The catastrophe on the Western Front, created on the basis of the Western Special Military District, became one of the most tragic pages in the first days of the war. Already on June 28, Minsk and Bobruisk were captured, west of the Belarusian capital they were surrounded by the 3rd and 10th armies, and the remnants of the 4th army retreated beyond the Berezina. There was a threat of a quick exit of the enemy's mobile units to the Dnieper and a breakthrough to Smolensk. Leaders Western front- Commander General of the Army D.G. Pavlov, Chief of Staff, Major General V.E. Klimovskikh, head of communications, Major General A.T. Grigoriev, commander of the 4th Army, Major General A.A. Korobkov and a number of other military leaders were removed from their posts in the first days of July. And then they were brought to trial by the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and shot. A little later, in September 1941, the same fate befell the commander of the artillery of the front, Lieutenant General N.A. Cry.
Stalin's fatal mistake
There is no disagreement among historians that this measure was nothing more than an attempt by Stalin to shift all the blame for the defeats at the beginning of the war onto the military leaders and thereby preserve his own reputation intact. The complex of documents at the disposal of specialists makes it possible to lay the main responsibility on the leader for the fact that the troops of the Red Army met the enemy attack in peacetime.
Out of fear of giving the Germans even the slightest pretext for aggression (although their purposeful preparation for war left no doubt), Stalin forbade the military leadership from the most elementary actions to bring troops to the necessary degree of combat readiness. All attempts by the commanders of the troops of the districts, including the Western Special, to advance at least some additional forces to combat positions to the border were severely suppressed.
The miscalculation in determining the probable timing of the German attack was the most fatal among the tragic mistakes of the USSR leadership. As a result, the main thing was not done - the covering troops, intended to repel the first enemy strike and gain time for the deployment of the second echelon of defense, did not promptly bring them to full combat readiness.
Political violence
The very procedure for establishing the circle of perpetrators looked like a political order. On June 30, Pavlov was removed from his post and summoned by Stalin to Moscow. The general stayed in the capital for several days, meeting only with the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov. Stalin did not accept him and ordered to return "to where he came from", knowing full well that the former commander would not reach the front headquarters.
On July 4, on the way to Gomel, where by that time the headquarters of the Western Front was located, Pavlov was arrested. The arrest procedure was supervised by the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, army commissar 1st rank Mekhlis, concurrently appointed a member of the military council of the front. He was also instructed to determine the circle of persons from the command staff of the front, who, together with the former commander, were to appear before the court, and to formulate a plausible justification for the massacre of them.
On July 6, 1941, Mekhlis personally compiled a telegram addressed to Stalin with the following content, which, in addition to him, was signed by the front commander Marshal Soviet Union Timoshenko and another member of the military council of the Ponomarenko front:
“The Military Council established the criminal activities of a number of officials, as a result of which the Western Front suffered a heavy defeat. The military council decided:
1. To arrest the former chief of staff of the Klimovsky front, the former deputy commander of the Air Force of the Tayursky front and the chief of artillery of the Klich [a] front.
2. Bring to court the military tribunal of the commander of the 4th army Korobkov, the commander of the 9th air division Chernykh, the commander of the 42nd rifle division Lazarenko, the commander of the tank corps Oborin.
3. We arrested - the head of communications of the front Grigoriev, the head of the topographic department of the front Dorofeev ...
We ask you to approve the arrest and trial of the listed persons ... "
On the same day, the leader's response followed, on behalf of the State Defense Committee, approving the arrests and hailing "these measures as one of the surest ways to improve the front."
Judging by the materials of the investigation, Pavlov and his former subordinates were severely tortured. The former front commander was forced to confess that he was a nominee of the “enemy of the people” Uborevich, who was shot in 1937 along with Tukhachevsky. To the question: “Did you, as a conspirator, open the front to the enemy intentionally?” Pavlov essentially gave an affirmative answer.
July 22 during the fleeting court session under Ulrich's presidency, he found the courage to deny accusations of hostile activity, pleading guilty only to the fact that the troops of the district had not been brought to a state of full combat readiness in advance.
According to the verdict of the court, Pavlov, Klimovskikh, Grigoriev and Korobkov were found guilty of showing cowardice, inaction, indiscretion, allowing the collapse of command and control, handing over weapons and ammunition to the enemy without a fight and unauthorized abandonment of combat positions by parts of the front, thereby disorganizing the country's defense and created an opportunity for the enemy to break through the front Soviet troops. They were sentenced to death, and on the same day the sentence was carried out.
It was a massacre covered up by a mock trial, because the verdict was based only on the testimony of the defendants, no operational documents were involved in the proceedings, and the testimony of witnesses was not heard.
General Sandalov's note
The first to officially raise the issue of the innocence of the executed generals was Colonel General L.M. Sandals. His daughter Tatyana Leonidovna handed over to the editors his memorandum and letter, which are published for the first time.
MESSAGE FROM COLONEL GENERAL L. M. SANDALOV TO THE CHIEF OF THE MILITARY SCIENTIFIC DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR TO ARMY GENERAL V.V. KURASOV
Troops of the Western Special Military District, including 4 A, during initial period The Great Patriotic War was almost entirely destroyed. At that time I was the chief of staff of the 4th Army.
Are the command of the troops of the ZOVO (renamed from the first days of the war into the command of the troops of the Western Front) and the command of 4 A to blame for the defeat of the troops in the initial period of the war?
In order to answer this important and complex question, it is necessary, in my opinion, to first answer another question: could any other district and army command have prevented this rout?
It is unlikely that anyone will undertake to prove the possibility of preventing the defeat of the troops of the district even with another more talented command of the troops of the district.
After all, the troops of the Baltic and Kiev military districts adjacent to the ZOVO were also defeated in the initial period of the war, although the main blow of the enemy was not aimed against the troops of these districts.
Consequently, the defeat of the troops of our western border military districts ultimately depended not on the quality of command and control, but happened:
- firstly, due to the weaker technical equipment and weaker training of the troops and headquarters of the Red Army compared to the army of Nazi Germany
- secondly, due to the suddenness of the attack by the fascist army, fully mobilized and concentrated to our borders, against our troops that were not put on combat readiness.
In these main reasons for the defeat of the troops of the border military districts, the share of the fault of the command of the troops of the districts and armies is small, which, in my opinion, does not require special evidence.
The main blow was directed against the troops of the ZOVO and, in particular, from the four tank groups that played the main role in offensive operation Germans, two tank groups were advancing against the ZOVO troops. On the other hand, the speed of the defeat of troops Western District, undoubtedly, to some extent also depended on the weak command and control of the troops on the part of the command of the ZOVO troops and the armies.
The reason for the weak command and control of the ZOVO troops to a large extent is the more than unsuccessful composition of the command of the ZOVO troops and, first of all, the inconsistency of his position with the district commander himself.
Army General PAVLOV, having no experience in commanding military formations (excluding command of a tank brigade for a short period of time), after participating in the war in Spain, was appointed head of the ABTU of the Red Army, and a year before the war commander of the ZOVO troops. Having neither experience in command and control, nor sufficient military education and a broad operational outlook, Army General PAVLOV was confused in the difficult situation of the initial period of the war and let go of command and control. The commander of the Air Force ZOVO KOPETS and the commander of the artillery of the district KLICH were just as random and inappropriate for their positions.
Both of them, just like PAVLOV himself, were participants in the war in Spain and had no experience in managing military formations: KLICH before his trip to Spain was a teacher and head of the artillery department at the academy for a very long time, and KOPETS before the war in Spain commanded an air squadron (in the first days of the war, KOPETS shot himself).
Was it possible to appoint PAVLOV, KOPETS and KLICH, with their light military scientific baggage and experience, to such high positions in the most important military district of the Red Army? The answer is obvious.
I summarize the above:
1. The main blame for the defeat of the ZOVO troops in the initial period of the war should be removed from the command of the ZOVO troops.
2. A heavier share of the responsibility of the command of the ZOVO troops in the defeat of the troops of the district in comparison with the command of neighboring military districts stems from the unsuccessful composition of the command of the ZOVO in the pre-war period, and part of this blame therefore lies with those who approved such a composition of the district command.
3. There was no preconceived intention to defeat the troops of the district or contribute to the defeat of the troops on the part of the entire command of the district and its individuals.
4. The conviction of the representatives of the command of the ZOVO troops must be removed.
Fragment of a letter from Major General I.I. Semenov
Colonel General L.M. Sandalov:
“Personally, from beginning to end, I was a direct participant in these events. With all responsibility I can say that there was neither panic nor confusion on their (Pavlov and his deputies - Yu.R.) side. Everything that could be done in those difficult conditions was done, but it was too late, we paid for the lost time and for the fact that we were reassured and believed, or rather, we were forced to believe that the Germans were almost our friends, remember the TASS statement and pictures in newspapers.
Personally, I suggested to Klimovsky and Pavlov two or three weeks before the start of the war to raise troops according to the cover plan, but they did not agree to this, there was a direct order not to do this.
Oh, Leonid Mikhailovich! If we had done this at least a week before the war, would we have allowed the Germans to advance so quickly, even despite their superiority?
By the decision of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR of July 31, 1957, the sentence of July 22, 1941 in relation to D.G. Pavlova, V.E. Klimovskikh, A.T. Grigoriev and A.A. Korobkov and the verdict of September 17, 1941 against N.A. The cry was canceled, and the proceedings against them were terminated due to the absence of corpus delicti in their actions.
Yuri Rubtsov - colonel, member of the Russian Association of Historians of the Second World War
Soviet commander of the Red Army. Member of the First World War, civil war, the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway, the fighting in Spain, the fighting on Khalkhin Gol, the Winter War. He headed the ABTU of the Red Army. Arrested and shot in 1941.
Early career
The future Red General Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov was born in 1897 in Kostroma province in a poor peasant family. By the standards of his time, he received a fairly good education: he graduated from a rural school (4 classes) and a 2-class school. Pavlov's military career began with voluntary entry into the army Russian empire in 1914, the first year of the First World War. He fought for the sovereign emperor Pavlov, apparently well, because, having started the war as a private, he rose to the rank of senior non-commissioned officer in two years. In 1916, Pavlov was captured by the Germans, where he was used as a forced laborer. He returned to his homeland already in 1919, after the surrender of Germany.
The Soviet government first needed his military talent. In August, Dmitry Pavlov joins the Red Army. He began a new career as a red commander in the 56th food battalion. In November 1919, the connection between Pavlov and the Soviet government also acquires a political character - he joins the Bolshevik Party. Pavlov's career continues to develop successfully. He takes part in the fighting on the Southern Front, including against Makhno's formations. He grows in his position, alternating combat and rear (mainly in the inspection of the cavalry of one or another formation, up to the front) posts. However, the civil war is gradually coming to an end, the army is beginning to be reduced, and there are fewer opportunities for further advancement.
The position of regiment commander would be the “ceiling” for Pavlov for almost a decade and a half. However, it was during this period that Dmitry Grigorievich actively improved his military education. So, he improves his skills as a cavalry officer at the Omsk United Higher Military School of Siberia. At the end of it, as an assistant commander of the regiment of the 6th Altai separate cavalry brigade, he fights with gangs of Basmachi in Central Asia. From 1925 to 1928, Pavlov studied again, this time at the Military Academy. After he receives the post of commander of the 75th cavalry regiment. In 1931, Pavlov again participated in hostilities - in the so-called "conflict on the CER", military operations in Manchuria against the troops of the local leader Zhang Xuelian.
In 1931, Pavlov took courses at the Leningrad Military Transport Academy. There he begins to master the skills of controlling armored vehicles, which just began to en masse enter the Red Army and with which his future career will be connected. At the end of the course, Pavlov again becomes the commander of the regiment - this time the 6th mechanized regiment stationed in Gomel.
In February 1934, Pavlov finally outgrew the position of regiment commander. Now he leads the 4th separate mechanized brigade stationed in Bobruisk. After a little over two years, Dmitry Grigorievich again falls into the war. This time - the civil war in Spain, and Pavlov will fight there under the pseudonym - General Pablo.
Brilliant General
Pavlov participated in the Spanish War for only eight months - from October 1936 to June 1937. During the fighting in Spain, General Pablo not only commanded his mechanized brigade, but also coordinated the actions of the battle group in 9-11 brigades. After that, his career skyrocketed, like the careers of many other "Spaniard" commanders. The rapid growth of ranks and positions held was explained both by the repressions that knocked out the top of the Red Army, and by the growth in the size of the Red Army that began (especially since 1939). For successful fighting in Spain, Pavlov received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Starting from July to November 1937, Dmitry Grigorievich was the deputy head of the Armored Directorate (ABTU) of the Red Army. Then he receives the rank of commander and becomes the head of ABTU. At these posts, Pavlov held great job perestroika organizational structure armor tank troops of the Red Army and the development of a new material part for them.
Some historians accused Pavlov of insisting in 1939 on the dissolution of the 4 existing at that time tank corps influenced by his Spanish experience. However, the decision to disband was made under the influence of a group of military men who concluded that such formations were poorly managed under the impression received during the “liberation campaign”, when the territories of Western Ukraine and Belarus were annexed to the Soviet Union. With regard to reforms in the field of organization armored forces, then Pavlov promoted a fairly flexible structure, consisting of mechanized divisions and tank brigades. After his departure, the existing formations began to be reorganized into mechanized corps, the readiness of which by the time the Great Patriotic War began was far from complete. Most historians recognize the contribution that Pavlov made to the development of the material part of the new generation of armored forces. He strongly advocated the adoption of tanks with heavier weapons and anti-cannon armor. Pavlov also advocated the resumption of work on self-propelled artillery, which had practically ceased by that time.
In parallel with his work at ABTU, Pavlov continued to participate in conflicts that broke out at that time on the borders of the Soviet Union. He passed on the experience of military operations with the use of tanks during the battles at Khalkhin Gol, commanded a division in Finland during the Winter War. Pavlov received new awards - three Orders of Lenin, two - the Red Banner, the medal "XX Years of the Red Army". The political aspect of Pavlov's career also reached its zenith: since 1938 he has been a candidate member of the Central Committee of the party. Pavlov also became a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st convocation.
In June 1940, a year before the start of World War II, Pavlov was appointed commander of the Western Special Military District. At the end of 1940, Dmitry Grigorievich, at a general meeting of the country's top military leadership, made a report on the introduction of a mechanized corps into a breakthrough, which caused a lot of discussion. In 1941, Pavlov received the rank of army general.
In June 1941, it was on his military district that the main blow of the troops of the Third Reich hit. The main forces of the Western Front, which arose on the basis of the Western Special Military District, fell into two pockets - Belostok and Minsk. Based general ratio forces in the summer of 1941, a heavy defeat for the Red Army was virtually inevitable. However, the top leadership of the Soviet Union felt that Pavlov had made the situation much worse by his actions.
Arrest and sentence
Already on July 4, Pavlov was arrested. Initially, they wanted to accuse him of betrayal. However, later this wording was removed and replaced with accusations of cowardice, inaction and indiscretion. According to them, Pavlov and a number of other officers of the Western Front (Klimovskikh V.E., Grigoriev A.T. and Korobkov A.A.) were sentenced to death on July 28, 1941.
Such a severe punishment of the leadership of the Western Front can be explained by a number of reasons. Firstly, the scale of the disaster in the territory of the Western Special Military District was the greatest. Secondly, Pavlov, as can be understood from the materials of the investigation, was considered a creature of Uborevich (repressed in 1937) and the former Chief of the General Staff Meretskov, who was arrested immediately after the start of the war (later released), and therefore his actions looked especially suspicious. Thirdly, it may have played a role that Pavlov, as a candidate member of the Central Committee, was not only a military man, but also a fairly large political figure.
The degree of Pavlov's real guilt in the defeat of the Western Front remains a rather debatable issue in historical science. Most likely, Pavlov simply found himself in a situation where his experience, and possibly his abilities, was not enough to maintain control over events. However, there is also evidence showing that the troops of the Western Special Military District were indeed weakened in the last prewar period orders given to them by the district command. In particular, a number of artillery formations were withdrawn from their places of deployment and sent to training grounds. Troops were not withdrawn from the famous Brest Fortress, etc. The loss of control of subordinate command troops by Pavlov was largely due to the fact that Pavlov did not comply with the order to transfer his headquarters from Minsk to the field command post.
In general, one gets the impression that the leadership of the Western Special Military District not only failed to take its own measures to prepare for the war, but also failed to comply with a number of instructions from the supreme command. Since even a fairly biased Soviet court of that time did not reveal treason, it remains to be assumed that Pavlov believed that the war could not start suddenly and that there was still time before the start of the active phase of hostilities, during which much could still be done. But this mistake, as the initial period of the war shows, was characteristic to varying degrees of the entire top leadership of the Soviet Union.
In 1957, by decision of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, Pavlov was posthumously rehabilitated and reinstated in rank, and the case was found to have no corpus delicti. Has justice prevailed? wrote in his memoirs that it was he who, with his authority, insisted on rehabilitation, although this was done contrary to the circumstances of the case. Not Pavlov, but was to blame for everything, - wrote Khrushchev. In other words, Pavlov was rehabilitated because Stalin was condemned by the decision of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Apparently, the time has come for an objective assessment of the activities of General Pavlov in the initial and most incredibly difficult period of the Great Patriotic War.
Image copyright AFP/Getty Image caption The catastrophic start of the war with Nazi Germany forced Stalin to take measures of intimidation against his own generals (captured Soviet soldiers in the picture)
75 years ago, exactly one month after the start of the Great Patriotic War, the commander of the Western Front, General of the Army Dmitry Pavlov, was shot.
Pavlov was executed in Moscow and buried at the NKVD training ground in Butovo.
Until recently, he, along with Georgy Zhukov, was considered the most powerful and promising commander of the Red Army.
"For cowardice, unauthorized abandonment of strategic points without the permission of the high command, the collapse of command and control, inaction of the authorities," the verdict read.
In the draft order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0250 with the announcement of the verdict, brought to the troops on July 28, these words were inscribed by Stalin's hand.
Six more generals shared the fate of Pavlov at the same time or a little later: Chief of Staff of the Front Vladimir Klimovskikh, Chief of Artillery Nikolai Klich, Deputy Chief of the Air Force Andrei Tayursky, Chief of Communications Andrei Grigoryev, Commander of the 4th Army Alexander Korobkov and Commander of the 14th Mechanized Corps Stepan Oborin.
On June 22, the head of the air force of the front, Major General Ivan Kopets, according to some sources, committed suicide, according to others, he was killed while resisting the Chekists who came after him.
Pavlov's wife, son, parents and mother-in-law were exiled to Krasnoyarsk region as the family of a traitor to the motherland, although treason was not mentioned in the verdict. Except for the son, no one returned from Siberia.
On July 31, 1957, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR overturned the sentences against the command of the Western Front due to the absence of corpus delicti in the actions of the convicts. They were posthumously restored in titles and awards.
Image copyright Getty Images Image caption At least 20 thousand people were shot by the Stalinist NKVD at the Butovo training groundAn important role was played by a note by Colonel General Leonid Sandalov, in June 1941, the chief of staff of the 4th Army.
Legally, the "i" are dotted. Historians continue to argue about the extent of Pavlov's personal guilt for the defeat of the Western Front, and about why it was he who paid the price, although the situation with neighbors in Ukraine and the Baltic states was no better.
rout
During the first 18 days of the war, the Western Front lost almost 418 thousand out of 625 thousand personnel, including 338.5 thousand prisoners, 3188 tanks, 1830 guns, 521 thousand small arms.
Thirty-two of the forty-four divisions were encircled, from which, according to the entry in the Journal of Combat Operations of the Western Front, "small groups and individuals" emerged.
34 generals and colonels in general positions were killed, captured or seriously injured.
On June 28, on the seventh day of the war, Minsk fell. The territories attached at the cost of colossal reputational costs under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were completely lost in five days.
I am not a traitor. The defeat of the troops I commanded occurred due to reasons beyond my control Dmitry Pavlov, court statement
The Wehrmacht paid for this with the loss of 15,723 men killed and wounded.
On June 22, Stalin and the leadership of the USSR considered the German attack as a major nuisance, but by no means a catastrophe. Directive No. 2 (07:15 on June 22) demanded "to fall upon the enemy forces and destroy them", and directive No. 3 (21:15) - to seize Suwalki and Lublin by June 24, that is, to transfer hostilities to enemy territory.
Of the 10,743 Soviet aircraft in the border echelon, the first strike on "peacefully sleeping airfields" destroyed about 800. There was more than to fight.
Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Stalin himself wrote in the order on the verdict to Pavlov: "for cowardice, unauthorized abandonment of strategic points without the permission of the high command, the collapse of command and control, inaction of the authorities"In the first days of the war, Stalin was calm and active. The stupor, when he left for the Near Dacha, did not contact anyone, and, according to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, he threw to the arriving members of the Politburo: “Lenin left us the proletarian Soviet state, and we forgot it,” happened to him after the fall of Minsk, June 29-30.
Dmitry Pavlov was born on October 23, 1897 in the village of Vonyukh, Kostroma Region, later renamed Pavlovo. Graduated from two classes, in the First world war rose to the rank of non-commissioned officer, in 1916 he was taken prisoner.
Returning to Russia in January 1919, he was mobilized into the Red Army and almost immediately joined the RCP(b). He served in the "food battalion" in Kostroma, that is, he was engaged in food requisitioning. He fought with Makhno, then with the Basmachi in the vicinity of Khujand and Bukhara.
In 1931 he switched from a horse to a tank, after graduating from the Frunze Academy and courses at Military Technical Academy.
Historian Vladimir Beshanov, based on an analysis of the curricula and memoirs of teachers and students, expresses doubt about the quality of education in the Soviet military academies of that time, but most of Pavlov's colleagues did not have this either. Georgy Zhukov studied only at short-term courses and used to say: "Whatever the fool, then the graduate of the academy."
In 1936-1937, Pavlov was an adviser to the Republican government of Spain under the pseudonym "General Pablo". Upon his return, he received the star of the Hero and was appointed head of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army. Participated in the operation on Khalkhin Gol and the war with Finland. In June 1940 he headed the Western Special Military District.
The first tanker of the Union
Nikita Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that in 1940 he was present at the tests of the T-34 tank and was amazed at how he, under the control of Pavlov, "flyed through swamps and sands", but in a conversation after the end of the races, the general "made a depressing impression, seemed to me underdeveloped human."
Some authors sarcastically ask what kind of Pavlov was, who depressed Khrushchev, who was also not too burdened with cultural baggage. Others point out that Pavlov probably did not read Kant or even Marx, but there is one circumstance that makes it difficult to consider him primitive.
Tanks T-34 and others, who glorified themselves during the Great Patriotic War, were the dream of Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov, embodied in metal Kirill Meretskov, Marshal of the Soviet Union
From the experience of fighting in Spain, Pavlov learned that it was necessary to create diesel tanks with anti-shell armor and long-barreled guns, and managed to convince Voroshilov and Stalin himself, who inscribed a resolution on his memorandum: "I am for."
Thanks to Pavlov, on the eve of the war, the Red Army received the KV and T-34 tanks, which had no analogues in the world, which were developed and built respectively in Leningrad and Kharkov and were put into service on the same day: December 19, 1939.
Only forward!
At all the exercises of the ZAPOVO under the leadership of Pavlov, only the offensive was practiced with "overcoming fortified areas" and "forcing water barriers." The next maneuvers were scheduled for June 22, 1941.
At a meeting of the highest command staff of the Red Army in the presence of Stalin on December 23-31, 1940, Zhukov and Pavlov made the main reports.
Zhukov's speech was entitled: "The nature of the modern offensive operation," Pavlov specified the tasks in relation to the mechanized corps, the main strike force of the Red Army.
Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Thanks to Pavlov, on the eve of the war, the Red Army received tanks that had no analogues in the world“Tank corps, supported massively by aviation, break into the enemy’s defensive zone, break his anti-tank defense system, hit artillery along the way. A couple of tank corps will have to cover a tactical depth of about 30-35 kilometers within a couple of hours, and rifle units will follow them. Of course , the most important factor is surprise," Pavlov described his vision of the upcoming war.
He also thought about the details: "do not take food trucks into the gap, meat can be obtained on the spot, bread must be found on the spot"; "to take cans and kegs on top of the tank, diesel fuel does not burn."
According to the memoirs of the meeting participants, 43-year-old Pavlov, squat and broad-shouldered, "breathed volcanic energy."
The only report on the defense was made by the commander of the Moscow Military District, Ivan Tyulenev, and even then about the containment of the enemy in separate sectors, which would have to be exposed in order to concentrate forces for a general offensive.
Historian Igor Bunich points out that of the 276 marshals, generals and admirals present, only one in three was destined for a long life. The rest were soon expected to die in battle, in a Nazi camp or from a KGB bullet.
Mystery game
From Zhukovsky's "Memoirs and Reflections", the story is widely known about how, during the command-staff game on the cards that followed the meeting, Pavlov repelled German aggression, commanding the conditional "Reds", Zhukov advanced at the head of the "Blues" and defeated Pavlov, acting almost like this the same as the real enemy will act in six months.
Why were the results of the game not taken into account when preparing the defense of Belarus? And why didn't Stalin dismiss the "incompetent" Pavlov, but a month and a half later he equalized him with Zhukov, conferring the rank of army general?
Who dared to ask questions about the defense was considered an alarmist Leonid Sandalov, Colonel General
Declassified documents cited by historian Pyotr Bobylev testify that during the game, again, not defense, but an offensive was practiced, and it took place in two stages: January 2-6 and January 8-11, 1941.
It was possible to attack Germany in two ways: from Belarus and the Baltic states to East Prussia and Northern Poland, or from Ukraine and Moldova to Romania with access to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Southern Poland.
The first option opened the shortest route to Berlin, but this theater had significantly more German troops and fortifications, as well as complex water barriers.
The second delayed the final victory, but made it relatively easy to take control of Romanian oil and knock Germany's allies out of the war. The first phase of the game, where Pavlov led the Soviet offensive and Zhukov repelled it, demonstrated the difficulties of the "northern" variant.
At the second stage, the military leaders switched roles. Stalin, who had already decided everything for himself, was not present, and People's Commissar for Defense Semyon Timoshenko and his deputy Semyon Budyonny, who supported the "southern" option, made the conditions so as to play along with the "Reds" as much as possible.
The traditional version is correct in one thing: Pavlov really acted against Zhukov without success.
As is clear from the latest plan for the war with Germany, known as and reported to Stalin on May 19, 1941, the final choice was made in favor of the "southern" option.
But the leader, obviously, had no complaints against Pavlov in connection with this: it was intended that way.
How did Pavlov command?
All day on June 21, 1941, Pavlov and Klimovskikh about suspicious movement and noise on the other side of the border.
Although by a secret order of June 19 the district was transformed into a front with an order for the headquarters to move from Minsk to a command post near the Obuz-Lesna station, Pavlov spent Saturday evening in the capital of the republic at a performance in the House of Officers, diligently demonstrating, as Army General Sergei Ivanov later wrote , "calm, if not carelessness."
The neighbor on the left, the commander of the Kiev district, Mikhail Kirponos, was watching a football match at the same time, and then went to the theater.
Pavlov, of course, did not go to sleep. At one in the morning on June 22, the People's Commissar of Defense called Minsk: "Well, how are you, calmly?"
Pavlov reported that German columns had been continuously marching towards the border for the last 24 hours, and that wire barriers had been removed from the German side in many places.
"Be calm and don't panic," Tymoshenko replied. "Assemble the headquarters just in case this morning, maybe something unpleasant will happen, but, look, don't go for any provocation. If there are separate provocations, call."
If I had withdrawn troops from the military camps without an order, and Hitler had not attacked, I would have had my head cut off Dmitry Pavlov, court statement
The next time Pavlov called with the message that the Germans were bombing and shelling Soviet territory and crossing the border.
On the one hand, permission to do what one wants, in professional language, is called a loss of control.
According to many researchers, the order, which demonstrated the confusion of the command, marked the beginning of the demoralization of the troops and the collapse of the front.
Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Georgy Zhukov later wrote in his memoirs how, during the command-staff game on the maps, Pavlov repelled German aggression, commanding the conditional "Reds". Zhukov advanced at the head of the Blues and defeated Pavlov (pictured Zhukov and French General Catru, Berlin, September 1945)On the other hand, before receiving Directive No. 2, which Zhukov began to write by hand in Moscow only at 07:15, the only valid instruction was Directive No. 1 of 00:25, the main content of which was the requirement "not to succumb to any provocative actions" .
Pavlov, at worst, allowed to open fire on the enemy, but he could not set more specific tasks, since he himself did not have them.
Failure near Grodno
Having received Directive No. 3, Pavlov at 23:40 on June 22 ordered his deputy, Lieutenant General Ivan Boldin, to form a group consisting of the 6th and 11th mechanized corps and the 6th cavalry corps (seven divisions and 1597 tanks, including 114 KV and 238 T-34) and hit the flank of the advancing Germans in the Grodno region.
"Due to the scattered formations, instability of control, and the impact of enemy aircraft, it was not possible to concentrate the grouping at the appointed time. The goals of the counterattack were not achieved," the authors of the monograph "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" state.
The failures of the Soviet tank troops are explained not by the poor quality of weapons, but by the inability of command and lack of experience in maneuvering Stalin's son Yakov Dzhugashvili, from testimony in German captivity
“The Volkovysk-Slonim highway was littered with abandoned tanks, burned-out vehicles, broken cannons so that traffic was impossible. The columns of prisoners reached 10 km in length,” activists of the Belarusian search club “Batkovshchina” wrote from the words of local old people.
Judging by the memoirs of the commander of the 3rd tank group of the Wehrmacht Herman Goth, who opposed Boldin, he simply did not notice a counterattack in the Grodno region.
Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder in his "Military Diary" mentioned Russian attacks in the direction of Grodno, but already at 18:00 on June 25 he wrote: "The situation south of Grodno has stabilized. The enemy attacks have been repulsed."
On June 24, Pavlov powerlessly called out from the front headquarters: "Why is the 6th MK not advancing, who is to blame? We must beat the enemy in an organized manner, and not run away without control."
On the 25th, he stated: "During the day, no data on the situation at the front was received by the front headquarters."
Actually, this was the end of Pavlov's independent leadership of the troops. Marshals Timoshenko and Kulik, who had flown in from Moscow, took over control, but they also failed to control the situation.
Rapid reprisal
On June 30, Pavlov was summoned to Moscow, where Molotov and Zhukov spoke to him, and appointed deputy commander of the Western Front.
On July 4, special officers stopped the car of Pavlov, who was going to the headquarters of the front in Gomel, near the city of Dovsk.
Investigators developed the case in a standard way, being interested not so much in the reasons for the failures of the Western Front, but in the relationship of the suspect with "enemies of the people Uborevich and Meretskov."
Pavlov, severely beaten, signed a confession that he was in a conspiracy and deliberately opened the front to the enemy, but at the trial he retracted this part of the testimony.
Stalin decided to confine himself to accusations of incompetence and cowardice, probably considering it inappropriate in a difficult situation to increase panic by declaring that traitors were in charge of our fronts.
As everybody
Pavlov, of course, did not crown himself with commander's laurels, but he was no worse than others.
The tank battle that unfolded on June 23-30 in Ukraine under the leadership of the commander of the South-Western Front Mikhail Kirponos and the chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov, who flew in from Moscow in the area of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody (3128 Soviet and 728 German tanks, more than near Prokhorovka), ended with the defeat of five mechanized corps of the Red Army. Losses amounted to 2648 and 260 tanks, respectively.
In the Baltic states, the Wehrmacht advanced at a rate of up to 50 km per day. Vilnius fell on June 24, Riga on June 30, Pskov on July 9, by mid-July the fighting was going on a hundred kilometers from Leningrad.
Image copyright Getty Images Image caption As Nikita Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs, General Pavlov "made a depressing impression, seemed to me an underdeveloped person"Ivan Boldin, the second man on the Western Front, who was also directly responsible for the defeat near Grodno, and the commanders of the 3rd and 10th armies Vasily Kuznetsov and Konstantin Golubev were not held accountable and commanded the armies until the end of the war.
The reason is simple: at the beginning of July they were encircled and inaccessible, and when they got out, the political necessity disappeared. In addition, in 1941, only 63 Soviet generals found themselves in captivity, so the rest had to be protected.
At the core, it was not Pavlov who was to blame, but Stalin Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader
And in any case, not Pavlov's prewar years forbade even talking about defense.
It was not Pavlov who pushed airfields and warehouses to the very border instead of arranging trenches and minefields.
It was not he who came up with the idea that if the Germans attacked, then the main blow would be delivered to Ukraine, as a result of which the 4th Army, located in the main Brest direction that turned out to be in reality, became the only army of the first echelon that did not have an anti-tank artillery brigade in its composition.
Russian roulette
The announced demotion was not so big, considering that Timoshenko himself took command of the front.
Obviously, something changed in four days - and this was due not to Pavlov's actions, but to Stalin's mood.
One of the versions says that on June 30, the leader, who was in prostration in the country, was not up to Pavlov, but when he came to his senses, he began to restore order in his usual manner.
Perhaps a political decision was made to shoot one front commander in a revealing manner, as in the early 2000s - to imprison one oligarch.
The choice fell on Pavlov, because Stalin was especially shocked and outraged by the loss of Minsk. According to historian Aleksey Kuznetsov, "Kyiv was still far away, and Vilnius did not sound so tragic."
Yes, he knew how, without reservations, suddenly - as it bakes - to transfer any of his miscalculations to someone's account Alexander Tvardovsky, "By the Right of Memory"
A certain role could be played by the appointment of Lev Mehlis, a particularly trusted Stalinist emissary, as a member of the Military Council of the Western Front, known for his habit, arriving at any new place, after a few days sending a proposal on who should be shot here.
Finally, Mark Solonin and some other researchers suggest a connection between the Pavlov case and the Meretskov case.
The former chief of the general staff, then commander of the Leningrad Military District, General of the Army Kirill Meretskov, was arrested a few hours before the start of the war on the Red Arrow train on the way from Moscow to his duty station.
In September he will be released, he will command the Volkhov and Karelian fronts and become a marshal. But by the time Pavlov was arrested, Meretskov had been in Lefortovo for almost two weeks, where he was beaten so that the caring Stalin subsequently offered him to report while sitting.
What and to whom Meretskov testified is unknown, because his investigative file was destroyed in 1955 by order of the KGB chairman Ivan Serov.
Among the confessions knocked out from Pavlov, there is this: allegedly in January 1940, on the Finnish front, drinking with Meretskov, he said: "Even if Hitler comes, we will not be worse off from this."
About the events connected with the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Especially everything related to the disaster on the Western Front, which was created on the basis of the Western Special Military District, a disaster that has become one of the most tragic pages in the history of the initial period of the war. When literally within the first week, by June 28, Minsk and Bobruisk were captured by the enemy. To the west of the Belarusian capital, the 3rd and 10th armies were surrounded, and the remnants of the 4th army retreated beyond the Berezina. There was a threat of a quick exit of the enemy's mobile units to the Dnieper and their breakthrough to Smolensk.
Events developed rapidly, and already on July 4, on the way to Gomel, where by that time the headquarters of the Western Front was located, the commander of the Western Front, General of the Army D. Pavlov, was arrested. The arrest procedure was personally supervised by the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, army commissar 1st rank Mekhlis, concurrently appointed a member of the military council of the front. He was also instructed to determine the circle of persons from the command staff of the front, who, together with the former commander, were to be brought to trial. As a result, in addition to Pavlov, the chief of staff of the front, Major General V.E., was arrested. Klimovskikh, head of communications, Major General A.T. Grigoriev, commander of the 4th Army, Major General A.A. Korobkov and a number of other military leaders. All of them were removed from their posts, and then brought to trial by the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and shot.
Until now, the characterization of the military commander, whom Stalin entrusted at that time with one of the most important military districts of the country, is still not clear and contradictory? The district, which was the second in terms of the number of troops, and in terms of the importance of the strategic direction, perhaps even the first, who is General Pavlov? What do we know about this person, except that he did not cope with his duties as a commander, that he lost command of the troops. As a result, the Red Army suffered an unprecedented heavy defeat. In just 17 days, out of 625 thousand soldiers and commanders, the Western Front lost about 420 thousand personnel! As a result, Pavlov came under a speedy trial and execution.
Who is Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov? Studying his biography, it is clear that there is nothing particularly outstanding in it, an ordinary biography, like all military leaders of that time. Born into a peasant family, he volunteered for the front during the First World War. In the tsarist army he rose to the rank of senior non-commissioned officer. He was wounded in 1916 and taken prisoner, released after the end of the war. From 1919 in the Red Army, during the Civil War from 1918 to 1920 he was a platoon commander, squadron commander, assistant regiment commander. He joined the CPSU (b) in 1919. Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovsky have the same biography.
Some researchers impute Pavlov's illiteracy and lack of military education. However, the biography shows that he graduated from the 24th Omsk Infantry School named after the Comintern, military academy them. M. V. Frunze and academic courses at the Military Technical Academy, so that for the commander of those times the education was quite sufficient. Zhukov, for example, did not even have an academic education, but this did not prevent him from leading the General Staff of the Red Army.
Interesting fact from the biography of D. Pavlov. November 1937 to June 1940 he headed the Armored Directorate of the Red Army, and in this very short time, Dmitry Grigorievich showed himself to be a pretty good theoretician of the use of tank troops and tanks on the battlefield. It was he who first announced the need for a radical revision of tank weapons, Pavlov suggested that the infantry escort tanks, which at that time included the T-26, be left to the infantry, and the T-28 and T-35 should be armed with a 76-mm cannon, in addition, to replace this two tanks, he proposed to develop a new heavy breakthrough tank. The main tank of the Red Army T-34 was also created on the instructions and requirements of the then head of the Red Army ABTV Commander D. Pavlov.
A lot of controversy caused and continues to cause the decision to disband the tank corps in the Red Army before the start of the war, many believed that this was almost a betrayal. However, not everything is so simple, it is interesting that D. Pavlov was one of the initiators of this decision. It was at his suggestion that instead of the disbanded directorates of the 4th tank corps, 15 divisions were created, which surpassed the disbanded corps both in the number of tanks, and in combat power, and in the ability to conduct combat operations. The principle of using tank brigades and motorized divisions according to Pavlov suggested that they could be included in rifle corps, combined arms armies and fronts, and also kept in the reserve of the High Command. What is most interesting, these and many other proposals of D. Pavlov were later implemented not only in the Red Army, but also by our main enemy - the German Wehrmacht. During the attack on the Soviet Union according to the Barbarossa plan, the Germans brought all their tank divisions, which had an average of 150 tanks each, into 4 groups (analogous to the ERP echelon of the development of a breakthrough according to Pavlov), according to this principle, they used tank troops in the German tank army " Africa" under the command of the famous Field Marshal E. Rommel.
As can be seen from these examples, Stalin, when appointing D. Pavlov to the post of commander of one of the main military districts of the country, apparently took into account that he was a fairly competent military commander who thought strategically. But as for the presence of combat experience and especially the experience of leading large formations, here, apparently, there really was the most vulnerable spot in D. Pavlov's personal preparedness as a commander. But whether it was decisive in that further tragedy of Pavlov as an army general, commander of the Western Special District, the question has not yet been disclosed. Few of the then Soviet generals had such experience, very few, only the last name Shaposhnikov comes to mind, and the fact that he is a pure General Staff officer, and not a commander.
Further, from the biography of D. Pavlov, it is known that in the early 20s he served and participated in hostilities in Turkestan against Basmachi gangs in the positions of assistant regiment commander, head of the fighter squad and commander of the cavalry regiment, and since 1928 D. Pavlov commander of a cavalry and mechanized regiment, commander and commissar of a mechanized brigade, in this position in 1929 he took part in an armed conflict against the Chinese on the CER. In 1936-1937, during the Spanish Civil War, he fought as a volunteer on the side of the Republican government, was the commander of a tank brigade. From these facts it is clear that in reality D. Pavlov was a brave man, he went through many, as they say now, “hot spots”, but at the same time he had experience of commanding only a brigade regiment and nothing more. This conclusion, in particular, is confirmed by the memorandum of Colonel General L. Sandalov, submitted by him to the head of the military scientific department of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces dated September 1, 1956, which, in particular, states:
“Army General Pavlov, having no experience in commanding military formations (excluding commanding a tank brigade for a short period of time), after participating in the war in Spain, was appointed head of the ABTU of the Red Army, and a year before the war - commander of the ZOVO troops. Having neither experience in command and control, nor sufficient military education and a broad operational outlook, Army General Pavlov was confused in the difficult situation of the initial period of the war and let go of command and control.
And where at that time was Stalin to find commanders with a General Staff education, experience in commanding armies and fronts, so D. Pavlov was the military commander of his time and he was not alone guilty of the fact that the enemy chose the direction of his main attack precisely in the direction of the Western Special District which he commanded at the time.
According to some modern researchers, allegedly Pavlov's main fault was, first of all, that he did not comply with the Directive of the NPO and the General Staff of June 12-13, 1941, instructing the command of the Western Military District, prescribing to increase combat readiness to begin advancing parts of the district to the defense lines according to the cover plans worked out on the basis of the May Directive by NGOs and the General Staff. However, the facts show that in mid-June 1941, D. Pavlov sent two encrypted messages to Stalin and the People's Commissariat of Defense asking for the withdrawal of troops to field positions and even tried to obtain permission to partially mobilize parts of the district, also asked to strengthen the district with communications units and tanks.
Also, according to these researchers, Pavlov, after receiving the Directive of June 12-13, did not give a timely command to withdraw three divisions from the Brest region, located there for the construction of fortifications. As a result, these three divisions - one tank and two rifle divisions, intended to cover the Brest direction, were destroyed during the first days of the war, which became the main reason for the defeat of the troops of the entire Western Front and thereby opened up to the enemy an important strategic direction to Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow .
In this regard, the following questions immediately arise. Where then was the General Staff of the Red Army, which was responsible for the strategic deployment of troops, in whose hands was all the intelligence information? Why was the district commander not given timely instructions to withdraw troops from the Brest region? Where was the People's Commissariat of Defense? And these questions, where and why, there are many, clear, specific answers to them.
There are also such researchers who, based on a list of certain facts, even argue about the betrayal of some part of the generals and commanders of a different level on the eve of the war and especially in its first days. So, for example, they cite facts of allegedly malicious withdrawal military units from the border right in the very first minutes of the war, as a result of which the already small and poorly armed units of the border guards remained face to face with the enemy a hundred times superior to them. As a result, none of the 435 frontier outposts on the western borders, unlike the troops of the Red Army, retreated without an order, many border guards died in battle, fulfilling their military duty to the end.
It is also interesting that Pavlov was not tried under the famous Article 58 of the Criminal Code. In the process of a closed court session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on July 22, 1941, the articles of the Criminal Code were reclassified, under which the command of ZAPOVO was accused. They were arrested on charges of committing crimes under Art. 63-2 and 76 of the Criminal Code of the Byelorussian SSR (analogous to the famous article 58 in the Criminal Code of the RSFSR). However, a harsh sentence was handed down on the basis of Art. 193-17/b and 193-20/b of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. The wording of the charge in the sentence was as follows: "for cowardice, inaction of the authorities, indiscretion, allowing the collapse of command and control, surrendering to the enemy without a fight, unauthorized abandonment of combat positions by units of the Red Army and creating an opportunity for the enemy to break through the front of the Red Army."
“Creating an opportunity for the enemy to break through the front of the Red Army” was imputed only to Pavlov himself as commander of the Western Front.
Stalin, having given instructions to reclassify the crime of the command of the Western Front to other articles of the Criminal Code, thereby made it clear to the generals that he did not intend to arrange a global power showdown with him, especially like 1937, but if necessary, he could easily do without the famous 58th article.
On July 31, 1957, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR issued a ruling by which the sentence of July 22, 1941 was canceled due to newly discovered circumstances and the case was dismissed due to the lack of corpus delicti. Dmitry Pavlov was posthumously reinstated in military rank.
The question of who bears the main responsibility for the defeats of June 1941 still remains open.
P avlov Dmitry Grigorievich - commander of the 4th separate mechanized brigade in the troops of the Republican Spain, commander.
Born on October 23 (November 4), 1897 in the village of Vonyukh, Kologrievsky district, Kostroma province, now the village of Pavlovo, Kologrivsky district, Kostroma region, in the family of a poor peasant. Russian. He graduated from the 4th grade of a rural school and the 2nd grade Sukhoverkhov School. Due to lack of money, he completed his studies and worked in the countryside.
Entered the Russian Imperial Army as a volunteer in 1914, served as a private in the 120th Serpukhov Regiment, in the 5th Hussars and in the 20th rifle regiment, in the 202nd reserve regiment. He rose to the rank of senior non-commissioned officer. Member of the First World War. He was wounded in 1916 in a battle on the Stokhid River and taken prisoner. In captivity was in the camps Klein, Vitemberg. He worked at the Springstof factory and the mines of Mariana Grube. Released from captivity after the end of the First World War, he returned home on January 1, 1919. He worked in the department of social security and labor protection of the Kologrievsky county labor committee.
Member of the Civil War. He was drafted into the Red Army on professional mobilization on August 25, 1919, sent to the 56th food battalion in Kostroma, was the clerk of the food detachment in the Levashovskaya and Klimovskaya volosts on food tax. Member of the RCP(b) since November 1919.
In December 1919, he entered the Kostroma infantry command staff courses, which he graduated on March 1, 1920, after which he left for the Southern Front. After an exam in the inspection of the cavalry of the 13th army, he was sent to the 8th Cossack cavalry division, where he served in a separate reserve division as a platoon commander of a hundred and a division commander. Fought near Perekop (Ivankovtsy). During the stationing of the division in Constantinograd (Poltava region), he fought with the Makhnovists in the area of the village of Martynovka. He was in the battles near Proskurov, near Volochysk, Zbarazh, Tarnopol. In October 1920, he was transferred to the cavalry inspection of the 13th Army and was appointed inspector for assignments.
In December 1920, after disbanding the inspection, he was transferred to the inspection of the cavalry of the Southern Front (Kharkov), and from there he was sent to study at the Omsk United Higher Military School of Siberia at the cavalry department. From January 1, 1921 to April 1922, he was a student and at the same time commanded a half-squadron of students of this school in the city of Omsk. He graduated from school with honors, for which he was awarded binoculars from the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) of the troops of Siberia.
From April 1922 - commander of the cavalry regiment of the 10th cavalry division (Semipalatinsk). Since June 1922 - assistant commander of the 55th cavalry regiment of the 6th Altai cavalry brigade of the 10th separate cavalry division fought against the Salnikov bands in the Ubinskoye region and the remnants of the Kaigorodov bands (Bukhtarma, Katon, Karagay). In 1923, together with the brigade, he was transferred to the Turkestan Front. In February 1923, as the head of the fighter detachment, he took part in hostilities against the Turdybai gang (Khojent region, Lyailak village). In August 1923, he was transferred with a brigade to Eastern Bukhara. He led operations against the gangs of Ibrahim-Bek, Ala-Nazar, Barot, Khodman, Haji-Ali, the last three were defeated, and the remnants were driven into Afghanistan. Was ill with malaria. From June 1924 he was assistant commander for the combat unit of the 48th cavalry regiment, from October of the same year - in the same position in the 47th cavalry regiment.
From October 1925 to June 1928 he studied at the Military Academy of the Red Army named after M.V. Frunze. After graduating from the academy, on July 1, 1928, he was appointed commander and military commissar of the 75th cavalry regiment of the 5th separate Kuban cavalry brigade (Dauria). In 1929, in the battles on the Chinese Eastern Railway near Dalainor and Manchuria, Pavlov's regiment ensured the complete defeat of the enemy for the entire brigade. Since March 1930 - at the disposal of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Red Army.
From January to August 1931 he studied at the Academic Courses for Technical Improvement of the Commanding Staff at the Dzerzhinsky Military Technical Academy in the city of Leningrad. After graduating from AKTUS, from March 1931 to February 1934 he commanded the 75th Cavalry Regiment and the 6th Mechanized Regiment of the Belarusian Military District in Gomel. From January 1934 to October 1936 - commander and military commissar of the 4th separate mechanized brigade.
From October 1936 to June 1937, under the pseudonym "De Pablo", he participated in the national revolutionary war of the Spanish people, where he commanded a tank brigade and combined groups from 11 to 9 brigades with all technical means.
W and the fulfillment of a special task by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 21, 1937 to the commander Pavlov Dmitry Grigorievich awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin. After the establishment of the sign of special distinction, he was awarded the Gold Star medal No. 30.
From July to November 1937 - Deputy Head of the Armored Directorate (ABTU) of the Red Army. From December 1937 - head of ABTU. At the same time, from March 1938 to June 1941, he was a member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army.
Participated in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.
From June 1940 Pavlov D.G. commanded the troops of the Western Special Military District, and from the first day of the Great Patriotic War - the Western Front.
The troops of the Western Front took the brunt of the Nazi troops and in a short time were defeated in battles in Western Belarus and in the Minsk region. On June 30, 1941, General of the Army Pavlov D.G. was removed from his post and summoned to Moscow. From there, he was again sent to the front without a specific position, and on July 4 (according to other sources, on July 6), 1941, he was arrested.
By a decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR of July 16, 1941, General of the Army Pavlov with a group of other military leaders was accused of cowardice, inaction, lack of command, of the collapse of command and control and of surrendering warehouses and property to the enemy without a fight, of unauthorized abandonment of military positions, his case was transferred to a military tribunal. According to the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR dated July 22, 1941, Pavlov D.G. and a number of other generals - the chief of staff of the Western Front, Major General Klimovskikh V.E., the head of communications of the front, Major General Grigoriev A.T., the commander of the 4th Army, Major General Korobkov A.A. were sentenced to death. All the convicts were shot on the same day.
By the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 21, 1947, Pavlov D.G. was deprived of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and all state awards.
By the decision of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR of July 31, 1957, the sentence was canceled, the case was dismissed due to the lack of corpus delicti, D.G. Pavlov and the generals convicted with him were rehabilitated posthumously.
November 25, 1965 Pavlov D.G. reinstated in the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and in the rights to other state awards.
Candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1939. Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st convocation (since 1937).
Military ranks:
brigade commander (11/26/1935),
commander (06/20/1937, bypassing the rank of division commander),
commander of the 2nd rank (03/27/1940),
colonel-general of tank troops (06/04/1940),
army general (02/22/1941).He was awarded three Orders of Lenin (08/16/1936, 07/21/1937, 04/07/1940), two Orders of the Red Banner (1930, 01/2/1937), the medal "XX Years of the Red Army" (1938).
In the village of Pavlovo, an obelisk was erected to the hero.
ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SENTENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE USSR IN THE CASE OF ARMY GENERAL D.G. PAVLOVA, GENERAL-MAJOROV V.E. Klimovskikh, A.T. GRIGORIEV and A.A. KOROBKOVA
By order of the State Defense Committee, the former commander of the Western Front, General of the Army Pavlov D.G., the former chief of staff of the same front, General Major Klimovskikh V.E., former head of communications of the same front, Major General Grigoriev A.T., former commander of the 4th Army, Major General Korobkov A.A.
Supreme Court USSR On July 22, 1941, he considered the case on charges of Pavlov D.G., Klimovskikh V.E., Grigoriev A.T. and Korobkova A.A.
The judicial investigation found that:
a) former commander of the Western Front Pavlov D.G. and the former chief of staff of the same front Klimovskikh V.E. from the beginning of hostilities by the fascist German troops against the USSR, they showed cowardice, inaction of the authorities, lack of discretion, allowed the collapse of command and control, the surrender of weapons and depots to the enemy, the unauthorized abandonment of combat positions by units of the Western Front, and this gave the enemy the opportunity to break through the front;
b) the former communications chief of the Western Front Grigoriev A.T., having the opportunity to establish uninterrupted communication between the front headquarters and the active units and formations, showed alarmism and criminal inaction, did not use radio communications, as a result of which, from the first days of hostilities, command and control of troops was disrupted;
c) former commander of the 4th Army of the Western Front Korobkov A.A. showed cowardice, cowardice and criminal inaction, shamefully abandoned the units entrusted to him, as a result of which the army was disorganized and suffered heavy losses.
Thus, Pavlov D.G., Klimovskikh V.E., Grigoriev A.T. and Korobkov A.A. violated the military oath, dishonored the high rank of a soldier of the Red Army, forgot their duty to the Motherland, their cowardice and alarmism, criminal inaction, the collapse of command and control, the surrender of weapons and depots to the enemy, the assumption of unauthorized abandonment of combat positions by units caused serious damage to the troops of the Western Front.
The Supreme Court of the USSR Pavlov D.G., Klimovskikh V.E., Grigoriev A.T. and Korobkov A.A. stripped of their military ranks and sentenced to death.
The sentence has been carried out.
I warn you that from now on everyone who violates the military oath, forgets their duty to the Motherland, discredits the high rank of a soldier of the Red Army, all cowards and alarmists who arbitrarily leave their combat positions and hand over their weapons to the enemy without a fight, will be mercilessly punished according to all the strictness of wartime laws, regardless on faces.
An order to announce to all command staff from the regiment commander and above.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
