of the offensive into Pomerania from the east, the 2nd Belorussian Front included five combined arms armies (2nd shock, 65th, 49th, 70th and 19th), three tank corps (1st, 3rd and 8th guards), one mechanized corps (8th), one cavalry corps (3rd Guards). However, it should be noted that by the beginning of the operation, units of the 19th Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Corps were on the move and their approach was expected no earlier than the second half of February. Putting them into battle K.K. Rokossovsky intended to carry out only on February 22–25, 1945. Air support for the troops of the front was provided by the 4th Air Army of Colonel General Aviation K.A. Vershinin.
Abandoned armored personnel carrier SdKfz.251. Silesia, February 1945
In total, in the five combined arms armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front, by the beginning of the new offensive, there were 45 rifle divisions. Almost all of them were struck by a disease common to the Red Army in 1945 - low completeness. The average staffing of the divisions of the 2nd shock army was slightly more than 4900 people, the 49th and 70th armies - about 4900 people, the 65th army - about 4100 people. The divisions of the armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front were not in a brilliant state before the East Prussian operation, but suffered losses during the January battles. For comparison: on January 10, 1945, the average strength of a division in the 2nd shock army was 7056 people, in the 49th army - 6266 people, in the 70th army - 6356 people and in the 65th army - 6093 people. As we can see, after a month of fighting on the fortifications of East Prussia, the formations numbered 1100-1800 people less. Only in the 19th Army, transferred to the front from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and on the march, the average staffing of the division reached 8300 people. There were only 297 combat-ready tanks and self-propelled guns in the front, another 238 were under repair.
The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were opposed by the 2nd Army of the Vistula Army Group, consisting of twelve infantry, two tank divisions, six battle groups, three large garrisons of fortresses, and a total of about twenty-two settlement divisions. Unlike the Soviet formations, the Germans managed to replenish many of their formations almost to the state. Thus, the 4th Panzer Division, which arrived from Courland, was replenished from local resources and on February 1, 1945, there were 12,663 people in service out of 14,871 in the state. Moreover, a significant part of the shortage fell on the "Khivi", the shortage of which in 1945 was quite understandable. For the same number, the division had 26 Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks, 4 Pz.Kpfw.III tanks, 11 Sturmgeshütz self-propelled guns and 168 armored cars and armored personnel carriers. The loss of equipment of the 4th Panzer Division was continuously replenished, and on February 7 it consisted of 23 Pz.Kpfw.IV, 21 Sturmgeshütz and JagdpanzerIV and 2 Tiger. Thus, the understaffed Soviet divisions in the direction of the main attack in Pomerania were opposed by formations in smaller numbers, but in high completeness, well equipped with equipment. In the 20th of February, a Panther battalion arrived from Courland to the 4th Panzer Division. As of January 15, the 7th Panzer Division had 1 Pz.III, 2 Flakpanzer.IV, 28 Pz.IV, 29 JagdpanzerIV / L70, 37 Pz.V "Panther" and one command tank combat-ready. Another six tanks were under repair. In addition to tank formations, the 2nd Army included the 209th, 226th and 276th assault gun brigades.
The offensive of the 2nd Belorussian Front began according to plan on the morning of February 10, 1945. The blow was delivered from a bridgehead on the left bank of the Vistula. In the center, in the zone of operations of the 65th Army, the enemy put up very strong resistance, and our troops managed with difficulty to capture two enemy strongholds - the cities of Shvets and Shenau. In the zone of action of the 49th Army, the offensive of our troops also developed very slowly. During the day of the battle, the formations of this army advanced only 2–3 km. The most successful were the actions of the 70th Army, reinforced by tank and mechanized corps. But even here the advance of the Soviet troops was insignificant. The formations of the right wing of the front did not go over to the offensive on the first day of the operation. Part of the forces fought to destroy the enemy, surrounded in Elbing and blockaded in Graudenitz, and the main forces of the 2nd shock army regrouped, leading them into the zone of operations of the 65th army on the left bank of the Vistula.
In five days of hostilities, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front advanced 15–40 km, with the 70th Army achieving the greatest success, which advanced 40 km. The 65th and 49th armies, operating in the center of the front grouping, advanced only 15–20 km during this time. The 2nd shock army, transferred to the bridgehead, did not conduct an offensive at that time due to the fact that the troops of the 65th army, in the zone in which it was supposed to advance, advanced slowly and did not reach the line from which it was planned to introduce the army to “fold” the enemy’s defense .
By February 15, the greatest achievement of the troops of K.K. Rokossovsky was the capture of large railway junctions and enemy strongholds: the cities of Konitz (Chojnice) and Tuchel. Due to the lack of fuel, the Germans were forced more often than usual to resort to transportation by rail. Therefore, a desperate struggle unfolded for nodes and large stations. Both tank divisions of the German 2nd Army, the 4th and 7th, were involved in the battles for Konitz and Tuchel.
The next day, February 16, the 108th Rifle Corps of the 2nd Shock Army from the area west of Graudenitz was finally brought into battle, striking along the left bank of the Vistula in a northerly direction. Overcoming enemy resistance, the troops of the front advanced until February 16 at a rate of 5–8 km per day. However, in the following days of the offensive, even this snail's pace of advance began to decline. One of the main reasons was the decrease combat strength front connections. According to K.K. Rokossovsky, the armies of the right wing of the front numbered twenty-six three thousand and eight four thousand rifle divisions.
Tank Pz.IV, shot down in the Breslau area. 1st Ukrainian Front, February 1945
It was obvious that without the introduction of additional fresh forces into the battle, the operation to defeat the enemy's East Pomeranian grouping could be greatly delayed. Therefore, K.K. On February 15, Rokossovsky ordered the formations that arrived from the Stavka reserve to advance to the left wing of the front. The troops of the 19th Army, Lieutenant General G.K. Kozlov was ordered to move out of the occupied area and by the end of February 21, 1945, concentrate in the rear of the front's shock group. The 3rd Guards Tank Corps was also ordered to move there by February 23. On February 19, at the line of Meve, Chersk, Chojnice, the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front was actually suspended. At the time of the suspension of the offensive, the maximum advance of the troops of the front was 70 km. The 65th, 49th and 70th armies were able to push the enemy to the north and northwest at a distance of only 15 to 40 kilometers. In addition, the 2nd Belorussian Front acquired its own “festung” in the person of Graudenitz.
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On July 16, the 39th Army re-entered the 3rd Belorussian Front. At the same time, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps was transferred to the 1st Baltic, and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps - to the 2nd Belorussian Front. On July 16, Army General Chernyakhovsky set the following tasks for the troops.
The 39th Army to continue the offensive with the task of capturing the border of the Nevyazh River by the end of July 18 and reaching the Kedainiai, Yasboyni, Chekishki, (claim) Vilki front; in the future, be ready to advance north of the Neman River in the general direction of Vodzhgira.
The 5th Army, widely using a roundabout maneuver from the north and south, to capture Kaunas, by the same time to bring the main forces of the army to the line of Wilki, Sapezhishki, (claim.) Art. Jure; in the future, be ready to advance south of the Neman River in the direction of Shakiai, Shillenen.
33rd Army, using the crossings and bridgeheads of the 5th Army, by the end of July 16, withdraw the first echelon to the western bank of the Neman River; on the morning of July 17, go on a decisive offensive with the task of capturing the line of art. Jure, Vysoka (14 km northeast of Marijampol), Lyudvinov; advance detachments to seize the Kozlova Ruda station, a fork in the highway 10 km south of the Kozlova Ruda station; the second echelon by the end of July 17 should be on the line of the Neman River.
The 11th Guards Army, continuing the offensive, by the end of July 17, capture the border of Lake Zhuvinty, Simno, Lake Dus; by the end of July 18 - (claim.) Lyudvinov, Kalvaria, (claim.) Vidugery.
The 31st Army will regroup its troops and on July 16, having crossed the Neman River along its entire length within its zone, by the end of July 17, capture the line (claim) Serey, Leipuny, Koptsovo - (claim) Sopotskin.
Meanwhile, the German command, seeking to delay the further offensive of our troops, made every effort to hold the line along the Sventa and Neman rivers and eliminate our bridgeheads along the western bank of the Neman. To this end, it transferred from other directions and pulled up from the depths against the 3rd Belorussian Front five new infantry divisions (212th, 69th, 131st, 170th and an infantry division, the numbering of which has not been established), six tank divisions (5th, 6th, 7th, 12th, "Grossdeutschland", tank division "Dead Head"), two infantry brigades (765th and 671st), 25 separate regiments and 15 separate infantry and special battalions.
The newly commissioned troops were supported large forces aviation.
FROM 16 to 20 July there were intense battles. The enemy, with fierce attacks by infantry and tanks, sought to push our troops back to the eastern bank of the Neman. The Germans exerted the strongest pressure on the Kaunas direction against the 5th Army and in the center of the front against units of the 33rd and 11th Guards armies.
Repelling enemy attacks, the troops of the front continued their offensive and by July 18 crossed the Neman River with the main forces of the 5th, 11th Guards and 31st Army and part of the forces of the 33rd Army at a front of 105 km. In the course of further battles, the greatest advance was achieved on the flanks of the front.
By July 20, the 39th Army, with its left flank and center, went directly to the Sventa River and part of its forces crossed it north of Veprya.
The 31st Army advanced from 2 to 16 km and reached the line west of Koptsovo, Sopotskin.
July 20 the front commander ordered all armies to gain a foothold on the achieved lines and temporarily switch to a stubborn and tough defense, with the goal of inflicting maximum losses on the enemy, especially his tanks. At the same time, the armies were to begin preparing for a further offensive, for which purpose they should bring up lagging equipment, ammunition and fuel as soon as possible.
From July 20 to July 28, the troops of the front fought stubborn defensive battles, during which they exhausted the enemy forces and improved their tactical position. From July 16 to July 28, the Germans lost only killed up to 15 thousand soldiers and officers. During the same time, our units destroyed 240 German tanks, self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers In air battles and at airfields, as well as anti-aircraft artillery fire, 172 enemy aircraft were destroyed.
Exit of the 11th Guards Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front to the Neman River and its forcing (July 12–19)
July 24 The 39th Army crossed the Sventa River with its right flank and captured a large highway junction and the Ukmerge railway station, advancing westward up to 14 km.
At the same time, the 33rd Army captured Preny and significantly expanded the bridgehead on the western bank of the Neman River in the Preny-Balverzhishki section.
Having suffered huge losses and not having achieved success, the Germans, after a series of fierce, but fruitless attacks, were forced to go on the defensive.
July 28th our troops, pulling up equipment, rear and replenished with ammunition, again went on the offensive and in three days of offensive fighting advanced to a depth of 50 km, expanding the breakthrough along the front to 230 km.
July 31 in the course of the offensive, the troops of the front captured the county center of the Lithuanian SSR - the city and the large railway station of Marijampole, as well as important communication centers st. Kozlova Ruda, Pilvishki, Shostakovo, Lyudvinov, Simno, Seims and occupied more than 900 other settlements. The 39th Army went directly to the Nevyazhis River.
The troops of the 5th Army broke into the city of Kaunas and, having broken the stubborn resistance of the enemy, on August 1, with the assistance of the troops of the 39th and 33rd armies, stormed the city and the fortress, which represented an operationally important communication center and a powerful stronghold of the German defense on the outskirts of Eastern Prussia.
Developing their success, the troops of the front crossed the Sheshupa River in several places and in some areas approached the border of East Prussia by 8–10 km, wedged into the zone of the forefield of the East Prussian fortified region.
The course of hostilities of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front
The 2nd Belorussian Front, having captured the city of Grodno in cooperation with the 3rd Belorussian Front on July 16 and reached the line of the Neman and Svisloch rivers, met increased enemy resistance here.
By this time, the Germans managed to gather in the area west and south-west of Grodno, on the left bank of the Neman River, five police regiments, three infantry regiments (1065th, 1068th and 1069th), which constituted a combat group, as well as a redeployed from Romania the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Dead Head"; in addition, there was also a part of the 50th Infantry Division, battered in previous battles. South of the Neman River at the turn of the Svisloch River, using its swampy floodplain, the Germans also sought to delay the advance of our troops in the Bialystok direction and offered fierce resistance with all available means. Here the enemy is part of the 367th and 50th infantry divisions, the 12th tank division, the 28th light infantry division, the 461st reserve infantry division and various security units and subunits total strength more than a division, going on counterattacks in some areas, took all measures to delay our attack on the Svisloch River and prevent advance to the city of Bialystok - the most important stronghold and a major road junction on the outskirts of East Prussia.
By July 17, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in their operational formation had two armies (50th and 3rd), deployed in the first echelon at the turn of the Neman and Svisloch rivers, and the 49th Army advanced to the front after a two-day rest, being at this time, 50 km in depth at the turn of Shchuchin, Zaimishche. The 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps operated on the right flank.
In the period from July 17 to July 21, the troops of the front on the right flank fought fierce battles and did not advance. The enemy, having introduced the newly arrived units of the 3rd Panzer Division southwest of Grodno, pressed the crossed July 17th part of the 69th Rifle Corps on the left bank of the Neman River and created some threat for the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, which is on the left bank of the river to 21 July occupied a significant part of the Augustow forests southwest of Sopotskin. At the same time, south of Grodno, at the turn of the Neman and Svisloch rivers to Krynka, the troops of the 50th Army, meeting fierce enemy resistance, repelled enemy counterattacks. During July 17–21, the Germans held back the advance of our troops, and in some places even slightly pushed them to the east. Only on the left flank of the front, the troops of the 3rd Army, with the help of three corps, with stubborn battles, overcame the resistance of the Germans and by the end of July 21 reached the line of Krynki, Novoselki, Ozyably, advancing 15–25 km in 4 days.
