Here in the European part of the country, we rarely remember the Far Eastern conflict on the CER. There was also the fact that both before 1929 and after, the USSR actively cooperated with various forces in China in its own interests and, guided by the rules of good taste, some of the joint history had to be "forgotten".
But in the late 1920s, the events on the CER became quite significant in the country's foreign policy life, were widely covered and, in addition, are quite full of interesting details for us today. For starters, this was the first major military operation of the Red Army after the end of civil war with the use of aviation, ships of the Far Eastern (Amur) flotilla, landing forces and tanks. In addition, the command of the Red Army in the Far East had to fight against its own "pupils" from China, where our advisers successfully worked both a few years before the conflict, and more than a dozen years after.
Under the cut, a brief historical background and photos. All photos are clickable.
WHERE IT ALL STARTED 
The Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) (built in 1897-1903, until 1917 - the Manchurian road) is a railway line that passed through the territory of Manchuria and connected Chita with Vladivostok and Port Arthur directly with the Trans-Siberian Railway. The road was built by Russians, belonged to Russia and was maintained by its subjects. An exclusion zone existed and was guarded around the road.
Bridge of the Chinese Eastern Railway across the tributary of the Amur river. Sungari
CER station "Manchuria"
Khingan Tunnel
As a result of all the ups and downs of the 20th century, by the end of the 1920s, the status of the road was regulated by Sino-Soviet agreements concluded during the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1924.
At the CER station
The Chinese, having come to their senses after the civil war, sooner or later had to try to change the status of the most important infrastructure facility in their favor. An active part in this was taken by numerous Russian White Guards who settled in Harbin, who, not only did they not sympathize with the Soviets, were also forced to earn their living by serving in the armies of various Chinese authorities.
Joint Russian-Chinese personnel of the CER
The events that led to the hostilities of 1929 took place from the middle of 1925 and are habitually called in our country "Provocations on the CER." These included numerous incidents of detentions of diplomatic workers, raids on the administrative buildings of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as border skirmishes.
Particular aggravation was caused by the order of the manager of the CER M.N. Ivanov, in which it was noted that from June 1, 1925, all railway employees who do not have Soviet or Chinese citizenship are subject to dismissal.
“The order was directed, first of all, against emigrants who worked in various structures of the railway. As a result of the actions of A.N. Ivanov, 19,000 railway workers began to apply for transfer to Soviet citizenship, mainly due to economic considerations.
in Chinese service
About a thousand emigrants renounced Soviet citizenship and took Chinese. About a thousand more preferred to be dismissed from the Chinese Eastern Railway than to accept this or that citizenship. A significant part of the emigrants, left without a livelihood, joined the ranks of the Chinese army.
In turn, the policy of provoking conflict situations on the Chinese Eastern Railway, considered, according to N.I. Bukharin, as a "revolutionary finger" launched into China, led to a confrontation with the local Chinese authorities.
The evacuation of Chinese Eastern Railway employees from Harbin after the capture of the road administration by the Chinese
The main northern militarists in Beijing - a group photo of the worst enemies: 1) Zhang Zuolin; 2) Zhang Zongchang; 3) Wu Peifu; 4) Zhang Xueliang (son of Zhang Zuolin). 06/28/1926, Beijing, Shuncheng-wang Palace.
"In June of the same year, a meeting of Chiang Kai-shek with former ambassador China in Moscow Zhu Chaoliang on the issue of the CER, and in early July at a meeting of the Chinese generals, held in Beijing under the chairmanship of Chiang Kai-shek, it was decided to seize the road. "The goal of our program is the destruction of unequal treaties," "red imperialism is more dangerous than white" - said Chiang Kai-shek.
Soviet magazine "Spark", 1929
Meeting of CER employees released from captivity by the Chinese in Moscow
On July 10, 1929, by order of the Nanjing government, the Mukden troops of the Governor of Manchuria, Zhang Xueliang, seized the CER telegraph along the entire line, closed the trade mission and other economic institutions of the USSR. Local authorities removed Soviet employees from their duties and replaced them with white émigrés. During this provocation, the professional and cooperative organizations of workers and employees of the road were defeated, more than 200 citizens of the USSR were arrested, and about 60 people, including the manager and his assistant, were deported from China.
At the same time, Zhang Xueliang put his troops and detachments of Russian white emigrants on alert and moved them to the Soviet border.
Governor of Manchuria Zhang Xueliang at the review of his aviation
On July 13, 1929, the Soviet government protested these illegal actions and drew the attention of "the Mukden government and the national government of the Republic of China to the extreme gravity of the situation created by these actions."
After a diplomatic squabble, mutual refusals to impracticable demands, on July 20 there was a break in diplomatic relations between the USSR and the central Nanjing government.
Soviet aviators with their "working tool"
Fighters of the armored train No. 13 "Red Ufimets" guarding the Soviet border
Report from the Australian newspaper The Sydney Morning Herald on the escalation of tensions between Red and White Russians on the border and the actions of the Chinese to strengthen their defenses in case of outbreak of hostilities
FORCES OF THE PARTIES 
VC. Blucher, commander of the ODVA
On August 6, 1929, the Special Far Eastern Army (ODVA) was formed. V.K.Blyukher, who previously worked successfully in China as an adviser to the Kuomintang army, was appointed commander. Now he had to fight against his own wards.
The monitors of the Amur flotilla, still built by the tsar, took an active part in the hostilities
The conflict on the CER with the Chinese became the first real combat clash for our army after the Civil War. The military reform authored by M. Frunze, which introduced the territorial-militia system in the Red Army, was just completing. By 1928, the number of non-cadre units in the army was 58%. It was the time of the First Five Year Plan. The country was saying goodbye to its agrarian past and hastily began industrialization. One can probably say that we went out to fight the Chinese with revolutionary enthusiasm, reinforced by the experience of the Civil War and the first samples of Soviet military equipment.
Tank MS-1 (T-18)
Seaplanes of the Amur Flotilla
The number of Soviet troops participating in the first stage of the conflict in the Sungaria operation was about 1100 people, 9 tanks (the first combat use domestic tank MS-1), 15 bombers, 6 seaplanes and ships of the Amur flotilla.
The Chinese dig in before the battle
The Chinese had a multiple advantage in manpower everywhere. Detachments of Russian White Guards operated in their ranks. There were several different types of ships and armed steamers, armored trains, and airplanes. The latter never took part in the hostilities "due to weather conditions." The presence of Japanese and European weapons is indicated, as well as the presence of foreign advisers. The main forces of the Mukden army were concentrated in strategic directions: along the Hailar-Manchuria railway; Chzhalainor, Hailar, Tsitsikar - south of Blagoveshchensk, at the mouth of the Songhua River and in the area of Turyev Rog.
White officers in the service of the Chinese came across quite often. Not only in Zhang Xueliang's army. I had to somehow feed my families, and getting a job in China was problematic for many reasons. Even the most "garbage" positions were inaccessible due to the huge number of poor Chinese
FIGHTING (briefly)
The actions of the Red Army were in the nature of preemptive strikes at the places of concentration of the Chinese army. 3 separate operations were carried out: the attack of the Sungari group (divided into 2 stages - the capture of Lakhasusu and the subsequent campaign against Fugdin, the Manchuro-Chzhalaynor operation and the fighting near Lake Khanka in Primorye.
Soviet landing under the cover of guns of river monitors. Polundra!
The battle for Lahasusu began on 10/12/1929 at 06:10 with a seaplane raid on the city and the Chinese flotilla. Further, the ships of the Amur flotilla enter the battle, which disable the artillery of the Chinese flotilla and land troops. The Chinese leave along the river inland and gain a foothold in the city of Fugdin. The landing force continues to move up the river. Songhua.
Soviet aviators show fashion for the autumn/winter 1929 season.
Ranks of brave Chinese with a slight splash of Slavic eyes
Under the banner of his Excellency ... this, God forgive him, yellow-faced trait, you won’t remember them all by nicknames ... Humble!
Soviet river monitor of the Amur flotilla "Sun-Yat-Sen". The ship was laid down in 1907 at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg as an armored river gunboat Shkval.
A day later, the ships of the Amur flotilla were at Fugdin. The Soviet offensive began on October 31 and on November 3, the city was taken. (Later I will make a separate post - I love river battles!) The defeat of the Sungari group has ended. The formations of the Red Army soon leave the territory of China and return to Khabarovsk.
The pilots are in a fighting mood! Charismatic faces with an equally impressive Lewis machine gun
fighting in the Trans-Baikal direction began on November 17 with the Manchuro-Chzhalaynor operation. Three Soviet divisions and a cavalry brigade advance to cut the railroad between Dalainor and Hailar and encircle the Manchu troops in the area. On November 18, parts of OKDVA entered the city. On the same day, thanks to the support of aviation, it was possible to occupy the Manchuria station.
Soviet tanks MS-1
Aircraft R-1 of the 19th Aviation Detachment "Far East Ultimatum". On board, the unit's emblem is a fist and the inscription "HNN'Aa!"
Soviet-Chinese conflict on K.V.Zh.D., 1929.
One of the Chinese officers, Wei Chang-ling, who died during the conflict
The entire headquarters of the Zhalainor-Manchurian group, led by Liang Zhujiang, was taken prisoner. Heavy fighting with heavy mutual losses ended on November 27 with the defeat of the Manchu grouping near the Khanka Lake, known in the future. There was no further pursuit of the retreating enemy due to the reluctance to aggravate relations with the Japanese. The Soviet troops, having completed the task, left China within a few days.
DENOUNCING
The Chinese requested negotiations, and on December 22, a Soviet-Chinese protocol was signed in Khabarovsk to restore the situation on the CER. In May 1930, for the victory in the conflict, V.K. Blucher was awarded the Order of the Red Star for No. 1.
Real fighting Buryats! - servicemen of the Buryat-Mongolian cavalry division
Participant of those events K.K. Rokossovsky also noted the role of the Buryat-Mongol division in the pre-dawn battle: “The division especially distinguished itself in the battle in the area southeast of the city of Manchuria, when a column of many thousands of General Liang made an attempt to break through to the east. The Buryat division raised on alarm, without waiting for the Kuban brigade to approach, he was the first to boldly attack the numerous columns of the enemy rushing to the east and, cutting into his ranks, delayed their advance, and then, together with the approaching Kuban, put the enemy to flight. This attack completed the operation to defeat the enemy's Manchu grouping."
The participants in the hostilities on the CER were awarded rather original awards - the badge "Fighter of the OKDVA" (1930). The sign was established by the Central Council of Osoaviakhim in early 1930 for the soldiers of the Red Army and fighters special units, formed from members of Osoaviakhim, in memory of these events and was very much appreciated in the Far East.
The ruler of Manchuria, Zhang Xueliang, soon staged a rebellion against the central government. Then he suddenly surrendered and voluntarily appeared before the court. Chiang Kai-shek commuted the rebel's sentence and commuted ten years' imprisonment to house arrest. However, since the “Young Marshal” was supposed to leave the big politics forever, the terms of house arrest were not specified.
1931, from right to left: Yu Fengzhi (Zhang Xueliang's wife), W. Donald (Zhang Xueliang's consultant, Australian), Zhang Xueliang, Countess Ciano (Mussolini's daughter)
For the next 40 years, Zhang Xueliang remained under house arrest; even when the Kuomintang were forced to flee from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek took Zhang Xueliang with him and continued to keep him in Taipei as his personal prisoner. Even after the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, Zhang Xueliang's freedom of movement was limited, only in 1991, President Li Denghui allowed him to leave the island. Despite numerous offers to return to China, where he was considered a hero, Zhang Xueliang flew to Honolulu, where he died in 2001 from pneumonia at the age of 101.
According to reporting documents, in the course of all the battles on the CER, our troops lost 281 people killed, who died from wounds at the stages of sanitary evacuation. (28% of total number losses); wounded, shell-shocked, frostbitten (excluding the lightly wounded, who did not need hospitalization, and the sick) - 729 people. 17 people are missing.
Rifle units had the greatest losses. For example, during the fighting, the 21st Perm Rifle Division lost 232 people, of which 48 people were killed or died from wounds. In the 36th rifle division 61 people died and died from wounds.
The losses of other branches of the military were insignificant. So, out of the total number of casualties, the cavalry brigade accounted for 11 people. killed and 7 people. wounded, to the Far Eastern flotilla - 3 people killed and 11 people. wounded (of which 3 people were injured as a result of a rupture of their guns on a ship during firing), only 1 wounded fell on the aviation detachments participating in the hostilities. From here.
"After the signing of the Khabarovsk protocol, all prisoners of war and those arrested in connection with the conflict on the CER were released, and Soviet troops withdrawn from China. The last detachment returned to the USSR on December 25, 1929. Soon the normal operation of the CER was restored.
Chinese prisoners of war in the Soviet Union were carefully "processed". Among them were experienced political workers who agitated Chinese soldiers for Soviet power. The barracks were decorated with slogans Chinese"We and the Red Army are brothers!"
A wall newspaper called "Red Chinese Soldier" was published in the camp. Two days later, 27 Chinese prisoners of war applied to join the Komsomol, and 1,240 people applied with a request to leave them in the USSR.
In 1931 Manchuria was finally occupied by Japan. In 1935, after numerous provocations in the area of the road, the USSR sold the Manchukuo Chinese Eastern Railway, in order to return it to itself in 1945, and then again donate it to communist China for political purposes, along with Port Arthur in the early 1950s.
Continued with rare photos:
From point of view international law The CER was supposed to belong to the RSFSR as the successor of tsarist Russia, since it was built exclusively at the expense of the Russian state. Nevertheless, all and sundry claimed the CER - China, Japan, the USA, France, etc.
In 1921, negotiations between the Far Eastern Republic and China regarding the CER began in Beijing. After the liquidation of the FER, in 1922, the negotiations were continued by the delegation of the RSFSR. The Soviet government proposed a correct and fair solution to the question of the CER - to establish a joint (on an equal footing) management of this railway.
On May 31, 1924, the "Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Issues between the USSR and the Republic of China" was signed. Under this agreement, a joint Soviet-Chinese administration of the CER was established.
However, the Mukden ruler Zhang Chiao-ling declared that he did not recognize the Soviet-Chinese agreement, since it affected the question of the CER, located on the territory of Manchuria, and demanded that the USSR conclude a special treaty with the Manchu authorities. The Soviet government, wishing to resolve the matter amicably, agreed to start negotiations with Chang Chiao-ling as the head of the provincial Manchu government. On September 20, 1924, an agreement was signed in Mukden, similar in content to the Beijing one (May 31, 1924), but mainly concerning the CER. The Mukden Agreement was sanctioned by the Beijing government.
Despite these adopted agreements, the situation on the CER remained extremely tense. To a large extent, this was facilitated by the presence in the lane of the road of tens of thousands of White Guards and simply bandits who fled from the territory of the USSR.
In 1925, the Mukden authorities, in violation of their obligations, refused to dismiss the White Guards from the CER, and only after the persistent demands of the USSR was an agreement concluded on the replacement of the White Guards by Soviet and Chinese citizens, although the implementation of this agreement was further sabotaged by the Mukden authorities headed by Zhang Chiao-ling .
In January 1926, the Mukden authorities arrested the manager of the CER, a Soviet citizen. And at the end of August, the Mukden authorities captured the river flotilla of the CER. In 1927, the Mukden authorities continued their outrages: they searched the Union of Railway Workers, and then the Soviet trade mission in Harbin, closed the office of the Soviet society "Transport", etc. In 1928, the CER telephone exchange was seized. At the end of May 1929, a raid was made on the Consulate General of the USSR in Harbin.
At the beginning of July 1929, 10 echelons with Chinese troops (up to 6 thousand people), 44 guns and 4 armored trains arrived at the Pogranichnaya station. Chinese soldiers began to rob Soviet railway employees and mock them. In broad daylight, a 14-year-old girl, the daughter of a railway employee, was publicly raped by soldiers.
Finally, on July 10-11, the Chinese captured the CER by force. Leading Soviet workers on the railway were removed from their posts, and there were numerous arrests of Soviet citizens in Manchuria.
The Soviet government withdrew from Kuomintang China all its diplomatic, consular and trade representatives, all Soviet workers of the CER. The Kuomintang ambassador in Moscow was asked to leave the USSR. The railway connection with Manchuria was interrupted.
At the same time, raids by White Guard gangs into Soviet territory began along the entire Chinese border. Moreover, the actions of gangs in a number of cases were covered by regular Chinese troops.
I will give several examples of bandit attacks on Soviet territory. At 3 am on August 12, 1929, the Dutov-Pozdnyakov gang crossed the Amur in boats in the Blagoveshchensk region, opposite the Chinese village of Eight Balagans (the Chinese name is Lobei). The bandits tried to intercept the border boat, but intense fire was opened on it from the Chinese coast, and the boat was forced to withdraw. The Lenin monitor came to his aid. From 6:00 am to 8:20 am, Lenin fired artillery at the Chinese coast. After the enemy firing point was suppressed, the monitor approached the shore and landed a small landing force. The paratroopers drove the Chinese 8 kilometers from the river, and then returned. Enemy losses are unknown, and we had one wounded - platoon commander Likhobabin.
But, apparently, the Chinese did not let up, and on August 13, Eight Balagans fired at the Lenin and Sverdlov monitors, as well as armored boats. The 76th regiment was landed on the Chinese coast.
After the mobilization of the local population, the Mukden army of about 300 thousand people and the White Guard detachments with a total strength of about 70 thousand people were at the disposal of Chang Chiao-ling. At the beginning of October 1929, Chang Chiao-ling's troops concentrated in four directions: in the areas of the stations of Manchuria, Hailar, Qiqihar; in the Blagoveshchensk direction; in the area of the mouth of the Sungari rivers (Lakhasusu, Fugdin) and in Primorye.
To defeat the enemy troops on the Soviet-Chinese border from the Siberian military district were transferred: in Transbaikalia, in the Dauria region, - the 18th rifle corps; in Primorye, in the Nikolsk-Ussuriysky region, - the 19th rifle corps. Subsequently, the 21st and 12th Rifle Divisions were brought up to the Chita-Dauria region, and a company of MS-1 tanks was brought to the area where the Trans-Baikal Group was concentrated. The Air Force of the Separate Far Eastern Army at the beginning of the conflict consisted of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern air groups. The Trans-Baikal air group included about forty aircraft, mainly R-1. The Far Eastern Air Group had 69 aircraft, most of which were also P-1 aircraft. In addition, the Far East Group had several TB-1 bombers and Martinside fighters.
From these troops, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR of August 7, 1929, a Special Far Eastern Army was formed, which also included the Amur river military flotilla. Vasily Konstantinovich Blucher, holder of four orders of the Red Banner, was appointed commander of the Special Far Eastern Army.
The Chinese created a rather powerful military flotilla on the Songhua. The Sungari flotilla included four specially built gunboats, five armed steamships, the Li-Chuan military transport (one 50-47 mm caliber gun) and the Dong-I floating battery, which was a non-self-propelled iron barge with four 47-mm guns , one 40mm machine gun, three bombers and two machine guns.
Naturally, gunboats of special construction represented the greatest striking force. The gunboat "Kiang-Heng" (aka "Kian-Hyn", also known as "Jiang-Hung") was built in 1907 in Japan at the Kawasaki shipyard. Its displacement is 565 tons, a steam engine with a capacity of 950 liters. With. allowed to develop a speed of 13 knots; armament: one 120/40 mm, one 75 mm, 4-47 mm guns, 4 machine guns, 2 bombers.
The gunboat "Li-Dzi", the former German gunboat "Otter", was built in Germany in 1909-1910. March 20, 1917 captured from the Germans by the Chinese. In the early 1920s, the boat was transferred to the Songhua. Its displacement is 314 tons, a steam engine with a capacity of 1728 liters. s, speed 15 knots. Armament: two 88/30 mm and one 52/55 mm guns, three bombers.
The gunboat "Li-Sui", the former German steamer "Vaterland", was built in Elbing in 1902-1904. Displacement 280 tons, steam engine 450 liters. s, speed 13 knots. Armament: one 88/30 mm, two 75 mm, two 52/40 mm cannons and two bombers.
The gunboat "Jian-Ping" (aka "Tsim-Pei") was built in Shetten in 1912 for China. Displacement 140 tons, steam engine with a capacity of 500 liters. With. gave a speed of 12 knots. Armament: two 75-mm, two 57/50-mm guns and two bombers.
Auxiliary steamships "Jian-Nai", "Jian-Tai", "Jian-Pai" and "Jian-Tun" are small paddle steamers captured by the Chinese from the Russians in 1918-1928. Their armament consisted of one or two guns of 47-52 mm caliber and two bombers.
The main rear base of the Sungarian flotilla was in Harbin, the operational base was in Lahasusu, and the winter base was in Fugdin.
The Soviet Amur flotilla included four monitors, four gunboats, three armored boats and the Strong mine layer. Most guns of monitors and gunboats in 1915-1916 was sent to the Baltic and captured by the Finns there. Therefore, there were big problems with artillery in the early 1920s on the Amur, and in some towers wooden barrels were placed, neatly painted and sheathed. However, the Chinese got wind of something, and their propaganda claimed that all the guns on the monitors were wooden, for which the Chinese later paid the price.
The Sverdlov monitor was armed with four 152/50 mm cannons in four turrets, two 76.2 mm Lender anti-aircraft guns and one 40 mm Vickers machine gun. The rest of the monitors had six 120/50 mm guns.
Anti-aircraft weapons on the Krasny Vostok monitor consisted of two 76.2-mm and one 40-mm Vickers assault rifles, and on the Sun Yat-sen and Lenin, two 40-mm Vickers assault rifles.
The gunboats "Poor", "Red Banner" and "Proletarian" were armed with two 120-mm cannons and one 76-mm Lender cannon. (On the Proletariat, instead of the Lender cannon, there was a 40-mm Vickers machine gun). The gunboat Buryat was armed with two 75/50 mm Kane cannons.
The Amur military flotilla included the 68th separate aviation river detachment - 14 MP-1 seaplanes. But in fact, only eight cars participated in the conflict. Moreover, four MP-1 seaplanes were based on the Amur aircraft, converted from the Whirlwind monitor.
Since the summer of 1929, most of the ships of the Sungarian flotilla were in the roadstead near the city of Lahasusu. A barrage of 60 galvanic and galvanic impact mines was placed at the mouth of the Songhua River. Mines were also placed on two channels connecting the Songhua with the Amur. Above the minefields, booms were installed, which almost completely blocked the reach of the river and its channel. As an additional barrier, barges loaded with stone stood at the entrance to the channels, prepared if necessary for flooding.
Our official sources claim that back in September, the Chinese began to launch floating mines from Sungari to Amur.
The Soviet government decided to deliver a decisive but limited blow against the Chinese troops stationed in the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The fighting of the Special Far Eastern Army began with the Sungari offensive operation. The purpose of the operation was the destruction of the Sungarian military flotilla and the defeat of Chinese troops in the areas of the cities of Lahasusu and Fugdin. The task of defeating the Lazasus grouping of the Chinese and the Sungarian flotilla was entrusted to the Amur military flotilla with the 2nd battalion of the Volochaevsky rifle regiment attached to it and to the 2nd rifle division.
On the night of October 12, Soviet ships approached directly to the mouth of the Songhua River and stood in position.
At 06:12 the monitors "Lenin", "Sverdlov" and "Sun Yat-sen" opened fire on the ships of the Sungarian flotilla. The Krasny Vostok monitor began shelling enemy coastal fortifications and batteries in the area of the villages of Mogonho and Chichikha. For 20 minutes, Krasny Vostok suppressed the enemy's two-gun battery in the village of Chichikha. Then he transferred the fire to the gunboat "Jian-Ping" and sank it 10 minutes later. At the 20th minute of the battle, the Sverdlov monitor sank the Li-Ji gunboat, and a few minutes later, with well-aimed volleys, damaged the Li-Sui gunboat and set fire to the Dzyan-Tai and Dzyan-Nai steamships.
The Sverdlov was not damaged, but during the shooting, the power supply system went out of order for technical reasons. The lights on the ship went out. The servants of the guns were forced to switch to manual feeding and aiming of the guns. But this did not affect the course of the battle.
Two shells from the Sun Yat-sen monitor hit the steamer Jian-Tai and caused an explosion in its powder magazine. The ship, engulfed in flames, sank. After that, the Sun Yat-sen gunners silenced the Dong-I floating battery.
Troops of the 2nd Infantry Division landed on the shore from the ships of the Amur Flotilla. Having knocked out the Chinese from the coastal fortifications, the landing units, supported by naval artillery fire, advanced towards the city of Lahasus. First landed 5th rifle regiment approached the city from the northeast. The 6th Infantry Regiment broke the enemy resistance and approached Lahasus from the south with a deep maneuver. Soviet troops broke into the city simultaneously from all sides and started a fight in the streets.
Meanwhile, the landing force, consisting of the 2nd battalion of the Volochaevsky regiment and a platoon of sailors, having landed from the minelayer "Strong" in the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Mogonho and Chichikha, immediately went over to the offensive and, despite the opposition of the enemy, with a swift blow knocked him out of fortified positions and pressed to the Songhua River. By 3 p.m., the landing force, having broken the resistance of the Chinese, captured the city and fortress of Lahasusu.
Minesweepers, having cleared a passage under the right bank, made it possible for gunboats and armored boats to enter the Lahasus roadstead. As a result of the battle, the coastal fortifications around Lahasusu were destroyed. According to Soviet data, the Chinese lost 4 ships, 200 people were killed, 98 were taken prisoner. The Dong-I floating battery, four barges, two motor boats, 12 guns, 13 bombers, 15 machine guns and about three hundred rifles were taken as trophies. About 2,200 Chinese soldiers scattered around the area.
After the battle at Lahasusu, the Soviet government invited the Chinese authorities to enter into negotiations, but was refused.
The Chinese began to focus large forces near the city of Fugdin. It was the second powerful fortified area of the Chinese after Lahasusu.
After the battle at Lahasusu, the Chinese were left with only the gunboat "Kian-Hung", three armed steamers ("Jian-Nai", "Jian-Tun" and "Jian-An") and the armed transport "Li-Chuan", which left during fight up the Songhua. But the enemy concentrated much more ground forces at Fugdin than at Lahasusu. By that time, the 7th and 9th Girin infantry brigades, squadrons of the 43rd cavalry regiment, as well as armed squads and a police detachment were here. Two cavalry regiments and a number of other military units were urgently transferred here from the city of San-Sin. All the way from Lahasusu to Fugdin, the Kuomintang destroyed all the bridges, and 14 km from Fugdin quite strong artillery positions and lines of trenches stretching 13 km were equipped. The city itself was fortified with the expectation of possible street battles.
The Revolutionary Military Council of the Special Far Eastern Army decided to carry out an operation to defeat the Fugdinsky fortified area. She was assigned again to the Amur flotilla in cooperation with the 2nd rifle division, the 5th Amur and 4th Volochaevsky regiments.
The ships of the flotilla assigned to this operation were divided into two groups. The first, shock, group received the task of breaking through to the Fugdinsky raid and destroying enemy ships along with their base. This group included the Krasny Vostok and Sun Yatsen monitors, the Krasnoe Znamya, Proletary, and Buryat gunboats, two minesweepers, the Strong mine layer, and the Bars armored boat. The actions of the strike group were led by the commander of the flotilla. The second group was supposed to land troops in the area of the village of Tuzaki and take the city and Fugdin fortress with a quick combined strike. The second group included the Sverdlov monitor, the Bednota gunboat, boats and steamships of the transport detachment, which had on board the 5th Amur Regiment, two battalions of the 4th Volochaevsky Regiment and a cavalry squadron. The group was commanded by the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division.
Monitor "Lenin" was supplied independent task: follow the strike group, enter the Lakhasu raid with it and land a naval assault in the city, thus ensuring the rear of the Soviet ships and units moving up the Sungari.
By 5 o'clock in the morning on October 30, the ships of the strike group took their starting position abeam the village of Mogokhno. At 05:30 they moved in marching orders: in front of them was a group of minesweepers, followed by gunboats Buryat, Krasnoe Znamya, Proletariy, monitors Krasny Vostok, Sun Yatsen, and the minelayer Smely. The last monitor was Lenin. The minesweepers, simultaneously with trawling, measured the depths and covered the fairway.
Having entered the Lahasu raid, "Lenin" landed troops, which entered the city of Lahasusu.
The second group of ships began moving at 08:45. The Sverdlov monitor was in front, followed by the gunboat Bednota and three steamships. All of them were towed by three barges. The line was closed by the steamer "Dauria" with a barge in tow.
The ships safely passed the "Eight" roll. Here the command decided to land troops not in the village of Tuzaki, as planned, but to come closer to Fugdin. At 1430 hours, minesweepers found a barricade abeam the village of Fanzyatun, near which Chinese ships were maneuvering. Noticing the Soviet flotilla, they began to hastily retreat up the Sungari. At 15 o'clock our minesweepers and gunboats approached the barrier. At this time, the gunboat "Kian-Khyn" opened fire on them. But the shells fell with a large shortfall. The commander of the Bars armored boat, approaching the barrier, found that it consisted of seven sunken barges with iron trusses on the deck and two passenger ships, which, although they had a large roll to starboard, were still afloat. Small passages were found between the flooded barges. In connection with the onset of darkness, our ships stopped moving and anchored.
Early in the morning of October 31, a battle began that lasted all day. At dawn, Soviet armored boats and minesweepers carried out reconnaissance and trawling. The rest of the ships moved along the trawled passages. The Chinese from the fortifications in the village of Jilin fired on our ships with artillery and mortar fire. The minesweepers were forced to reverse course, and the Chinese transferred the fire of their two batteries to the gunboats Red Banner and Proletarian, which, in turn, also opened artillery fire on the enemy. But the gunboats failed to suppress the fire of the Chinese batteries, and they were forced to retreat. Then the monitors entered the fray.
The airborne battalion, landed by the mine layer "Strong", began at 13 o'clock an offensive in the direction of Fugdin. The Chinese resisted fiercely. At 15 o'clock, the 5th Infantry Regiment and the cavalry squadron landed on the shore, which was to cut off the enemy's retreat by a deep detour of Fugdin. The landing units successfully advanced along the coast and, despite serious resistance from the Chinese, by six o'clock in the evening occupied the eastern outskirts of Fugdin. Around the same time, the rest of the Soviet units occupied the western part of the city. The Chinese retreated, fighting desperately for every street. By eight o'clock in the evening the whole city was occupied by Soviet units.
In the battle on October 31, seaplanes of the 68th detachment made nine sorties in the Fugdin area. Two MP-1 aircraft sank the gunboat Kian-Khyn. The Chinese had only five Breguet-type aircraft in all of Manchuria, they never appeared over the battlefield during the entire conflict.
Having eliminated the enemy grouping in the Fugdin area, Soviet troops and ships returned to Khabarovsk. On November 6, all vessels participating in the operation arrived in Osipovsky backwater. Only the monitor "Krasny Vostok" ran aground on the Amur, 150 meters from the Chinese coast, an attempt to remove it from the shallows failed, and the monitor, along with the crew, had to be left there for the winter.
The most serious offensive of the Soviet troops in the course of this conflict was carried out in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Dalainor and Manchuria railway stations. The goal of the Dalaynor-Manchurian operation was to defeat the enemy’s Trans-Baikal grouping, located in two fortified areas - at the Dalaynor station and at the Manchuria station. Total population Chinese troops in these areas amounted to 15-17 thousand people.
To defeat this grouping, the Trans-Baikal Group of the Separate Far Eastern Army was created as part of the 21st Perm Rifle Division, the 5th Cavalry Brigade, the Buryat-Mongolian Cavalry Division, a separate tank company, the 6th and 25th air squadrons, the 26th bomber air squadron , the 18th artillery battalion of corps artillery, the 18th engineer battalion and one railway company. In total, the group consisted of 6091 bayonets and 1599 sabers with 88 guns, 32 aircraft, three armored trains and nine T-18 (MS-1) tanks. (In the autumn of 1929, ten T-18 tanks arrived in the Chita region, one of which was badly damaged during unloading and dismantled for spare parts to repair the rest of the tanks). The commander of the Trans-Baikal group was S. Vostretsov under the general leadership of V.K. Blucher.
The Kuomintang built field fortifications in the area of Dalainor station. The road to Abagaytuevsky was cut by three lines of trenches of a full profile, between which there were reliable blockhouses with ceilings from rails and sleepers, covered from above with a meter layer of earth. There were only two lines of trenches on the southern and eastern sides, and only one line on the eastern side. In the direction of the main attack, the Chinese dug three-four-meter anti-tank ditches up to 2.5 meters deep to block the way Soviet tanks and armored vehicles. The key position in this area was Hill 269.8, which covered the approaches to the station from the east.
The offensive was launched on November 17, 1929. By the evening of November 20, our troops defeated the Chinese grouping in the area of the Manchuria and Dalainor stations. Soviet troops captured over 8 thousand soldiers and 300 of the Mukden army. Only the personnel of the 35th Infantry Division during the fighting from November 17 to November 19, 42 officers and 998 enemy soldiers were taken prisoner. In the same place, after the end of hostilities, 1035 killed Chinese soldiers and were buried.
Pursuing the remnants of the defeated units of the Mukden army, the Soviet troops occupied Hailar on November 27, 1929.
The Chinese were greatly impressed by our MS-1 tanks, although they acted rather stupidly. Not a single Chinese shell hit our MS-1s. Only one car was damaged by hand grenades. It turned out that the effect of a 37-mm fragmentation projectile from a tank gun was very weak. Therefore, in the future, the leadership of the Red Army decided to transfer all tank and anti-tank guns from 37 mm to 45 mm.
The Soviet command was greatly impressed by the 81-mm Stokes-Brandt mortars (created according to the imaginary triangle scheme), which were intensively used by the Chinese. Immediately, several captured mortars were sent to our training grounds. I note that before that we used fundamentally different schemes for mortars (mostly a deaf scheme, a unitary barrel, etc.). On the basis of the Chinese 81-mm mortar group "D", under the leadership of N.A. Dorovlev, was created in 1931 the first Soviet mortar according to the scheme of an imaginary triangle.
With some stretch, we can say that the conflict over the CER was the first local war carried out by the Soviet Union.
In the conflict, on average for October-November 1929, 18,521 Soviet soldiers and commanders participated. Losses were moderate: 143 people were killed, 4 people were missing, 665 people were wounded and shell-shocked. The main losses were suffered by rifle units. The cavalry lost 11 killed and 7 wounded. The Amur flotilla did not have a single one killed and only four wounded, and even then three of them were injured when their own guns burst during firing. In the aviation units that participated in the hostilities, one was wounded.
On December 1, 1929, the Manchu government of Zhang Chiao-ling was forced to begin peace negotiations, and on December 22, a Soviet-Chinese agreement was signed in Khabarovsk to restore the previous situation on the CER. After that, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Manchuria.
A few words should also be said about the international reaction to the conflict. The United States and France sided with China and incited it to continue fighting. Already during the talks in Khabarovsk, the United States offered its services as an intermediary. To which the Soviet government expressed surprise in an official note: why did the United States, which had not established diplomatic relations with the USSR, consider it appropriate to turn to the Soviet government with "advice". But the most important for the USSR was, of course, the position of Japan.
In subsequent years, for obvious reasons, Soviet historians argued that the de Japanese supported the Chinese. But in the secret report of the OGPU on the Far East dated June 22, 1929, it is said: “The Japanese consul in Manchuria Kawamoto, in a conversation with the manager of the road st. Manchuria, wondering if Soviet institutions, including the Trans-Baikal Railway, were really being evacuated from Manchuria, said that the Chinese needed to be taught a lesson and that the Soviet troops needed to take the road as soon as possible.
Another report of the OGPU noted: “The mood of the Chinese soldiers is not very good, there are cases of desertion. Reinforcements arrive weakly, as the Japanese prevent the passage of military trains through Changchun.
These, as well as a number of other episodes, indicate that Japan maintained a neutrality in the conflict that was favorable to the USSR.
|
In the summer of 1928, Chiang Kai-shek completed the unification of China under his command and moved the capital to Nanjing. The Nanjing government was recognized by the great powers, including the USSR, as the central government of China. At the same time, Manchuria actually remained under the control of Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang. Zhang Zuolin at one time received goods and weapons from the Japanese, but decided to break with them and was killed. Zhang Xueliang joined Chiang Kai-shek in order to enjoy his patronage in relations with the Japanese (he refused to pay his father's loans to Japan). It was the forces of Zhang Xueliang who were direct participants in the hostilities against the USSR. The Soviet side believed that Chiang Kai-shek pushed him to aggression, who, in turn, was forced to do so by Russian White Guard emigrants and the governments of the Western powers, who wanted to test fighting qualities Red Army and weaken the positions of the USSR in the region. Shortly before this, in 1927, a series of hostile actions were carried out against Soviet embassies and trade missions in Great Britain, Germany, Poland and China. Thus, the conflict on the CER was considered by the Soviet side as part of a large conspiracy of the imperialists against the USSR. It has been argued in the West that the real reason for the Chinese takeover of the road was that the Soviet-controlled CER was starting to generate much less profit, which drained the Chinese treasury. So, in 1924, the income of the CER was 11 million rubles, in 1926 - almost 20 million rubles, and starting from 1927, the profits of the railway began to fall uncontrollably. In 1927 - less than 10 million rubles, in 1928 - less than 5 million rubles, although Canadian and American experts claimed that the CER was capable of bringing in up to 50 million gold rubles annually. Side forcesUnder the command of Zhang Xueliang, the Mukden army numbered 300,000 people, in addition, up to 70 thousand White Guards and 11 ships of the Sungari river flotilla were in the border area. The main forces were concentrated as follows: Soviet troops numbered only 16,481 people and 9 tanks, but they were better armed and trained. On the side of the Chinese troops, the White Guards, as follows from the report of the ROVS, did not fight, although individual white detachments made unsuccessful raids on Soviet territory. Chronology of eventsFirst stageBeginning in December 1928, the Manchu authorities began to make attempts to seize the CER. After a propaganda campaign in the press, on December 22, 1928, the Harbin Chinese police seized the CER telephone exchange. Airplanes patrolled, powerful searchlights were installed in the area of Pogranichnaya station. Artillery exercises were held near Blagoveshchensk. The border areas in China were panic-stricken - the inhabitants were confident in the imminent Soviet invasion. Before the start of hostilities, under the leadership of Grigory Salnin, an intelligence group of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army of four people was trained and sent to Chinese territory, which, with the assistance of the Chinese Communists from military organization the city of Qiqihar operated on Chinese territory for 9 days and returned, having successfully completed the tasks assigned to it A large number of Soviet citizens lived in the right-of-way of the CER, who served the road. With the beginning of the conflict, some of them went over to the side of the Chinese. But many began to fight against the Chinese authorities. Peaceful forms of struggle were self-dismissal at the call of the Soviet trade union of the CER and the distribution of propaganda leaflets. During the period from July 10 to December 31, 1929, 1,689 people left the CER. The Chinese authorities arrested Soviet agitators. For example, a 20-year-old student N.A. Aleshchenko was arrested, who on the night of August 6-7, 1929 posted leaflets calling for workers and employees of the CER to go on strike. Soviet young activists also used violent methods of struggle - sabotage, killing of policemen and persons who were loyal to the Chinese government. The Chinese authorities arbitrarily resigned workers and employees of the road, as well as those accused of wrecking and distributing Soviet propaganda materials, were sent to the Sumbei concentration camp near Harbin. Many employees of the road waited out the conflict, leaving due to illness, and the most cautious even temporarily left Manchuria. Sungari offensive operationThe Chinese soldiers, upon reaching Fugdin, set about robbing stores and killing civilians. At the same time, the Red Army seized large military depots, including a large amount of food, but there were no complaints from civilians about its actions. There was a danger that the Chinese troops could outnumber the Soviet ones by a ratio of 3 to one, so the command of the Red Army decided to start offensive operation to crush the enemy before he can muster his strength. A directive was issued according to which the Soviet side renounced any territorial claims and intended only to defeat the militarist armies and free the prisoners. Special emphasis was placed on the fact that civilian structures and organizations would not be attacked. Contrary to the expectations of the Mukden authorities and their Western allies, the morale of the Red Army was very high. Political workers learned specially composed songs with the soldiers:
Also in use were ditties:
Fugda operationManchurian-Chzhalaynor operationThe Soviet offensive was directed at two fortified regions centered on Manzhouli and Zhalainuoer. In these areas, the Chinese dug many kilometers of anti-tank ditches and built fortifications. offensive during Mishanfussky operation began on the night of November 17th. The frost was about -20 °C. To ensure the effect of surprise, all measures were taken for proper disguise. The task force under the command of D.S. Frolov crossed the state border, overcame the rampart of Genghis Khan and, passing unnoticed over 30 kilometers, captured the Belano mine 8 km south of the city of Manchuria, and then blocked the roads and occupied the dominant heights to the south and west of the city; at the same time, a group of Streltsov approached the city from the north. The encirclement was closed by the 106th Rifle Regiment, which approached from the east, and the Buryat Cavalry Division. Following this, six Soviet aircraft attacked military facilities in the city (the barracks were destroyed and the radio station was disabled), and three aircraft dropped bombs on the Lyubensyan fortress, causing fires here. Taking advantage of the confusion of the enemy, one of the rifle companies of the Streltsov group, under the cover of artillery and machine gun fire, broke into the Chinese trenches on the northern outskirts of the city. Since the Soviet cavalry cut the railway at Zhalaynor, the Chinese troops could neither retreat along it nor receive reinforcements. On the night of November 17-18, 1929, the enemy attempted to break out of the city to the south, as a result, the Buryat cavalry division left the height of 444.88 and retreated to the Abagaytuy junction. In order to rectify the situation, the commander of the 21st Infantry Division P. I. Ashakhmanov, on 4 trucks, hastily transferred reinforcements that had arrived from Chita to the Belyano region: one company of the 61st Osinsky Infantry Regiment and a team of foot scouts who counterattacked and drove the enemy back. On the same day, the fighters of the 35th and 36th rifle divisions of the Red Army, with the support of MS-1 tanks, managed to break the enemy’s resistance before the reinforcements seen from the air had time to approach. The city of Zhalaynor was taken, despite the engineering fortifications and the fierce resistance of the Chinese troops. When the Soviet units entered Chzhalaynor, the city was in a state of chaos. All the windows are broken, on the streets - abandoned military equipment. Khabarovsk ProtocolOn November 19, Charge d'Affaires Cai Yunsheng sent a telegram to the representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Khabarovsk, A. Simanovsky, stating that two former employees of the Soviet consulate in Harbin were heading towards the Pogranichnaya-Grodekovo front and asking to be met. On November 21, two Russians - Kokorin, seconded to the German consulate in Harbin in order to help Soviet citizens after the break in diplomatic relations with China, and Nechaev, a former translator of the CER - crossed over to the Soviet side in the area of Pogranichnaya station along with a Chinese colonel. Kokorin conveyed to the Soviet authorities a message from Cai Yunsheng that he was authorized by the Mukden and Nanjing governments to begin immediate peace negotiations and asked the USSR to appoint an official to meet with him. On November 22, Simanovsky gave them the answer of the Soviet government, and the three envoys headed back to Harbin. The reply telegram said that the USSR was ready to agree to a peaceful settlement of the conflict, but considered it impossible to enter into negotiations on the same terms, which were announced through the German Foreign Ministry on August 29, until China recognizes the status quo on the Chinese Eastern Railway on the basis of the Beijing and Mukden agreements of 1924 , will not reinstate the Soviet road manager and will not release all those arrested. As soon as the USSR receives confirmation of the fulfillment of these conditions, all Chinese prisoners who were arrested in connection with the conflict on the CER will also be released, and the Soviet side will take part in a peace conference. Zhang Xueliang agreed - his answer came to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on November 27. M. M. Litvinov replied the same day and asked Zhang Xueliang to send his representative to Khabarovsk. On December 3, 1929, Cai Yunsheng and Simanovsky signed a preliminary agreement. On December 5, Zhang Xueliang confirmed his agreement by telegram. On December 13, Cai Yunsheng arrived in Khabarovsk. It was announced that Lu Zhonghua's powers as president of the Chinese Eastern Railway would cease on December 7. Simanovsky announced that the Soviet government was appointing Yu. V. Rudogo as general manager of the road. The Chinese prisoners of war were well treated and well fed, and agitation and explanatory work was carried out with them. Medical care was provided to the wounded and sick prisoners of war. Slogans in Chinese "We and the Red Army are brothers" were posted on the barracks. A wall newspaper called "Red Chinese Soldier" was published in the camp. Two days later, 27 Chinese prisoners of war applied to join the Komsomol, and 1,240 people filed an application with a request to leave them in the USSR. The conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway sharply weakened the white emigration in Manchuria. During the operation, Soviet troops arrested and deported to the USSR many active white émigrés. According to the OGPU certificate dated July 31, 1930, 244 whites were taken from Manchuria to the USSR: 96 Chinese citizens, 129 stateless people and 19 Soviet citizens. Most of them were executed despite their citizenship. In the same OGPU certificate, it was reported that out of these 244 whites, 153 people were shot (59 Chinese citizens, 90 stateless people and 4 Soviet citizens), 74 were sentenced to various camp terms, 16 were under investigation, and only one person was released. After the end of the conflict, the Soviet side carried out a large-scale purge of the personnel of the CER. Persons who retired from the road during the conflict were reinstated, they were returned state-owned housing and paid salaries for the period from the moment of dismissal until the moment of reinstatement. If they refused to be reinstated, they received severance pay. According to the Khabarovsk Protocol, all persons hired by the CER during the conflict were dismissed without paying a “freelance” allowance. According to an order dated September 29, 1930, Soviet citizens who had taken Chinese citizenship during the conflict were dismissed for dual citizenship. Memory
Also, all participants in the hostilities on the CER were awarded a metal badge of a participant in the hostilities on the CER. At the same time, the fighters of the Red Army and the Far Eastern military flotilla, who took part in the hostilities, as well as the distinguished fighters of the Osoaviakhim detachments, who provided protection for the rear of the army, received a badge with the inscription “Fighter OKDVA. OSOAVIAKHIM", and the border guards of the Red Banner Border Guard of the Far Eastern Territory who participated in the hostilities - a sign with the inscription "OSOAVIAKHIM. Fighter KPO DVK. CER". At the Otpor railway station, a monument was erected to K. D. Zaparin - a platoon commander, a graduate of the Omsk Infantry School named after M. V. Frunze, who destroyed the enemy dugout with grenades, but was wounded, captured and brutally killed by the Chinese |
Annotation: The conflict of 1929 on the CER remains a poorly studied page in Soviet-Chinese relations. In Soviet and Kuomintang historiography, these events were interpreted from opposite positions. The mutual accusations of the parties were clearly ideological and often far from reality. According to the author of the article, the Comintern and the USSR actually did not use their influence on the CER to plant the communist movement in Manchuria. And the goal of Chiang Kai-shek's stratagem was not to seize the territories of the USSR, but to use the contradictions of the great powers through "revolutionary diplomacy" and turn the control over the road established by the Chinese government into the beginning of the liquidation of the system of unequal agreements. But the actions taken by Nanjing led to a sharp deterioration in relations with the USSR, the transition of the conflict into a military phase. As a result, Japan took advantage of the fruits of the Soviet-Chinese confrontation, gaining control over the Chinese Eastern Railway a few years later.
Historiography of events: points of view
The domestic historiography of Soviet-Chinese relations in the second half of the 1920s largely repeats the official version of the Soviet authorities formulated on the eve and during the conflict of 1929 on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). The most extreme point of view can be found in the study of V. Dushenkin, who argued that the Nanjing government, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Mukden government, headed by Zhang Xue-liang, deliberately provoked the war by organizing provocations on the border. At the same time, the USSR patiently tried to reason with the Chinese side and did everything possible to avoid war. The far-reaching plans of Chiang Kai-shek, this author emphasized, consisted in invading Soviet territory in the region of Lake Baikal, destroying the railway tunnels and cutting transport connection between Western and Eastern Siberia. The result of this operation was to be the rejection and absorption of the Soviet Far East.
Modern Russian historians are more careful in assessing the motives that guided the Chinese government and do not insist that Chiang Kai-shek sought to invade the territory of the USSR. However, they argue that it was the Chinese side that was solely responsible for the sharp deterioration in bilateral relations. N. Ablova, for example, pointed to provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border, unjustified repressions against Soviet organizations in Manchuria and Soviet employees of the CER. The very fact of seizing the road in violation of existing international agreements, in her opinion, did not leave the USSR any choice but to use military means to resolve the conflict. Other Russian historians adhere to similar positions, noting that the opening of hostilities against China was provoked by the actions of the Chinese side, which bears full responsibility for the consequences of the conflict.
Along with this, some Russian scholars offer a more subtle approach to the problem, placing it in the general context of Nanjing's nationalist foreign policy aimed at restoring China's sovereignty. At the same time, they reasonably note that the hostility shown by the government of Chiang Kai-shek specifically towards Soviet Russia was a reaction to the foreign policy chosen by the USSR to support those opposition forces in China that were trying to overthrow the Nanjing government. And the methods used by the Chinese side to return the CER to China eventually prompted Moscow to decide to stop diplomatic efforts and use military force. In some modern general works on the history of the foreign policy of the USSR, it is noted that the provocations of the White Guards and the Manchu troops in the border areas became only a "pretext" for deciding on a military invasion of China. At the same time, the reader may get the impression that continued diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict would be a more productive position.
From the point of view of Taiwanese authors (although in the studies of historians of the Republic of China there are no works covering the events of interest to us in sufficient detail), Nanjing's desire to eliminate the system of semi-colonial dependence, of which the CER was a part, was fully justified. However, this natural demand ran into opposition from the USSR, which not only wanted to keep the CER under its control with all its might, but also to turn Manchuria into a base for subversive activities in China. Other Taiwanese historians, in an effort to be more objective, have noted that Chiang Kai-shek's motives were not limited to the desire to restore the trampled sovereignty of China, but also included the intention to place autonomous Manchuria under the stronger control of the Central Government, taking advantage of the situation of national upsurge in connection with possible military confrontation with the USSR.
Historians of the PRC, like their Taiwanese colleagues, often characterize Soviet policy in Manchuria as a continuation, in essence, of the imperialist course pursued in China. royal Russia. They point out that the USSR wanted to consolidate its control over Chinese territory, thereby infringing on China's sovereignty. In their opinion, the USSR proceeded from selfish considerations arising from its understanding of Russia's interests. At the same time, China sought to strengthen its sovereignty, and the Nanjing government proceeded from the need to respect China's national interests, which became the main cause of the conflict. Along with this, some historians admit that it was the Chinese side that provoked the deterioration of relations, since Chiang Kai-shek believed that the transition of the conflict to a military phase would inevitably lead to a war between the USSR and the great powers, which would only play into the hands of China.
Some authors of the PRC thus revealed the reasons that led to the Soviet-Chinese conflict: "The incident of 1929 on the CER was the result of the actions of Chiang Kai-shek and, as a result, relations between the two countries were severed." In other works, it is recognized that the USSR was striving for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, but it was China, having taken an uncompromising position, that, in essence, provoked a harsh response from Russia. In a monograph on the role of Soviet Russia in the Chinese revolution, the prehistory and essence of the conflict are described as follows: “The Nanjing government refused to comply with the terms of the 1924 treaty, regained control of the CER by force of arms, arrested Soviet employees of the railway and, thus, provoked a conflict. This was a continuation of the anti-Soviet policy that Nanjing began to pursue from December 1927, and became another concrete manifestation of its anti-Soviet and pro-imperialist course. The response actions taken by the USSR were necessary and inevitable.
In some studies of PRC historians, it is noted that the road management system created in pursuance of the 1924 treaty clearly infringed on the rights and interests of the Chinese side. But it was precisely the actions of Chang Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shek, who supported him, that violated the existing agreements and thus created the necessary pretext for the USSR to carry out a "punitive" operation against China. Approximately the same position is taken in his detailed study of the history of relations between the USSR and the Republic of China by the prominent historian of the PRC Bi Heng-t'ien. He stressed that the basic cause of the conflict was the management system of the CER, created after the conclusion of the 1924 treaty, which was clearly unfair and did not meet the interests of China. At the same time, he acknowledged that it is the Chinese side that is responsible for the violation of existing international treaties. The actions of Chiang Kai-shek, taken by him to achieve the goals of "revolutionary diplomacy", were inconsistent, since the blow was directed specifically against the USSR, and not the imperialist powers, which were assessed as an incommensurably stronger enemy. It is obvious, therefore, that the overwhelming majority of modern historians of the PRC lay the responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict on the Chinese side, which preferred the armed path of returning the CER under its control to peaceful negotiations.
In the Western historiography of events, one can also find two opposing points of view. The first of them presents the USSR as an aggressor seeking to defend its "imperialist" interests. In the work of B. Elleman, devoted to the military history of China, it is emphasized that Chiang Kai-shek sincerely believed that "red imperialism" was the main threat to China's sovereignty, and in this sense, the actions of the Chinese government to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway to eliminate this threat were fully justified. . In O. Clubb's study of the history of Soviet-Chinese relations in the 20th century, on the contrary, it was noted that Chiang Kai-shek's decision to place the CER under Chinese control was the result of strategic analysis international situation, which led him to the conclusion that Soviet Russia was the weakest potential adversary in comparison with other great powers. This was followed by the actions of the Chinese side, which can be considered a violation not only of the Soviet-Chinese agreements, but also of the norms of international law. Along with this, the American historian noted, the Mukden government was behind the military provocations organized by the White Guard movement against the borders of the USSR and mass repressions against Soviet employees of the road and Soviet citizens living in the CER region. In May 1929, under the pretext of stopping subversive activities and in violation of international law, a raid was made on the Soviet consulate in Harbin, although the accusations made by the Chinese side were never convincingly confirmed.
Thus, a circle of questions emerges that need to be clarified: how justified were the accusations that the parties exchanged on the eve and during the conflict; what were the true, and not presented to the domestic and international public opinion their motives; which side was primarily interested in provoking tension, and what were the main features of the stratagem formulated by Chiang Kai-shek the day before and during the confrontation.
Escalation of tension on the CER
1927 was a time of dramatic changes in the internal political situation in China and in Soviet-Chinese relations. By the spring of this year, it became clear that the southern Kuomintang government was close to winning the civil war between South and North and implementing its strategic plan to control all of China. Wuhan, Nanking, and then Shanghai passed into the hands of the southerners. But this was accompanied by increased friction both in the Kuomintang itself and between comrades-in-arms on the united front - Chinese nationalists and communists. The result of these contradictions was the collapse of the united front and the coming to power of Chiang Kai-shek, who formed the Nanjing government, which declared itself the central government of the country. Chiang blamed the outbreak of the civil war, this time between the CPC and the Kuomintang, on the Communists and the Comintern behind them, and, consequently, on the USSR. In a situation of sharp deterioration in Soviet-Chinese relations, in violation of international law and the Soviet-Chinese agreements of 1924, Russian diplomatic institutions in China were attacked by the central and local Chinese authorities. Under the pretext that the USSR missions were the base of support for the Chinese Communists, which, however, corresponded to reality, in April 1927 the consulates in Beijing and Shanghai were raided, and in December the consulate in Guangzhou was besieged and defeated, and some of its employees were executed.
During 1928 serious changes also took place in the situation in Manchuria itself. In June, as a result of an assassination attempt organized by Japanese intelligence, Zhang Tso-lin was killed, and his son Zhang Xue-liang came to power in the region of the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria), who decided to cooperate with the Nanjing government headed by Chiang Kai-shek . By mid-1928, Nanjing was able to establish control over the main regions of China, and already in December of the same year, the new ruler of Manchuria officially recognized the Nanjing government as the central government of China. In this radically changed military-political situation, Soviet Russia again found itself on the side of the anti-government forces. But if earlier the USSR supported the struggle of the Kuomintang against the central Beijing government, with which Russia had diplomatic relations, this time Moscow supported the Chinese communists, who embarked on the path of armed struggle against Nanjing. All these circumstances most directly affected the situation in the area of the CER and contributed to the fact that in 1929 Russia and China were drawn into a border military conflict.
To begin with, one should try to answer the question of what guided the parties when they embarked on the path of confrontation. And this primarily concerns the Chinese side, since it was she who took the initiative in aggravating the situation and violating the provisions of the Soviet-Chinese agreements of 1924, including the agreements on the CER. Russia had to look for justifications for its actions already at the final stage of the conflict, when a decision was made on an armed invasion of Chinese territory. In other words, why was it that Soviet Russia was chosen as the object of "revolutionary" diplomacy, while the other great powers continued to enjoy the many privileges that stemmed from a system of unequal treaties?
One of the most serious accusations put forward by the Chinese side and designed to clarify the question of why Russia became the object of "revolutionary diplomacy" was that Moscow used its presence on the CER to "communize China." This was repeatedly stated by Chiang Kai-shek himself and mentioned in the notes of the Chinese government. Indeed, if the USSR took real steps to intensify the activities of the CPC in Manchuria, similar to how it acted in South China, then this would significantly strengthen Nanjing's position and make its actions aimed at establishing control over the road more justified.
Analysts from the British Embassy in China, who obviously had a good idea of the situation in the country and quite objectively informed their leadership in London about it, also tried to clarify this issue. Their conclusion was that if the road was being used to help the CCP, it was mainly in the main region of Communist activity in southern China, and not in Manchuria. According to their information, in some cases, military equipment intended for the insurgents was transported along the CER, but the starting and ending point of its transportation was Soviet territory. After being delivered to Vladivostok, the weapons were sent by sea to unguarded sections of the coast of the provinces of Fujian and Jiangxi, and already there they were transferred to partisan detachments.
Taking into account what material and organizational efforts were made by Moscow to support communist movement in southern China, it would be quite reasonable to expect that in Manchuria, where the USSR had a real presence and which was close to its borders, the scale of such actions should at least not be inferior to the assistance provided by the CPC in southern China. But documents show that such assistance, and indeed the communist movement itself, was practically absent in the territory of the Three Eastern Provinces. For example, in a letter from the Secretary of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern, I. Rylsky, sent to Moscow from Shanghai in September 1929, i.e. less than two months before the start of the war, he noted that there were no CPC committees in Manchuria and suggested that the formation of party cells be urgently started, primarily in Harbin. I. Rylsky wrote: “And in the most important point of work - in the three provinces of Manchuria - there is almost no party. Harbin, for example, was not serviced by comrades at all, and to this day, despite the intensified work on the part of the comrades, the expulsion of people, it has not been possible to create party points. Workers expelled from the center will be arrested there after a couple of days.” In this regard, a natural question arises: who was more right in assessing the communist threat in the Northeast of China - I. Rylsky, a highly informed senior official of the Comintern, who was in China at that time, or the leader of the Nanjing government?
For Chiang Kai-shek, presumably, the seizure of the road was a kind of response to the policy of Moscow, which actively supported the communist movement in China, which openly declared that the goal of the CCP was to overthrow the power of the Nanjing government and Chiang Kai-shek himself. Indeed, for all the difficulties in relations between China and the great powers, Russia was the only state that sought to overthrow the legitimate Chinese government, which had international recognition. But the stratagem formulated by Chiang Kai-shek was not limited to this. In the event of a favorable outcome for Nanjing (if China succeeded in forcing Russia to abandon the CER), this could become a prologue to subsequent actions aimed at eliminating the entire system of unequal treaties and raising Chiang's prestige as a defender of China's national interests. And in this sense, Chiang Kai-shek acted as a consistent nationalist, although Moscow accused him of the opposite.
In the event that the Soviet leadership resorted to military aggression against China in order to defend its interests, the other great powers, according to the head of the Nanjing government, would not stand aside and the military conflict that broke out between them would only play into the hands of China. To this it must be added that Russia was regarded as the weakest opponent in comparison with other powers, and in this sense was a suitable object for "revolutionary" diplomacy. In addition, Chiang Kai-shek also hoped to strengthen the position of the central government in Manchuria, since Chang Xue-liang was clearly incapable of resisting the USSR on his own.
The motives that guided the new "owner" of Manchuria, Zhang Xue-liang, who actively cooperated with the central government in "squeezing" Russia out of the CER region, were of a completely different nature. If successful, he hoped to increase his political prestige as a national leader, strengthen control over the Three Eastern Provinces region, and strengthen Manchuria's independence from the center. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the leaders of both the central and Mukden governments had to be aware that the achievement of their goals was impossible within the then existing system of interstate agreements between China and international law as a whole. But this was the main feature of "revolutionary" diplomacy, which, by definition, had to proceed not from international legal principles, but from China's national interests. As for Moscow, during this period it was clearly not interested in aggravating the situation in the CER region, since the Soviet leadership was busy with issues of international recognition, problems of intra-party struggle and overcoming the difficulties that arose at the first stage of collectivization.
In December 1928, Nanjing began to implement its plan. A police detachment confiscated a telephone exchange in Harbin, opened at the expense of the CER, and, despite all the protests of the Soviet side, the Chinese authorities refused to return it, declaring it the property of the city administration. The annual report of the British Embassy in China described the events as follows: "In December, the Chinese authorities renewed their pressure by forcefully confiscating the telephone exchange, which rightfully belonged to the road in accordance with various agreements since 1896." Other diplomatic sources noted that the takeover of the telephone hub was a clear start to the Chinese authorities taking full control of the railway. At the end of May, the Chinese police raided the Soviet consulate in Harbin on the pretext that it was being used for meetings of supporters of the 3rd International. 39 people were arrested, mostly employees of Soviet organizations in Manchuria, and a significant number of various documents were confiscated. The diplomatic staff of the consulate, however, was not arrested. Subsequently, some of the confiscated documents were published in the Chinese press in order to confirm that the consulate was the center of communist subversion. However, as noted by numerous domestic and foreign scientists, some of the published documents were clearly falsified. It should also be noted that the decision to attack the consulate was taken by Chang Hsueh-liang, who obtained the preliminary consent of Chiang Kai-shek.
In this regard, it must be emphasized that the diplomatic institutions of the USSR, of course, were used to carry out intelligence tasks both through the foreign department of the OGPU and the intelligence service of the Comintern. However, after the attacks on the consular offices of the USSR in China in 1927, when the facts of the involvement of Soviet diplomats in anti-government activities became public, at the insistence of the head of the Soviet foreign policy department M. Litvinov, a special decision was made by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, prohibiting the use of diplomatic missions for communications with foreign communists. Thus, most likely, the raid on the Soviet consulate in Harbin in 1929, indeed, did little to reinforce the accusations of the CER administration of organizing subversive activities in China.
In this situation, at the beginning of June 1929, the leadership of the USSR began to discuss the situation on the CER and Russia's possible response actions. The opinions of the members of the PB were divided, and a particularly lively discussion arose between K. Voroshilov and N. Bukharin. If the former was a staunch supporter of an armed demonstration on the Soviet-Chinese border, the latter uncompromisingly opposed such an action. K. Voroshilov was so enraged by the position of his party comrade that he was even ready to challenge him to a fistfight. Obviously, the actions of the Chinese authorities, which openly contradicted the Soviet-Chinese agreements, clearly strengthened the position of the Moscow "hawks", who insisted on a military invasion of Chinese territory in order to force the Chinese authorities to comply with the agreements.
Capture of the Chinese Eastern Railway
As subsequent events showed, Chiang Kai-shek was not going to rest content with what he had achieved and wanted to bring things to the final elimination of Russia's presence in the area of the CER. On July 7-10, 1929, a meeting was held in Peking with the participation of the head of the Nanking government, the ruler of Manchuria, Zhang Xue-liang, and also the head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Wang Zheng-ting. As a result of the discussion on July 10, the following decision was made: “Regarding our position in the field of relations with Japan and Russia. In order to prevent the communization of China, we must establish control over the Chinese Eastern Railway, and for this purpose we must put the telegraph junction of the road under our control.” Chiang Kai-shek promised to support the ruler of Manchuria in the event of an aggravation of the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border, providing troops from the central government, and agreed to provide financial support of 2 million yuan.
After the telegraph station was withdrawn from the road administration, the turn of Soviet foreign trade organizations followed, as well as trade unions and cooperatives, whose offices were closed. Moreover, immediately after the capture of the telegraph hub, about 200 Soviet citizens were put under arrest without any serious charges being brought, and diplomatic protests and calls from the Soviet side to discuss the situation at a special conference were ignored. The Russian road manager A. Yemshanov and his deputy A. Eismont were suspended from work and forced to leave China.
In a speech delivered by Chiang Kai-shek on July 15 during a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, he officially announced that China was regaining control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and outlined the reasons behind this decision of the Chinese government. The first was the statement that Russia undertook to return the CER to China, but did not fulfill its promise. It is difficult to understand what exactly Russia's promise to return the road to China was appealed to by the head of the Nanjing government (possibly, to the "first declaration of Karakhan"). However, it is obvious that under the agreements of 1924 the road was transferred to the control of the USSR, and its return to China was due to the convening of a special conference on this issue, which was never opened. If Soviet Russia sincerely wanted to help China's national liberation, Chiang Kai-shek continued, then it should have voluntarily given up its property in China itself. Chiang went on to touch on motives that look more believable and reflect the true aspirations of the Chinese leader. He stressed that if it is possible to achieve the goal in the conflict with Russia, then this can become a model for the abolition of the entire system of unequal agreements. Along with this, he noted that the elimination of the presence of the USSR in Manchuria would help strengthen the national unity of China, the main threat to which was the communist movement, backed by Moscow.
For summer months 1929 escalating tensions between the two countries continued to escalate. On July 17, the government of the USSR received a note from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which rejected Soviet protests about the violation by the Chinese side of the terms of the 1924 agreements and the norms of international law. In response, the USSR announced the severance of diplomatic relations with China and began to recall personnel from the consulates in Harbin, Qiqihar, Manzhouli, Hailar, and Heihe. On July 20, in a response statement from the Chinese side, it was announced that the diplomatic personnel from the Chinese embassy in Moscow were being withdrawn.
As the documentary chronicles of Chiang Kai-shek's life testify, he thus assessed the main aspects of the international situation that arose after the capture of the CER: “If Soviet Russia decides to use military force, this will seriously complicate it international position, and for this reason such actions are unlikely. Unleashing a war will require the mobilization of all Russia's resources, and this will complicate the situation inside the country - and this is the second reason why it is unlikely to take such a step. If Russia nevertheless sends troops to Manchuria, then Japan is unlikely to calmly watch this, send its army to Northern Manchuria, and as a result we will have a second Russo-Japanese war.
As subsequent events showed, such a vision of the situation was completely erroneous. But it is hardly possible to unequivocally declare Chiang Kai-shek a short-sighted strategist, since his analysis was shared by other observers, including from among foreign diplomats accredited in China. In particular, a dispatch from the British embassy in Nanjing sent to London said: "With the exception of military intervention, which Russia is unlikely to dare, she, like other powers, has no leverage to deter China in its attack against the privileges provided for by the treaties" .
Nevertheless, Chiang Kai-shek still admitted the possibility that Russia would decide to defend its interests by force of arms. He wrote about this in a dispatch dated July 19, addressed to Zhang Xue-liang and containing his ideas about the prospects for the development of the situation. Chiang reiterated that, from his point of view, the USSR was unlikely to dare military intervention, but at the same time advised to be prepared for various scenarios. He proposed a concentration of troops in the area of the Soviet-Chinese border, but insisted on the need to exercise restraint and avoid provocations that could provoke retaliatory measures from Russia. In the event that Russia still decided on a military demonstration, he advised starting a retreat in the direction of South Manchuria in order to enable Japan to intervene in the military conflict. Thus, it is obvious that, having made a firm decision to deprive Russia of privileges in Manchuria, the Chinese government was no less determined to avoid the conflict escalating into a war, and even more so had no plans to transfer hostilities to the territory Eastern Siberia and the Far East with the aim of annexing Soviet lands.
However, Chiang Kai-shek's plans to internationalize the conflict were not destined to materialize, as the great powers, including Japan, chose to stand aside, declaring neutrality. Attempts by the United States to act as an intermediary (note by US Secretary of State G. Stimson) did not receive support from Great Britain and Japan, and were characterized in the Soviet press as America's plan to establish its own control over the CER with the connivance of the Nanjing government.
At the end of July, the parties had the opportunity to resolve the situation peacefully. Unexpectedly for the Soviet side, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mukden government, Tsai Yung-cheng, in a conversation with the Consul General of the USSR Melnikov, put forward some proposals that could become an object of discussion and bring the situation out of the crisis. Behind these proposals was Zhang Xue-liang, who was clearly afraid of an escalation of the conflict. But a week later, none other than Zhang himself, under pressure from Chiang Kai-shek, withdrew these proposals, declaring that a return to the principles of the 1924 agreement on the CER was impossible under any circumstances. In this situation, on August 8, the PB of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to make public the appointment of General V. Blucher, in the recent past the chief military adviser at the headquarters of Chiang Kai-shek, as commander of the Special Far Eastern Army and to receive instructions to urgently serve to the Far East.
On August 20, 1929, a statement was published by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, which formulated a position on the settlement of the conflict. The Chinese side was accused of numerous violations of Soviet borders, armed provocations against Soviet civilians and military persons, of condoning the activities of the White Guard detachments, primarily those responsible for crossing the borders, as well as of illegal arrests of Soviet road employees and Soviet citizens living in Manchuria. The statement contained demands for the immediate disarmament of the White Guards, the release of interned Soviet citizens, and the return to the place of work of the exiled Soviet administration of the road.
The answer to the Soviet statement of August 20 was contained in the draft joint communiqué, which a few days later was proposed by the Chinese side for consideration by Moscow through the German ambassador G. Dirksen. Nanjing agreed to release the detained citizens of the USSR, but flatly refused to agree to the return to work of the Soviet administration of the road. Needless to say, these proposals were unacceptable to the Soviet side.
Since September 1929, Soviet Union took a clearly offensive position - additional troops were transferred to the Far East and military equipment, increased the size of the Special Far Eastern Army. During September-October, the parties continued to exchange accusations of provoking tension in the border areas and preparing for war. The statements of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs outlined numerous facts of violation of Soviet borders, killings of civilians and military personnel on the territory of the USSR, cited cases of reprisals, torture and inhuman treatment of Soviet citizens who ended up in Chinese prisons, the number of which had already reached 2000 by October. The Chinese side, in turn, also accused Russia of fomenting tensions on the border, that the special forces of the Red Army crossed the border and staged mass executions among the Russian population of the Cossack villages on Chinese territory. The Soviet-Chinese conflict was rapidly approaching its military denouement.
Hostilities between Russia and China took place on Chinese territory and lasted only 10 days, between December 17 and 27, 1929. The Soviet Far Eastern Army easily broke the resistance of the local formations of Chinese troops, capturing more than 8 thousand prisoners, and chose not to go deep into Chinese territory. Already at the end of November, negotiations on the status of the CER were resumed at the request of Zhang Xue-liang and ended with the signing of a protocol in Khabarovsk on December 22, according to which, in fact, the order that existed before the start of the conflict was restored on the road. All arrested Soviet citizens were to be released, and Russia, in turn, undertook to return the Chinese prisoners of war. The diplomatic missions of the USSR in Manchuria resumed work, and the Soviet administration of the CER returned to Harbin.
The Soviet Union did not take advantage of the fruits of its military victory and did not seek new concessions from China. Japan took advantage of them, convinced of the weakness of the Nanjing and Mukden governments and began to seize Manchuria in September 1931, which, in turn, became the prologue of the Japanese invasion of China in the summer of 1937. Under the conditions of the establishment of Japanese control over Northeast China, when the Japanese authorities constantly obstructed the work of the Chinese Eastern Railway, in 1935 Russia was forced to sell the road for nothing to the government of Manchukuo, which was backed by the Japanese military authorities.
Conclusion. Conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway: myths and reality
Obviously, the events around the CER were not limited to diplomatic and military confrontation, but were also a fierce ideological war in which myths and reality were closely intertwined. Moreover, the accusations that the parties exchanged, for the most part, did not correspond to reality. Chiang Kai-shek's assertion that the Chinese Eastern Railway was used for the "communization" of China, which became the main pretext for seizing the road, could be considered a misunderstanding if we assume that Nanjing and Mukden did not know the state of the communist movement in Manchuria. The latter, however, looks unlikely. In fact, the communist cells in Dongbei were small, poorly organized, disoriented, their activities were extremely passive, and there was no connection with the Soviet party, administrative and diplomatic organizations in Manchuria. In fact, both the CPC Central Committee and Moscow ignored the communist movement in Northeast China, focusing all their attention on the situation in the southern provinces, where the communists managed to achieve some success. At the same time, it should be taken into account that although the accusation of using the Chinese Eastern Railway to help anti-government forces in China did not correspond to reality, on the other hand, the USSR did provide all kinds of assistance to the CPC, which fought to overthrow the internationally recognized government of China.
The USSR also needed an ideological justification for its actions, especially at the last stage of the conflict, when plans for a military invasion within the borders of China began to be developed. For him, the main problem was to convincingly explain to the Chinese and international communist movement, as well as to the world community, why the Soviet state, which proclaimed the rejection of imperialist privileges as the main principle of its foreign policy, was ready to resort to military intervention against China to protect the property of the tsarist government. The “ideologeme” formulated in the bowels of the Comintern was that the Nanjing government and the Mukden regime, acting in collusion with the powers, planned to make the capture of the CER a prologue to military intervention against the USSR, with the ultimate goal of tearing away the Soviet Far East. After that, the Kuomintang regime was ready to hand over the road to foreign powers in exchange for support in the civil war in China.
These accusations also had nothing to do with reality. On the contrary, in these events Chiang Kai-shek acted as an open nationalist who fought for the return of sovereignty to China. For him, the capture of the Chinese Eastern Railway was only the first stage in the struggle against the system of unequal treaties and privileges enjoyed by foreign powers in China. It should be borne in mind that the foreigners themselves, including Japan, which behaved most aggressively in China, ultimately preferred "imperialist" solidarity with the USSR to the anti-Soviet collusion with the Nanjing government, declaring neutrality in the conflict. There is also no evidence that the Chinese government was planning a war of aggression to annex Soviet territory. On the contrary, Chiang Kai-shek constantly urged Chang Hsueh-liang to be careful not to give Moscow a pretext for military intervention.
In this regard, the following question requires an answer: who, ultimately, is responsible for the fact that Soviet-Chinese relations during 1929 became not only more and more hostile, but also, as a result, turned into an armed confrontation? Obviously, the responsibility for this lay primarily with Nanjing, and not at all with Moscow, which until the autumn of 1929 rather patiently tried to resolve disputes through diplomacy. From the point of view of the obligations assumed by China in accordance with the agreements of 1924, the actions of the Chinese authorities looked like a violation of the norms of international law of that time, which was noted by Western observers. However, a share of the responsibility also lay with Russia, which from 1927 supported the Chinese communists with all their might, who fought to overthrow the Nanking government. This was no less blatant violation of international law, however, not directly related to the situation on the CER.
When asked why the leader of the Kuomintang needed to provoke the USSR and bring matters to a war, the answer is also quite obvious. Chiang Kai-shek formulated a complex stratagem that seemed to him invulnerable and envisaged the achievement of several goals at once. In the event of a successful capture of the CER, he hoped to use its fruits to further attack the positions of foreign powers in China and strengthen his prestige as a patriot and national leader. The confrontation with the USSR in Manchuria, in addition, was supposed to help strengthen the positions of the central government within the Three Eastern Provinces, since Zhang Xue-liang was hardly capable of fighting against Russia alone. Chiang Kai-shek's plan also included options for action in the event of an unfavorable scenario. If the Soviet military invasion had succeeded, then in this situation, Chiang proposed to retreat deep into Manchuria with battles in order to enable Japan to cross arms with the USSR. Thus, the conflict would be internationalized, leaving additional features to maneuver in line with "revolutionary" diplomacy. However, all these calculations turned out to be built on quicksand, since Moscow did not plan to seize the territories of China, but only sought to restore the status quo on the CER.
Literature
- Ablova N.E. CER and Russian emigration in China. Moscow: Russian panorama, 2005
- American and French capitalists want to seize K-V iron road, Truth, 6.08.1929
- Bi Ying-hsien, Zhonghua Minguo shi waijiao zhi (History of foreign relations of the Republic of China), Taipei: Guoshiguan, 2002
- Bi Heng-tian, Minguo shiqi Zhong Su guanxi shi, 1917-1949 (History of Soviet-Chinese relations during the period of the Republic of China, 1917-1949), Beijing: Zhong gundan shi chubanshe, 2009, v.2
- The Soviet-Chinese protocol was signed in Khabarovsk, Truth, 23.12.1929
- Wang Te-han, Dongbei junshi shiluye ( military history Manchuria), Taipei: Chuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1982
- VKP(b), Comintern and China, v.3, part 1
- Guan Kui-hai, Zhong E guanxi dy lishi yu xianshi (Chinese-Russian Relations: History and Reality), Beijing: Shehui kesxue wenxian chubanshe, 2009
- Dee Hou-zhuang (Bruce A. Elleman), Jindai Zhongguo junshi yu zhanzheng (Military history and wars of modern China), Taipei: Shiin, 2000
- Documents on foreign policy USSR, tt.11-12
- Dushenkin V.V. From soldier to marshal. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966
- From a letter to I.A. Rylsky to the Eastern Secretariat of the ECCI, Shanghai, 09/30/1929, VKP(b), Comintern and China, v.3, part 1
- History of China. Moscow: MGU Publishing House, 1999
- Kartunova A.I. Blucher in China. Moscow: Oriental Literature, 1979
- Lin Jun, 1929 Nian Zhong Su fu jiao shuping (On the restoration of Soviet-Chinese relations in 1929), shijie lishi, 1990, №1
- Appeal of the Nanjing government to the government of the Soviet Union, Truth, 31.08.1929
- From the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Truth, 10.09.1929
- From the People's Commissariat for foreign affairs, Truth, 20.08.1929
- Letter from K. Voroshilov to S. Ordzhonikidze dated 06/08/1929. VKP(b), Comintern and China. The documents. Moscow: Poligran, 1999, v.3, part 1
- Systematic history of international relations, 1918-2000. Moscow: Moscow Worker, 2000
- Xiang Qing, Shi Chih-fu, Liu Te-si, Sulian Yu Zhongguo geming (Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution), Beijing: Zhongyang bianze chubanshe, 1994
- Usov V.N. Soviet intelligence in China, 1920s. Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 2002
- Huang Ding-tian, Zhong Ye guanxi tongshi (General history of relations between Russia and China), Harbin: Heilongjiang chubanshe, 2007
- Shen Chihhua, Zhong Su guanxi shigang 1917-1949 (History of Soviet-Chinese relations 1917-1949), Beijing: Zhonghua chubanshe, 2007
- Yan Ru-ping, Deng Zemin, Jiang Zeshi Zhuan Gao (Biographical Essays Chiang Kai-shek ) , Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1992
- O.Clubb, Chinaand Russia: The “Great Game,” Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1971
- R. Jarman (Edited), ChinaPolitical Reports 1911-1960, UK: Archives Edition Limited, 2001, vol.4
- The Chronological Events. The Chiang Kai-shek Collections, Taipei: Academia Historica, vol.6, Chinese.
“After the signing of the Khabarovsk Protocol, all prisoners of war and those arrested in connection with the conflict on the CER were released, and Soviet troops were withdrawn from Chinese territory. The last detachment returned to the USSR on December 25, 1929. Soon the normal operation of the CER was restored.
Chinese prisoners of war in the Soviet Union were carefully "processed". Among them were experienced political workers who agitated Chinese soldiers for Soviet power. The barracks were adorned with slogans in Chinese "We and the Red Army are brothers!".
A wall newspaper called "Red Chinese Soldier" was published in the camp. Two days later, 27 Chinese prisoners of war applied to join the Komsomol, and 1,240 people applied with a request to leave them in the USSR.”
In 1931 Manchuria was finally occupied by Japan. In 1935, after numerous provocations in the area of the road, the USSR sold the Manchukuo Chinese Eastern Railway, in order to return it to itself in 1945, and then again donate it to communist China for political purposes, along with Port Arthur in the early 1950s.
NOW A FEW MORE DETAILS ABOUT THE SONGARIA OPERATION.
Troopers and ships of the Far Eastern (Amur) flotilla Photo from the archive of the grandson of one of the crew members of the Sverdlov monitor
“In the early 1920s, reinforced with new gunboats, the Chinese River Guard Administration was renamed the Jilin and Heilongjiang River Flotilla. The connection included eight ships with a total displacement of about 2200 tons. The flotilla was engaged in the protection of shipping from robbers and carried out border functions. In June 1920, the staff of the flotilla command was approved, located in the Daowai district of Harbin. In the same year, the gunboats Jiangheng and Lichuan were stationed in Fugdin (Fujin) in order to protect Chinese commercial ships in the middle reaches of the Amur.
The gunboats "Ljie" and "Lisuy" wrung out from the Germans in WWI were assigned the task of patrolling the navigable channel of the Sungari between Harbin and Lahasusu. In the spring of 1922, the flotilla was subordinated to the unified command of the troops of the Three Eastern Provinces, and a combat training department appeared at the headquarters. This was due to a chronic lack of funds for the maintenance of ships. In fact, the existence of the flotilla was paid from the personal funds of the uncrowned Emperor of Manchuria, Zhang Zuolin.
Zhang Zuolin's son, young marshal Zhang Xueliang (center, in white) liked planes more than ships
At first, Governor Zhang Zuolin had little interest in the development of the navy. The attitude changed during the 1st Zhili-Fengtian War, when the Manchu troops suffered painful losses from the fire of the Haichou and Haizhong cruisers. After that, Shen Hongle, chief of staff of the Jilin-Heilongjiang flotilla, who was educated in Japan, became Zhang Zuolin's chief adviser on naval warfare.
Before the start of the conflict, the flotilla was concentrated at the confluence of the Amur and Sungari, at the mouth of which the stronghold of the Chinese army, the city of Lahasusu (Tongjiang), was located. The general management of the actions of the ships was carried out by Shen Hongle. The parking lot of the flotilla was covered with floating barriers, and the armament of the ships was strengthened: guns with a caliber of less than 76 mm were replaced, if possible, with more powerful ones.
List of ships of the Chinese Sungarian flotilla: 
1. The flagship of the flotilla is a Japanese-built gunboat, 1907, “Jiangheng”. Length 60 m. Draft 2.5 m. Displacement 550 tons. Speed 13 knots. Crew - 15 officers, 90 sailors and foremen. Armament: 1 x 120 mm gun, 3 x 76 mm guns, 4 x 47 mm rapid-fire guns, machine guns - 4 x 7.92 mm. (The numbers may contain inaccuracies). Interestingly, during the time of our Civil War, the Chinese handed over one of the 76-mm guns of the ship to the red partisans (Tryapitsyn) to fight the whites.
2. gunboat of German construction, 1908, “Lijse”, in German nee Otter. The Germans carried 2 × 52 mm rapid-fire guns and 3 machine guns. The Chinese supplied one 57 mm gun and three machine guns.
3. German-built gunboat “Li-Sui”, in German nee Vaterland.
In 1903, the shipyard F.Schichau Elbing (German) was laid down, building No. 711 for the German. Navy. Launched on 08/26/1903, dismantled and brought to China by sea, assembled in Shanghai and launched. 05/28/1904 entered service as VATERLAND and served as a stationer on the river. Yangtze in Nanjing. 18.08. 1914 abandoned by the crew and fictitiously sold by the fleet to a private German owner as LANDESFATER. 03/20/1917 confiscated after China entered the war with Germany. Before the capture, the Germans destroyed all the weapons of the ship and the Chinese installed their own. In the same year, it underwent repairs and after it, as part of the 2nd squadron, the whale. Navy in Shanghai as LI SUI. On 07-09.1919, she left Shanghai and crossed the Amur to the Sungari. Armament 1-76 mm, 1-47 mm, as well as two machine guns.
4. Chinese-built armed tug Lichuan.
The rest of the ships were armed ships from the Russian security flotilla of the CER
5. Armed paddle steamer from the CER shipping company, 1898 “Jianping”
6. armed paddle steamer from the CER shipping company, 1898 “Jian'an”
7. armed paddle steamer from the CER shipping company, 1898 “Jiantai”
8. Chinese-built non-self-propelled armed barge, 1927 “Dongyi”
9. armed paddle steamer from the CER shipping company, 1898 “Jianqing”
10. Armed paddle steamer from the shipping company of the Chinese Eastern Railway “Liji” (Former “cruiser” of the Security Guards of the Chinese Eastern Railway “Sixth”, requisitioned by the Chinese authorities).
11. armed paddle steamer from the CER shipping company, 1898 “Jiantong”
It is worth noting here that the steamships of the CER were in the hands of the Chinese (at the beginning of the century, Russia successfully prevented the appearance of its own ships from China with all its might) thanks to the manager of the CER, D.L. Croat, who allowed merchants to sell ships bypassing all prohibitions - if only they did not get to the Bolsheviks. They wanted to spoil their political competitors, but as a result, they spoiled the country, strengthening their neighbor on the border. As usual.
THE TAKING OF LAHUSUS
Map of the operation from the Museum of the History of the Far Eastern Military District
In terms of the form of warfare, it was a river assault. Let me remind you that the Red Army had experience of such operations since the Civil War, and Russian ships sailed along the Sungari since the middle of the 19th century. By the beginning of the 20th century, Russian sailors completely controlled the mouth of the river and knew the direction of this section quite well.
The design of Soviet monitors made it possible to approach close to the shore
On the night of October 12, 1929, the ships of the Soviet Far Eastern Flotilla entered the mouth of the Songhua River and anchored. At 6 am, an air raid began on the ships and coastal batteries of the Chinese.
Soviet landing
Place of fighting. You can understand from what distances and in what navigational conditions the ships of the flotilla worked. Duel through a handkerchief!
Behind them monitors "Lenin", "Sverdlov" and "Sun-Yat-Sen", standing at anchor, opened fire on the same targets. Under the cover of artillery, the minesweepers cleared the fairway within 15 minutes, thanks to which the mine layer "Strong" and the gunboats on which the landing force was located were able to approach the landing area.
German built gunboat, 1908, “Lijie” ex “Otter”
One of the versions reports an important detail: Earlier, on October 11, the commander of the Chinese flotilla, Shen Hongle, unexpectedly left Lahasusa on the flagship of the gunboat Jiangheng and went upstream the Songhua River to Fugdin. The commander of the Jiangheng, Captain 2nd Rank Yin Zuoqian, was left in Lahasusu with an order to temporarily take the flotilla under his control. In 1923-1924. the newly-made commander commanded the gunboat Lijie. On it, he raised his pennant, making her the new flagship of the flotilla.
The return fire of the Chinese forced the monitors to weigh anchor and engage in an artillery duel with the shore, confidently moving in wake formation in a rather narrow river. By 8 o'clock in the morning, damaged by the fire of the Sverdlov, the temporary flagship of the Chinese flotilla Lijie was thrown ashore by the crew above Lahasusu and abandoned. The steamships Jiangping and Jiangtai sank, and the Jiangan was torn in half by explosions. The Dun-i battery was damaged and became a Soviet trophy. The rest of the ships, despite the damage, managed to escape up the Sungari.
The landing force landed at about 9 am and engaged in combat with a coastal defense battalion from Qingdao. The Chinese steadfastly held their position and tried several times to counterattack with bayonets, so they almost completely died - about 200 died, about 40 were captured.
By 15 o'clock in the afternoon, paratroopers broke into the city. The ships, by that time, with the help of minesweepers who cleared mines, were able to come close to the city and open fire.
In the engine room of the Sverdlov monitor
“From the close explosions of enemy shells, as well as from the intense fire of our own guns, the power supply failed on the Sverdlov. The bowels of the ship plunged into darkness, the combat power mechanisms stopped. But the high morale and training of the crew saved the situation: the servants of the artillery cellars quickly switched to the manual supply of ammunition to the towers (40-50 kg), and the shooting did not stop for a minute.
Soviet monitor "Sun-Yat-Sen", the former royal "Shkval".
Turret gunboats, later flurry-type river monitors. In total, at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in 1907-10. 8 units built Displacement (standard / full) 963.9 / 1082 tons. Dimensions: (length / width / draft) 70.98 / 12.8 / 1.59 m. Speed 11.9 knots. Crew 154 people. Armament: Artillery of the main caliber 2 × 1 - 152-mm / 50 guns of the Obukhov plant mod. 1908; 2 × 2 - 120 mm/50 Vickers gun mod. 1905. Anti-aircraft artillery: 2 × 1 - 47 mm; 6 × 1 - 7.62 mm machine guns "Maxim". UPD: At the time of the conflict, the weapons on the Chinese Eastern Railway changed according to the principle “what they found, they put it”. The information is in the comments to the post.
Power plant: for the first time in the history of the fleets of the world, these gunboats were used as the main propulsion system diesel engines. 4 diesels 250-260 hp each
Like all ships of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Dong-I floating battery had a name in Chinese and Russian
The Dong-I floating battery after the battle. Taken as a trophy, it will still be useful to the USSR in the fight against the Japanese in 1945.
Artillerymen "Sun Yat-Sen" entered the battle from the floating batteries "Dun-I". Having received hits from three shells, the monitor incapacitated his opponent. Monitor "Krasny Vostok" was engaged in the suppression of coastal batteries and along the way sank the gunboat "Jiang-Ping".
152-mm and 120-mm guns of Soviet monitors fired almost point-blank
Estimate the moment: 4 monitors, each with two 152 mm and four 120 mm guns, enter a rather narrow river and begin to hammer at the Chinese defending a rather small (see photo of Lahasusu) territory with DIRECT FIRE! How much is their total airborne salvo there? But the Chinese hold on and fire back from standing ships and the shore, forcing, in general, rather big monitors to maneuver in narrowness, which also causes respect. So the opponent was serious and with high morale.
By evening the city was in our hands. The surviving Chinese ships withdrew up the river to the city of Fugdin, and the manpower dispersed in the surrounding forests.
Captured Chinese
Monitor team "Sverdlov"
According to Soviet data, the Chinese lost 4 ships, 200 people killed, 98 captured. As trophies were taken the floating battery "Dun-I", which under the name "X42500" took part in the defeat of Japan here on the Amur in 1945, four barges, two motor boats, 12 guns, 13 bombers, 15 machine guns, about 300 rifles.
On the same day, units of the Red Army, having destroyed the surviving enemy fortifications, returned to Soviet territory. Negotiations were offered to the Chinese, which was followed by a proud refusal, clearly indicating the continuation of the banquet.
Rare photo. VC. Blucher from 08/06/1929 - commander of the Special Far Eastern Army on board the monitor of the Far Eastern (Amur) flotilla
CAPTURE OF FUGDIN
The refusal of the Chinese to negotiate on the results of the first part of the operation forced the USSR to continue what had been started near Lahasusu. The plan for further military operations provided for the zeroing of the remnants of the Sungari military flotilla, the defeat of the Chinese garrisons up the Sungari River to the city of Fugdin. As before, these tasks were assigned to the river landing force, with the support of ships and seaplanes of the Far Eastern Flotilla.
After the first act of the Sungarian tragedy on the water, the Chinese were left with only the flagship gunboat "Jiang Heng", which left the battlefield in advance, and several armed steamers. The ground group defending this area included two infantry brigades, two squadrons of the 43rd cavalry regiment, as well as armed squads and a police detachment. There are about 5,000 in total. (Data on the exact number of Fugdin's defenders differ in different descriptions)
Reserves were on the way. All the way from Lahasusu to Fugdin, the Chinese destroyed the bridges and prepared for defense by burrowing into the ground and equipping artillery positions.
Mines were laid on the river, and the approaches to Fugdin along the Sungari were blocked by sunken ships and ships damaged in the battle near Lahasusu. The battle promised to be hotter than in the first part of the operation.
SOVIET PLAN
“In view of the approaching freeze-up, most of the ships of the Far Eastern military flotilla left for the winter in the Osipovsky backwater. Only the monitor "Lenin", the gunboats "Poor" and "Red Banner" continued to carry out border service. But in connection with the new operation, the ships of the flotilla, already preparing for the winter, were quickly brought to a state of combat readiness.
Monitors of the Far Eastern (Amur) Flotilla
The gunboat of the Far Eastern (Amur) flotilla "Buryat"
The crew of the gunboat "Buryat" after loading coal.
The ships of the flotilla assigned to this operation were divided into two groups. The first group (shock) received the task of breaking through to the Fugdinsky raid and destroying enemy ships along with their base. It included monitors "Krasny Vostok" and "Sun-Yat-Sen", gunboats "Red Banner", "Proletary", "Buryat", two minesweepers, a mine layer "Strong" and an armored boat "Bars". The actions of the strike group were led by the commander of the flotilla, the Latvian Ozolin, a former ship's paramedic of the tsarist fleet and military commissar of the Dvina and Azov flotilla.
54-meter river gunboat of the Far Eastern Flotilla "Poor". In 1939 the name was changed to "Red Star". And when it was built in Sormovo in 1905, it was named “Vogul”, and before that it was “Transbaikalian”.
The second group was supposed to land troops in the area of the village of Tuzaki and take the city and Fugdin fortress with a quick combined strike. It included the monitor "Sverdlov", the gunboat "Poor", the armored boat "Spear" and "Peak", as well as 5 steamers - "Daur", "Dzerzhinsky", "Kubyak", "Nakarenus", "Chicherin". Each of them towed two barges with paratroopers ("Daur" one). The landing force included the 5th Amur Regiment, two battalions of the 4th Volochaevsky Regiment and a cavalry squadron. This group was commanded by the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division I.A. Onufriev.
Monitor of the Far Eastern (Amur) flotilla “Lenin”, former “Storm” (1907).
The flotilla was supposed to break into the Fugdin roadstead, destroy enemy ships and coastal fortifications located there, and then land troops and capture the city. The monitor "Lenin" was given an independent task: to follow the strike group, enter the Lakhasu raid with it and land a naval assault in the city, thus ensuring the rear of the ships and units moving up the Sungari.
Frosty morning over Songhua
On October 30, 1929, at a temperature of -11°C at 5.30, the ships of the first group moved up the Sungari. Not without difficulties: navigational and hydrographic (outdated topographic maps of the beginning of the century, waterlogging of the river, an abundance of channels and small rivers, rifts) and hydrometeorological (strong storm wind with gusts, low temperature, strong wave, ice fields, hummocks, beginning freezing). At the head of the shock group were minesweepers, which, in addition to control trawling, measured the depth and set milestones that marked the fairway. Behind them came the gunboats Buryat, Krasnoye Znamya, Proletary, monitors Krasny Vostok, Sun Yat-Sen, and the mine layer Smely. The last monitor was Lenin. He landed on land between Lahasusu and Fugdin sabotage group which damaged the telegraph and telephone line.
Monitor of the Far Eastern (Amur) flotilla "Sverdlov", born armored river gunboat "Vyuga" (1907) on the move.
The second group of ships began moving at 8.45. Ahead was the Sverdlov monitor, followed by the gunboat Bednota and three steamers. All of them were towed by three barges. The line was closed by the steamer "Dauria" with a barge in tow. At 15:00, Soviet minesweepers and gunboats approached the barrage of sunken ships. At that time, coastal batteries and the gunboat Jiang-Heng, the most powerful of the ships of the Chinese Sungarian flotilla, opened fire on them. But the shells fell with a large shortfall.
The commander of the armored boat "Bars", approaching the barrier, found that it consisted of sunken barges with iron trusses on the deck and two passenger steamers, which had a large roll to starboard, but were afloat. Small passages were found between the flooded barges. In connection with the onset of darkness, the Soviet ships stopped moving and anchored.
Modern landscape in the area of the event
At dawn on October 31, the ships passed through the barriers and approached the Fugdin raid. At about 0630, mutual shelling from all types of weapons began to the accompaniment of an air raid by Soviet bombers and seaplanes. Covered by the fire of the ships, the minesweepers made passages in the minefields for the landing. Mines were destroyed by boat crews.
After a successful transition with two roll monitors, the group commander Ya. I. Ozolin decided to bring the landing site closer to the barrier. The reconnaissance carried out by the armored boat "Bars" behind the barrier determined a convenient place for the landing, leading the landing troops to the flank and rear of the enemy's main fortified position.
The flagship of the Chinese flotilla is a Japanese-built gunboat, 1907, “Jiang-heng”. Length 60 m. Draft 2.5 m. Displacement 550 tons. Speed 13 knots. Crew - 15 officers, 90 sailors and foremen. Armament: 1 x 120 mm gun, 3 x 76 mm guns, 4 x 47 mm rapid-fire guns, machine guns - 4 x 7.92 mm. (Weapon data may contain inaccuracies, since it is not clear what fired at the time of the battle).
Meanwhile, the monitors sank armed steamships already damaged by aerial bombardment. During the battle, MP-1 seaplanes from the 68th detachment made nine sorties in the Fugdin area. In addition to successful hits on steamships, the plane of the detachment commander E. Lukht seriously damaged the Chinese flagship, the gunboat Jiang-Heng. Until 1943, this ship was considered the largest ship sunk by Soviet aircraft. Having dealt with the remnants of the Sungari flotilla, the ships transferred their fire to the shore.
Armed paddle steamer “Liji” (Former “cruiser” of the Security Guard of the CER “Sixth”, requisitioned by the Chinese authorities)
At 8 o'clock on October 30, minesweepers established a passage through the barrier. The enemy put up strong resistance. Until 11:25 a.m., the battle between the Krasny Vostok monitor and our two gunboats continued with enemy batteries. At about 13.00, the mine layer Strong landed an advanced landing group to occupy the bridgehead, and then ships with barges approached Fugdin, from which the main forces (5th Infantry Regiment and Cavalry Squadron) began to land at 1500. disembarkation landing troops finished at 17:00. At 18 o'clock the city was surrounded and our units went to the outskirts of the city.
Chinese soldiers in the late 1920s
The cavalrymen who came to the aid of the besieged Fugdin were detected from the air and driven back. Street fighting went on until the morning of November 1, after which, stubbornly resisting the Chinese, they exhausted the possibilities of their defense. Fugdin was taken. The Chinese lost in the battle up to 300 people killed and about a thousand wounded, and the Sungarian flotilla was completely destroyed.
Ships of the Far Eastern (Amur) Flotilla in parade formation
Monitor of the Far Eastern (Amur) flotilla "Krasny Vostok", former "Trotsky", born armored river gunboat "Hurricane" (1907).
“Having decided the set combat mission, all Soviet ships and troops left Fugdin on November 2 and arrived in Osipovsky backwater on November 6. Only the monitor "Krasny Vostok" ran aground on the Amur, 150 meters from the Chinese coast, an attempt to remove it from the shallows failed, and the monitor, along with the crew, had to be left there for the winter. He returned to the base only on May 14, 1930.
Seaplanes MP-1 of the 68th detachment
The commander of the 68th separate river aviation detachment, polar pilot Eduard Martynovich Lukht (first from the left)
Along with the sailors of the Far Eastern military flotilla, the 68th separate river aviation detachment especially distinguished itself. On October 30, the first day of the operation, the personnel of the detachment made 17 sorties, disrupted further enemy work to block the Sungari River, sank two steamships and a flagship gunboat. In the future, the squadron supported the landing troops and conducted aerial reconnaissance. During the operation, which was successfully completed by the evening of November 1, 1929, the aviation detachment lost two aircraft.
A monument in Ussuriysk at the site of the reburial of 14 soldiers of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army who died during the conflict on the CER.
Data on losses monstrously vary. Let's take it from here:
Losses of the Far Eastern Flotilla: 3 people. killed and 11 people. wounded (of which 3 people were injured as a result of the explosion of their guns on the ship during firing).
Aviation: 1 wounded.
Rifle units lost much more. But the source cited only indicates the total losses IN ALL sectors of the conflict without division into operations, which, I recall, were three in different sectors of the Soviet-Chinese border: 281 killed and about 800 wounded and frostbite. Most of the losses came from high-explosive shells.
Sunset over Fugdin
The text is not a serious historical study. It may contain inaccuracies and is intended to arouse interest in the topic.
related posts:
