October 24, 1950 is considered the day of the formation of troops special purpose- special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU GSh). At first, these were separate companies, later - battalions, and from the end of 1962, special-purpose brigades began to form in the military districts.
However, to be precise, the first regular part of the army special forces - a separate special-purpose engineering brigade - was formed in the spring of 1942 on the Kalinin Front, in the zone of operations of the 30th Army. It was this military formation that became the prototype of the reconnaissance and sabotage units of the GRU GSH special forces. Ilya Starinov stood at its origins.
Starinov, who was quite deservedly called “the legend of Russian special forces” during his lifetime, played a decisive role in the creation of special sabotage units, developed the basics of their tactics, created special types of weapons and equipment for their effective operation.
Let us once again briefly remind readers of Starinov's biography, especially of the period when Ilya Grigorievich worked on the realization of his dream - the creation of army special forces.
Hero Hemingway
In 1936, Starinov, on the direction of the GRU leadership, left for Spain as an adviser and instructor of the reconnaissance group, Domingo Ungri. It was necessary to work out in practice the methods of waging a sabotage war. Starinov's idea was simple, like everything ingenious. The main tension during the war, of course, occurs on the line of contact between the opposing sides. But the duration of this tension depends, in addition to the moral factor, on the timely provision of the warring units with everything necessary. It is difficult for sabotage groups to operate in the front line: a high density of combat-ready units, round-the-clock combat protection. Another thing is the extended communications of the enemy. To organize their effective protection is impossible in principle. In addition, less combat-ready personnel serve in the rear units. Well-organized and coordinated from the center, sabotage activities can largely paralyze the enemy's transport network and divert combat-ready units from the front to guard it.
In December 1936, Starinov, together with the sabotage group he had prepared, went on a combat mission for the first time. During the operation between the cities of Teruel and Calatayud, road and railway bridges were destroyed, and the communication line was disabled. After each exit, Starinov carefully analyzed the reasons for successes and failures. Constantly improved mines. Ilya Grigorievich made time-delayed mines from several pocket watches bought with his personal salary. Under Haen, fighters from the International Brigade joined the ranks of the demolition detachment. Starinov quickly increased the size of the detachment, and after appropriate preparation, several groups began to go to the rear of the enemy at the same time. For the first time, groups began to use delayed-action grenades to break away from the pursuit of the enemy (and today reconnaissance groups, leaving the place of an ambush or sabotage, mine escape routes if necessary). In the rear of the enemy, Starinov began to create bases on which he stored a stock of explosives and mines. Groups went to the rear lightly, which allowed the fighters to save strength and complete several combat missions in one exit.
Under Cordoba, the sabotage group, which included Starinov, managed to derail a large echelon with the headquarters of the Italian air division. This event caused a great resonance. Mikhail Koltsov and Ilya Ehrenburg came to interview the miners. On March 23, Ehrenburg published an article about this event in Pravda. Starinov, for obvious reasons, remained in the shadows. Only the initiates knew about his participation in the Spanish events. Ernest Hemingway, who was a front-line correspondent in Spain, also met the people of Starinov's detachment. With the fighters of the detachment, he took part in several raids behind enemy lines. Based on the materials collected, Hemingway wrote his famous novel For Whom the Bell Tolls, where he truthfully, albeit with a slight touch of pathos, described the actions of a sabotage group behind enemy lines.
Trained by Starinov, mine-blasting instructors and commanders of sabotage groups, after a couple of months, they themselves acted as organizers of sabotage activities, which made it possible to quickly increase the number of groups sent behind enemy lines. As a result, by 1937, the 14th partisan corps was formed, which consisted of 5 thousand people. On separate sections of the railway, the saboteurs managed to completely block the movement of trains for several days. Groups also actively used ambush actions on highways: they fired at enemy convoys, captured single cars, used them to move behind enemy lines and undermine bridges.
In total, Starinov spent eleven months in Spain. During this time he created efficient system training of saboteurs. The groups trained by him blew up almost a hundred trains, destroyed several hundred cars, about 2,000 enemy soldiers and officers, many bridges and communication lines. The Spanish war was thus the first in which sabotage was carried out on such a large scale.
During this war, the military genius of Starinov was fully manifested. He developed the basis for the training and control of sabotage forces in combat conditions, the tactics and strategy for their use, and determined the ways for the development of special mines and equipment. Ilya Grigorievich summed up the results of his stay in Spain as follows: “The successful use of engineering mines on the communications of the Francoists became possible only because we energetically took up the development of this formidable weapon in our homeland in the early thirties. The tactics and technique of mining developed by the Soviet partisans turned out to be higher than the tactics and technique of the enemy in mine clearance. Thus, by 1937, the Red Army received the most modern sabotage equipment and tactics, which were not yet available in other armies. But the invaluable experience of Starinov was completely ignored by the military leadership of the country, and in 1941 Ilya Grigorievich would have to start all over again!
Out of the frying pan into the fire
While Starinov fought in Spain, many senior and middle-level military cadres were repressed. Most of his colleagues and acquaintances were also arrested. All the preparations for waging a guerrilla war, which Starinov and his associates carried out in the 30s, were called "a conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet government." After returning to his homeland, Ilya Grigoryevich's feeling of honestly performed military duty gave way to despair.
Starinov personally reported on his participation in the Spanish events People's Commissar defense of Voroshilov. Voroshilov highly appreciated the merits of Starinov and recommended that his superiors promote Ilya Grigorievich in rank and position. Starinov was awarded the Orders of Lenin and the Red Banner. But instead of being promoted, Starinov was summoned to the NKVD and interrogated about the goals of forming secret partisan bases, about training partisan personnel in the 30s. Seeking protection from persecution, Starinov turned to Voroshilov, and the Commissar of Defense was able to protect him. Thus, Starinov was one of the few who managed to avoid arrest. And at least 10 thousand people were repressed in this case: the entire leadership of the GRU, the heads of intelligence of the western military districts, almost all the leaders of partisan detachments, and ordinary partisans were arrested. Fortified areas and partisan bases were liquidated.
The beginning of the war
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Starinov was appointed commander of an operational-engineering group, whose tasks included the destruction of transport infrastructure in front of the advancing enemy. In two sapper battalions, which were placed at the disposal of Ilya Grigorievich, there was one rifle for three fighters, there was almost no engineering equipment. Nevertheless, Starinov's group acted very successfully. She managed to destroy dozens of bridges. Since the Germans were literally on the heels of the retreating Soviet troops, delayed-action mines (MLM) were required. Without waiting for the arrival of regular MZD, Starinov began to manufacture them in the field. Installed in a pile of rubble or covered with cobblestones, MZD turned into stone throwers - a kind of directional mines (MON). Mines set for non-removability exploded when they were cleared. After the war, on the principle of a directed explosion, regular mines will be created: MON-50, MON-100 and others, which are very widely used today in all military conflicts.
In early July, Starinov sent the first sabotage group behind enemy lines, which mined the road and successfully blew up several cars.
Head of the first partisan school
On July 13, Starinov, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, was appointed head of the first front-line partisan school. Western front. Arriving in Roslavl, where the school was located, Starinov quickly became convinced that none of the people responsible for training the partisans had any idea about the tactics of the partisan detachments. Everything had to be started all over again, the experience of the 30s was lost, the personnel were destroyed!
The planned training of partisan personnel began. Sixty hours of preparation - and the partisans were sent behind enemy lines. The school was constantly moving east. The war was approaching Moscow. The sabotage instructors trained at the school were transferred to other schools.
At the end of July, Starinov was sent to Kyiv, where he once served and where there was a powerful center for training partisan personnel. Not a single former instructor could be found! The partisans were trained by party officials who did not understand anything about this. Five days Starinov taught classes in Kyiv, later held short classes in Chernigov, organized a school in Orel. In September, groups from Tula and Kursk arrived in Orel to prepare. Starinov, thus, organizes the training of sabotage personnel on the scale of several fronts, regions, and three union republics. In fact, he turned out to be the only specialist in the Red Army who knew the sabotage business.
In the second half of September, Starinov was given the task of mining and destroying the most important objects of industrial and transport infrastructure in Kharkov. Starinov received the order to carry out the work at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command personally from the Chief of the General Staff Boris Shaposhnikov.
In Kharkov, Starinov's detachment planted hundreds of mines - such a scale of mining was used for the first time during the war. In one of the party mansions, Ilya Grigorievich installed a high-power radio mine. On the night of November 14, a signal was given from a powerful radio station in Voronezh to blow it up. In a mined mansion, the commandant of Kharkov, Lieutenant-General Georg von Braun, and officers of the headquarters of the 68th Infantry Division took off into the air. This act of sabotage entered the annals of sabotage art and special textbooks.
Together with Starinov, the Spaniards, whom he trained in sabotage in Spain, took part in mining objects in Kharkov. Starinov made sure that a group of Spaniards was accepted into the engineering units. In the future, he will carry them with him on all fronts.
Despite the threats of the Mehlis
On November 28, Starinov was appointed to the post of assistant chief of staff of the engineering troops of the Red Army. He writes a letter to Stalin about the need for mass production of special anti-vehicle mines, about organizing sabotage behind enemy lines. Starinov is summoned to Headquarters. Instead of Stalin, he was received by the Stavka representative Lev Mekhlis, who failed to prove anything. Moreover, Mekhlis promised to shoot Starinov if he did not stop bothering Stalin with "nonsense". Instead of planned sabotage work in the rear, the Headquarters decided to give the partisans the task of burning forests and villages (in winter!), i.e. to deprive partisans of shelter and shelter over the heads of Russian people who fell into the occupation.
Ignoring the threats of Mekhlis, Ilya Grigoryevich sent another letter to Stalin, which finally had an effect. A special meeting was held in the State Planning Commission, to which Starinov was invited, and by the spring new mines began to en masse enter the troops and partisan detachments.
The first military unit for special purposes
In the spring of 1942, Starinov for the first time raised the question of creating special brigades for operations on enemy communications, and met with the commander of the airborne troops, Glazunov. After this meeting, experienced instructors were sent to the Airborne Forces to teach paratroopers the basics of sabotage tactics and mine-blasting. But Starinov believed that it was necessary to create special forces for operations behind enemy lines.
In the same spring, Starinov again found himself on Tver land. He was sent to the headquarters of the engineering troops of the Kalinin Front to organize work on the installation of minefields. But, in addition to the main work, Ilya Grigorievich is again trying to create special sabotage units for operations behind enemy lines. With this idea, he turned to the front commander, Lieutenant General Ivan Konev. Konev instantly appreciated Starinov's idea and immediately gave the order to form a special sabotage brigade based on airborne troops. “From the very beginning, the matter acquired a rapid acceleration,” recalled Ilya Grigorievich. Konev contacted the Chief of the General Staff Alexander Vasilevsky and asked him to receive Starinov. Vasilevsky gave the green light to the creation of special sabotage brigades and instructed Starinov to lead a separate special-purpose engineering brigade on the Kalinin Front. On the instructions of Vasilevsky, Ilya Grigorievich also developed a draft order on the creation of special units on all fronts, a plan for disrupting enemy communications on the Western and Kalinin fronts.
The brigade included three battalions of the 5th engineering brigade and the 110th separate motorized regiment. From the cadets of the Nakhabinsk Engineering School, Starinov selected commanders of sabotage groups. In addition, he achieved secondment to the brigade of commanders with whom he served near Kharkov and Rostov, as well as a group of Spaniards. The first commanders of the brigade groups were captain Kazantsev, senior lieutenants Chepak, Romanyuk, Ilyushenkov. Their first deployment behind enemy lines was carried out at the site of the 3rd shock army. Some groups were supposed to connect with partisan detachments, while others were to act independently. special school for the training of miners for partisan detachments was also created under the northwestern group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus, at the headquarters of the Kalinin Front (the group was located in the village of Sheino).
At the request of Starinov, Konev reinstated all the Spaniards in their previous ranks, some were appointed to the posts of commanders of sabotage groups, others were sent as mine-blasting instructors to partisan detachments. The first groups of senior lieutenant Romanyuk, lieutenants Sokolov and Criulin, Spaniards Canel, Francisco Gaspar, Chico Mariano were withdrawn to the rear of the enemy. Groups of senior lieutenant Chepak went out to carry out sabotage on the Smolensk-Vyazma railway.
The main efforts of the groups were aimed at disrupting the supply of materiel and enemy personnel to the enemy's Rzhev defense center. For the first time, the issue of special high-calorie food packages for neglected groups was also raised. A sabotage school was also created in Valdai in the zone of operations of the North-Western Front. Unfortunately, there were not enough portable radio stations, and, having used up the supply of mines and explosives, the groups were forced to return back across the front line, losing precious time and effort. There were not enough special mines, and Starinov set up their production in Kalinin. In the zone of the Kalinin Front, in case of a possible summer retreat of the Soviet troops, 46 warehouses with weapons and mines were laid. In June, 73 groups of miners went behind enemy lines. There were almost no casualties among the personnel.
Starinov was still convinced that special troops should be created to operate behind enemy lines. And he again writes a letter to Stalin. The idea of \u200b\u200bcreating troops was warmly supported by Konev. In Moscow, according to this letter, Starinov met with Voroshilov, Kalinin, the secretary of the Central Committee, Malenkov, and the chief of the General Staff, Vasilevsky. To replenish the brigade with the Spaniards, Starinov turned to Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Dimitrov was keenly interested in the tactics of the sabotage groups, asked questions about the possibility of using their experience in the fight against the Nazis in the occupied territories of Europe. After this meeting, another hundred Spaniards were sent to the brigade.
The creation of special forces was not far off. On July 23, the Soviet Information Bureau reported that the unit, commanded by Colonel Starinov, derailed 10 enemy echelons. Starinov is in correspondence with the command of neighboring fronts. The preparation of sabotage groups was also carried out on the Karelian, Western and Southern fronts. The documents on the creation of special-purpose engineering units were about to be signed.
Behind enemy lines
But Starinov is unexpectedly summoned to Moscow and sent to work at the Central Headquarters of the partisan troops. On August 17, 1942, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, separate guards battalions of miners and a separate guards brigade of miners were created at the Headquarters "for mining and destroying communications behind enemy lines." On the Kalinin front, the 10th separate guards battalion of miners was formed. Few people from the 5th brigade got into it, but the 160th and 166th battalions of the brigade continued to operate effectively in the rear. The battalions were especially active in the enemy rear from April to August 1943. In the summer of 1943, entire companies of miners began to land behind enemy lines. During the fighting, seven fighters from the brigade were awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union: senior lieutenant Kolosov, senior sergeant Goryachev, sergeant Yablochkin, junior sergeant Efimov, private Bazalev, Bezrukov, Myagky. Hundreds of miners were awarded military orders and medals.
In August 1943, the commander of the sabotage group, Lieutenant Andrianov, withdrew six hundred civilians from the occupied territory. In September of the same year, Andrianov's group of 25 people captured and disarmed 88 enemy saboteurs. In June 1944, the group, along with a detachment of partisans, was surrounded. The fight lasted all day. During the breakthrough, Andrianov died. After the war, the Volga motor ship was named after "Peter Andrianov".
Thus, Starinov was on Tver land from spring to mid-August 1942. This period is considered one of the most important stages in the creation of special forces.
"Rail war" or "war on rails"?
At the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, Starinov headed a school for the training of miners and a technical department for the production of special mines. In January 1943, Starinov went to the Caucasus to plan operations behind enemy lines. He took with him a significant group of Spaniards. In the rear of the enemy in the area between Rostov, Salsk, Tikhoretskaya and Krasnodar with an interval of several days, 16 sabotage groups were parachuted. Later, they began to develop operations to withdraw groups behind enemy lines on torpedo boats to the regions of Novorossiysk and the Crimean peninsula.
The practice of using sabotage groups and their tactics were improved. Usually the size of the group was 5-7 people, the detachment - 20-30 people. At night - movement and sabotage, during the day - the organization of the day and observation. The big difficulty was the evacuation of the groups. In order to extend the period of their actions behind enemy lines, food and ammunition were transferred to the groups by air.
On March 7, 1943, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was disbanded. The school headed by Starinov was also disbanded. He was transferred to the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement. As deputy chief of staff, Starinov himself determined the scope of his duties: he created a department for training saboteurs and planning sabotage operations. As before, Starinov with great difficulty manages to defend his opinion on the principles of the use of partisan and sabotage forces. The command continued to plan operations where the partisans had to go head-on with the enemy. In such battles, the forces of the partisans quickly dried up, since they did not have heavy weapons, ammunition supplies were limited, and the accumulated wounded reduced the mobility of the detachments. Starinov, on the other hand, saw sabotage on communications as the main thing in the tactics of the partisans. This required incomparably less ammunition and explosives, and the effect was much higher.
The battle was approaching Kursk Bulge, and Starinov left for the Voronezh Front. The tasks are the same - disruption of enemy transportation by railways and highways. As Starinov notes, in the period of preparation for the Battle of Kursk, the higher command finally had an understanding that mines are not only defensive, but also offensive weapons. Of course, one of the "culprits" of realizing this reality was Starinov, whose successful experience on absolutely all fronts spoke for itself. The most surprising thing is that Starinov managed to convince the leadership to abandon the "rail war" and wage a "war on rails." As a result, it was his plan for a massive strike on enemy communications that was adopted.
To coordinate the efforts of partisan detachments, Starinov flew behind enemy lines. During the Great Patriotic War it was his first flight over the front line. In the partisan detachments of Kovpak, Fedorov, Saburov, Vershigora and others, Ilya Grigorievich trains miners. For the first time, a large-scale application of MZD on railways was planned.
Beautiful and effective idea
On July 5, 1943, the Battle of Kursk began. Starinov believed that if the partisan detachments were provided with the necessary number of mines, explosives and specialists in a timely manner, then enemy communications could be completely paralyzed. Moreover, he was sure that already in 1942 it would be possible to completely paralyze the supply of the enemy by rail on all fronts.
Subsequent events showed that Starinov's calculations were correct. Dozens of sabotage groups planted hundreds of mines on all railways leading to the front line in the southern direction. And again - a beautiful and ingenious idea. At the same time, in one area, saboteurs set a dozen MZDs for non-removability (mines exploded when they tried to clear mines) from different times slowdown. The first mine is put on a combat platoon - the first echelon of the enemy is undermined. The Germans are checking the road, reinforcing security, and reopening trains. Some of them manage to pass, which dulls the vigilance of the guards. At this time, the saboteurs put the second mine on the combat platoon, and the next echelon goes downhill. The Germans are combing the forests in search of partisans, but the Nazis are unaware that the mines are already in the roadbed. So successively, the mines wait for the end of their slowdown, become armed and explode from the vibration of the train passing from above. In the end, not finding an answer and not eliminating the cause, the enemy was forced to completely stop moving along the section of the road.
So, only Fedorov’s detachment from July 7 to August 10, using the MZD, derailed 123 enemy echelons, while in the previous 16 months - only 65. To destroy the same number of echelons from the air, hundreds of sorties, hundreds of tons of aviation explosives, the inevitable loss of dozens of aircraft. The enemy hurriedly threw more and more units on the guard of communications, but the mines continued to explode. As a result of the actions of saboteurs, the supply of troops along many railways was completely (completely!) Paralyzed. In total, in the second half of 1943, the partisans derailed 3143 echelons! In terms of effectiveness, partisan sabotage turned out to be 100 times more effective than aviation! And if the partisan detachments acted in concert, they would be able to paralyze the movement over a vast territory. To understand this simple idea, on which Starinov insisted all the time, it took two difficult years of war and millions of deaths.
They did not recognize because they were afraid
During the Great Patriotic War, Starinov went through almost all fronts, created dozens of schools for the training of saboteurs, laboratories for the production of mines, personally trained over 2,000 demolition workers. His students and the miners trained by them derailed about 12,000 enemy echelons. He was on the list of Hitler's personal enemies.
It was Starinov who made a decisive contribution to the creation in 1950 of the special forces - the special forces of the GRU General Staff. He developed in detail the tactics and strategy of its application, created dozens of samples special equipment. It was Starinov who managed to prove in practice that “mines are not defensive, but purely offensive weapons”, that “a mine laid in the right place hits without a miss”, unlike a blind projectile.
Life is a feat
More on civil war Starinov seriously undermined his health, earning severe rheumatism. During the Finnish war, he received a severe disability, which allowed him to leave the army. Doctors released Ilya Grigorievich, with proper observance of the regime, 50 years of life. Strict self-discipline, a healthy lifestyle (never drank or smoked, constantly engaged in physical education) allowed him not only to live to be a hundred years old, but also to go through four difficult wars. Starinov was presented five times to the rank of general, three times to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But he did not receive either - too often a top-level professional did not agree with his superiors, too often openly defended his opinion
First of all, you should clearly understand what sabotage is. This is the destruction or damage of various material objects by explosion, arson, shelling, mechanical destruction or by any other method. For example, currently one of effective ways sabotage is precise targeting cruise missile(or a guided abyabomba) fired from an aircraft at a great distance from the target. Let us recall the liquidation of General Dzhokhar Dudayev with the help of a rocket fired from an aircraft and rushing towards his cell phone. In the same way, you can aim a missile at a radio beacon (the same cell phone) installed on an object, or using a laser target illumination.
Unlike aerial bombing, rocket or artillery attacks, sabotage is carried out when military operations are not being conducted in the area of the object, or there is no war at all.
Diversions are carried out:
1) special military units(special forces, "green berets", etc.);
2) sabotage and reconnaissance groups created by special services;
3) rebels or partisans.
Sabotage should be distinguished from acts of terror carried out by extremists, members of radical political movements, religious fanatics, mentally ill people, etc. other figures.
The objects of sabotage are:
1) control and communication centers (headquarters, government agencies, radio and television stations, repeaters);
2) transport facilities (bridges, tunnels, locks);
3) energy facilities (power plants, transformer substations);
4) radar stations;
5) launchers ballistic and cruise missiles;
6) warehouses of ammunition, fuel, weapons, equipment, etc.;
7) other facilities, the destruction of which causes serious consequences (for example, hydraulic structures).
1) Direct protection of objects (their camouflage, the use of all kinds of fences and locks, technical means of observation and warning, the installation of mines, the organization of guard duty, the implementation of security measures such as restricting access, checking documents, etc.). For example, seismic sensors buried in the ground and connected to the central console are a good technical means of warning. They react to any movement. However, they may not always be used. Where various animals often appear, seismic sensors are excluded. Highly good remedy protection of the object - anti-personnel mines in plastic cases, set to be non-removable. It is clear that the use of mines in peacetime is limited.
2) Ground (surface, underwater) and air patrols of areas adjacent to protected objects. For example, in the Strategic Missile Forces Russian Federation direct protection of objects and patrolling of the areas adjacent to them is assigned to separate security and reconnaissance battalions, groups to combat sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRGs), mobile reserves, reconnaissance groups and guards.
3) Operational work at protected sites and in adjacent areas. In turn, operational work includes: - identification of persons recruited by enemy agents (or vulnerable in terms of recruitment), conducting covert surveillance of them; - identification of persons whose behavior is characterized by carelessness and sloppiness, and the removal of such persons from responsible positions and posts; - control of radio and telephone exchange at protected objects and in the areas adjacent to them; - identification of areas of structures at protected facilities that are vulnerable to sabotage, strengthening their protection, maintaining constant monitoring of them through agents or proxies; - Obtaining, through covert and other means, information about an emergency, fire and explosion hazard, or other unfavorable situation that can be used by saboteurs or their agents to commit sabotage.
It is impossible to say in advance which activities of these three groups (security, patrolling, operational work) are more important. It all depends on the conditions of the place and time. However, one aspect should be emphasized. Unlike bombing and shelling, sabotage is, relatively speaking, a "pinpoint" character. In other words, the objects of sabotage are always very specific objects (and not strikes on areas), often not even objects as a whole, but some of their important nodes (parts, fragments).
The conclusion follows from this thesis: a prerequisite for committing sabotage is the "exit" (penetration) of saboteurs directly to such an object (or to its node, part, fragment), or the precise aiming of a missile (guided bomb) at this object (node) using special devices.
Therefore, almost always saboteurs need help from their agents. If there are no recruited agents, saboteurs, secretly located in the area adjacent to the object, are looking for people who sympathize with them, or those who can be used "in the dark" (for example, alcoholics, drug addicts, children, people who are in dire need of money). This public knows (can learn) the conditions of the area, such features of objects, regime, technical means of protection that cannot be established even by long-term observation (eavesdropping) from the outside.
Hence - the fundamental importance of the operational activities of counterintelligence agencies (authorized persons) directly at the facilities and areas adjacent to them. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the sabotage itself is preceded by the actions of saboteurs who secretly advanced (abandoned) into the adjacent area in order to monitor the object, as well as contact them with their agents or search for persons who can be used for their own purposes.
No less important activity is patrolling. After all, if it is possible to detect in advance the appearance in the protected zone of suspicious persons, or groups of people, vehicles, technical surveillance equipment, explosive depots, other ammunition, prepared shelters (“cache”), then the enemy’s sabotage operation will definitely be thwarted. In this regard, one of the best means of patrolling are light helicopters equipped with radars, night vision devices and other equipment. Unfortunately, the permanent use of helicopters is not possible. First, it is an expensive pleasure; secondly, weather conditions do not always allow (fog, blizzard, heavy rain).
As soon as the counterintelligence body (or patrol) manages to accurately determine the location of the enemy DRG, the approximate strength, weapons, communications, it is necessary to conduct an assault operation in order to destroy it.
It is highly and highly desirable to start this operation with a powerful fire strike against the identified shelter (or shelters) of the DRG. They are always well camouflaged, often semi-underground (like a light dugout) or located in dilapidated buildings, the approaches to them are usually mined and viewed with the help of optoelectronic devices. Therefore, it is important to destroy (or seriously damage) such a shelter and the mines laid around it from the very beginning, destroy or injure as much as possible more saboteurs. A fire strike is delivered by artillery (including mortar) shelling, shelling from tank guns or infantry fighting vehicles, from attack helicopters, from heavy grenade launchers, etc.
However, the "bosses", frightened by the appearance of saboteurs, very often neglect the fire strike (they say that it takes a lot of time to call in helicopters, bring up tanks or artillery, and now we will get hit in the neck for delay). Hence the inevitable losses, often large ones, because. quite often, ordinary "conscripts" with ordinary Kalashnikov assault rifles in their hands are trying to "exterminate" perfectly trained professionals. In Chechnya, there were "hefty rich" such cases. In Belarus, if suddenly “it breaks out”, it will be the same.
The condition for the operation from the moment it began is the electronic suppression of communications between the DRG and its command. At the next stage of the assault operation, one inevitably has to come into direct fire contact with the DRG. Here, an important requirement for the participants in the operation is the control of all directions around the shelter or shelters (in order to completely exclude the possibility of saboteurs retreat), the continuity of actions to destroy the DRG without any pauses (marking time), and the increase in fire impact. Otherwise, serious losses are possible in their ranks, or the withdrawal of the enemy DRG.
All this, in turn, requires unity of command, quick decision-making in accordance with the development of the situation, good communication between the commander and all groups involved in the operation. As you know, it is these three points (unity of command, speed of decision-making and reliable communications) that have traditionally been weak points in the former Soviet Army. fighting in Chechnya showed that in Russian army in this regard, there have been no changes for the better, rather the opposite. It is not necessary to analyze the “quality” of the anti-sabotage units of the “Belarusian troops” from this position, since there are simply no such units. The command, inspired by the wise instructions of the country's leadership, has no doubt that if the "thunder strikes", it (the command) will provide all anti-sabotage measures in the best possible way.
Now a few words about the fire impact on the DRG by the participants in the assault operations themselves (already after the fire strike with the use of heavy weapons). For this, it is advisable to use the following types. From a long distance - large-caliber sniper rifles(such as the Russian SVN caliber 12.7 mm or the Hungarian M-3 caliber 14.5 mm with an aiming range of the order of 1500-2000 meters), mounted grenade launchers type AGS-30 (caliber 30 mm, effective range up to 1700 meters). On the close range(100-200 m), it is important to ensure, firstly, a significant power of fire, and secondly, a high density of fire. For the solution of the first task, flamethrowers of the "Bumblebee" type (sighting range up to 200 m, explosion power corresponds to a 122 mm caliber artillery shell) and hand grenade launchers of the GM-94 type (43 mm non-fragmentation thermobaric grenade) are well suited. To solve the second task - single machine guns of the "Pecheneg" type (caliber 7.62 mm, rate of fire 650 rounds per minute) and 9-mm submachine guns (such as "Buk", "Kedr", "Cypress", "Klin" with rate of fire from 650 to 1200 rounds per minute). Both must be applied at the same time. There are very good samples of foreign-made weapons (Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Finland), but I decided to limit myself here to indicating Soviet (Russian) samples as better known and accessible to Belarus.
There are several general rules for committing sabotage and guerrilla activity:
1. Make sure the operation will be effective. Never waste time on a violent or non-violent operation that is ineffective.
2. Hit your enemies where they least expect it and where it hurts them the most.
3. Many acts of sabotage should be carried out at night.
4. Time must be perfect, because the longer the operation takes, the greater the chance that something will go wrong.
5. Only deal with people you trust. Many spies and informants will come up with plans that will only lead you to failure. Operate in small groups or cells of at most four or five people.
6. All operations should be simple and fast. Several escape routes should be planned.
7. All types of weapons must be hidden. Explosives must be treated with the respect they deserve.
8. Each group must have a leader. It should be selected according to the quality of the leadership. He must make all the major decisions.
9. The need for secrecy is obvious. Security and privacy must be maintained without restriction.
10. Any member of the group who violates the rules of group behavior must be punished in front of other members.
ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS OF ACTIONS OF SUBVERSION AND INTELLIGENCE FORMATIONS
A special forces battalion (hereinafter referred to as special forces) consists of a headquarters, a headquarters company and three identical special forces companies "A", "B", "C", and a special forces company - from a headquarters with a headquarters detachment and five operational detachments. There are 94 people in the company, including 16 officers. The special forces detachment is the main unit designed to operate behind enemy lines. It consists of 2 officers (captain and first lieutenant) and 12 specialist sergeants: for combat use and intelligence - 3; for the production of blasting - 2; for their own and foreign weapons - 2; material support - 1; radio operators - 2; medical workers - 2.
In total, the special-purpose battalion has 15 detachments of 14 people each. However, for operations behind enemy lines, personnel of a headquarters company and headquarters detachments can be used. Taking them into account, up to 20 sabotage and reconnaissance groups consisting of 12-14 people or up to 30 sabotage and reconnaissance groups consisting of 7-8 saboteurs can be formed from a battalion. In the special forces group, respectively, up to 60 or up to 100 sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
ORGANIZATION OF A SPECIAL PURPOSE GROUP
Rice. 3.1 Organizational structure special forces battalion
The NATO command considers secrecy and maneuverability to be the main principles of the actions of sabotage and reconnaissance formations (hereinafter - DRF). Not having enough powerful weapons, nor large numbers, operating in conditions that practically exclude the possibility of building up forces, saboteurs and "partisans" can count on success only if they remain undetected as a result of the secrecy of their actions. It is noted that with the help of the principle of surprise it is possible to negate the superiority of the enemy in forces and means.
The maneuverability of actions is understood as the rapid concentration of forces in the area of strike (committing sabotage) with an immediate transfer to another area or dispersal after the completion of a combat mission. High maneuverability is ensured by the absence heavy weapons and support services, knowledge of the area, the presence of a wide network of bases, strongholds, as well as equipping saboteurs with special vehicles.
The main tactical methods of actions of saboteurs are likely opponents: committing sabotage and raids; ambush; conducting sabotage and reconnaissance raids and acts of terror; conducting propaganda and agitation; organizing riots among the population, as well as offensive actions with limited goals.
Sabotage can be carried out both with penetration into the object and without penetration. In the second case, they are carried out by installing nuclear bombs at such a distance from the object that, during the explosion, it falls into the affected area; setting mines on vehicles and cargo following the object; filling the pipelines with chemicals that decompose fuel; distribution of chemical and biological means on the approaches to the object.
The raids are supposed to be carried out against various stationary and linear objects in order to destroy or disable them, as well as to capture weapons, manufactured products, documents or prominent scientists and other persons with their subsequent transfer across the front line.
Ambushes are carried out for a sudden attack on mobile objects with the aim of destroying them or seizing transported goods and vehicles.
It is believed that the successful conduct of sabotage, raids and ambushes, in addition to causing material damage and disruption of communications, also leads to undermining the morale of the enemy population, disrupts the work of government and administration, and has a "positive" impact on the further deployment of the "resistance movement".
Sabotage and reconnaissance raids are a combination of various methods of action - raids, ambushes, terror, propaganda, carried out on the route or in the area along the path of sabotage and reconnaissance groups. During the raid, several tasks are solved simultaneously or sequentially: causing material damage, disorganizing management, demoralizing the population, assisting the "resistance movement", dispersing enemy forces and means, and others.
Offensive operations with limited objectives can be carried out by the enemy's DRF, as a rule, in the interests of a grouping of troops advancing from the front. The main goal is to delay the advance of enemy reserves to the combat area.
Enemy DRFs will generally avoid defensive combat. When they are detected by the troops, they will quickly get out of the way, disperse and take cover, and only when this fails, will they be forced to fight a defensive battle.
ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS OF ACTION OF ILLEGAL
ARMED FORMATIONS
Illegal armed formations(hereinafter referred to as illegal armed formations) aim at: the violent overthrow of the constitutional order, the violation of the political, economic and moral situation, the inclination of the population to their side, the armed seizure political power or coercion of the authorities to conduct policies that are beneficial to them.
To strengths The organizational structure of illegal armed formations includes:
High mobilization capabilities;
A clear control system that ensures the centralization of the leadership of armed formations with the autonomous nature of their combat operations;
Proximity to the structures of army-type formations, the presence in them the composition of units and units of various purposes (motorized infantry, mountain rifle, tank, artillery, air defense, reconnaissance, communications, etc.);
The national-ethnic and religious community of the contingent, providing solutions to issues of psychological processing, maintaining discipline, etc.
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The main method of striking for the RDG was sabotage on enemy communications, military and industrial facilities. In carrying out these operations, heavy charges and a wide variety of mine devices were used - from miniature magnetic mines to large land mines. During the four years of the war, the conditions for carrying out sabotage operations changed, especially on railways and highways. The system of protection of railway stations and tracks on the hauls by the enemy became more and more complex and sophisticated. If in 1941-1942. Since the business was limited, as a rule, to patrolling (usually three paired patrols for each kilometer of the way), then from the summer of 1942, policemen (up to 10 people) began to be allocated to help these patrols. In 1943–1944 the system of road protection has reached the limit of saturation with combat force and equipment, means of detecting and destroying reconnaissance saboteurs and mines laid by them. Patrolling on strategically important roads was supplemented by the installation of guard towers equipped with searchlights and machine guns, firing points. The Germans created open spaces, for which they cut down forests for 200–300 meters on both sides of the track, installed booby traps, noise devices, wire barriers on the approaches to the tracks.
Railway bridges were most carefully guarded. Each of the large bridges was a real defensive line with barbed wire, minefields, systems of towers with machine guns, pillboxes, searchlights, rocket alarms. At certain intervals, armored trains passed along the highways, firing at the forest approaches to the roads. Well-trained guard dogs were widely used. In an effort to divert explosions from locomotives and wagons, the Germans launched empty platforms in front of the echelons. On especially dangerous sections of the road, traffic slowed down, and on some it was allowed only during the day and only after a thorough inspection of the corresponding section of the road in order to search for mines. The most serious danger for the saboteurs was enemy ambushes, waiting for them on the outskirts of the highways and on the escape routes. They could be expected on any part of the route. But each time the scouts had to make a long way from the base camp to the place of sabotage. Overcoming thickets and windbreaks, swamps and open spaces of 30-40 km, and in some cases up to 100 km (when the target task was to carry out sabotage in a particularly remote section of the highway), despite any obstacles, the saboteurs still carried out their tasks.
The tactics of saboteurs on the railroad were usually as follows. The demolition group almost always operated under the guise of a security subgroup. Approaching the road, the group lay within sight of the railway track, studied the situation, conducted observation, and chose the place of approach to the track. Sometimes it lasted several days. The installation of each mine required genuine skill, the utmost effort and attention. Of particular danger was the installation of non-recoverable mines that could be triggered by any vibration of the soil. The camouflage of mines also required great skill. There should not have been any traces left at the place of their installation. It was impossible to mix the dry upper layers with the damp lower ones - this would immediately arouse the suspicion of the guards. Excess land was carried away with them on a cape. Having installed a mine, pebbles were laid on top - as they lay along the canvas before mining. As they left, they cleared their tracks. But all this was done at night, in absolute darkness, with silence observed: at the slightest sound, rockets soared into the sky and fire instantly opened ... Theoretically, in order to kill a railway rail, 200 grams of TNT or 400 grams of ammonite or ammonal are required, but in reality In fact, the explosion must be so strong as to snatch out a funnel in the flooring of the canvas, through which the wheelsets of the steam locomotive and wagon cannot jump. And for this you need at least 3-4 kilograms of TNT. Under the large echelon, 3-4 charges were placed in different places on the canvas. It was convenient to blow up the canvas at the turn, where the charge was placed at the junction of the rail - then the effect was greater.
Scouts-saboteurs for sabotage on highways developed an original tactic called "death field". The essence of this method is that two or three mines of pressure action are installed on the road, and the rear mines are triggered by the explosion of the front mine in the direction of travel. Thus, if the front car explodes, it will blow up 1-2 more cars following it. At the same time, along the movement of the column, along the ditches, German captured mines "spring-minen" S-34 were installed. This anti-personnel mine bounces up when it explodes.
During the explosion of cars, the surviving Germans rushed into the ditch and fell on jumping mines there.
Winter training of special forces
As already noted, reconnaissance groups in the rear often fell into enemy ambushes themselves and evaded pursuit. Departing from pursuit, the scouts usually mined their trail with anti-personnel mines. They also broke away from their pursuers with the help of F-1 grenades. "Limonka" was fixed in a fork in the bush, next to the path. The pin of the grenade was almost pulled out, leaving the very tip holding the striker. The twine from the checks was pulled across the path, disguising it. Then, every 100 m, they left outstretched ropes, but without grenades. The calculation was like this. Having blown up, the pursuers will become more attentive, the string will stop them, but when their vigilance is dulled, when they are tired of empty searches, then another charge will work. If the Nazis took the group into the ring, surrounded, then the "ram" method of breaking through was used. First of all, they found the most extended line in the German chain, where there were gaps between the pursuers, so that the firepower of the group was stronger than that of the enemy in the place where the breakthrough was planned. The location of the RDG is a wedge, a ledge. In the moment of a breakthrough, everything is decided by speed, onslaught and surprise. The fighters rammed the chain with a wedge, firing from everything they had, and disappeared, leaving behind their pursuers shot at close range.
