Corps participated in operations of the Great Patriotic War:
- Stalingrad strategic offensive
- Srednedonskaya front offensive operation (Operation "Little Saturn")
- Yelninsko-Dorogobuzh operation (from August 28 to September 6, 1943)
- Smolensk-Roslavl operation (September 15 - October 2, 1943)
- Vitebsk-Orsha front-line offensive operation
- Vilnius front offensive operation
- Insterburg-Königsberg Frontal Offensive Operation
June 29, 1942 By the end of June, the corps was in the reserve of the commander of the Southwestern Front, and on June 29 it was transferred to the Bryansk Front. On the same day, the brigades of the corps concentrated in the Stary Oskol area.
June 30, 1942 During subsequent hostilities, due to poor reconnaissance and conflicting orders from the command, parts of the corps made long aimless marches, leading to wear and tear of equipment and the failure of tanks. For example, the 54th brigade made a 158-kilometer march on June 30 alone, without firing a single shot at the enemy, losing 8 T-34s and 6 T-60s as stragglers due to technical malfunctions.
July 2, 1942 On the afternoon of July 2, units of the 24th TC were attacked by divisions of the 48th (German) TC. As a result of the battle, due to poor communication between neighbors, units of the 54th brigade were surrounded, but by evening they managed to escape from the ring. At the same time, 6 T-60s, 1 T-34s were lost and 8 German tanks were destroyed.
July 3 - 5, 1942 In the following days, the corps brigades, waging continuous rearguard battles with German tank units, retreated to the Don. At the same time, a large number of tanks (especially KV-1) were blown up by the crews due to lack of fuel and technical malfunctions. The fact is that tank brigades during the fighting were cut off from their rear and experienced great difficulties in providing repair, evacuation means and fuel. For example, only on July 3, the 4th Guards. The brigade blew up 4 failed KVs, and the 54th brigade blew up 3 T-34s on July 5-6 (2 due to lack of fuel and 1 stuck in a swamp due to the inability to evacuate).
July 6, 1942 By evening, units of the 24th Tank Corps approached the Don crossing in the Uryv area, where they took up defensive positions. By this time, the following number of tanks remained in the brigades: in the 54th brigade - 14 T-34 and 6 T-60, in the 130th brigade - 16 T-36, 17 M3 light, in the 4th Guards. tbr - 15 KB and 11 T-60.
July 7 - 10, 1942 In the following days, parts of the corps fought with German units trying to take the crossing over the Don in the Uryva area. However, tankers suffered losses not only from enemy fire. So, on the night of July 7-8, 1942, the commander of the 2nd brigade of the 54th brigade captain Bessonov and the commissar of the battalion art. political instructor Krivenko, leaving his unit, crossed to the eastern bank of the river, “from where they ordered the unit commanders to lead their tanks to the other side of the Don to flood them. As a result of this, 3 T-34s were sunk in the Don, and 5 T-34s were thrown onto the battlefield, 2 of which were destroyed (the motor group was blown up).
July 11, 1942 Due to heavy losses in tanks, the 4th Guards crossed to the eastern bank of the Don. tank brigade, transferring the remaining 3 KB and 13 T-60s to the 24th MSBR
July 14, 1942. On this day, the 54th brigade crossed, transferring the remaining 5 T-34s and 5 T-60s to the 130th brigade. In addition to tanks, motorized rifle battalions of the 4th Guards were transferred to the disposal of the 130th brigade. brigade and 54th brigade.
July 25, 1942 Parts of the 24th Tank Corps fought in the Uryv area until the end of July, and then were withdrawn to the rear. As of the evening of July 25, parts of the corps still had 7 T-34s, 31 T-60s and 3 M3 light ones on the move.
From March 1943, he trained as part of the Voronezh Front, and then participated in the Battle of Kursk. After a short rest, since September already in the Western front, participated in his autumn-winter battles. From May 1944, after a two-month stay in the reserve, until the end of the war he acted as part of the 3rd Belorussian Front.
Tactical designations
In the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, the tactical sign of the formation was an arrow with a letter of the Cyrillic alphabet above it. The letter denoted the number of the brigade: L - 4th Guards. brigade, B - 25th Guards. brigade, I - 26th Guards. tbr. Under the "arrow" the personal tactical number of the tank was applied (T-34-85 - "236"). The number of tanks of the 4th Guards began with the number "100". brigade, from the number "200" - 25th Guards. brigade, from the number "300" - 26 guards. tbr, although the latter rule was not always respected.
Final statement by type of combat activity (by number of days)
| on the offensive | on the defensive | in reserve | in reserve front | in the army reserve | in the 2nd echelon | in the 3rd echelon | |
| 1941 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1942 | - | - | - | - | 5 | - | - |
| 1943 | 82 | 49 | 25 | 148 | 61 | - | - |
| 1944 | 63 | 53 | 62 | 98 | 99 | - | - |
| 1945 | 15 | 3 | - | 108 | 3 | - | - |
On the basis of the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction No. 00274 / op dated April 17, 1942, for the "more massive use of tanks", by order of the troops of the Southern Front No. 00156 in the Voroshilovgrad region, the 24th tank corps (USSR) was formed from tank brigades.
24th tank corps after heavy May battles on the Southern Front, as part of the 4th Guards Tank, 2nd, 54th Tank and 24th Motorized Rifle Brigades, almost until November 1942 he was in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, restoring combat capability.
By directive of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 170465 of June 28, 1942, the corps from the Southwestern Front was reassigned to the Bryansk Front.
At dawn on July 3, 1944, with a powerful attack from the east and northeast, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps broke into Minsk. At the forefront of the attack was a tank platoon under the command of Guards Second Lieutenant D. G. Frolikov from the 4th Guards Tank Brigade, which was the first to enter Minsk.
For the successful fulfillment of command assignments during the liberation of the capital of Belarus, the city of Minsk, the corps administration, as well as 4, 25, 26 guards tank and 4 guards motorized rifle brigades of the corps, were awarded by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 07/23/1944
Connection history:
The 2nd Tank Corps began to be formed in April 1942 by NKO Directive No. 724218ss dated March 31, 1942 in Gorky. Under the headquarters of the corps, 3 rooms were first allocated in the Nizhny Novgorod Kremlin. Tank units were completed in winter camps near the city, military equipment also arrived here.
On April 24, 1942, by directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 170322 dated April 24, 1942, it was transferred to the Bryansk Front. According to the instructions, the headquarters of the 2nd TC was located in the village of Kazaki, 15 kilometers west of Yelets.
On June 28, the German troops of the GRA "South" launched an offensive according to the "Blau" plan. Having broken through the front at the junction of the 13th and 40th armies of the Bryansk Front, units of 4TA Gotha began to develop an offensive in the direction of Voronezh. To deliver a counterattack on the flank of the breakthrough of the German troops in the zone of the Bryansk Front, 5TA was advanced (on July 1, 2 and 11TK and 340sd). On the night of July 3, formations of the 5th Panzer Army completed their concentration south of Yelets. On the night of July 4, its commander A.I. Lizyukov received a directive from Moscow obliging “to intercept the communications of the enemy tank group that had broken through to the Don River to Voronezh; actions on the rear of this group to disrupt its crossing over the Don. However, a simultaneous counterattack by the forces of the entire tank army did not work. The situation near Voronezh required the immediate transition of the army to the offensive without waiting for the concentration of all the corps. On July 5, the enemy broke into Voronezh. Street fighting broke out in the city. On July 6, the 7th Tank Corps went into battle first, then the 11th Tank Corps (July 8) and, finally, the 2nd Tank Corps (July 10). The corps entered the battle, not being able to conduct reconnaissance, to fully concentrate. The Dry Vereika River, which was in the offensive zone of the army of A.I. Lizyukov, did not live up to its name and met the advancing tanks with a swampy floodplain. July 7, 1942 Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters The Bryansk Front was divided into Bryansk (3rd, 48th, 13th and 5th tank armies, 1st and 16th tank corps, 8th cavalry corps, aviation group of General Vorozheikin) and the Voronezh Fronts. Lieutenant General Chibisov N.E. was appointed commander of the Bryansk Front, from July 12, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky.
2TK was tasked with capturing the settlement of Bolshaya Vereika. At nightfall on July 9, the 148th and 27th tank brigades took their starting positions, and the 2nd motorized rifle brigade went on the attack. With a quick dash forward, her units broke into the village. Motorized riflemen acted decisively and purposefully. By dawn, they drove the enemy out of most of the village and captured the bridge over the river in the center of the village. The Germans, however, managed to cling to the southeastern outskirts of the village and hold it. At dawn, the heavy tanks of the 148th brigade entered the battle. They broke into battle formations the enemy, crushed his firing points and infantry with caterpillars. Other parts of the corps, overcoming the resistance of the enemy, reached the settlements of Chirikov and Sklyaevo. Our units entrenched themselves on the so-called "Vereisk heights", leaving cover at the crossings across the Bolshaya Vereika River.
The corps commander set a task for the units for July 11: by the end of the day, take control of the Somovo-Bolshaya Tereshchevka line. In the morning the battle broke out with new force. The KV tanks of the 148th brigade began to ford the river. The Nazis opened heavy fire, trying to prevent the crossing. A direct hit from a heavy shell knocked out the lead tank. Forcing was temporarily delayed. Artillery and mortars of the enemy with powerful fire fell on the battle formations of the attackers. Our artillery, supporting the battle of motorized rifle and tank brigades, also suppressed enemy batteries. Tanks were hit by direct fire. The battle lasted an hour and a half or two. Gradually, the enemy fire began to weaken. By noon, the tankers and motorized riflemen of our units had crossed the river. The Nazis were completely driven out of Bolshaya Vereika.
However, the enemy did not accept the loss of Bolshaya Vereika and, in order to restore the situation under the cover of strong air support, began to attack parts of the corps. Our troops suffered the greatest losses from enemy aircraft. Days passed in a continuous rumble and fire. Blazed bloody glow and at night. On the outskirts of the village and in it, everything was shredded and mixed with the earth.
The 5TA counterattack by A.I. Lizyukov did not lead to major success, however, it forced to distract units of two strong tank divisions (9th and 11th divisions) specially replenished for Operation Blau from the direction of the main attack. As a result, even after repulsing the counterattack, these divisions remained part of the German troops in the central sector of the front, which significantly weakened the composition of the armies advancing on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The rate was unhappy with the actions of 5TA. July 9, 42 in the Directive of the Rate there is such a message " 5TA, having in front of it a weak enemy of no more than one tank division, is marking time for the third day. Due to indecisive actions, parts of the army got involved in protracted frontal battles, lost the advantage of surprise and did not complete the task. On July 15, 1942, 5TA was disbanded, and A.I. Lizyukov was appointed commander of 2TK. On July 23, 1942, A. I. Lizyukov had a difficult conversation with the commander of the operational group, deputy commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General N. E. Chibisov, about the unsatisfactory actions of the 2nd tank corps. On the night of July 23, 1942, A. I. Lizyukov was summoned to Lukino for command post task force of the Bryansk Front under the command of General N. E. Chibisov, where he received an order with the forces of his corps to advance after the 148th tank brigade, which had already broken through (as it was believed), to Medvezhye. Fulfilling the order, A.I. Lizyukov and the commissar of the 2nd tank corps, regimental commissar N.P. Assorov, left Bolshaya Vereika on a KV tank, following the 26th and 27th tank brigades. Tank KB A. I. Lizyukov was hit, and he himself died.
On July 28, 1942, the corps was transferred to the reserve of the Bryansk Front. On July 31, before the formation, order No. 227 of July 27, 1942 was read to the personnel of the corps.
On August 22, the echelons of the corps under the command of a major general tank troops A. G. Kravchenko arrived at the Log railway station (northwest of Stalingrad). On August 22, 2TK consisted of 26tbr (37 T-34, 5 T-70, 23 T-60), 27tbr (42 T-34, 5 T-70, 24 T-60), 148tbr (15 KV-1, 5 T -70, 27 T-60). The corps was sent to the Stalingrad Front to repel an attack on the city from the south of 4TA Gotha. However, while the corps was on the way, the situation changed dramatically. On August 23, 14TK Wittersheim went on the offensive from the bridgehead on the Don near Vertyachey. By the evening of August 23 german tanks after passing 70 km we went to the Volga and the village. Market. Parts of 2TK were cut into two parts. One of the echelons with the 148th tank brigade was intercepted by enemy tanks that had broken through at the Konnom junction, and the tankers had to engage in battle directly from the platforms. The remaining echelons of this brigade and part of the 2msbr remained cut off from the corps by the German breakthrough and subsequently operated independently north of the city in the Kotluban region.
The 26th and 27th Tank Brigade and the remaining units of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade were ordered to move to the northwestern outskirts of the city. Parts of the corps took up defense on the s-z outskirts of the city, having units of 23TK A.M. to their left. Hasina. Having received the task, the headquarters of the corps took all measures to withdraw the units to their original areas, provide the commanders with maps and bring combat orders to them. It was also important to coordinate actions with the brigades of the 23rd tank corps and units of the 10th division of the NKVD, which, together with the working detachments of the militias of the Barrikady, Tractor and Krasny Oktyabr factories, hastily took up defenses along the line of the Mechetka River.
On August 24, 1942, the corps received an order from the commander of the tank group of the front, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces A. D. Shtevnev, to strike at dawn in the general direction of Gorodishche, Yerzovka and destroy the enemy units that had broken through. General A. G. Kravchenko decided to advance with the forces of the 26th tank brigade and the 2nd motorized rifle brigade interacting with it in the direction of the northern outskirts of Gorodishche and further through the heights to the eastern outskirts of Yerzovka. The 27th tank brigade received the task of advancing in the direction of heights 146.2 (7 kilometers northwest of Gorodishche) and 143.6, the western slopes of height 147.6.
The corps went on the offensive already on the morning of August 24. The 26th and 27th tank brigades reached their original positions at 0700 and launched an offensive in a northeasterly direction. The purpose of the offensive was to reach Yerzovka and cut off the "head" of the German tank wedge that had made its way to the market. The first success of the corps of A. G. Kravchenko was the capture of Orlovka and the heights around it. A month later, heavy fighting would unfold around them during the second assault on Stalingrad. The capture and holding of these positions by the 2nd Panzer Corps will subsequently significantly complicate the life of the German units storming the city. The 26th and 27th brigades failed to advance further than the height of Orlovka. Faced with the intensified defense of the enemy, the corps changed the direction of the blow. At 17:00 on August 24, the 26th tank brigade was redirected to the east and received an order to occupy the village. Market. By 23.00 the order was executed. Thus, with the first counterattack, the 2nd Panzer Corps not only prevented the enemy from spreading into the territory of Stalingrad, but also recaptured tactically important points within the city. There was no question of any breakthrough to Stalingrad from the north, recorded in Paulus' order of August 19. The losses of the corps of A. G. Kravchenko in the first battle were relatively small: 8 T-34s, 1 T-70 and 1 T-60 burnt out and 16 T-34s knocked out, 28 people were killed and 97 people were wounded.
On August 25, the 2nd Tank Corps was reinforced by the 56th Tank Brigade and tried to build on the success achieved the previous day. However, the Germans, who came to their senses from the shock, organized a strong anti-tank defense, and the advance of the advancing units amounted to no more than 800 meters. A. G. Kravchenko showed caution and from noon he ordered to consolidate on the achieved lines. The tanks stood still and fired on enemy firing points that showed themselves. Corps losses amounted to only 6 tanks. The 56th tank brigade was taken away from Kravchenko and instead handed over to the newly formed 99th tank brigade, which had 50 T-34s. When foreign researchers, in particular P. Carell, talk about unpainted "thirty-fours" straight from the factory, they are most likely talking about the 99th brigade. The tanks of the 2nd Panzer Corps were fired far behind the front. Judging by the pictures, these were T-34s with a hexagonal “nut” turret manufactured by factory #183 in the Urals.
The attack of the brigades of the corps of A. G. Kravchenko on August 26 was also unsuccessful, and parts of the corps went on the defensive. Losses for that day amounted to 18 T-34 tanks in the 99th brigade, 3 T-34s in the 26th brigade and 6 T-34s, 1 T-70 in the 27th brigade. It is impossible not to note the rather low rate of losses in the 2nd Tank Corps. The "alien" 99th brigade (formed from the 21st and 28th training tank battalions) suffered heavy losses. Kravchenko's own corps brigades held out well and managed not to lose their equipment in the very first days of their stay near Stalingrad. On August 27, the 2nd Tank Corps received the 315th Regiment to consolidate its positions. rifle division. On August 28, the 26th and 27th tank brigades received 21 T-70 tanks as replacements. On August 29, on the orders of Shtevnev, the 27th tank brigade (12 T-34s, 20 T-70s, 15 T-60s) and the 2nd motorized rifle brigade attacked at 1600 in the northwest direction. The purpose of the offensive was the experimental field farm. Units of the 16th Tank Corps entered the area northeast of the state farm the previous day (August 28). However, on August 29, it was not possible to break through towards the Kovalenko group of the corps of A. G. Kravchenko. Encountered by heavy anti-tank fire, the tanks stopped and fired from their standstill. Having lost 5 tanks, the brigades withdrew to their original positions by evening. On August 30–31, the 2nd Tank Corps defended the occupied lines and gradually handed them over to the arrived 115th Rifle Brigade. On September 1-2, 1942 Shtevnev's tank group was disbanded.
On the morning of September 3, the enemy broke through the defense front of the 62nd Army, 18 km from Stalingrad near Pitomnik. By 12.00 the Germans were already in Talovaya, a few kilometers from the city. The commander of 62A Lopatin assigned the commander of 2TK Kravchenko the task of counterattacking in the direction of the Experimental Station together with units of the 87th Infantry Division. At 14.30 the 27th tank brigade set out on the march and by 15.40 was in the area of Stalingrad, north of the Experimental Station. At that time, the brigade had 9 T-34s, 7 T-70s and 15 T-60s. At 17:00, the 99th Tank Brigade (23 T-34s, 7 T-70s, 1 T-60s) followed the 27th Brigade. The counterattack was scheduled for 5:00 the next day. In the final version, the corps of A. G. Kravchenko was to act together with the remnants of the 87th, 98th and 112th rifle divisions. The counteroffensive began at 0800 on 4 September. tanks of the 2TK corps made their way to Gumrak, but in the afternoon they were forced to retreat to their original positions. 1 T-34, 1 T-70 and 13 T-60 remained in the 27th brigade. On September 5, Gumrak was held by the remnants of the 112th Rifle Division (285 active bayonets), the 27th Tank Brigade (11 T-60s) and the reconnaissance battalion (2 armored cars, 4 armored personnel carriers) of the 2nd Tank Corps. South of Gumrak, the 99th tank brigade (16 T-34, 4 T-70. Soviet command so far it was possible to keep the enemy from breaking through to the streets of Stalingrad.
On September 6, 1942, the neighboring right-flank 399th Rifle Division at 9.00 left the occupied line under the onslaught of the enemy, which exposed the right flank and rear of the combat formation of the 2nd Tank Corps. The 112th Rifle Division, which was defending the eastern outskirts of Gumrak, also withdrew after suffering heavy losses. To eliminate the threat to the right flank of the corps and to avoid encirclement, the corps commander ordered the 12th separate reconnaissance battalion to hold the enemy on the section of roads going from Gumrak to Kamenny Buerak, and with the five light tanks of the 27th brigade remaining on the move, his reserve (three T-34 tanks ) and seven surviving tanks of the 99th brigade to counterattack the enemy at the turn of heights 155.1 and 146.2. The task was successfully completed by these extremely limited forces, and the enemy was held up in front of the heights.
By September 7, all the tanks of both brigades of the 2nd Panzer Corps were out of order. The commander of the 27th tank brigade was wounded, and the commander of the 99th tank brigade was killed. On September 8, the 2nd Panzer Corps was withdrawn to the left bank of the Volga. On September 11, the 135th, 137th, 155th, 254th, 169th and 99th tank brigades were subordinated to him and the task of defending the eastern bank of the Volga on a front of 84 km was set. The slow tanks of the 27th and 99th tank brigades were transferred to the 23rd tank corps.
Some parts of 2TK, in cr. least tank battalion 27tbr, continued to defend themselves in Stalingrad in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 102 and the village. Red October until September 30th. The tankers received replenishment with tanks from the Stalingrad factories and repaired the damaged equipment themselves and successfully defended themselves by supporting units of the 112sd with fire. On the night of October 1, the remnants of the 436th tank battalion of the 27th brigade, having transferred the remaining 2 T-34s and 2 T-60s to the 6th Guards Brigade, crossed to the left bank of the Volga.
On September 13-14, 6A Paulus launched an assault on Stalingrad. The enemy crushed our defenses at the junction of the 62nd and 64th armies. The struggle was now being waged in the streets and squares of the central districts of the city itself. Together with other units, the 26th tank brigade of the corps was advanced to the place of the Nazi breakthrough at the junction of the two armies. In the Kuporosnoe area, she fought to the last tank.
In mid-September, the corps command and the remaining personnel of the 99th tank brigade and the 12th separate reconnaissance battalion concentrated in the Middle Akhtuba area. By order of the front headquarters, the corps temporarily included several units that had a few people in the ranks - the 135th, 155th, 187th and 254th tank brigades, the 140th mortar regiment. It was necessary to take up defense on the islands of Controversial, Zaitsevsky, Golodny, to prevent the enemy from crossing and capturing the islands, to subordinate everything that was on the islands to defense. The front of defense, in fact, the newly assembled unit stretched up to 100 kilometers.
At the end of September, an order was issued to send the corps for reorganization to Saratov.
The 2nd Panzer Corps, from which, figuratively speaking, only one name and a handful of commanders remained, but which honorably fulfilled its combat mission, defending Stalingrad, was to find a new life in Saratov.
12/16/1942 the corps, having replenished, is withdrawn from the reserve of the Southwestern Front and transferred to the 3rd guards army. In the same way, through familiar stations, the echelons of the corps again moved to the Stalingrad region. In accordance with the instructions, they unloaded at the Ilovlya station.
After reorganizing and receiving reinforcements in the Saratov region, some formations and units were reassigned, and now the corps included the 26th, 99th, 169th tank and 58th motorized rifle brigades, the 12th separate reconnaissance battalion, 1257th anti-aircraft artillery regiment, 401st guards mortar battalion and other units.
On December 16–18, the armies of the Southwestern Front N.F. Vatutin launched an offensive against the Italian, German and Romanian troops in the Middle Don. The enemy front on the Don and Chir rivers was crushed for more than 300 kilometers. By the end of December, the entire Southwestern Front had advanced 150–200 kilometers. Parts of 2TK arrived on December 24 at st. Lipki (58th motorized brigade was formed in the South Ural Military District and was sent to the corps from the station Yug in the Urals with unloading at the station Log, Ilovlya on December 26-29) from where they marched to the x. Lysov (west of Kalach). After a 140 km march, by December 28, the brigades concentrated in the x. Lysov, Staromaksimovsky joining the 5TA. It was supposed to use the body to strike at the rear of the enemy's Tormosinskaya grouping. However, in connection with the successful offensive of the 1st and 3rd GvA on the Middle Don and the 2nd GvA on Kotelnikovo, the threat of deblockade of Paulus' encircled army was removed. On December 30, the corps received an order to make 230 km to the location of 3GvA Lelyushenko.
The corps consisted of 40 T-34s and 60 T-70s. Due to the lack of fuel for the T-70 and wheeled vehicles at the 5TA bases, only T-34 tanks made the march. The long march was carried out in difficult winter conditions along snow-covered roads. To ref. On January 2, the corps headquarters and part of the brigades without vehicles and T-70 tanks concentrated in the Milyutinskaya area. OK. 20 T-34s were left on the roads due to lack of fuel and oil. Wheeled transport stretched for 350 km along the route of the corps from the Log station to Milyutinskaya. During January 3-6, the concentration of parts of the corps continued. Upon the arrival of the equipment, the brigade advanced south from Milyutinskaya to the Bystraya River as an ambush to Novomaryevka, Kostino-Bystryansky. The 58th Rifle Brigade made a march from the Log station on foot, also due to the lack of gasoline for cars.
On January 6, an order was received to concentrate the corps on the Kalitva River in the Ilyinka, Gusynka area. By the morning of January 7, parts of the corps were concentrated in this area. Movement on the roads was under the influence of German aviation. In the concentration area, the corps consisted of: 26tbr 8 T-34, 9 T-70, 9 vehicles, 3 37mm, 4 76m guns, 2 DShK, Total 320 people; 99tbr 9 T-34, 3 T-70, 10 wheeled vehicles, min. company; 169tbr 9 T-34, 8 T-70, 33 vehicles, 4 zen. guns, 5 guns; 58msbr - reconnaissance. company, 12 armored vehicles, a battery of 76mm guns. In total, the corps consisted of 26 T-34s and 20 T-70s. The remaining parts of the corps were scattered along the route of movement. Total population The corps consisted of 5675 people, 51 tanks (and 60 under repair), 39 armored vehicles.
By January 9, the corps concentrated in the Gusynka area. According to the plan of the commander of the 3GvA Lelyushenko, the corps was to be introduced into the breach in the 266sd area on the Kalitva river and moving towards the Sev. Donets seize crossings on the river. From the side of the enemy, the 7th division, recently transferred from Germany, operated on the Kalitva River. The enemy tank units went over to counterattacks, trying to frustrate our offensive with active actions. In view of the dangerous actions of the German tank group in the area of the village of Novocherkassky, against which units of the 2GvTK and 1GvMK were fighting, the direction of the offensive was changed to the village of Novocherkassky. Having gone on the offensive on the morning of January 9, the brigades went to the area west. h.Novocherkassky. On January 10, parts of the corps, together with the 158sd, captured Nocherkassky and Litvinov. The actions of the corps put the enemy grouping sowing. Novocherkassky under the threat of encirclement. On the morning of January 11, with the support of aviation, enemy tanks from three sides (from the east from the Maslov region, from the south from the Gornyatsky mine and from the west from Gusynka) attacked parts of the corps. However, the tankers withstood these attacks, holding their lines. Grouping of the enemy cut off sowing. h.Novocherkassky was defeated. Losses during the battle amounted to 720 people. killed and wounded. Motorized infantry of the 58msbr suffered heavy losses. 6 T-34s were shot down, 1 T-34 and 1 T-70 burned down.
On the morning of January 12, the brigades of the corps went on the offensive from the Litvinov area to the west. the bank of the Kalitva, and by lunchtime the tankers of the 99th brigade had captured Dyadin, having reached the river Sev. Donets. The advance of the 26th brigade and 58msbr in the Lenin area was more difficult. On the morning of January 13, enemy tanks launched a counterattack against the 26th brigade and 58msbr from the Ust-Belokalitvenskaya area. In the ensuing battle, 23 enemy tanks were hit, 6 serviceable tanks were captured. Our losses amounted to 6 T-70s burned down, 2 T-34s and 2 T-70s were knocked out. German aircraft continuously bombed our battle formations. On January 14, tankmen of the 99th and 169th brigade captured the Krasny Yar settlement on the banks of the Donets and fought on the outskirts of Kalitvenskaya. Stubborn fighting continued in the Kalitvenskaya area. On the side of the Germans, Kalitvenskaya was defended by Cossack units from Soviet citizens who had transferred to the service of the Germans. 169tbr during January 15-16, during heavy fighting, knocked out enemy units from Krasny Yar and Kalitvenskaya. The 26th brigade fought to the north in the Nov. Erokhiin area, the 99th brigade continued to defend the Dyadin area, waiting for the infantry to approach. On January 16, the brigades of the corps launched an offensive against Kamensk. Coming out to Skorodumovka (a suburb of Kamensk on the northern bank of the Donets), the brigades fought here during January 16-20. Star. The village and Skorodumovka changed hands 5 times. Leaving a barrier in the Skorodumovka area, parts of the corps began to cross the Donets to bypass Kamensk from the southeast. 26tbr to ref. On January 20, she crossed with 150gvsp 50gvsd to South coast Donets east. Kamensk. Soon in the Upper. Dichinsky crossed and 99tbr. The enemy tried to counterattack our bridgehead with tanks, but this attack was repulsed. Units of 23TK were fighting from the west in Kamensk. The losses of brigades in these battles amounted to 117 people. killed and wounded, 2 T-34s and 3 T-70s burned out; 4 T-34s and 7 T-70s knocked out.
On the evening of January 21, an order was received from the 3GvA in which the corps was ordered, in cooperation with the 23TK, to bypass Kamensk from the south and capture Likhaya station. However, the crossing of the 58msbr near the Nizh. Goveyny was repulsed by a counterattack of enemy tanks. 99tbr having crossed at the Top. Dichin's tanks also tried to attack Nizh. Goveyny but the attack was stopped by the stubborn defense of the enemy. In the meantime, in the afternoon, German troops attacked units of the 23TK and 60gvsd in Kamensk and to ref. day they were driven out of the city, forcing them to retreat to the north. bank of the Don. A further attack from the occupied bridgeheads in these conditions lost its meaning. On the night of January 26, parts of the corps surrendered their sector to 60gvsd and 203rd and were withdrawn in the Verkh area. Klinovy, Astakhov. As of January 25, 2TK numbered 5411 people, 50 serviceable tanks and 72 under repair, 48 mortars, 521 vehicles, 40 BA. The irretrievable losses of the corps amounted to 3552 people, 23 T-34s, 27 T-70s.
On the night of January 26, having handed over its positions to the 50th Guards Rifle Division, the corps was sent on a march from the west of Kamensk to the Kruzhilovka area to the North. Donce cleaned himself up. Intelligence sought out convenient crossings across the Donets. At the end of January, the 3rd GvA was preparing to go on the offensive again from the Donets line in order to liberate the Donbass. The army strike group included 2GvTK, 1 GvMK, 2 and 23TK.
On January 30, the 3GvA rifle divisions went on the offensive from the bridgehead they occupied between Kruzhilin and Bol. Drybreaker. Corps tanks crossed the North. Donets in the Davido-Nikolskoye area along specially reinforced by sappers crossings on the ice of the Donets. By this time the state of mat. parts of the hull were far from shiny. So 169tbr consisted of only 4 T-34s and 4 T-70s. To ref. day the brigades of the corps advanced to Ivanovka. Having cleared along with parts of 14gvsd on the trail. day Ivanovka brigades of the corps continued the offensive reaching Nadezhdino. Developing the offensive southwest direction parts of the corps during January 31 - February 2 advanced to the line Krasnoe, Andreevka. The 61st Guards Rifle Division approached the area of operations of the corps, which, together with the tankers, fought for the station of Popovka. Having entered the area, the Red Corps found itself in a dangerous position due to the threat to rear communications from the Popovka, Samsonovka area, from where the German tank units attacked both the positions of the 2TK and in the north. in the direction where the tankers of 2GvTK Badanov fought and to the east to Verkh.Duvannaya where 1GvMK Russiyanova fought. The battle for Popovka was led by infantrymen of the 61st Guards Rifle Division and 169th Brigade. 99tbr and 58msbr, continuing the offensive to the west, crossed the Luganchik River and occupied the Engels colony. Together with the 279th Rifle Division, which approached from the 279th Rifle Division, on February 6, Popov's tankers captured the Voroshilovgrad airfield and advanced to Pervozvanovka.
On February 6, 8KK and fresh 243sd were introduced into the breakthrough created by parts of the 2TK. The corps brigades advanced to Voroshilovgrad, having surrendered their positions to the infantry of the 14GVSK (14th, 50th and 61st Guards Rifle Divisions), the tankers handed over their combat area to them, and they themselves received an order, together with the 279th Rifle Division, to advance on the southern and southwestern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad. In the battles near Voroshilovgrad, the commanders of the 169th brigade Colonel Kodenets and the 99th brigade Colonel Gorodetsky, as well as the beginning. Corps Headquarters Colonel Maltseva. The brigades of the corps, together with the infantry of the 279th division, went south on February 7th. env. Voroshilovgrad in the Rozzalinovka area, where until February 13 they fought to capture Voroshilovgrad
.On February 8, German troops began to withdraw their troops from a large arc formed by the rivers Sev. Donets and Don to the border of the Miuss river. Leaving the capture of Voroshilovgrad to infantry divisions on February 14, the corps went on the offensive from the southern suburbs of the city in a western direction, occupying a temporary warehouse. Davydovka and in a southerly direction, going to the north. Lutugino. On February 16, the remaining tanks and ammunition of the corps were transferred to the 1GvMK. The brigades that suffered heavy losses were withdrawn to the Georgievskoye area.
On February 23, parts of the corps liberated the large energy center of Donbass - the city of Shterovka. After the liberation of Voroshilovgrad and Shterovka, the fighting in the area of deployment of the 3rd Guards Army slowed down. The troops suffered heavy losses and were tired. The rear was stretched out, which made it difficult to supply combat units. The thaw also made itself felt. At the end of February, the Nazis, having concentrated their forces on separate sectors of the front, launched private counterattacks and stubbornly resisted. A strong enemy counterattack was inflicted on the troops that had broken through to the Krasnoarmeysk region. The Germans managed to cut off the grouping of our troops.
The corps commander received an order to go to the Izyum area with all his might, gather under his command subdivisions and units that were not retreating in a completely organized manner, and try to stabilize the front. In the following days, parts of the corps, in particular, its 58th Motorized Rifle Brigade, are engaged in heavy fighting in the Izyum direction. In the early spring of 1943, fierce battles were going on in the Izyum-Barvenkovsky direction. The Hitlerite command made great efforts to throw our units from their positions. In these battles, forces were exhausted on both sides, equipment was ground. Other fights dragged on, escalated, turned into real battles.
As already noted, units of the 2nd Panzer Corps suffered significant losses during the winter offensive battles and needed rest and replenishment. As a matter of urgency, the corps was given for service 40 T-70 tanks - maneuverable, light vehicles armed with 45-millimeter cannons. The corps commander ordered to turn them to staffing the 26th and 169th tank brigades. At the same time, about ten thirty-fours were repaired and returned to service.
In March, the situation at the front was even more unfavorable for the Red Army. Fascist troops captured Kharkov again. The corps, at the direction of the front headquarters, was moved to its right flank, to the 6th Army zone, to the Kharkov direction. These days, a formation consisting of two incomplete brigades was supposed to take up defense in the Chuguev area, in the Bazaleevka, Kochetok sector, and prevent the enemy from forcing the Seversky Donets River. Fulfilling the order of the commander, the 169th and 26th tank brigades took up defensive positions at the indicated line. The headquarters of the corps was located in a village called Kitsevka. For more than a week, parts of the corps held the occupied lines, repelling the fierce attacks of the Nazis.
The tank brigades of the corps lost almost everything combat vehicles, motorized rifle battalions were greatly thinned. By order of the front headquarters, parts of the corps retreated to the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets. At the end of March 1943, the front line stabilized, the Soviet units began to consolidate on the occupied lines. The enemy troops also stopped, apparently finally exhausted. Both sides went on the defensive.
The corps was withdrawn to the front reserve. Fairly depleted brigades settled down in the Urazova area, south of Valuyek. Within two months, parts of the corps were replenished with personnel and military equipment, tactical exercises and training firing were carried out. The commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General R. Ya. Malinovsky, set the 2nd Tank Corps the task of being ready to strike in three directions and keep in mind the fourth - on the left flank. During the stay in the reserve of the front, the corps was transformed - the tank brigades now had 65 vehicles each, a full complement of crews. The motorized rifle brigade was replenished to the state. The corps included new units - a howitzer and anti-aircraft artillery regiments, a mortar regiment, and a sapper battalion. On a special account was the Katyusha division included in the staff.
In early July, the corps was alerted. By the order received at the headquarters at night, his brigades were ordered to redeploy from the South-Western to the Voronezh front. On July 5, 1943, the Battle of Kursk began. The 2nd Panzer Corps joined the fighting a little later. On the night of July 8, its units, having made a march from the Urazov region, concentrated near the Prokhorovka station. The enemy pulled up his selective divisions "Dead Head" and "Reich" here. In front of the front of the corps there were up to 300 tanks, a large number of self-propelled artillery, infantry.
On July 8, the corps enters the battle. For three days there were fierce battles. The corps operated in the zone of the 6th Guards Army, to the right - the 1st Tank Army. On July 11, battalions of a motorized rifle brigade arrived in the area of operations of the corps, marching on foot and therefore late. Motorized rifle units were distributed among tank brigades to strengthen the defense.
On July 12, after a regrouping of forces, a long aviation and artillery preparation, the enemy launched his last, furious offensive in the direction of Prokhorovka, Pravorot, Storozhevoy. About 100 enemy tanks, many self-propelled guns, four regiments of infantry were moving into the battle formations of the corps.
By order of the front commander, the corps left the operational subordination of the 69th Army and became part of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The army commander ordered: having covered one brigade from a flank attack, the main forces should advance in the direction of Storozhevoy. Fighting in the Prokhorovka area, although with less force, still continued after. So, on July 13, the enemy managed to push back parts of the 29th Panzer Corps for about a kilometer with a large group of tanks and infantry. Here we had to go on a tough defense. Until July 16, firefights raged at the turn of Lutovo, Belenikino, Storozhevoe, Vinogradovka. The enemy was still snarling.
The corps emerged from the Prokhorovsky battle with considerable losses. It was necessary to restore and bring the combat equipment to readiness with the help of the far from complete parts of the corps and small repair units. The corps was given only 7 days for this. People worked for days, but it was not possible to fully staff them on their own. Nevertheless, the corps could and should have been considered combat-ready.
During this period, a partial regrouping of the forces of the front was carried out. The 2nd Tank Corps was moved closer to the right wing and transferred to the 40th Army, commanded by Colonel General K.S. Moskalenko.
Regrouping usually precedes an offensive. And so it happened this time. The corps, introduced into battle after the infantry divisions had captured the first position of the enemy's defense, outstripped the battle formations of other formations, struck in the direction of the city of Lebedin. The tanks of the corps at high speed wedged deeper and deeper into the enemy defenses. The Nazis were forced to withdraw their units, fearing encirclement. With a swift maneuver, the brigades, having completed the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses, went to his rear.
In the direction of Sumy, Lebedin, with a steel wedge, the corps entered the depth of the enemy defense. Only in one of the sectors did the Nazis try to stop the advance of the corps. They organized a counterattack with the forces of tank units. On the approaches to Lebedin, in the immediate vicinity of the city, parts of the corps met strong enemy resistance. The tactics of the enemy were opposed by the tactics of powerful tank strikes, swift maneuvers with access to his flanks and rear. On August 19, parts of the corps from three sides simultaneously approached Lebedin, burst into it on the move. Motorized riflemen barely kept up with the tankers, the Nazis did not lose hope of returning the city and launched a whole series of counterattacks. But part of the forces of the corps held Lebedin, while his other brigades rushed further and further forward.
During the day of August 20, 1943, the advancing units of the corps passed 40 kilometers with short battles. During the further offensive, the tankers fought for the city of Zenkov for several days. At the end of August, parts of the corps fight for Sumy. On September 8, the corps was given the task of developing an offensive in the direction of the city of Lubny. During the night, units with an attached anti-tank destroyer regiment concentrated in the starting area. On the morning of September 9, front-line aviation dealt a massive blow to the enemy, and artillery made a powerful fire raid. The enemy's defense in this sector was upset, his fire system was suppressed. Having crossed the Grun River and rounded the combat formations of the rifle divisions of the 40th Army, parts of the corps entered the gap and rushed to the west. Sweeping away the enemy's barriers, they broke into the settlement of Lipovaya Dolina on the move, captured the crossing over the Khorol River.
The dynamics of the actions of the tankers was sometimes so rapid that the enemy could not even linger at the intermediate lines. On September 10, 1943, the corps continued the offensive. In the area of \u200b\u200bthe settlements of Rozbishevka, Novoselovka, Petrovka, the Nazis pulled together large forces and organized a powerful counterattack. They managed to knock down the left tank barrier - a heavy tank regiment, cut off parts of the corps from the main forces of the front. The battle lasted several hours, the ammunition was coming to an end. The corps was threatened by enemy encirclement. By the end of the day, only 19 combat-ready tanks and nine guns remained in the corps. With these small means, the soldiers of the corps steadfastly held the defense on the occupied lines, fought off the Nazi units pressing from all sides. The infantry of the 47th Rifle Corps rescued the tankers. Together with them, the tankers continue the offensive.
Having made a march to the area of the city of Lokhvitsa, the tankers, together with parts of the rifle corps, launched an attack on Lubny. On September 18, the tank brigades of the corps bypassed Lubny from the southwest, the regiments of the 337th rifle division from the northeast. By radio signal, a swift attack began from two opposite directions. The enemy troops that had accumulated in the city could not hold it back, they could not flee either - just at that moment the railway bridge flew into the air.
Borodina S.V.
2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps in the battles on the Kursk Bulge.
70 years ago, on July 12, 1943, the largest oncoming tank battle in the history of World War II took place on Prokhorovka land. Many books, monographs, scientific papers have been written about him. Most of the authors in their works mainly talk about the events of July 12 - the apogee of the greatest battle. On the eve of the battles were fought in the Prokhorovsky direction. Tank formations sequentially, day after day, destroyed military equipment, manpower of the enemy, and held their positions with battles. The soldiers showed courage and steadfastness, trying with all their might to stop the advance of the German troops. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps actively participated in the battles of July 6-9 and in the Prokhorov battle itself.
The success of the battle largely depended on the talent of the commander, his ability to make quick decisions, objectively assess the situation and clearly fulfill the assigned tasks. And Alexey Semenovich Burdeiny, commander of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, possessed such qualities. In his memoirs, P. A. Rotmistrov noted that in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the commanders of tank and mechanized corps showed outstanding qualities of military leaders, including A. S. Burdeiny. “It was thanks to the skillful management and skillful use of tank units and units that commanders-military leaders showed in practice what tank troops are capable of and what is their role in the war.” [Rotmistrov, 1970, p. 68-69].
Before proceeding to a detailed consideration of the participation of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, I would like to dwell on how it began and how its battle path developed, how the name Tatsinsky was obtained. After all, it was then that the invaluable combat experience of soldiers and officers, which came in handy on Prokhorovskaya land, began to take shape. The corps was formed in April 1942 on the Southern Front in the area of the city of Voroshilovgrad as the 24th Tank Corps. On December 17, 1942, the tank corps was introduced into the gap and began its legendary deep raid. On December 24, the corps broke into the village of Tatsinskaya and destroyed one of the most important airfields from which the encircled enemy group in Stalingrad was supplied. The 24th Tank Corps was transformed into the 2nd Guards Tank Corps for military merit and received the honorary name Tatsinsky.
Since January 1943, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps participated in the Voroshilovgrad offensive and in the Kharkov defensive operations on the Southwestern Front. When repulsing the counterattack of the 4th German TA, the corps defended on the left bank of the Seversky Donets. On March 22-23, they struck at the advancing enemy units in the area of Kreid (a suburb of Belgorod), after which on March 24 the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was transferred to 64 A, and then withdrawn to the reserve of the Voronezh Front and until July 5 was stationed in the area city of Korocha.
While in reserve, the command and rank and file of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps actively prepared for the upcoming battles, honed their combat skills, and control of equipment. For example, the soldiers of the 26th Guards. TBR actively used temporary respite. At the beginning of July 1943, drill training was carried out, driving a tank over obstacles, cleaning the tank and small arms. July 4 on a day off, competitions were held physical training between platoons, companies and, on a battalion scale, in gymnastics, grenade throwing, as well as a cross in gas masks for 10 km. In the evening, the personnel went to the 1st battalion for a performance by an amateur art brigade. On this day, the fighters had the last opportunity to rest and prepare for the upcoming battles.
In order to clearly trace the movement of the corps, and form a holistic view of its participation in the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Prokhorov, we will consider the movement and combat operations of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps from July 5 to 17, 1943.
The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was stationed in Koroche. On July 5, the corps was transferred to the command of the commander of the 6th Guards Army, Chistyakov I.M. The commander, Colonel A.S. in the north and northeast directions. [Chichenkov, 1996, p. 26]. (Fig. 1.) Burdeyny Alexey Semenovich.
At the beginning of the fighting on the Kursk Bulge, one could only guess how events would develop. In the event of a favorable situation, it was planned to defeat the Nazi troops that had penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards Army and launch a counterattack. These plans are confirmed by the military private order of the headquarters of the Voronezh Front: “To be ready from the dawn of 07/06/43 in cooperation with the 5th Guards. mk. go on a counterattack in the direction: Kryukovo, Krapivensky yards and further to Gremuchy, Belgorod. Scheme of deployment of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky tank corps on July 5, 1943
By the morning of July 6, it became obvious that the situation was not going as planned ... On this day, advancing with the main forces on Yakovlevo, the German troops sought to push back parts of the left wing of the 6th Guards Army across the river. Lipovy Donets. The main blow in this direction was delivered by the Reich Panzer Division. By 9 o'clock during the battle, the enemy advanced eastward. By order of the commander of the 6th Guards Army, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps crossed to the western bank of the river. Lipovy Donets and in the course of fierce fighting threw back parts of the enemy to the west.
During the counterattack, which began on July 6 in the direction of the village. Smorodino performed feats of fighters of the 2nd Guards. Tatsinsky tank corps, one of them was committed by tankman Butenko I.E.
During a short fight, the crew of Ivan Efimovich destroyed three tanks, knocked out one in the same battle, and on one T-34 tank made two tank rams at once. The feat was not a simple price, the tank caught fire, the driver of the guard, foreman Caesar, was killed, and the radio operator of the guard, senior sergeant Slivkin, was seriously wounded. The wounded comrade Butenko pulled out of the burning tank, entered into a fight with the surviving members of the crew of German tanks. And he also emerged victorious from this battle, while obtaining valuable documents from a German officer. For the perfect feat Butenko I.E. was awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union.
But it was not possible to consolidate the success achieved in the battles during the day. On the night of July 7, in connection with the advance of the enemy to the north, by order of the front commander, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky tank corps was withdrawn to its former defensive line along the eastern bank of the river. Lipovy Donets. [Koltunov, 1970, p. 149-150].
On July 7, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps held its former positions. Defensive battles were fought. 4th Guards brigade was in the reserve of the corps commander. During the day, the enemy made repeated attacks to break through the defenses, and was repulsed by artillery fire. German aviation in groups of 18-25 aircraft continuously bombed - Teterevino, Novye Lozy, Volobuevka and battle formations of tanks.
On July 8, after two days of defensive battles, the tanks of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps passed through the infantry and rushed to the offensive. The enemy concentrated 2 SS tank divisions "Dead Head" and "Reich", numbering more than 150 tanks, most of them of the "Tiger" type, in the direction of the corps' offensive.
The quantitative superiority of the enemy in technology was complemented by a well-thought-out organization of the fire system. German anti-tank artillery batteries were placed on the commanding heights. The enemy offered fierce resistance to the offensive of tank units on the ground and in the air. Dozens of aircraft, both fighter and bomber aircraft, continuously attacked the battle formations of Soviet tankers, trying to hold back their advance.
The German troops sought to develop the offensive in the northern and northeastern direction, for the realization of these goals tanks and motorized infantry were pulled up from the depths. You can learn about the difficulties our troops faced during the offensive from combat reports. One of the clearest examples of such difficulties is given in the reports of the 4th Guards Tank Brigade.
Before the 4th Guards the brigade was tasked with reaching the initial area south of 2 km. Teterevino and be ready to act in the direction of Teterevino, Nechaevka. Which is what was done. (Fig. 2) Scheme of the offensive of the 4th Guards. brigade on Nechaevka July 8, 1943
At 14.30, the brigade went on the offensive southwest of Teterevino, Nechaevka. By 18.00 directing platoon 1 TB. reached the river crossing. Lipovy Donets near Nechaevka. The crossing turned out to be unsuitable for tanks, the bridge was blown up, there was no ford, and without a crossing, an offensive was impossible. The line was held until 2.30, after which they retreated to the starting line.
Thus, no significant changes were achieved during the day. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, having gone on the offensive, was met with strong counterattacks by enemy tanks, supported from the air by aircraft, and despite successes in some areas, soon withdrew to its original position.
On July 9, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was still on the defensive. In some areas, military operations were carried out, reconnaissance was actively carried out, the preparation of the materiel for further battles. In order to better understand how the defense was carried out on this sector of the front, let us again turn to the example of the actions of the 4th Guards. tbr.
During the night and morning of July 10, the brigade continued to occupy the defenses in the Teterevino area, which had been held the day before. The enemy led artillery. min. fire on the battle formations of the brigade. With the onset of darkness, a company of enemy submachine gunners approached the battle formations (from the MTS areas, north of Belenikhino), with whom they fought throughout the night, by dawn the submachine gunners were destroyed.
On July 11, they were actively preparing for the decisive battle, military operations were planned, and the alignment of forces was clarified. Before the command staff were placed combat missions. The equipment was brought into combat condition. Thus, the time was used for the last preparation, it was already obvious - the moment of the decisive battle had come. As a result of the regrouping of forces, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps from the 69th Army, Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenko, was transferred to the operational subordination of the 5th tank army on July 11 at 18.00.
P.A. Rotmistrov: “Wasting no time, I conducted a reconnaissance of the area of operations with the corps commanders and assigned combat missions to the corps. The area for the deployment of the main forces of the army was chosen somewhat to the west and southwest of Prokhorovka, at a front of up to 15 kilometers. Taking into account that they were to enter into battle with a very strong enemy tank grouping, which, according to the information received, had about 700 tanks and self-propelled guns in the Prokhorovka direction, including more than 100 "tigers" and "Ferdinands", it was decided to deploy in the first echelon all at once four tank corps (18th, 29th, 2nd Guards Tatsinsky and 2nd). [Rotmistrov, 1984]
On July 11, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps occupied a position from the Yamki farm to the Plot on the left flank. From the memoirs of A.S. Burdeiny: “Soon from P.A. Rotmistrov, an order was received in which specific tasks were set for July 12. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky tank corps was included in the shock tank group of the front to deliver a counterattack. We were faced with the following task: “as part of the 5th Guards Tank Army, on its left flank, advance in the direction of Belenikhino, Ozerovsky, break the enemy’s resistance in the Belenikhino region and develop an offensive in the direction of Yakovlevo.” A powerful and decisive blow was being prepared against the main enemy grouping, which had penetrated deep into our defenses, and the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was assigned an important and very responsible task: acting on the left flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, actively participate in the defeat of this grouping.
But, as is often the case in war, the active actions of the enemy always make significant adjustments to the developed plans. Having regrouped forces from the northern to the northeastern direction on the eve of our offensive - on July 11, the enemy conducted active hostilities not only in the direction of the location of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky tank corps, but also to the north. On that day, the enemy succeeded in pressing our troops in separate directions, but the main thing was that he pinned down significant forces of our troops, destined for a counterattack. As a result, of the five armies, only two practically participated in the counterattack on July 12 - the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards, as well as two separate tank corps - the 2nd and 2nd Guards, subordinate to the commander of the 5th Guards Tank army.
Late in the evening at 20.00 - 21.00, the commanders of the units were given information about the position of the enemy and tasks were assigned to the corps and the immediate tasks of each unit. 25th Guards Tank Brigade Lieutenant Colonel S.M. Bulygina attacked Teterevino in order to defeat the enemy in the area of Teterevino, Yasnaya Polyana; The 4th Guards Tank Brigade was to defeat the enemy and capture the Kalinin and Ozerovsky area, and the 4th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade was tasked with defeating the enemy west of the railway, capturing the Sobachevsky farm and, together with the neighbor on the left - the 183rd Infantry Division - to reliably cover the corps from South.
On the 26th Guards. tank brigade of lieutenant colonel S.K. Nesterov was assigned the task of preventing a possible enemy offensive from the south and southeast in the directions of Belenikhino and to the north - to Prokhorovka. As events in the following days showed, such a precaution was not superfluous.
Time, as always before the offensive, was short. Everyone spent the night in hard work preparing people and equipment for tomorrow's offensive and, of course, in great anxiety. [Beketov, 2000, p. 124-125].
Before proceeding to the consideration of specific actions and events on July 12, it is advisable to dwell on the plans and goals of the parties on the eve of the decisive battle. Despite the fact that July 11 did not bring any significant success to the German command, Hitler, the high command, the general staff of the ground forces continued to blindly believe in victory. So, the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Manstein, expected to defeat the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area on July 12. He noted: “The command of the army assumed that after repelling enemy counterattacks, moving the main direction of its strike and introducing reserves into battle, it would resume the offensive again on July 12 in order to complete the breakthrough. Stopping the battle now would probably mean losing the victory!” [Manstein, 1957, p. 445, 448].
The Soviet command was able to correctly assess the imminent crisis of the German offensive. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the troops of the left wing of the western and Bryansk fronts to go on the offensive in the morning of July 12 in order to defeat the enemy's Oryol grouping. At the same time, the troops of the Voronezh Front, reinforced with strategic reserves, were to launch a powerful counterattack against the main enemy forces in order to decisively disrupt his offensive in the Prokhorovka direction and defeat the wedged strike force. [Soloviev, 2003, p. 99].
This day - July 12 is of great importance not only in the chronology of the events of the Battle of Kursk, the Prokhorov tank battle, but in the fate of people, the history of the Great Patriotic War and our Motherland. Therefore, we will consider the events of this day literally by the hour, we will dwell in detail on the military operations of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps on the decisive day of the fighting.
From the memoirs of A.S. Burdeyny: “At 8.30 on July 12, after our air strikes and artillery preparation, the corps went on the offensive. To the right of us, the tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army went on the offensive. Almost simultaneously, the enemy went on the offensive. All the airspace above us was filled with planes - both ours and the enemy. The roar of tanks, the howl of shells and the rumble of engines in the air merged into a single mighty "hurricane". There has never been such a battle anywhere. The battle broke out in the northern and southern directions almost simultaneously. In the first half of the day, we managed to break through the railway to the western side and drive the enemy out of the settlements of Yasnaya Polyana, Kalinin and start a battle for the Ozerovsky and Sobachevsky farms, but we could not advance further. ”[Beketov, 2000, p. 125].
At 9.50 the 26th Guards. The brigade receives a combat order to go to the northwestern outskirts of Shakhovo. This was done to cover the left flank of the army. During the day, the battalion fought containment battles at the occupied nodes of resistance. The enemy with a strength of up to 50 tanks and motorized infantry was moving in a northeast direction - Shakhovo. The river crossing was blown up. There was an art shootout. The battalion was in the 2nd echelon. The 26th tank brigade attacked the Nazis from the Shakhovo area in the direction of Shchelokovo. As a result of a successful oncoming battle, two motorized regiments of the Nazis were defeated. From air strikes, the troops of Colonel A.S. Burdeyny at the starting positions was covered by the 1695th zenap of Major Sereda. His batteries deployed in the villages of Ivanovka and Vinogradovka.
At 11.15, after a short artillery shelling along the front line of the Germans, two tank brigades of Colonel A.S. Burdeyny - 4th Guards. and 25th Guards. brigade numbering 94 combat vehicles went on the attack. The first to reach the front line of the Germans at about 12.00 in the MTS area south of Yasnaya Polyana were the tankers of Lieutenant Colonel S.M. Bulygin. Over the area of concentration of the Tatsinsky corps, a “frame” was circling from early morning. Therefore, it is no coincidence that as soon as the attack began, the battle formations of the 25th Guards. the brigade immediately came under fire from six-barreled mortars from the temporary storage area. "Komsomolets" and with. Ivanovsky Vyselok and at the same time they were hit by 20 enemy bombers.
The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky tank corps of Colonel A. S. Burdeyny, advancing in the direction of Kalinin, by 14.30 started an oncoming battle with the SS Reich Panzer Division. Due to the lagging behind of the 29th Tank Corps and the threat to its open right flank, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps withdrew to its original position, where it entrenched itself, repelling the tank attacks of the Nazis. [Koltunov, 1970, p. 169]. On the example of the actions of the 4th Guards. the brigade clearly shows that each fighter did everything to complete the task, but it was not always possible to consolidate the successes of individual units. The corps commander A. S. Burdeyny had information about how the situation developed throughout the entire area of the battles. And the order to retreat to the previous positions was due to the need to maintain the occupied positions and conduct coordinated actions in this direction.
Based on the order of the commander of the 2nd Guards. TTK No. 034 at 12.00 on July 12, from the defense area of Belenikhino-Ivanovka, the 4th Guards Tank Brigade went on the offensive in the direction of Kalinin-Sobachevsky, vys. 232.0. At 15:00, three T-34 tanks (guiding platoon) broke into the southeastern outskirts of Kh. Kalinin, where they met a strong anti-tank defense of the enemy. As a result, the brigade suspended the offensive. The tanks of the leading platoon were burned by the enemy, the remaining tanks of the brigade withdrew and took up defensive positions. Despite heavy artillery shelling and intensive bombardment from the air, the brigade stubbornly continued to stand on the defensive 700 meters south of x. Kalinin, and only by order of the commander of the 2nd Guards. tk. at 18.00 they retreated to the starting line and took up defense in the Belenikhino, Ivanovka area. (Fig. 3) Scheme of the offensive of the 4th Guards. brigade at 12.00 on July 12, 1943 on Kalinin.
To better imagine the atmosphere of the battle, let's turn to the memoirs of Alexei Semenovich Burdeiny: “It is very difficult to describe the picture of that day. Bombs and shells exploded in front, behind, among us, and their howl merged with cannon shots from tanks and artillery pieces into one continuous roar. In the air there is a desperate battle between our fighters and enemy fighters and bombers. Bombers and attack aircraft drop bombs and storm the enemy, and he bombs us with the same "zeal".
Throughout the day of July 12 and until late at night, tankers, artillerymen, sappers, motorized rifle units and units, signalmen, all support units, all personnel of the corps were under continuous fire from enemy tanks, artillery and aviation. No one even thought not only about a minute's rest, but also to eat their dry rations, drink a mug of iced tea or plain water. It was a day of superhuman stress, but the Soviet soldiers withstood it with honor.
If we talk about heroism, then it was literally the mass heroism of everyone who took part in this battle.
Here are just a few examples out of a thousand: in a heavy battle near Belenikhino, a tank of the guard Lieutenant Kozakevich was hit (a cannon in the tank was broken). Capturing a machine gun, machine gun, grenades, Kozakevich and his crew jumped out of the tank, took up defense not far from the tank and entered into battle with the enemy infantry. One by one, the lieutenant's comrades perished. From a direct hit by an enemy shell, his tank was also smoking. Soon they ran out of ammo. Noticing this, the Nazis rushed to Kozakevich with a cry - "Rus, surrender!" In response, the lieutenant rushed to his tank, jumped into it and slammed the hatch. The Nazis shouted something after him, but then there was a strong explosion! All the Nazis who were nearby died. Guard lieutenant Kozakevich and his crew perished in front of his fighting friends.
The platoon commander of the 755th artillery battalion, N. Bramiya, and his crew had special stamina, diligence and excellent knowledge of their business. Reflecting the attacks of enemy tanks, in the battle in the area of Vinogradovka and Belenikhino, his platoon destroyed two heavy Tiger tanks and up to 30 Nazis.
The battery commander of the same division, Lieutenant V.V. Kaskevich, repelling enemy attacks in the area of Ivanovskie Vyselok, defeated five enemy T-IV tanks and two heavy T-VI tanks. The enemy tanks did not pass in this direction.
Tank company commander of the 26th Guards. tbr. Captain K. Goychenko personally destroyed two enemy tanks from his tank and, being seriously wounded, did not leave the battlefield, continued to fight and set fire to one Tiger tank. In the battle in the Shakhovo area, the commander of the artillery battery of the 26th brigade, Senior Lieutenant S. Ryabov, distinguished himself. Repulsing the attack of enemy tanks, he was seriously wounded, but remained in position, continuing to direct the fire of the battery. The enemy attack was repulsed."
Summing up the results of the hostilities on July 12, it would be advisable to give a description made by P. A. Rotmistrov: “In the middle of the day, success in the main direction was clearly indicated. The first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army persistently pressed the enemy, inflicting heavy losses in manpower and military equipment. We won a territory that was not so significant, but we did the main thing - in the oncoming battle we stopped and crushed the enemy strike force advancing along the railway to Prokhorovka. The tip of the enemy tank wedge, broken in the area of Oboyanskoe highway, was broken. The brigades of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps of the Guards Colonel A. S. Burdeyny, pushing back parts of the SS Reich division, vigorously advanced in the direction of Vinogradovka and Belenikhino. [Rotmistrov, 1984]. On July 12, the nature of the struggle in the Battle of Kursk changed dramatically. The Soviet troops were already advancing, and the Nazis were forced to go on the defensive. The last attempt of the Nazi command to return the lost strategic initiative have crashed. And a considerable contribution to what has been achieved belongs to the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps. The fighting in the Prokhorovsky direction continued.
For several days, intense battles were fought with superior enemy forces. The Reich SS Panzer Division, operating at the junction between the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, launched powerful flank attacks in the direction of Storozhevoye and by fifteen o’clock captured this village, as well as the northern outskirts of the village of Vinogradovka. As a result, a direct threat was created for the enemy to reach the rear of two of our tank corps at once. The impending threat had to be eliminated by the forces of the tank corps themselves.
Fierce fighting in this area continued until late in the evening, and in one place our tankers and motorized riflemen counterattacked the enemy, in another they repulsed his counterattacks. Only with the onset of darkness did both sides, exhausted by the tense battle, go over to the defensive. [Rotmistrov, 1984].
Burdeyny A.S. noted that the 4th Guards Tank Brigade suffered especially heavy losses both in men and in tanks. The brigade was faced with the following task - to firmly occupy the defense in the area of Belenikhino, Ivanovka. In the evening at 20.00, 12 enemy tanks and up to a company of submachine gunners launched an attack on Belenikhino, and already at 20.15 the attack was repulsed by the fire of our tanks, the enemy lost two tanks of 12 people, after which he retreated to the southeastern outskirts of Yasnaya Polyana.
The fight continued the next day. On the morning of July 14, the enemy went on the offensive with a tank group with the support of motorized infantry in cooperation with artillery and aviation in three directions from Yasnaya Polyana - Kalinin to Belenikhino, from Ivanovsky Vyselok - Storozhevoye to Vinogradovka, from Kalinin-Sobachevsky to Leski.
On the southern outskirts of Vinogradovka, tanks entered into battle with enemy tanks, which supported anti-tank guns, including self-propelled ones. By 20.00 the enemy reached a height of 234.9 where they threw our units in the direction of Maloyablonovo, Belomestnoye, Pravorot. At 22.00, the corps commander gave the order: the brigade was withdrawn from the battle and concentrated in the Podolkha area.
By the end of the day on July 14, the position of the units of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was difficult. During these days, enemy attack aircraft were especially raging. Enemy tanks came close to the western outskirts of Zhimolostnoye, where the corps headquarters was located.
The intensity of the fighting did not decrease. The attack on the positions occupied by the corps continued. Despite the fact that the enemy used tanks and aircraft, our fighters put up successful resistance and held back the offensive. So at the location of the 26th Guards. On July 15, at 4.40 am, 12-14 enemy tanks and motorized infantry advanced in the direction of the southeastern encirclement. Maloyablonovo and opened fire on the tanks of the brigade from the rear. Unable to withstand the onslaught of the enemy, the fighters of the brigade were forced to retreat and take up defense, where they stopped the German tanks. At the same time, it should be taken into account that enemy aircraft bombed our battle formations throughout the day. The general picture is accurately and objectively described in his memoirs by A.S. Burdeyny: “On July 15 and 16, heavy battles flared up again. Obviously, the enemy has not yet abandoned his goal - to defeat our troops in the interfluve area and merge or combine his main forces with the Kempf task force advancing from south to north along the Sev River. Donets. During these two days, the enemy still managed to push us to the northeast. [Beketov, 2000, p. 127].
To sum up the results of the hostilities from July 13 to 16: the German troops failed to build on their success. In order to finally exhaust the forces of the advancing enemy, the armies of the Voronezh Front switched to stubborn defense on the lines they occupied.
By the morning of July 17, the situation was as follows: after a short but powerful artillery preparation, the 5th Guards Tank Army went on the offensive. The enemy held back our formations with strong rearguards, which included grenadier regiments, tanks, artillery, mortars, and sappers. They mined the approaches to the heights and settlements, forest edges, road junctions and offered stubborn fire resistance. The 2nd and 2nd Guards Tatsinsky tank corps advanced only 3 to 4 kilometers in a day. [Rotmistrov, 1984].
A.S. Burdeyny: “As always, at dawn on July 17, everyone was already in place and preparing to meet the enemy with fire from all types of weapons. A “frame” hated by all of us appeared in the air - a spotter and reconnaissance aircraft, very maneuverable. He kept at a height inaccessible to our anti-aircraft guns. Enemy artillery opened fire. We all expected that the tanks and infantry of the enemy were about to appear. Hours pass, but there are no enemy tanks. In the middle of the day, an incomprehensible silence settled in front of us.
So far, this silence has not caused any delight in anyone. We simply did not know what the enemy was doing, and we ourselves went over to active operations, sending reconnaissance to all directions. It was soon established that the enemy had left small rearguards in front of us, and that the main forces were retreating to the south and southwest. The headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank Army did not keep us waiting either: we received information that the enemy had begun to withdraw his forces, and then an order to pursue the retreating enemy. Now the initiative has completely passed into our hands.” [Beketov, 2000, p. 127]
The combat path of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps from Stalingrad to the fields of Belarus - entered the military history our country. In the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the glory of the tank guards grew stronger and multiplied. Wherever they fought, fighters, sergeants and officers followed the fighting traditions of the corps.
After the Battle of Kursk, the 2nd Guards. tank corps Burdeyny continued its combat path, took part in a number of major operations Great Patriotic War. The commander of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps of the Guards, Major General of the Tank Forces A.S. Burdeyny, showed his talent as a commander in the Belarusian operation. There he valiantly acted in the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, and during the Minsk operation he traveled over a thousand kilometers with battles. Tankers of the corps were the first to break into Minsk and liberated it together with units of the 5th Guards. TA.
Burdeyny Alexei Semenovich did not leave military service and after the war continued to command the corps. He graduated from the Armored Academy and the Academy. Voroshilov. Since August 1963, he has held the responsible position of head of the Central Automotive and Tractor Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Hero of Socialist Labor, retired Colonel-General Alexander Timofeevich Smirnov, first deputy and friend of Burdeyny Alexei Semenovich, recalled him and the work carried out during this period in this way: Based on the joint years of service, I saw in him a person endowed with a great sense of responsibility and organizational gift. These qualities were manifested in the process of developing new military automotive equipment and its supply to the troops. Alexey Semenovich paid a lot of attention to military automobile schools and a training automobile brigade. With his participation, new educational buildings, autodromes for training driver mechanics appeared. Issues related to the organization of the operation of automotive equipment, the construction of parks, the technical and combat training of personnel have always been in the first place when Alexei Semenovich travels to the troops. Moreover, the general-front-line soldier was ready to solve even quite, it would seem, small issues. For example, in one of the parks, Burdeyny drew attention to the fact that it is impossible to simply wash your hands after work. But technicians constantly deal with machines, engines. So Aleksey Semenovich forced the father commanders in that unit and in others to create normal living conditions for their subordinates. Burdeyny was a very demanding, but at the same time attentive, caring commander. At the same time, he was a modest person, he talked about the heroism of his subordinates, but never about his own.
Since January 1974, Colonel-General A.S. Burdeyny has been retired. Died April 21, 1987. He was buried at the Kuntsevo cemetery in Moscow.
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 19, 1945, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Aleksey Semyonovich Burdeyny was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 5026). Awards: 2 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 2nd Class, Order of Kutuzov 2nd Class, Order of the Patriotic War 1st Class, 2 Orders of the Red Star, medals and foreign orders.
The exploits of the fighters of the 2nd Tatsinsky tank corps of Alexei Semenovich Burdeiny are not forgotten even today. In the village of Tatsinskaya there is a lane named after Burdeyny. After the war, he repeatedly visited the Tatsinsky district, took part in the opening of the Breakthrough memorial.
In the Museum of Military Glory of the Third Military Field of Russia, part of the exposition is dedicated to the 2nd Guards. tk. The showcase contains photographs of the corps soldiers, as well as personal belongings of the commander of the tank corps, Colonel Burdeyny Alexei Semyonovich - his officer's tablet, a diploma of graduation from the Armored Academy, Golden medal Academy them. Voroshilov and other documents. All these unique things and the dress uniform of Colonel-General A.S. were transferred to the museum by his daughter Rasshchupkina Lyudmila Alekseevna. (Fig. 4) Part of the museum exposition dedicated to the 2nd Guards. tk.
Burdeyny Aleksey Semyonovich - honorary soldier of the military unit and honorary citizen of the hero city of Minsk (was awarded in 1967). A street in Minsk was named after the Hero, a memorial plaque was installed on it, and an eternal flame was lit on Victory Square by the Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel-General A.S. Burdein, in honor of the 17th anniversary of the liberation of the city from the Nazi invaders, July 3, 1961.
Documents stored in the archives, reports, orders, combat reports signed by Burdeyny A.S., allow us to trace the actions and location of the units that were part of the corps during the Battle of Kursk, by day and hour. These data are also of great importance in the course of studying the events of the Prokhorov tank battle. These archival documents not only provide dry figures on the amount of equipment in the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, but also show concern for the fighters. In his memoirs of battles, Aleksey Semenovich always cites examples of the feats accomplished by the soldiers of the corps, who at the cost of their lives defended their homeland from the Nazi invaders.
Bibliography:
1. GANIBO. F. 1140. Op. 6. D.2. L. 40. Order of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps dated May 2, 1944 No. 10.
2. Archival materials, combat reports of 1943, which are in the funds of the Museum of Military Glory of the Third Military Field of Russia.
3. State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskoye Pole". Belgorod, 2005. 48 pages.
4. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. Lost victories. Translation from German. Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense USSR. M. - 1957. 588 pages.
5. Ivanovsky E.F. The attack began tankers. - M.: Military Publishing, 1984. - 254 p.
6. Koltunov G.A., Soloviev B.G. Battle of Kursk M., Military Publishing House, 1970, 400 pages.
7. Stay young. Book of Memory of those who died in the Battle of Prokhorovka on July 10-20, 1943. Editor-compiler V.P. Beketov. Belgorod, 2000, 515 pages.
8. Rotmistrov P. A. Steel Guard. - M.: Military Publishing, 1984
9. Rotmistrov P.A. Tanks at war. Publishing house DOSAAF. Moscow. 1970 95 p.
10. Solovyov B.G. Battle of the Fire Arc. Belgorod: Ed. Fomina N.B., 2003, 288 pages.
11. Chichenkov A.P. Fifty fiery days. Historical chronicle. Belgorod. "Peasant business", 1996, 225 pages.
Badanov understood that without ammunition, he could not beat off a new attack by Balk. According to post-war Soviet sources, Vatutin allowed Badanov to leave, but it is more likely that Vatutin continued to insist that the corps hold its positions as the deblocking troops still moved forward. During these battles, the tank corps received the honorary title of Guards, and Badanov was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 2nd degree - it seemed that the encircled troops had already been written off by the Southwestern Front.
However, on December 27, after the German attack, Badanov independently began to prepare for the retreat. Here he ran into two problems. He did not have diesel fuel, and without it, the T-34s, which were necessary to break through the German encirclement, turned out to be immobilized. In addition, hundreds of his soldiers were wounded and were now housed in the basements of houses in Tatsinskaya - there was practically no possibility of evacuating them. fuel by mixing jet fuel, gasoline and benzene. The resulting mixture made it possible for the T-34 tanks to move, but rather soon led to damage to the fuel injection system and completely disabled the engine. Badanov ordered that the few remaining T-34s be filled with this fuel, which were supposed to make a breakthrough. By the evening of December 27, Vatutin ordered to parachute a number of military supplies badly needed by Badanov, but only half of them landed at the location of the corps; not a single aircraft attempted to land to evacuate the wounded or unload fuel or tank ammunition.
At 22:00 Badanov gathered his remaining officers to the Military Council. They came to the conclusion that the tanks of the 24th Panzer Corps, which were still on the move, would begin their breakthrough within four hours. All the wounded were left, despite Hitler's order to "take no prisoners." 300 volunteers remained behind to provide a retreat. The only chance for salvation was the western sector in the ring of German encirclement, where a gap formed between the positions of the 4th motorized and 15th tank regiments. On December 28, at 02:00, Badanov ordered his troops to launch a feint to the northeast, feigning a breakthrough. At 03:00 he made the main breakthrough with his main body to the west. Badanov led a column of 11 tanks and 30 trucks with 927 soldiers. Thanks to a diversionary strike, the Soviet column managed to pass unnoticed into the gap formed in the German positions. When the Germans finally discovered that the enemy had left, they destroyed two Soviet tanks, but they could no longer prevent the withdrawal of the rest of the troops, moving on a dark winter night to the north-west towards Mikhailov, towards the units of the 3rd Guards Army. Not a single member of the Soviet group that delivered a distracting strike left the German encirclement. Early in the morning of December 28, units of the 11th Panzer Division occupied the empty airfield in Tatsinskaya, which was again occupied by Luftwaffe aircraft for some time, but the VIII Aviation Corps did not want to resume transport transportation from the destroyed air base. Several hundred wounded Soviet soldiers captured at Tatsinskaya were most likely massacred in accordance with Hitler's orders. Three days later, when units of the 3rd Guards Army approached, the Germans left Tatsinskaya forever.
After a hard march through snowy terrain that lasted all day, often on foot, the surviving soldiers of the 24th Tank Corps reached the positions of the 266th Rifle Division of the 3rd Guards Army on the Bystraya River. Badanov's corps - now the 2nd Tatsinsky Guards Tank Corps - suffered such huge losses that even when the 24th Mechanized Brigade, which acted separately, reunited with it, only 30% of its personnel and less than 10% of its equipment remained. However, Badanov's unauthorized withdrawal displeased the Soviet High Command, and Vatutin soon ordered Badanov, who had only 50 tanks and a small number of infantry, to advance across the Bystraya River and take Tatsinskaya back. In fact, Badanov no longer took a special part in Operation Little Saturn, which ended on December 30: Army Group Don was able to stop the Soviet offensive, and now the troops under Vatutin had to be reorganized so that they could resume their offensive.
