Soviet-Polish war.

Soviet-Polish War (1919-1921)
Bereza Pinsk Lida Vilno Minsk (1) Berezina (1) Dvinsk Latichov Mozyr Korosten Kazatin Berezina (2) Kyiv (1) Kyiv (2) Volodarka Glubokoe Mironovka Olshanitsa Zhivotov Medvedovka Dzyunkov Vasilkovtsy Bystrik Brest (1) Grodno (1) Neman (1) Boryspil Auta Dubno Kobryn Lomza Brody Demblin Nasielsk Serock Radzymin Ossuv Warsaw Płock Wkra Kock Cycow Ciechanów Lviv Zadwuzhe Mława Białystok Komarov Dityatyn Neman (2) Grodno (2) Brest (2) Molodechno Minsk (2)

Soviet-Polish War(Polish wojna polsko-bolszewicka (wojna polsko-rosyjska) , Ukrainian Polish-Radian War) - an armed conflict between Poland and Soviet Russia, Soviet Belarus, Soviet Ukraine on the territory of the collapsed Russian Empire - Russia, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine in 1919–1921 during the Russian Civil War. In modern Polish historiography it is called the “Polish-Bolshevik War”. Troops of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic also took part in the conflict; in the first phase of the war they acted against Poland, then units of the UPR supported Polish troops.

Background

The main territories for the possession of which the war was fought until the middle of the 14th century were various ancient Russian principalities. After a period of internecine wars and the Tatar-Mongol invasion of 1240, they became objects of expansion by Lithuania and Poland. In the first half of the 14th century, Kyiv, the Dnieper region, the area between the Pripyat and Western Dvina rivers became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and in 1352 the lands of the Galicia-Volyn principality were divided between Poland and Lithuania. In 1569, according to the Union of Lublin between Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, some Ukrainian lands, previously part of the latter, came under the authority of the Polish crown. In - gg., as a result of three divisions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, part of the lands (Western Belarus and most of Western Ukraine) came under the rule of the Russian crown, Galician territories became part of the Austrian monarchy.

Goals of the parties to the conflict

The main goal of the Polish leadership led by Józef Pilsudski was the restoration of Poland within the historical borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, with the establishment of control over Belarus, Ukraine (including Donbass) and Lithuania and geopolitical dominance in Eastern Europe:

On the Soviet side, the establishment of control over the western provinces of the former Russian Empire(Ukraine and Belarus) and their Sovietization, as a maximum program - the Sovietization of Poland, followed by Germany and the transition to world revolution. The Soviet leadership considered the war against Poland as part of the struggle against the entire Versailles international system that existed at that time.

Progress of the war

The situation in Eastern Europe at the end of 1918

Poland in 1918-1922

According to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty of March 3, 1918, the western border of Soviet Russia was established along the line Riga - Dvinsk - Druya ​​- Drisvyaty - Mikhalishki - Dzevilishki - Dokudova - r. Neman - r. Zelvinka - Pruzhany - Vidoml.

On January 1, 1919, the Belarusian SSR was proclaimed. On the same day, Polish units took control of Vilnius, but on January 6 the city was recaptured by units of the Red Army. On February 16, the authorities of the Byelorussian SSR proposed to the Polish government to determine the borders, but Warsaw ignored this proposal. On February 27, after Lithuania was included in the Byelorussian SSR, it was renamed the Lithuanian-Byelorussian SSR (Litbel Republic).

Poland could not provide significant assistance to the KZVO detachments, since part of the Polish troops were drawn into the border conflict with Czechoslovakia and were preparing for possible conflict with Germany for Silesia. , and there were still German troops in the western regions of Poland. Only after the intervention of the Entente on February 5, an agreement was signed that the Germans would let the Poles through to the east. As a result, on February 4, Polish troops occupied Kovel, on February 9 they entered Brest, and on February 19 they entered Bialystok, abandoned by the Germans. At the same time, Polish troops moving east liquidated the administration of the Ukrainian People's Republic in the Kholm region, Zhabinka, Kobrin and Vladimir-Volynsky.

On February 9 - 14, 1919, German troops allowed Polish units to reach the river line. Neman (to Skidel) - Zelvyanka river - river. Ruzhanka - Pruzhany - Kobrin. Soon units arrived there from the other side Western Front Red Army. Thus, a Polish-Soviet front was formed on the territory of Lithuania and Belarus. Although by February 1919 the Polish army nominally numbered more than 150 thousand people, the Poles initially had very insignificant forces in Belarus and Ukraine - 12 infantry battalions, 12 cavalry squadrons and three artillery batteries - only about 8 thousand people, the rest of the units were located on borders with Germany and Czechoslovakia or were in the process of formation. The size of the Soviet Western Army is estimated at 45 thousand people, however, after the occupation of Belarus, the most combat-ready units were transferred to other directions, where the position of the Red Army was extremely difficult. On February 19, the Western Army was transformed into the Western Front under the command of Dmitry Nadezhny.

To prepare for the offensive to the east, Polish troops in Belarus, which received reinforcements, were divided into three parts: the Polesie group was commanded by General Antoni Listovsky, the Volyn group - by General Edward Rydz-Smigly, on the Shchitno-Skidel line there was the Lithuanian-Belarusian division of General Vaclav Iwaszkiewicz-Rudoshansky . To the south of them were the divisions of generals Juliusz Rummel and Tadeusz Rozwadowski.

The offensive of Polish troops in Belarus

At the end of February, Polish troops crossed the Neman and launched an offensive in Belarus (which had been in a federation with the RSFSR since February 3). On February 28, General Ivashkevich’s units attacked Soviet troops along the Shchara River and occupied Slonim on March 1, and Listovsky’s units took Pinsk on March 2. The task of both groups was to prevent the concentration of Soviet troops along the Lida-Baranovichi-Luninets line and to prepare for the occupation of Grodno after the withdrawal of German troops from there. Soon Ivashkevich was replaced by Stanislav Sheptytsky.

Jozef Pilsudski in Minsk. 1919

On April 17 - 19, the Poles occupied Lida, Novogrudok and Baranovichi, and on April 19, the Polish cavalry entered Vilna. Two days later, Józef Pilsudski arrived there and made an appeal to the Lithuanian people, in which he proposed that Lithuania return to the union of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Meanwhile, Polish troops in Belarus under the command of Stanislav Sheptytsky continued to move east, receiving reinforcements from Poland - on April 28, the Poles occupied the city of Grodno, abandoned by the Germans. In May-July, the Polish units were replenished with the 70,000-strong army of Józef Haller, transported from France. At the same time, Western Ukraine comes under the control of the Poles - on June 25, 1919, the Council of Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, the USA, and Italy authorizes Poland to occupy eastern Galicia up to the river. Zbruch. By July 17, eastern Galicia was completely occupied by the Polish army, and the administration of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUNR) was liquidated.

The offensive of Polish troops in Belarus continued - on July 4, Molodechno was occupied, and on July 25, Slutsk came under Polish control. The commander of the Soviet Western Front, Dmitry Nadezhny, was removed from his post on July 22, and Vladimir Gittis was appointed in his place. However, the Soviet troops in Belarus did not receive significant reinforcements, since the Soviet General Staff sent all reserves to the south against Anton Denikin’s Volunteer Army, which launched an attack on Moscow in July.

Front in December 1919

Meanwhile, in August, Polish troops again went on the offensive, the main goal of which was Minsk. After a six-hour battle on August 9, Polish troops captured the Belarusian capital, and on August 29, despite stubborn resistance from the Red Army, Bobruisk was captured by the Poles. In October, units of the Red Army launched a counterattack on the city, but were defeated. After this, the fighting died down until it began next year: The parties entered into a truce. This was explained by the reluctance of the Entente countries and Anton Denikin to support plans for further Polish expansion. A long negotiation process began.

Diplomatic struggle

As mentioned above, the successes of the Polish troops in Belarus were largely due to the fact that the leadership of the Red Army sent the main forces to defend the southern direction from the advancing troops of Anton Denikin. Denikin, like the White movement as a whole, recognized the independence of Poland, but was opposed to Polish claims to the lands east of the Bug, believing that they should be part of a single and indivisible Russia.

The Entente's position on this issue coincided with Denikin's - in December the Declaration on the eastern border of Poland (see Curzon Line), coinciding with the line of ethnographic predominance of the Poles, was announced. At the same time, the Entente demanded that Pilsudski provide military assistance to Denikin’s troops and resume the offensive in Belarus. However, at that time, the Polish troops were located significantly east of the Curzon line and the Pilsudski government did not intend to leave the occupied territories. After months of negotiations in Taganrog between Denikin and Pilsudski's representative, General Alexander Karnicki, ended without result, Polish-Soviet negotiations began.

A conversation took place in Mikashevichi between Julian Marchlewski and Ignacy Börner. The release of political prisoners was expected - a list was compiled of 1,574 Poles imprisoned in the RSFSR and 307 communists in Polish prisons. The Bolsheviks demanded a plebiscite in Belarus among the local population on the issue government structure and territorial affiliation. The Poles, in turn, demanded the transfer of Dvinsk to Latvia and the cessation of hostilities against the UPR of Petliura, with which they had by this time entered into an alliance.

Although the negotiations ended without results, the break in hostilities allowed Pilsudski to suppress the pro-Soviet opposition, and the Red Army to transfer reserves to the Belarusian direction and develop an offensive plan.

Polish offensive in Ukraine

After failure peace talks fighting resumed. In early January 1920, the troops of Edward Rydz-Smigly took Dvinsk with an unexpected blow and then handed the city over to the Latvian authorities. On March 6, Polish troops launched an offensive in Belarus, capturing Mozyr and Kalinkovichi. Four attempts by the Red Army to recapture Mozyr were unsuccessful, and the Red Army’s offensive in Ukraine also ended in failure. The commander of the Western Front, Vladimir Gittis, was removed from his post, and 27-year-old Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who had previously proven himself during the battles against the troops of Kolchak and Denikin, was appointed in his place. Also, for better command and control of troops, the southern part of the Western Front was transformed into the Southwestern Front, the commander of which was appointed Alexander Egorov.

The balance of forces on the Soviet-Polish front by May 1920 was as follows:

On the southern sector of the front - from the Dnieper to Pripyat:

Polish Army:

  • 6th Army of General Vaclav Iwaszkiewicz
  • 2nd Army of General Antoni Listovsky
  • 3rd Army of General Edward Rydz-Smigly

A total of 30.4 thousand bayonets and 4.9 thousand sabers.

  • 12th Army of Sergei Mezheninov
  • 14th Army of Hieronymus Uborevich

A total of 13.4 thousand bayonets and 2.3 thousand sabers.

On the northern section of the front - between Pripyat and Western Dvina:

Polish Army

  • 4th Army (Polesie and Berezina region) General Stanislav Sheptytsky
  • Operational group of General Leonard Skersky (Borisov area)
  • 1st Army (Dvina region) General Stefan Mayevsky
  • Reserve Army of General Kazimierz Sosnkowski

A total of 60.1 thousand bayonets and 7 thousand sabers.

  • 15th Army of Augustus Cork
  • 16th Army of Nikolai Sollogub

A total of 66.4 thousand bayonets and 4.4 thousand sabers.

Thus, in Belarus the forces were approximately equal, and in Ukraine the Poles had an almost threefold numerical superiority, which the Polish command decided to make maximum use of by transferring additional troops to this direction with a total force of 10 thousand bayonets and 1 thousand sabers. In addition, the actions of the Poles, in accordance with the agreement, were supported by Petliura’s troops, numbering about 15 thousand people at that time.

Polish-Ukrainian troops enter Kyiv. Khreshchatyk, 1920

On April 25, 1920, Polish troops attacked the positions of the Red Army along the entire length Ukrainian border and by April 28 they occupied the line Chernobyl - Kozyatin - Vinnitsa - Romanian border. Sergei Mezheninov, not risking engaging in battle, withdrew the troops of the 12th Army, parts of which were scattered at a great distance from each other, lost unified control and needed to be regrouped. During these days, the Poles captured more than 25 thousand Red Army soldiers, captured 2 armored trains, 120 guns and 418 machine guns. On May 7, the Polish cavalry entered Kyiv, abandoned by units of the Red Army, and soon the Poles managed to create a bridgehead up to 15 km deep on the left bank of the Dnieper.

The offensive of the Red Army in the spring-summer of 1920

Tukhachevsky decided to take advantage of the diversion of part of the forces of the Polish army from the Belarusian direction and on May 14 launched an offensive on the Polish positions with the forces of 12 infantry divisions. Despite the initial success, by May 27, the offensive of the Soviet troops had stalled, and on June 1, the 4th and parts of the 1st Polish armies launched a counteroffensive against the 15th Soviet army and by June 8 inflicted a heavy defeat on it (the army lost killed, wounded and more than 12 thousand soldiers were captured).

On the Southwestern Front, the situation was turned in the Soviet favor with the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Army of Semyon Budyonny, transferred from the Caucasus (16.7 thousand sabers, 48 ​​guns, 6 armored trains and 12 aircraft). It left Maykop on April 3, defeated Nestor Makhno’s troops in Gulyai-Polye, and crossed the Dnieper north of Yekaterinoslav (May 6). On May 26, after the concentration of all units in Uman, the 1st Cavalry attacked Kozatin, and on June 5, Budyonny, having groped weakness in the Polish defense, broke through the front near Samogorodok and went to the rear of the Polish units, advancing on Berdichev and Zhitomir. On June 10, the 3rd Polish Army of Rydz-Smigly, fearing encirclement, left Kyiv and moved to the Mazovia region. Two days later, the 1st Cavalry Army entered Kyiv. Attempts by Egorov's small troops to prevent the retreat of the 3rd Army ended unsuccessfully. Polish troops, having regrouped, tried to go on a counteroffensive: on July 1, the troops of General Leon Berbetsky struck the front of the 1st Cavalry Army near Rovno. This offensive was not supported by adjacent Polish units and Berbetsky's troops were driven back. Polish troops made several more attempts to capture the city, but on July 10 it finally came under the control of the Red Army.

To the west!

To the West, workers and peasants!
Against the bourgeoisie and landowners,
for the international revolution,
for the freedom of all peoples!
Fighters of the workers' revolution!
Turn your eyes to the West.
The fate of the world revolution is being decided in the West.
Through the corpse of white Poland lies the path to world fire.
Let's carry happiness on bayonets
and peace to working humanity.
To the west!
To decisive battles, to resounding victories!

At dawn on July 4, Mikhail Tukhachevsky's Western Front again went on the offensive. The main blow was delivered on the right, northern flank, on which an almost twofold superiority in men and weapons was achieved. The idea of ​​the operation was to bypass the Polish units with Guy's cavalry corps and push back the Polish Belorussian Front To Lithuanian border. This tactic brought success: on July 5, the 1st and 4th Polish armies began to quickly retreat in the direction of Lida, and, unable to gain a foothold on the old line of German trenches, retreated to the Bug at the end of July. In a short period of time, the Red Army advanced more than 600 km: on July 10, the Poles left Bobruisk, on July 11 - Minsk, on July 14, units of the Red Army took Vilna. On July 26, in the Bialystok area, the Red Army crossed directly into Polish territory, and on August 1, despite Pilsudski’s orders, Brest was surrendered to Soviet troops almost without resistance.

On July 23, in Smolensk, the Bolsheviks formed the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland (Polrevkom), which was supposed to assume full power after the capture of Warsaw and the overthrow of Pilsudski. The Bolsheviks officially announced this on August 1 in Bialystok, where Polrevkom was located. . The committee was headed by Julian Marchlewski. On the same day, August 1, Polrevkom announced the “Appeal to the Polish working people of cities and villages,” written by Dzerzhinsky. The “Appeal” announced the creation of the Polish Republic of Soviets, the nationalization of lands, the separation of church and state, and also contained an appeal to workers to drive away capitalists and landowners, occupy factories and factories, and create revolutionary committees as government bodies (65 such revolutionary committees were formed) . The committee called on the soldiers of the Polish Army to mutiny against Pilsudski and defect to the side of the Polish Republic of Soviets. Polrevkom also began to form the Polish Red Army (under the command of Roman Longwa), but did not achieve any success in this.

Polish trenches near Milosna, August 1920

Poland's position had become critical by the beginning of August - not only due to the rapid retreat in Belarus, but also due to the deterioration international situation countries. Great Britain actually stopped providing military and economic assistance to Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia closed their borders with Poland, and Danzig remained the only point of delivery of goods to the republic. As the Red Army troops approached Warsaw, the evacuation of foreign diplomatic missions began from there.

Front in August 1920.

Meanwhile, the position of the Polish troops worsened not only in the Belarusian, but also in the Ukrainian direction, where the Southwestern Front again went on the offensive under the command of Alexander Egorov (with Stalin as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council). The main goal of the front was the capture of Lvov, which was defended by three infantry divisions of the 6th Polish Army and the Ukrainian army under the command of Mikhailo Omelyanovich-Pavlenko. On July 9, the 14th Army of the Red Army took Proskurov (Khmelnitsky), and on July 12 it stormed Kamenets-Podolsky. On July 25, the Southwestern Front began the Lvov offensive operation, however, he was never able to capture Lvov.

Battle of Warsaw

On August 12, the troops of Mikhail Tukhachevsky’s Western Front went on the offensive, the goal of which was to capture Warsaw.

Composition of the Western Front:

  • 3rd Cavalry Corps Guy Guy
  • 4th Army of Alexander Shuvaev
  • 15th Army of Augustus Cork
  • 3rd Army of Vladimir Lazarevich
  • 16th Army of Nikolai Sollogub
  • Mozyr group of Tikhon Khvesin

The two fronts of the Red Army were opposed by three Polish ones: Northern Front of General Józef Haller

  • 5th Army of General Wladislav Sikorski
  • 1st Army of General Frantisek Latinik
  • 2nd Army of General Bolesław Roja

Central Front of General Edward Rydz-Smigly:

  • 4th Army of General Leonard Skersky
  • 3rd Army of General Zygmunt Zielinski

Southern Front of General Vaclav Iwaszkiewicz:

  • 6th Army of General Władysław Jędrzejewski
  • UPR Army of General Mikhailo Omelyanovich-Pavlenko

The total number of personnel differs in all sources. We can only say with confidence that the forces were approximately equal and did not exceed 200 thousand people on each side.

Mikhail Tukhachevsky's plan included crossing the Vistula in the lower reaches and attacking Warsaw from the west. According to some assumptions made, the purpose of “deviating” the direction of the attack of Soviet troops to the north was to quickly reach the German border, which was supposed to speed up the establishment of Soviet power in this country. 13 August two rifle divisions The Red Army struck near Radimin (23 km from Warsaw) and captured the city. Then one of them moved towards Prague, and the second turned right - towards Nieporent and Jablonna. Polish forces retreated to the second line of defense.

The Polish counteroffensive plan included concentration large forces on the Wieprz River and a sudden attack from the southeast to the rear of the troops of the Western Front. For this purpose, two strike groups were formed from the two armies of the Central Front of General Edward Rydz-Śmigły. However, order 8358/III fell into the hands of the Red Army soldiers on a counterattack near Wiepsz with detailed map, But Soviet command considered the found document to be disinformation, the purpose of which was to disrupt the Red Army's attack on Warsaw. On the same day, Polish radio intelligence intercepted an order from the 16th Army to attack Warsaw on August 14. To get ahead of the Reds, on the orders of Józef Haller, Wladislav Sikorski's 5th Army, defending Modlin, from the area of ​​the Wkra River struck Tukhachevsky's extended front at the junction of the 3rd and 15th armies and broke through it. On the night of August 15, two reserve Polish divisions attacked Soviet troops from the rear near Radimin. Soon the city was taken.

On August 16, Marshal Pilsudski began implementing the planned counterattack. The information received by radio intelligence about the weakness of the Mozyr group played a role. Having concentrated more than a double superiority against it (47.5 thousand soldiers against 21 thousand), Polish troops (the first strike group under the command of Pilsudski himself) broke through the front and defeated the southern wing of Nikolai Sollogub’s 16th Army. At the same time, an attack was underway on Włodawa by the forces of the 3rd Legion Infantry Division, as well as, with the support of tanks, on Minsk-Mazowiecki. This created a threat of encirclement of all Red Army troops in the Warsaw area.

"Battle of Komarov". Hood. Jerzy Kossak

Given the critical situation on the Western Front, on August 14, Commander-in-Chief Kamenev ordered the transfer of the 12th and 1st Cavalry Armies to the Western Front to significantly strengthen it. However, the leadership of the Southwestern Front, which was besieging Lvov, ignored this order.

In the summer of 1920, Stalin, sent to the Polish front, encouraged Budyonny to disobey command orders to transfer the 1st Cavalry Army from near Lvov to the Warsaw direction, which, according to some historians, had fatal consequences for the Red Army campaign. Tucker Robert Stalin. The path to power. page 16

Only on August 20, after a sharp demand from the central leadership, the 1st Cavalry Army began moving north. By the time the 1st Cavalry Army began to march from near Lvov, the troops of the Western Front had already begun an unorganized retreat to the east. On August 19, the Poles occupied Brest, and on August 23, Bialystok. On the same day, the 4th Army and the 3rd Cavalry Corps of Guy Guy and two divisions from the 15th Army (about 40 thousand people in total) crossed the German border and were interned. At the end of August, through Sokal, the 1st Cavalry Army struck in the direction of Zamosc and Grubeshov, in order to then, through Lublin, reach the rear of the Polish attack group advancing to the north. However, the Poles advanced the General Staff's 1st Cavalry reserves to meet them. On August 31, 1920, the largest equestrian battle since 1813 took place near Komarov. Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army entered into battle with Rummel's 1st Polish cavalry division. Despite the superiority in numbers (7,000 sabers versus 2,000 sabers), Budyonny’s army, exhausted in the battles for Lvov, was defeated, losing more than 4,000 people killed. Rummel's losses amounted to about 500 soldiers. Budyonny's army, and behind it the troops of the Southwestern Front, were forced to retreat from Lvov and go on the defensive.

Polish soldiers display Red Army banners captured in the Battle of Warsaw

As a result of the defeat near Warsaw, Soviet troops on the Western Front suffered heavy losses. According to some estimates, during the Battle of Warsaw, 25 thousand Red Army soldiers died, 60 thousand were captured by Poland, 40 thousand were interned by the Germans. Several thousand people went missing. The front also lost a large amount of artillery and equipment. Polish losses are estimated at 15 thousand killed and missing and 22 thousand wounded.

Fighting in Belarus

After the retreat from Poland, Tukhachevsky consolidated himself on the line of the Neman - Shchara - Svisloch rivers, using German fortifications remaining from the First World War as a second line of defense. The Western Front received large reinforcements from the rear areas, and 30 thousand people from among those interned in East Prussia. Gradually, Tukhachevsky was able to almost completely restore the combat strength of the front: on September 1, he had 73 thousand soldiers and 220 guns. By order of Kamenev, Tukhachevsky was preparing a new offensive.

The Poles were also preparing for the attack. The attack on Grodno and Volkovysk was supposed to tie up the main forces of the Red Army and enable the 2nd Army to reach the deep rear of the advanced units of the Red Army through the territory of Lithuania, holding the defense on the Neman. On September 12, Tukhachevsky gave the order to attack Wlodawa and Brest with the southern flank of the Western Front, including the 4th and 12th armies. Since the order was intercepted and deciphered by Polish radio intelligence, on the same day the Poles launched a pre-emptive strike, broke through the defenses of the 12th Army and took Kovel. This disrupted the general offensive of the Red Army troops and threatened the encirclement of the southern group of the Western Front and forced the 4th, 12th and 14th armies to retreat to the east.

The defense of the Western Front on the Neman was held by three armies: the 3rd of Vladimir Lazarevich, the 15th of August Kork and the 16th of Nikolai Sollogub (in total about 100 thousand soldiers, about 250 guns). They were opposed by the Polish group of Jozef Pilsudski: the 2nd Army of General Edward Rydz-Smigly, the 4th Army of General Leonard Skerski, the reserve of the commander-in-chief (about 100 thousand soldiers in total).

On September 20, 1920, the bloody battle for Grodno began. At first, the Poles were successful, but on September 22, Tukhachevsky’s troops brought up reserves and restored the situation. Meanwhile, Polish troops invaded Lithuania and moved towards Druskenniki (Druskininkai). Having captured the bridge across the Neman, the Poles flanked the Western Front. On September 25, unable to stop the Polish advance, Tukhachevsky gave the order to withdraw troops to the east. On the night of September 26, the Poles occupied Grodno, and soon crossed the Neman south of the city. Lazarevich's 3rd Army, retreating to the east, was unable to restore the front and withdrew to the Lida region with heavy losses. On September 28, however, Soviet troops were unable to capture the city already occupied by the enemy and were soon defeated (most of the personnel were captured).

Pilsudski intended to build on his success, encircle and destroy the remaining troops of the Western Front at Novogrudok. However, the Polish units, weakened in battle, were unable to carry out this order and the Red Army troops were able to regroup and organize defense.

During the Battle of the Neman, Polish troops captured 40 thousand prisoners, 140 guns, a large number of horses and ammunition. Fighting in Belarus continued until the signing of the peace treaty in Riga. On October 12, the Poles re-entered Minsk and Molodechno.

Terror against civilians

During the war, troops from both countries carried out executions. civilian population and at the same time, Polish troops carried out ethnic cleansing, the targets of which were mainly Jews. The leadership of both the Red Army and the Polish Army initiated official investigations into the results of such actions and tried to prevent them.

The first documented use of weapons against non-combatants was the shooting by the Poles of the Russian Red Cross mission on January 2, 1919; this act was most likely committed by the Polish Self-Defense units, since the regular Polish army had not yet left Poland. In March 1919, after the Polish army occupied Pinsk, the Polish commandant ordered the shooting of 40 Jews who had gathered for prayer, who were mistaken for a Bolshevik meeting. Some of the hospital staff were also shot. . In April of the same year, the capture of Vilnius by the Poles was accompanied by massacres of captured Red Army soldiers, Jews and people sympathizing with the Soviet regime. The offensive of Polish troops in Ukraine in the spring of 1920 was accompanied by pogroms and mass executions of Jews: in the city of Rovno, the Poles shot more than 3 thousand civilians, in the town of Tetiev about 4 thousand Jews were killed, the villages of Ivanovtsy, Kucha, Sobachi were completely burned for resistance to food requisitions. Yablunovka, Novaya Greblya, Melnichi, Kirillovka and others, their residents were shot. Polish historians question these data; according to the Brief Jewish Encyclopedia, the massacre in Tetiev was carried out not by Poles, but by Ukrainians - a detachment of Ataman Kurovsky (Petlyurite, former Red commander) on March 24, 1920. A representative of the Polish Civil Administration of the Eastern Lands (the Polish administration in the occupied territories), M. Kossakovsky, testified that the Polish military exterminated people only because they “looked like Bolsheviks.”

A special place in terror against the civilian population is occupied by the activities of the Belarusian units of “ataman” Stanislav Balakhovich, who at first were subordinate to the Polish command, but after the truce acted independently. The Polish military prosecutor, Colonel Lisovsky, who investigated complaints about the actions of Balakhovich’s men, described the activities of Balakhovich’s division as follows:

...Balakhovich's army is a gang of robbers that transports stolen gold. To occupy a city, an army is sent, whose soldiers rob and kill. And only after numerous pogroms, two days later, Balakhovich arrives with his headquarters. After the robbery, drinking begins. ...As for Balakhovich, he allows plunder, otherwise they would refuse to move forward... every officer who joins Balakhovich's army pours mud on himself that cannot be washed away.

An investigation conducted by Colonel Lisovsky, in particular, established that in Turov alone, Balakhovites raped 70 Jewish girls aged 12 to 15 years.

Excerpt from the testimony of H. Gdanski and M. Blumenkrank to the investigation, given in the book of the Polish researcher Marek Kabanovsky “General Stanislav Bulak-Balachovich” (Warsaw, 1993):

[…] On the way there we met a Balakhov captain. He asked:
-Who are you leading?
- Jews...
- Shoot them.
There was another Jew with us - Marshalkovich.
The guards ordered us to lower our underwear and lick each other's asses. Then they also forced us to urinate in each other’s mouths and do other abominations... And the men were gathered around and ordered to watch all this... They forced us to have sexual intercourse with a chick. They raped us and scolded us on our faces...
Blumenkrank could not bear the abuse and asked to be shot. Marshalkovich is still ill after suffering bullying.

A resident of Mozyr, A. Naidich, described the events in the capital of the BPR Mozyr after the capture of the city by the Balakhovites (GA RF. F. 1339. Op. 1. D. 459. L. 2-3.):

At 5 o'clock. In the evening the Balakhovites entered the city. The peasant population joyfully greeted the Balakhovites, but the Jews hid in their apartments. Now the pogrom began with mass rape, beatings, bullying and murders. Officers participated in the pogrom along with soldiers. A small part of the Russian population robbed the shops opened by the Balakhovites. All night long there were heartbreaking screams throughout the city...”

The report of the commission for registering victims of Balakhovich’s raid in Mozyr district stated that

Girls from 12 years old, women 80 years old, women with an 8-month pregnancy... were subjected to violence, and violence was committed from 15 to 20 times. Although the local commission that was formed for examination and assistance promised complete preservation of medical confidentiality, the number of people seeking help reaches only about 300 women, most of whom are sick with sexually transmitted diseases or become pregnant...

On the Soviet side, Budyonny’s army gained fame as the main pogrom force. Particularly large pogroms were carried out by Budennovites in Baranovka, Chudnov and Rogachev. In particular, from September 18 to 22, the 6th Cavalry Division of this army committed more than 30 pogroms; in the town of Lyubar on September 29, during a pogrom, 60 people were killed by division soldiers; in Priluki, on the night of October 3, 12 people were wounded, 21 were killed “and many women were raped.” At the same time, “women were shamelessly raped in front of everyone, and girls, like slaves, were dragged away by beasts and bandits to their carts.” In Vakhnovka on October 3, 20 people were killed, many were wounded and raped, and 18 houses were burned. After on September 28, while trying to stop the pogrom in the town of Polonnoye, the commissar of the 6th division G. G. Shepelev was killed, the division was disbanded, and two brigade commanders and several hundred ordinary soldiers were put on trial and 157 were shot.

Polish officers captured by the Red Army were certainly shot on the spot, as were Bolshevik commissars captured by the Poles.

The fate of prisoners of war

Captured Red Army soldiers in the Tukholsky camp

There is still no exact data about the fate of Polish and Soviet prisoners of war. According to Russian sources, about 80 thousand Red Army soldiers out of 200 thousand who were captured by Poland died from hunger, disease, torture, bullying and executions

Polish sources give figures of 85 thousand prisoners (at least that many people were in Polish camps at the end of the war), of which about 20 thousand died. They were kept in the camps remaining after the First World War - Strzałkow (the largest), Dombier, Pikulice, Wadowice and Tuchol concentration camp. According to the 1921 agreement on the exchange of prisoners (addition to the Riga Peace Treaty), 65 thousand captured Red Army soldiers returned to Russia. If the information about 200 thousand captured and the death of 80 thousand of them is correct, then the fate of about 60 thousand more people is unclear.

The mortality rate in Polish camps reached 20% of the number of prisoners, mainly the cause of death was epidemics, which, in conditions of poor nutrition, overcrowding and lack of medical care, quickly spread and had a high mortality rate. This is how a member of the International Committee of the Red Cross described the camp in Brest:

A sickening smell emanates from the guardhouses, as well as from the former stables in which prisoners of war were housed. The prisoners are chillingly huddling around a makeshift stove where several logs are burning - the only way to warm themselves. At night, sheltering from the first cold weather, they lie in close rows in groups of 300 people in poorly lit and poorly ventilated barracks, on planks, without mattresses or blankets. The prisoners are mostly dressed in rags... due to the overcrowding of the premises, unsuitable for habitation; close cohabitation of healthy prisoners of war and infectious patients, many of whom died immediately; malnutrition, as evidenced by numerous cases of malnutrition; swelling, hunger during the three months of stay in Brest - the camp in Brest-Litovsk was a real necropolis.

In the prisoner of war camp in Strzalkow, among other things, numerous abuses of prisoners took place, for which the camp commandant, Lieutenant Malinowski, was later put on trial.

Of the 60 thousand Polish prisoners of war after the end of the war, 27,598 people returned to Poland, about 2 thousand remained in the RSFSR. The fate of the remaining 32 thousand is unclear.

The role of the “great powers” ​​in the conflict

The Soviet-Polish war took place simultaneously with the intervention in Russia of the Entente countries, which actively supported Poland from the moment of its re-establishment as independent state. In this regard, Poland's war against Russia was considered by the "great powers" as part of the struggle against the Bolshevik government.

The Polish "Blue Army" was so named because of the blue French uniforms it wore.

However, the Entente countries' opinions regarding the possible strengthening of Poland as a result of the conflict differed greatly - the United States and France advocated all possible assistance to the Pilsudski government and took part in the creation of the Polish army, while Great Britain was inclined to limited assistance to Poland, and then to political neutrality in this conflict. The participation of the Entente countries concerned economic, military and diplomatic support for Poland.

From February to August 1919, Poland received 260,000 tons of food worth $51 million from the United States. In 1919, Poland received $60 million worth of military equipment from US military warehouses in Europe alone; in 1920, $100 million worth. In the spring of 1920, England, France and the USA supplied Poland with 1,494 guns, 2,800 machine guns, about 700 aircraft, and 10 million shells. The US military fought together with the Poles - the Kosciuszko squadron, which operated against Budyonny’s army, was made up of US pilots and was commanded by US Colonel Fauntleroy. In July 1919, a 70,000-strong army arrived in Poland, created in France mainly from emigrants of Polish origin from France and the United States. French involvement in the conflict was also reflected in the activities of hundreds of French officers, led by General Maxime Weygand, who arrived in 1920 to train Polish troops and assist the Polish General Staff. Among the French officers in Poland was Charles de Gaulle.

American pilots of the squadron named after. Kosciuszko M. Cooper and S. Fauntleroy

Britain's position was more restrained. The Curzon Line, proposed by the British minister as the eastern border of Poland in December 1919, assumed the establishment of a border west of the front line at that time and the withdrawal of Polish troops. Six months later, when the situation had changed, Curzon again proposed to fix the border along this line, otherwise the Entente countries pledged to support Poland “with all the means at their disposal.” Thus, throughout virtually the entire war, Great Britain advocated a compromise version of the division of the disputed territories (along the eastern border of the Poles).

However, even in the conditions of Poland's critical military situation, Great Britain did not provide it with any military support. In August 1920, a conference of trade unions and labor voted for a general strike if the government continued to support Poland and tried to intervene in the conflict; further shipments of ammunition to Poland were simply sabotaged. At the same time, the International Federation of Trade Unions in Amsterdam instructed its members to strengthen the embargo on ammunition destined for Poland. Only France and the United States continued to provide assistance to the Poles, but Germany and Czechoslovakia, with whom Poland managed to enter into border conflicts over disputed territories, at the end of July 1920 banned the transit of weapons and ammunition through their territory for Poland.

The reduction in assistance from the Entente countries played a significant role in the fact that after the victory at Warsaw, the Poles were unable to build on their success and defeat the Soviet troops of the Western Front. A change in Britain's diplomatic position (under the influence of the trade unions, which were in turn secretly financed by the Soviet government) precipitated the conclusion of the Riga Peace Treaty.

Results of the war

Polish-Soviet border after the war

Belarusian caricature on the division of Belarus between Russia and Poland: “Down with the shameful Riga division! Long live the free, undivided, people's Belarus!”

Neither side achieved its goals during the war: Belarus and Ukraine were divided between Poland and the republics that became part of the Soviet Union in 1922. The territory of Lithuania was divided between Poland and the independent by the state of Lithuania. The RSFSR, for its part, recognized the independence of Poland and the legitimacy of the Pilsudski government, and temporarily abandoned plans for a “world revolution” and the liquidation Versailles system. Despite the signing of a peace treaty, relations between the two countries remained tense for the next twenty years, which ultimately led to the Soviet participation in the partition of Poland in 1939.

Disagreements between the Entente countries that arose in 1920 on the issue of military-financial support for Poland led to the gradual cessation of support by these countries for the White movement and anti-Bolshevik forces in general, and subsequent international recognition of the Soviet Union.

see also

  • Polish citizens in Soviet captivity (1919 - 1923)
  • Tuchol (concentration camp) – Polish prisoner of war camp


Notes

Literature

  • Raisky N. S. The Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920 and the fate of prisoners of war, internees, hostages and refugees. - M., 1999. ISBN 0-7734-7917-1
  • “FROM THE WAR OF 1914 TO THE WAR OF 1939” (using the example of Poland). “Russian binding”, http://www.pereplet.ru/history/suvorov/suv_polsh.htm
  • Soloviev S. M. “History of Russia since ancient times”, M., 2001, ISBN 5-17-002142-9

At the beginning of the twentieth century, an undeclared Soviet-Polish war occurred, during which the Bolshevik leadership and the government of Jozef Pilsudski tried to resolve pressing territorial issues.

Background to the conflict and its causes

Since 1815, Poland was part of the Russian Empire. During the First World War, these territories were occupied by German and Austro-Hungarian troops, who, in order to gain support from the local population, declared Poland a formally independent state. The Petrograd Provisional Government also turned to the Polish leadership, proposing independence on Russian terms: drawing the border along ethnographic lines (that is, transferring Galicia and Silesia to Poland), as well as concluding peace with Russia.

The foreign policy of the Provisional Government was partially continued by Vladimir Lenin. One of the first events of the Bolsheviks after the victory of the Great October revolution There was the signing at the end of 1917 of several decrees that granted independence to many territories that were once part of the Russian Empire. The newly formed independent countries included Poland, Ukraine and Belarus.

Before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles (1919), which ended the First World War, there were German garrisons in Poland. But at the end of the autumn of 1918, Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, a talented and decisive politician who set several main goals for the country, became the ruler of Poland:

  • Clear the country of German occupiers;
  • Oppose Bolshevism;
  • To revive the former Polish greatness and create a second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within the borders of 1772 (that is, to include the western parts of Ukraine and Belarus into the state).

From a historical point of view, the Polish national-patriotic movement arose at a very opportune moment: Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary were exhausted by the world war. In addition, the Treaty of Versailles did not define the borders of Poland.

Meanwhile, on the territory central Russia The Civil War was also raging. By 1919, the Bolsheviks began to gain the upper hand over the white movement. The main centers of resistance to the new government, such as the Omsk Directory, were broken. Now, when the old regime did not pose a serious threat to the Bolsheviks, they decided to begin restoring the territorial integrity of the state and Sovietize the nearby countries - Belarus and Ukraine, where White Guard units still remained, and groups of anarchist atamans were also active. The most cherished and grandiose goal of the Soviet leadership was the establishment of a communist regime in Germany. Poland lay between two powers, and Pilsudski was an ardent opponent of Bolshevism and Russian domination.

Thus, the main goals of the Bolshevik leadership included:

  • Eliminate anti-Soviet groups in Ukraine and Belarus;
  • Establish your influence in Eastern Europe;
  • Prevent the expansion of Poland to the borders of 1772;
  • Eliminate all possible obstacles to the Sovietization of Germany.

At the end of 1918, the Polish leadership became familiar with two options for establishing new borders: Bolshevik and Western. Both Lenin and European countries were ready to expand the territory of Poland, but the proposed borders were smaller than the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which did not suit Pilsudski. The aggravation of relations between the two states reached its peak and led to an armed conflict.

Progress of the war

First stage: Polish offensive (January - October 1919)

In early 1919, while the Red Army was busy fighting Anton Denikin, Pilsudski launched an offensive against Belarus and Ukraine, once part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.


One after another, the Polish army occupied: Vilna, Slonim, Pinsk, Grodno, Minsk, Bobruisk. During the decisive actions of the Polish command, the whole of Galicia was occupied. In order to continue advancing eastward, Warsaw had to find allies. It was planned to rely on the Entente countries and Denikin’s Volunteer Army, but in both cases the Polish proposals were accepted with great caution. Neither Denikin nor the Western powers wanted Poland to become too strong, especially at the expense of Russian lands. Therefore, the negotiations reached a dead end.

In turn, the Bolsheviks could not resist the Polish pressure, since the Red Army had to prepare for Denikin’s campaign against Moscow. As a result, both sides were forced to temporarily lay down their arms.

Pilsudski understood that the restoration of the monarchy in Russia, for which Denikin fought, was unlikely to bring independence to Poland. Therefore, the Polish marshal decided to take a wait-and-see position. Since, according to his calculations, the Volunteer Army was rather weak, he just had to wait until it was defeated by the Red Army, and only then strike at the Bolsheviks, exhausted from the fight against Denikin.

Resumption of hostilities, repeated Polish offensive (January - May 1920)

At the end of 1919, Piłsudski began preparing for a new offensive:

  • He concluded a military alliance against the Bolsheviks with the Ukrainian chieftain Simon Petlyura. At the same time, Petlyura was forced to cede large areas of Ukraine to the Poles;
  • Developed a strategic plan for an attack on Ukraine and a repeated campaign against Belarus.

The Bolsheviks also reorganized the army in the west of the country. As part of these transformations, two fronts were created:

  • Western, commanded by Tukhachevsky;
  • Southwestern, headed by Egorov.

In the Belarusian direction, the Poles reached the Berezina, which was their original goal. On the Ukrainian front, Polish regiments, as well as the armies of the atamans of Petlyura and Tyutyunnik, moved into battle. Pilsudski's main striking force was the Poznan Riflemen - those Polish units that served as part of the German army. Having learned about the approach of the Poles, the inhabitants of Galicia rose up in the rear of the Red Army, wanting to achieve the independence of Western Ukraine. The rebels hoped that Pilsudski would help them expel the Bolsheviks and create their own state, but this was not part of the Polish marshal’s plans. The rebels who came out to meet the “liberators” were immediately captured.

The Polish army, supported by the local population and atamans, quickly moved forward. The Poles managed to occupy Kyiv and even move to the left bank of the Dnieper.

English intervention

European powers tried several times to intervene in the course of events and stop the civil war in Russia, and at the same time the Soviet-Polish conflict. For this purpose, Great Britain turned to the Bolshevik and Polish governments several times. For a long time both sides ignored the messages of the British Foreign Minister Curzon. But in May 1920, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin suddenly agreed to accept British conditions:

  • Stop the Red Army's attack on Georgia and Armenia;
  • Start peace negotiations with Wrangel, who is entrenched in Crimea;
  • Through the mediation of England, begin negotiations with Poland on borders.

The Poles stubbornly continued their offensive because they understood that England would not insist on restoring the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the borders of 1772. The Bolsheviks did not want to stop either. They kept part of their obligations and actually stopped the onslaught on Crimea and the Caucasus. But only in order to transfer the most combat-ready units of the Red Army to the west.

Counter-offensive of the Red Army (May - August 1920)

In the late spring of 1920, the Red Army launched an offensive in Ukraine. Budyonny's cavalry was especially effective, managing to oust the Poles from Kyiv, Zhitomir and Berdichev. While Budyonny was successfully advancing deep into Ukraine, Tukhachevsky launched an attack on Belarus. If the Ukrainians supported the Polish army and willingly joined its ranks, the population of Belarus was dissatisfied with the arrival of the Poles and sided with Tukhachevsky.

Pilsudski had to quickly withdraw his troops. At the height of the Polish flight and the advance of the Red Army inland of Eastern Europe Lenin received another message from Curzon from Great Britain. The British minister again insisted on starting negotiations with Poland. He also proposed drawing a demarcation line along which the border between the two states would run (“Curzon Line”). But this time the Bolsheviks wanted to bring the war to a victorious end. Tukhachevsky, Egorov, Budyonny and Stalin, who also held one of the commanding positions on the Southwestern Front, were ordered to speed up the offensive. Pilsudski was forced to leave the occupied lines and retreat to the capital. The forces of Egorov and Tukhachevsky moved towards Warsaw.

Miracle on the Vistula

In mid-August 1920, the battle for Warsaw began. Preparing for the strike, the Bolsheviks underestimated the Polish army and the capabilities of enemy intelligence. Therefore, part of the Red Army moved not to the capital, but to other cities. A very important document also fell into the hands of the Red Army soldiers - a detailed plan for the Polish counterattack near Wiepsz. However, Tukhachevsky decided that this paper was nothing more than an attempt to misinform him. At the same time, Polish intelligence officers managed to find out exact time attack of the Western Front on the capital. On August 14 and 15, the Poles launched several successful attacks on Tukhachevsky’s forces. The Poles even managed to destroy the radio station, disrupting the coordination of the front's actions.

On August 16, the Polish army went on the offensive. Pilsudski managed to break through the front and crush the main forces of the Bolsheviks. The frivolity with which Tukhachevsky treated Pilsudski turned out to be a complete failure for the red commander. The army was rapidly retreating, losing people, equipment and equipment.

Results

In March 1921, the Riga Peace Treaty was signed. According to this document:

  • Huge territories were transferred to Poland. The border was established much east of the “Curzon Line”;
  • The Bolsheviks were forced to pay considerable reparations to Poland, as well as the debts of the tsarist government;
  • The RSFSR pledged to return to Poland all valuables taken from there after 1772.

Subsequently, after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and during the Tehran Conference, the Soviet government managed to achieve the drawing of the border exactly along the “Curzon Line”.

Soviet-Polish War (1920–1921)

Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia

Treaty of Riga 1921

Opponents

Ukrainian SSR

Byelorussian SSR

Latvian SSR

Entente intervention

Commanders

M. N. Tukhachevsky

J. Pilsudski

A. I. Egorov

E. Rydz-Smigly

S. M. Budyonny

S. V. Petliura

M. V. Omelyanovich-Pavlenko

P. S. Makhrov

Strengths of the parties

About 900 thousand fighters (summer 1920)

About 850 thousand fighters (summer 1920)

Military losses

100-150 thousand dead

About 60 thousand dead

Soviet-Polish War(Polish wojna polsko-bolszewicka (wojna polsko-rosyjska), Ukrainian Polish-Radian War) - armed conflict between Poland and Soviet Russia, Soviet Belarus, Soviet Ukraine on the territory of the collapsed Russian Empire - Russia, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine in 1920–1921 during the Russian Civil War. In modern Polish historiography it is called the “Polish-Bolshevik War”. Troops of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic also took part in the conflict; in the first phase of the war they acted against Poland, then units of the UPR supported Polish troops.

Background

The main territories for the possession of which the war was fought until the middle of the 14th century were various ancient Russian principalities. After a period of internecine wars and the Tatar-Mongol invasion in 1240, they fell into the area of ​​influence of Lithuania and Poland. In the first half of the 14th century, Kyiv, the Dnieper region, the area between the Pripyat and Western Dvina rivers became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and in 1352 the lands of the Galicia-Volyn principality were divided between Poland and Lithuania. In 1569, according to the Union of Lublin between Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, some Ukrainian lands, previously part of the latter, came under the authority of the Polish crown. In 1772-1795, as a result of the three divisions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, part of the lands (Western Belarus and most of Western Ukraine) came under the rule of the Russian crown, and the Galician territories became part of the Austrian monarchy.

After Germany's defeat in the war in November 1918, when Poland was restored as an independent state, the question of its new borders arose. Although Polish politicians differed on exactly what status the eastern territories of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth should have within the new state, they unanimously advocated their return to Polish control. The Soviet government, on the contrary, intended to establish control over the entire territory of the former Russian Empire, making it (as officially stated) a springboard for the world revolution.

Goals of the parties to the conflict

The main goal of the Polish leadership led by Józef Piłsudski was to restore Poland to the historical borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of 1772, establishing control over Belarus, Ukraine (including Donbass), Lithuania and geopolitical dominance in Eastern Europe:

On the Soviet side, the initial goal was to establish control over the western provinces of the former Russian Empire (Ukraine and Belarus) and their Sovietization. As the war progressed, the goal became the Sovietization of Poland, followed by Germany and the transition to world revolution. The Soviet leadership considered the war against Poland as part of the struggle against the entire Versailles international system that existed at that time.

Lenin subsequently noted that the attack on Warsaw created a situation in which “even in relation to Germany we tested the international situation.” And this “probing” showed: a) “the approach of our troops to the borders of East Prussia” led to the fact that “Germany was completely boiling”; b) “you won’t get Soviet power in Germany without a civil war”; c) "in internationally There is no other force for Germany other than Soviet Russia.”

Progress of the war

The situation in Eastern Europe at the end of 1918

According to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty of March 3, 1918, the western border of Soviet Russia was established along the line Riga - Dvinsk - Druya ​​- Drisvyaty - Mikhalishki - Dzevilishki - Dokudov - r. Neman - r. Zelvinka - Pruzhany - Vidoml.

On November 11, 1918, the Compiegne Truce was signed, ending the First world war, after which the withdrawal of German troops from the occupied territories began. In Eastern European countries, this led to a political vacuum that different forces tried to fill: on the one hand, local governments, most of them successors to the authorities formed during the German occupation; on the other, the Bolsheviks and their supporters, supported by Soviet Russia.

In November 1918, German units began to withdraw from the territories of the former Russian Empire they had occupied.

The Soviet Western Army, whose task was to establish control over Belarus, moved after the retreating German units on November 17, 1918 and entered Minsk on December 10, 1918. The Poles of Lithuania and Belarus created the organization “Committee for the Defense of the Eastern Outskirts” (KZVO) with combat units formed from former soldiers of the Polish corps, and turned to the Polish government for help. By decree of the Polish ruler (“temporary head of state”) Jozef Pilsudski dated December 7, 1918, KZVO units were declared integral part Polish troops under the overall command of General Władysław Veitka. On December 19, the Polish government gave the order to its troops to occupy Vilnius.

On December 21, 1918, a Polish administration was created in Vilnius: the Temporary Commission for the Administration of the District of Central Lithuania.

On January 1, 1919, the Belarusian SSR was proclaimed. On the same day, Polish units took control of Vilnius, but on January 6, 1919, the city was recaptured by units of the Red Army. On February 16, the authorities of the Byelorussian SSR proposed to the Polish government to determine the borders, but Warsaw ignored this proposal. On February 27, after Lithuania was included in the Byelorussian SSR, it was renamed the Lithuanian-Byelorussian SSR (Litbel Republic).

Poland could not provide significant assistance to the KZVO detachments, since some of the Polish troops were drawn into a border conflict with Czechoslovakia and were preparing for a possible conflict with Germany over Silesia, and there were still German troops in the western regions of Poland. Only after the intervention of the Entente on February 5, an agreement was signed that the Germans would let the Poles through to the east. As a result, on February 4, Polish troops occupied Kovel, on February 9 they entered Brest, and on February 19 they entered Bialystok, abandoned by the Germans. At the same time, Polish troops moving east liquidated the administration of the Ukrainian People's Republic in the Kholm region, Zhabinka, Kobrin and Vladimir-Volynsky.

On February 9 - 14, 1919, German troops allowed Polish units to reach the river line. Neman (to Skidel) - r. Zelvyanka - r. Ruzhanka - Pruzhany - Kobrin. Soon, units of the Western Front of the Red Army approached there from the other side. Thus, a Polish-Soviet front was formed on the territory of Lithuania and Belarus. Although by February 1919 the Polish army nominally numbered more than 150 thousand people, the Poles initially had very insignificant forces in Belarus and Ukraine - 12 infantry battalions, 12 cavalry squadrons and three artillery batteries - only about 8 thousand people, the rest of the units were located on borders with Germany and Czechoslovakia or were in the process of formation. The size of the Soviet Western Army is estimated at 45 thousand people, however, after the occupation of Belarus, the most combat-ready units were transferred to other directions, where the position of the Red Army was extremely difficult. On February 19, the Western Army was transformed into the Western Front under the command of Dmitry Nadezhny.

To prepare for the offensive to the east, the Polish troops in Belarus, which received reinforcements, were divided into three parts: the Polesie group was commanded by General Antoni Listovsky, the Volyn group - by General Edward Rydz-Smigly, on the Shchitno-Skidel line there was the Lithuanian-Belarusian division of General Vaclav Ivashkevich-Rudoshansky . To the south of them were the divisions of generals Juliusz Rummel and Tadeusz Rozwadowski.

The offensive of Polish troops in Belarus

At the end of February, Polish troops crossed the Neman and launched an offensive in Belarus (which had been in a federation with the RSFSR since February 3). On February 28, General Ivashkevich’s units attacked Soviet troops along the Shchara River and occupied Slonim on March 1, and Listovsky’s units took Pinsk on March 2. The task of both groups was to prevent the concentration of Soviet troops along the Lida-Baranovichi-Luninets line and to prepare for the occupation of Grodno after the withdrawal of German troops from there. Soon Ivashkevich was replaced by Stanislav Sheptytsky.

On April 17 - 19, the Poles occupied Lida, Novogrudok and Baranovichi, and on April 19, the Polish cavalry entered Vilna. Two days later, Józef Pilsudski arrived there and made an appeal to the Lithuanian people, in which he proposed that Lithuania return to the union of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Meanwhile, Polish troops in Belarus under the command of Stanislav Sheptytsky continued to move east, receiving reinforcements from Poland - on April 28, the Poles occupied the city of Grodno, abandoned by the Germans. In May-July, the Polish units were replenished with the 70,000-strong army of Jozef Haller, transported from France. At the same time, Western Ukraine comes under the control of the Poles - on June 25, 1919, the Council of Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, the USA, and Italy authorizes Poland to occupy eastern Galicia up to the river. Zbruch. By July 17, eastern Galicia was completely occupied by the Polish army, and the administration of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUNR) was liquidated.

The offensive of Polish troops in Belarus continued - on July 4, Molodechno was occupied, and on July 25, Slutsk came under Polish control. The commander of the Soviet Western Front, Dmitry Nadezhny, was removed from his post on July 22, and Vladimir Gittis was appointed in his place. However, the Soviet troops in Belarus did not receive significant reinforcements, since the Soviet General Staff sent all reserves to the south against Anton Denikin’s Volunteer Army, which launched an attack on Moscow in July.

Meanwhile, in August, Polish troops again went on the offensive, the main goal of which was Minsk. After a six-hour battle on August 9, Polish troops captured the Belarusian capital, and on August 29, despite stubborn resistance from the Red Army, Bobruisk was captured by the Poles. In October, units of the Red Army launched a counterattack on the city, but were defeated. After this, the fighting subsided until the beginning of next year: the parties concluded a truce. This was explained by the reluctance of the Entente countries and Anton Denikin to support plans for further Polish expansion. A long negotiation process began.

Diplomatic struggle

As mentioned above, the successes of the Polish troops in Belarus were largely due to the fact that the leadership of the Red Army sent the main forces to defend the southern direction from the advancing troops of Anton Denikin. Denikin, like the White movement as a whole, recognized the independence of Poland, but was opposed to Polish claims to the lands east of the Bug, believing that they should be part of a single and indivisible Russia.

The Entente's position on this issue coincided with Denikin's - in December the Declaration on the eastern border of Poland, coinciding with the line of ethnographic predominance of the Poles, was announced. At the same time, the Entente demanded that Pilsudski provide military assistance to Denikin’s troops and resume the offensive in Belarus. However, at that time, the Polish troops were located significantly east of the Curzon line and the Pilsudski government did not intend to leave the occupied territories. After months of negotiations in Taganrog between Denikin and Pilsudski's representative, General Alexander Karnicki, ended without result, Polish-Soviet negotiations began.

A conversation took place in Mikashevichi between Julian Marchlewski and Ignacy Börner. The release of political prisoners was expected - a list was compiled of 1,574 Poles imprisoned in the RSFSR and 307 communists in Polish prisons. The Bolsheviks demanded a plebiscite in Belarus among the local population on the issue of state structure and territorial affiliation. The Poles, in turn, demanded the transfer of Dvinsk to Latvia and the cessation of hostilities against the UPR of Petliura, with which they had by this time entered into an alliance.

In October, Polish-Soviet negotiations resumed in Mikashevichi. The immediate reason why the Polish side again entered into negotiations was its concern about the successes of Denikin’s army in the fight against the Red Army, his occupation of Kursk and Orel on the way to Moscow. According to Pilsudski, white support was not in Poland's interests. A similar opinion was expressed to Julian Marchlewski by the representative of the head of the Polish state at the negotiations in Mikashevichi, Captain Ignacy Berner, noting that “helping Denikin in his fight against the Bolsheviks cannot serve the interests of the Polish state.” A direct consequence of the negotiations was the transfer of the elite Latvian division of the Red Army from the Polish to the Southern Front , the victory of White became possible solely thanks to the flank attack of the Strike Group, the basis of which were Latvians. In December 1919, negotiations in Mikashevichi were stopped at the initiative of the Poles. This is largely explained by the low assessment of the Red Army (as well as the AFSR) by Pilsudski before the start of military operations of the Polish troops against the Reds - in particular, in January 1920, in a conversation with the British diplomat Sir MacKinder, he expressed the following opinion:

Although the negotiations ended without results, the break in hostilities allowed Pilsudski to suppress the pro-Soviet opposition, and the Red Army to transfer reserves to the Belarusian direction and develop an offensive plan.

Polish offensive in Ukraine

After the failure of peace negotiations, fighting resumed. In early January 1920, the troops of Edward Rydz-Smigly took Dvinsk with an unexpected blow and then handed the city over to the Latvian authorities. On March 6, Polish troops launched an offensive in Belarus, capturing Mozyr and Kalinkovichi. Four attempts by the Red Army to recapture Mozyr were unsuccessful, and the Red Army’s offensive in Ukraine also ended in failure. The commander of the Western Front, Vladimir Gittis, was removed from his post, and 27-year-old Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who had previously proven himself during the battles against the troops of Kolchak and Denikin, was appointed in his place. Also, for better command and control of troops, the southern part of the Western Front was transformed into the Southwestern Front, the commander of which was appointed Alexander Egorov.

The balance of forces on the Soviet-Polish front by May 1920 was as follows:

On the southern sector of the front - from the Dnieper to Pripyat

Polish Army:

  • 6th Army of General Vaclav Iwaszkiewicz
  • 2nd Army of General Antoni Listovsky
  • 3rd Army of General Edward Rydz-Smigly

Total: 30.4 thousand bayonets and 4.9 thousand sabers.

Southwestern Front of Alexander Egorov:

  • 12th Army of Sergei Mezheninov
  • 14th Army of Hieronymus Uborevich

Total: 13.4 thousand bayonets and 2.3 thousand sabers.

On the northern section of the front - between Pripyat and Western Dvina

Polish Army

  • 4th Army (Polesie and Berezina region) General Stanislav Sheptytsky
  • Operational group of General Leonard Skersky (Borisov area)
  • 1st Army (Dvina region) General Stefan Mayevsky
  • Reserve Army of General Kazimierz Sosnkowski

Total: 60.1 thousand bayonets and 7 thousand sabers.

Western Front of Mikhail Tukhachevsky:

  • 15th Army of Augustus Cork
  • 16th Army of Nikolai Sollogub

Total: 66.4 thousand bayonets and 4.4 thousand sabers.

Thus, in Belarus the forces were approximately equal, and in Ukraine the Poles had an almost threefold numerical superiority, which the Polish command decided to make maximum use of by transferring additional troops to this direction with a total force of 10 thousand bayonets and 1 thousand sabers. In addition, the actions of the Poles, in accordance with the agreement, were supported by Petliura’s troops, numbering about 15 thousand people at that time.

On April 25, 1920, Polish troops attacked the positions of the Red Army along the entire length of the Ukrainian border and by April 28 occupied the line Chernobyl - Kozyatin - Vinnitsa - Romanian border. Sergei Mezheninov, not risking engaging in battle, withdrew the troops of the 12th Army, parts of which were scattered at a great distance from each other, lost unified control and needed to be regrouped. During these days, the Poles captured more than 25 thousand Red Army soldiers, captured 2 armored trains, 120 guns and 418 machine guns. On May 7, Polish cavalry entered Kyiv, abandoned by units of the Red Army, and soon the Poles managed to create a bridgehead up to 15 km deep on the left bank of the Dnieper.

The offensive of the Red Army in the spring-summer of 1920

Tukhachevsky decided to take advantage of the diversion of part of the forces of the Polish army from the Belarusian direction and on May 14 launched an offensive on the Polish positions with the forces of 12 infantry divisions. Despite the initial success, by May 27, the offensive of the Soviet troops had stalled, and on June 1, the 4th and parts of the 1st Polish armies launched a counteroffensive against the 15th Soviet army and by June 8 inflicted a heavy defeat on it (the army lost killed, wounded and more than 12 thousand soldiers were captured).

On the Southwestern Front, the situation was turned in the Soviet favor with the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Army of Semyon Budyonny, transferred from the Caucasus (16.7 thousand sabers, 48 ​​guns, 6 armored trains and 12 aircraft). It left Maykop on April 3, defeated Nestor Makhno’s troops in Gulyai-Polye, and crossed the Dnieper north of Yekaterinoslav (May 6). On May 26, after concentrating all units in Uman, the 1st Cavalry attacked Kazatin, and on June 5, Budyonny, having found a weak spot in the Polish defense, broke through the front near Samogorodok and went to the rear of the Polish units, advancing on Berdichev and Zhitomir. On June 10, the 3rd Polish Army of Rydz-Smigly, fearing encirclement, left Kyiv and moved to the Mazovia region. Two days later, the 1st Cavalry Army entered Kyiv. Attempts by Egorov's small troops to prevent the retreat of the 3rd Army ended unsuccessfully. Polish troops, having regrouped, tried to go on a counteroffensive: on July 1, the troops of General Leon Berbetsky struck the front of the 1st Cavalry Army near Rovno. This offensive was not supported by adjacent Polish units and Berbetsky's troops were driven back. Polish troops made several more attempts to capture the city, but on July 10 it finally came under the control of the Red Army.

At dawn on July 4, Mikhail Tukhachevsky's Western Front again went on the offensive. The main blow was delivered on the right, northern flank, on which an almost twofold superiority in men and weapons was achieved. The idea of ​​the operation was to bypass the Polish units with Guy's cavalry corps and push the Polish Belorussian Front to the Lithuanian border. This tactic brought success: on July 5, the 1st and 4th Polish armies began to quickly retreat in the direction of Lida, and, unable to gain a foothold on the old line of German trenches, retreated to the Bug at the end of July. In a short period of time, the Red Army advanced more than 600 km: on July 10, the Poles left Bobruisk, on July 11 - Minsk, on July 14, units of the Red Army took Vilna. On July 26, in the Bialystok area, the Red Army crossed directly into Polish territory, and on August 1, despite Pilsudski’s orders, Brest was surrendered to Soviet troops almost without resistance.

On July 23, in Smolensk, the Bolsheviks formed the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland (Polrevkom), which was supposed to assume full power after the capture of Warsaw and the overthrow of Pilsudski. The Bolsheviks officially announced this on August 1 in Bialystok, where the Polrevkom was located. The committee was headed by Julian Marchlewski. On the same day, August 1, Polrevkom announced the “Appeal to the Polish working people of cities and villages,” written by Dzerzhinsky. The “Appeal” announced the creation of the Polish Republic of Soviets, the nationalization of lands, the separation of church and state, and also contained an appeal to workers to drive away capitalists and landowners, occupy factories and factories, and create revolutionary committees as government bodies (65 such revolutionary committees were formed) . The committee called on the soldiers of the Polish Army to mutiny against Pilsudski and defect to the side of the Polish Republic of Soviets. Polrevkom also began to form the Polish Red Army (under the command of Roman Longwa), but did not achieve any success in this.

The creation of the Polrevkom was explained by the serious hopes of the Soviet leadership for the help of the Polish proletariat and played a negative role in the decision on further actions by the military leadership.

Having reached the Polish border, the High Command of the Red Army was faced with a difficult choice whether to continue the operation or not. Commander-in-Chief Kamenev 2 years later in the article “The Fight against White Poland” (originally published in the magazine “Military Bulletin”, 1922, 12, pp. 7-15) described the situation that developed when making the decision:

“The period of struggle in question turned out to be the cornerstone in the entire course of events. Having achieved the above successes, the Red Army obviously faced the last task of capturing Warsaw, and at the same time with this task, the situation itself set a deadline for its completion “immediately.”

This period was determined by two most important considerations: information on the political side boiled down to the fact that the tests of the revolutionary impulse of the Polish proletariat must not be delayed, otherwise it will be strangled; judging by the trophies, prisoners and their testimonies, the enemy army undoubtedly suffered a great defeat, therefore, there is no time to hesitate: the uncut forest will soon grow back. This forest could grow soon also because we knew about the help that France was in a hurry to provide to its beaten brainchild. We also had unequivocal warnings from England that if we crossed such and such a line, then real help would be provided to Poland. We crossed this line, therefore, it was necessary to stop until this “real help” was provided. The listed motives are sufficiently weighty to determine how short the period at our disposal was.

Naturally, our command faced the question of whether an immediate solution to the upcoming task was feasible for the Red Army in its composition and condition in which it approached the Bug, and whether the rear could cope. And now, as then, we have to answer this: yes and no. If we were right in taking into account the political moment, if we did not overestimate the depth of the defeat of the Belopol army and if the fatigue of the Red Army was not excessive, then the task had to be started immediately. Otherwise, the operation, quite possibly, would have had to be abandoned completely, since it was “It would be too late to give a helping hand to the proletariat of Poland and finally neutralize the force that carried out the treacherous attack on us. Having repeatedly checked all the information listed, it was decided to continue the operation without stopping.”

As you can see, the decision was made based on two factors - political and military. And if the second, in general, was probably assessed correctly - the Polish army was really on the verge of disaster, even according to outside observers (in particular, a participant in the French military mission, General Faury noted that “at the beginning of the operation on the Vistula, for all military specialists, the fate of Poland seemed completely doomed, and not only was the strategic situation hopeless, but also morally the Polish troops had formidable symptoms, which, it seemed, should have finally led the country to destruction”) and it was impossible to give her time for a break under other favorable conditions, then the second factor turned out to be erroneous. As Kamenev noted, “now the moment has come when the working class of Poland could really provide that assistance to the Red Army... but there was no outstretched hand of the proletariat. Probably, the more powerful hands of the Polish bourgeoisie hid this hand somewhere.”.

Subsequently - this opinion has become widespread recently - it is customary to place the blame for the decision to further develop an extremely risky offensive on Tukhachevsky. This opinion was also heard from military professionals, in particular Konev (here is what K. Simonov, for example, wrote down in his conversations with Marshal Konev: “His (Tukhachevsky’s) shortcomings included a well-known touch of adventurism, which manifested itself in the Polish campaign, in the battle of Warsaw. I. S. Konev said that he studied this campaign in detail, and, whatever the mistakes of Egorov and Stalin on the South-Western Front, there was no reason to blame them entirely for Tukhachevsky’s failure near Warsaw. His very movement with exposed flanks, with stretched communications and all his behavior during this period do not make a solid, positive impression.”). Nevertheless, as we see, this risk was recognized - and accepted - at the highest level by the military and political leadership of the country:

“Thus, the Red Army openly took risks, and the risks were excessive. After all, the operation, even with a satisfactory resolution of all the listed conditions, still had to be carried out primarily without any rear, which was completely impossible to quickly restore after the destruction caused by the White Poles.

There was another moment of risk here, which was created by political significance the Danzig corridor, which the Red Army might not have appreciated and was forced to accept a plan to capture Warsaw from the north, since first of all it was necessary to cut it off from the highway, which not only served material aid by the Poles themselves, but the help of the Entente (read France) in manpower could appear.

The very operation of capturing Warsaw from the north severely separated our main forces from the Ivangorod direction, where significant forces of the White Poles were retreating, and then overextended our front. Our forces, unable to receive reinforcements, since the railways left to us by the White Poles were completely destroyed, melted away every day.

Thus, we were approaching the moment of denouement, every day decreasing in number, in military supplies and stretching our front.”

Ultimately, it was the factor of extended communications and the weakening of the Red Army, combined with the strengthening, and not weakening (as the Soviet political leadership expected) rear of the Polish army that led to the situation balancing on a razor’s edge. At this moment, any insignificant factor and/or the slightest tactical error could play a decisive role in the turn of fortune to one side or another, which is what happened in reality. This is what an outside observer-participant wrote in particular: White movement, Major General of the General Staff of the Old Army Goncharenko:

“The rapid movement forward, without preparing the rear and equipping communication lines, for its part, most decisively affected the loss of the campaign. The leaders of the Red Army are blinded by political considerations... At the same time, the command makes extremely bold, risky decisions, where not only is there a complete absence of any pattern, but where the presence of risk in every strategic maneuver is striking, more than abundantly justifying the thought of old Moltke “great successes in war are impossible without great risk”. Moreover, the essence of operational plans is sharpened to such an extent that “one inch of strategic error nullifies miles of strategic success”

However, by the beginning of August the situation in Poland was critical and close to disaster. This is not only due to the rapid retreat in Belarus, but also due to the deterioration of the country’s international position. Great Britain actually stopped providing military and economic assistance to Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia closed their borders with Poland, and Danzig remained the only point of delivery of goods to the republic. However, the main supplies and assistance were provided not by the above countries, but by France and the United States, which did not stop their activities (see below “The role of the “great powers” ​​in the conflict”). As the Red Army troops approached Warsaw, the evacuation of foreign diplomatic missions began from there.

Meanwhile, the position of the Polish troops worsened not only in the Belarusian, but also in the Ukrainian direction, where the Southwestern Front again went on the offensive under the command of Alexander Egorov (with Stalin as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council). The main goal of the front was the capture of Lvov, which was defended by three infantry divisions of the 6th Polish Army and the Ukrainian army under the command of Mikhailo Omelyanovich-Pavlenko. On July 9, the 14th Army of the Red Army took Proskurov (Khmelnitsky), and on July 12 it stormed Kamenets-Podolsky. On July 25, the Southwestern Front launched the Lvov offensive operation, but was never able to capture Lvov.

Battle of Warsaw

On August 12, the troops of Mikhail Tukhachevsky’s Western Front went on the offensive, the goal of which was to capture Warsaw.

Composition of the Western Front

  • 3rd Cavalry Corps Guy Guy
  • 4th Army A.D. Shuvaev, chief of staff - G.S. Gorchakov
  • 15th Army of Augustus Cork
  • 3rd Army of Vladimir Lazarevich
  • 16th Army of Nikolai Sollogub
  • Mozyr group of Tikhon Khvesin

The two fronts of the Red Army were opposed by three Polish ones:

Northern Front of General Józef Haller

  • 5th Army of General Wladislav Sikorski
  • 1st Army of General Frantisek Latinik
  • 2nd Army of General Bolesław Roja

Central Front of General Edward Rydz-Śmigły

  • 4th Army of General Leonard Skersky
  • 3rd Army of General Zygmunt Zielinski

Southern Front of General Vaclav Iwaszkiewicz

  • 6th Army of General Władysław Jędrzejewski
  • Army of the UPR General Mikhail Omelyanovich-Pavlenko

The total number of personnel differs in all sources. We can only say with confidence that the forces were approximately equal and did not exceed 200 thousand people on each side.

Mikhail Tukhachevsky's plan included crossing the Vistula in the lower reaches and attacking Warsaw from the west. According to some assumptions made, the purpose of “deviating” the direction of the attack of Soviet troops to the north was to quickly reach the German border, which was supposed to speed up the establishment of Soviet power in this country. On August 13, two rifle divisions of the Red Army struck near Radimin (23 km from Warsaw) and captured the city. Then one of them moved to Prague (the right bank part of Warsaw), and the second turned right - to Nieporent and Jablonna. Polish forces retreated to the second line of defense.

At the beginning of August, the Polish-French command finalized the counteroffensive plan. Soviet historian Soviet-Polish war N. Kakurin, analyzing in detail the formation of this plan and the changes made to it, comes to the idea of ​​​​the significant influence of the French military on the appearance of its final version:

“Thus, we can assume that the final plan of action in the Polish headquarters took shape only on August 9. It was the fruit of the collective creativity of Marshal Pilsudski, gene. Rozvadovsky and Weygand. The first of these generals was responsible for the technical processing of the plan, the second was the author of very important adjustments made to the original plan of action. Therefore, we can consider that the final plan of action of the Polish high command of August 9 is a symbiosis of the operational ideas of Marshal Pilsudski and General. Weygand, but by no means the fruit of the former’s independent operational creativity, as one might think based on Pilsudski’s book “1920”. ... Turning to the analysis of the enemy’s plan, we note once again that it included elements of exceptional risk and was the fruit of collective creativity with the very significant participation of the gene in it. Weygand. Weygand's intervention, firstly, expanded and clarified its scope, gave a clear goal setting, activated the entire plan and, with the creation of a northern strike wing, somewhat mitigated the risk that filled Pilsudski's original plan. ... Based on Pilsudski's own admission, we are inclined to consider the original version of his decision of August 6 to be more a gesture of despair than the fruit of sound calculation. Apart from the immediate goal - saving Warsaw at any cost - Pilsudski saw nothing..."

The Polish counteroffensive plan provided for the concentration of large forces on the Wieprz River and a sudden attack from the southeast to the rear of the Western Front troops. For this purpose, two strike groups were formed from the two armies of the Central Front of General Edward Rydz-Śmigły. However, order 8358/III on a counterattack near Wieprze with a detailed map fell into the hands of the Red Army soldiers, but the Soviet command considered the found document to be disinformation, the purpose of which was to disrupt the Red Army's offensive on Warsaw. On the same day, Polish radio intelligence intercepted an order from the 16th Army to attack Warsaw on August 14. To get ahead of the Reds, on the orders of Józef Haller, Wladislav Sikorski's 5th Army, defending Modlin, from the area of ​​the Wkra River struck Tukhachevsky's extended front at the junction of the 3rd and 15th armies and broke through it. On the night of August 15, two reserve Polish divisions attacked Soviet troops from the rear near Radimin. Soon the city was taken.

On August 16, Marshal Pilsudski began implementing the planned counterattack. The information received by radio intelligence about the weakness of the Mozyr group played a role. Having concentrated more than a double superiority against it (47.5 thousand soldiers against 21 thousand), Polish troops (the first strike group under the command of Pilsudski himself) broke through the front and defeated the southern wing of Nikolai Sollogub’s 16th Army. At the same time, an attack was underway on Włodawa by the forces of the 3rd Legion Infantry Division, as well as, with the support of tanks, on Minsk-Mazowiecki. This created a threat of encirclement of all Red Army troops in the Warsaw area.

Given the critical situation on the Western Front, on August 14, Commander-in-Chief Kamenev ordered the transfer of the 12th and 1st Cavalry Armies to the Western Front to significantly strengthen it. There is an opinion that the leadership of the South-Western Front, which was besieging Lvov, ignored this order, and one of the opponents of the transfer of Cavalry to the western direction was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front, I. V. Stalin, who in general was a principled opponent of the plans to conquer the primordially Polish territories, in particular the capital of Poland.

This opinion appeared almost immediately after the Civil War, and became especially widespread in the 60s, with the debunking of the cult of personality, in connection with the issue of transferring the 1st Cavalry Army to the Western Front, as well as the assertion that it was this refusal that caused the defeat Bolsheviks near Warsaw. If the second is partly true, then the first part of the statement is more than controversial. The issue of the delay in the turn of the First Cavalry to the north was discussed in detail back in the 20s in the work “Civil War”, written under the editorship of Kakurin and Vatsetis. Kakurin, who examined this issue in detail based on documents, ultimately came to the conclusion that the decision made by the Commander-in-Chief finally on August 10-11 to reorient the First Cavalry and 12th Armies to the north could not be implemented in a timely manner, primarily due to friction in the operation of the control apparatus:

It was precisely the friction in the work of the control apparatus and the inertia associated with the withdrawal of the 1st Cavalry from the battles in the Lvov direction that predetermined that fatal delay, which turned out to be decisive at the moment of crisis, “the straw that broke the camel’s back.”

So, only on August 20, the 1st Cavalry Army began moving north. By the time the 1st Cavalry Army began to march from near Lvov, the troops of the Western Front had already begun an unorganized retreat to the east. On August 19, the Poles occupied Brest, and on August 23, Bialystok. On the same day, the 4th Army and the 3rd Cavalry Corps of Guy Guy and two divisions from the 15th Army (about 40 thousand people in total) crossed the German border and were interned. At the end of August, through Sokal, the 1st Cavalry Army struck in the direction of Zamosc and Grubeshov, in order to then, through Lublin, reach the rear of the Polish attack group advancing to the north. However, the Poles advanced the General Staff's 1st Cavalry reserves to meet them.

There is a legend that at the end of August, near Komarov, the largest cavalry battle since 1813 took place, in which the 1st Polish division of Rummel, numbering 2,000 sabers, defeated the Cavalry Army, numbering 7,000 sabers (and according to other statements, 16 thousand). The reality, of course, was much more prosaic. Firstly, the size of the Cavalry Army is 16 thousand bayonets and sabers - this is its number at the beginning of the campaign - after the Ukrainian campaign and heavy battles in Lviv, its number was reduced by more than half. Secondly, when the First Cavalry was thrown into the raid on Zamosc, in order to ease the situation of the armies of the Western Front, there it encountered more than one Polish division. According to Soviet intelligence, by the time of the raid in the Zamosc area, the Poles had managed to regroup, and in addition to units of the 3rd Polish Army, the 10th and 13th Infantry, 1st Cavalry, 2nd Ukrainian and Cossack divisions were discovered there. Those who write about Rummel’s one and only division, which defeated the Cavalry alone, as a rule do not mention that this division arrived to reinforce the formations of the 3rd Polish Army that were already operating in that area, while the reinforcements themselves were not limited to this division alone. The battle near Komarov was only one of the episodes in which only one of the four cavalry divisions, the 6th, took part on the side of the Cavalry, i.e. the number of Red and Polish units that collided near Komarov was comparable, and the scale of the battles did not in any way match the a large cavalry battle (in Soviet historiography, the largest cavalry battle of the Civil War is considered to be the oncoming battle at Sredny Yegorlyk on February 25-27, 1920 - up to 25 thousand sabers on both sides). The failure of the raid on Zamosc was more than understandable - the Cavalry began this raid, being exhausted in the battles for Lviv, leaving supply bases on the right bank of the Western Bug, and being forced to overcome “throughout the entire five-day raid the raging elements that covered this entire wooded and swampy area continuous rains turned areas of terrain into difficult to pass, greatly complicating the issue of maneuvering.” Extremely tired and not having enough ammunition, the units could not withstand the collision with the enemy who had received reinforcements, and with difficulty escaped from the encirclement. Budyonny's army, and behind it the troops of the Southwestern Front, were forced to retreat from Lvov and go on the defensive.

As a result of the defeat near Warsaw, Soviet troops on the Western Front suffered heavy losses. According to some estimates, during the Battle of Warsaw, 25 thousand Red Army soldiers died, 60 thousand were captured by Poland, 45 thousand were interned by the Germans. Several thousand people went missing. The front also lost a large amount of artillery and equipment. Polish losses are estimated at 15 thousand killed and missing and 22 thousand wounded.

Fighting in Belarus

After the retreat from Poland, Tukhachevsky consolidated himself on the line of the Neman - Shchara - Svisloch rivers, using German fortifications remaining from the First World War as a second line of defense. The Western Front received large reinforcements from the rear areas, and 30 thousand people from among those interned in East Prussia returned to its composition. Gradually, Tukhachevsky was able to almost completely restore the combat strength of the front: on September 1, he had 73 thousand soldiers and 220 guns. By order of Kamenev, Tukhachevsky was preparing a new offensive.

The Poles were also preparing for the attack. The attack on Grodno and Volkovysk was supposed to tie up the main forces of the Red Army and enable the 2nd Army to reach the deep rear of the advanced units of the Red Army through the territory of Lithuania, holding the defense on the Neman. On September 12, Tukhachevsky gave the order to attack Wlodawa and Brest with the southern flank of the Western Front, including the 4th and 12th armies. Since the order was intercepted and deciphered by Polish radio intelligence, on the same day the Poles launched a pre-emptive strike, broke through the defenses of the 12th Army and took Kovel. This disrupted the general offensive of the Red Army troops and threatened the encirclement of the southern group of the Western Front and forced the 4th, 12th and 14th armies to retreat to the east.

The defense of the Western Front on the Neman was held by three armies: the 3rd of Vladimir Lazarevich, the 15th of August Kork and the 16th of Nikolai Sollogub (in total about 100 thousand soldiers, about 250 guns). They were opposed by the Polish group of Jozef Pilsudski: the 2nd Army of General Edward Rydz-Smigly, the 4th Army of General Leonard Skerski, the reserve of the commander-in-chief (about 100 thousand soldiers in total).

On September 20, 1920, the bloody battle for Grodno began. At first, the Poles were successful, but on September 22, Tukhachevsky’s troops brought up reserves and restored the situation. Meanwhile, Polish troops invaded Lithuania and moved towards Druskenniki (Druskininkai). Having captured the bridge across the Neman, the Poles flanked the Western Front. On September 25, unable to stop the Polish advance, Tukhachevsky gave the order to withdraw troops to the east. On the night of September 26, the Poles occupied Grodno, and soon crossed the Neman south of the city. Lazarevich's 3rd Army, retreating to the east, was unable to restore the front and withdrew to the Lida region with heavy losses. On September 28, however, Soviet troops were unable to capture the city already occupied by the enemy and were soon defeated (most of the personnel were captured).

Pilsudski intended to build on his success, encircle and destroy the remaining troops of the Western Front at Novogrudok. However, the Polish units, weakened in battle, were unable to carry out this order and the Red Army troops were able to regroup and organize defense.

During the Battle of the Neman, Polish troops captured 40 thousand prisoners, 140 guns, a large number of horses and ammunition. The fighting in Belarus continued until the signing of the peace treaty in Riga. On October 12, the Poles re-entered Minsk and Molodechno.

Terror against civilians

During the war, troops from both countries carried out executions of civilians, while Polish troops carried out ethnic cleansing, mainly targeting Jews. The leadership of both the Red Army and the Polish Army initiated official investigations into the results of such actions and tried to prevent them.

The first documented use of weapons against non-combatants was the shooting by the Poles of the Russian Red Cross mission on January 2, 1919; this act was most likely committed by the Polish Self-Defense units, since the regular Polish army had not yet left Poland. In March 1919, after the Polish army occupied Pinsk, the Polish commandant ordered the shooting of 40 Jews who had gathered for prayer, who were mistaken for a Bolshevik meeting. Some of the hospital staff were also shot. In April of the same year, the capture of Vilnius by the Poles was accompanied by massacres of captured Red Army soldiers, Jews and people sympathizing with the Soviet regime. The offensive of Polish troops in Ukraine in the spring of 1920 was accompanied by pogroms and mass executions of Jews: in the city of Rovno, the Poles shot more than 3 thousand civilians, in the town of Tetiev about 4 thousand Jews were killed, the villages of Ivanovtsy, Kucha, Sobachi were completely burned for resistance to food requisitions. Yablunovka, Novaya Greblya, Melnichi, Kirillovka and others, their residents were shot. Polish historians question these data; according to the Brief Jewish Encyclopedia, the massacre in Tetiev was carried out not by Poles, but by Ukrainians - a detachment of Ataman Kurovsky (Petliurist, former Red commander) on March 24, 1920. A representative of the Polish Civil Administration of the Eastern Lands (the Polish administration in the occupied territories) M. Kossakovsky testified that the Polish military exterminated people only because they “looked like Bolsheviks.”

A special place in the terror against the civilian population is occupied by the activities of the Belarusian units of “ataman” Stanislav Balakhovich, who at first were subordinate to the Polish command, but after the truce acted independently. The Polish military prosecutor, Colonel Lisovsky, who investigated complaints about the actions of Balakhovich’s men, described the activities of Balakhovich’s division as follows:

An investigation conducted by Colonel Lisovsky, in particular, established that in Turov alone, Balakhovites raped 70 Jewish girls aged 12 to 15 years.

Excerpt from the testimony of H. Gdanski and M. Blumenkrank to the investigation, given in the book of the Polish researcher Marek Kabanovsky “General Stanislav Bulak-Balachovich” (Warsaw, 1993):

A resident of Mozyr, A. Naidich, described the events in the capital of the BPR Mozyr after the capture of the city by the Balakhovites (GA RF. F. 1339. Op. 1. D. 459. L. 2-3.):

The report of the commission for registering victims of Balakhovich’s raid in Mozyr district stated that

On the Soviet side, Budyonny’s army gained fame as the main pogrom force. Particularly large pogroms were carried out by the Budennovites in Baranovka, Chudnov and Rogachev. In particular, from September 18 to 22, the 6th Cavalry Division of this army committed more than 30 pogroms; in the town of Lyubar on September 29, during a pogrom, 60 people were killed by division soldiers; in Priluki, on the night of October 3, 12 people were wounded, 21 were killed “and many women were raped.” At the same time, “women were shamelessly raped in front of everyone, and girls, like slaves, were dragged away by beasts and bandits to their carts.” In Vakhnovka on October 3, 20 people were killed, many were wounded and raped, and 18 houses were burned. After on September 28, while trying to stop the pogrom in the town of Polonnoye, the commissar of the 6th division G. G. Shepelev was killed, the division was disbanded, and two brigade commanders and several hundred ordinary soldiers were put on trial and 157 were shot.

Polish officers captured by the Red Army were certainly shot on the spot, as were Bolshevik commissars captured by the Poles.

The fate of prisoners of war

There is still no exact data about the fate of Polish and Soviet prisoners of war. According to Russian sources, about 80 thousand of the 200 thousand Red Army soldiers captured by Poland died from hunger, disease, torture, abuse and execution.

Polish sources give figures of 85 thousand prisoners (at least that many people were in Polish camps at the end of the war), of which about 20 thousand died. They were kept in the camps remaining after the First World War - Strzałkow (the largest), Dombier, Pikulice, Wadowice and Tuchol concentration camp. According to the 1921 agreement on the exchange of prisoners (addition to the Riga Peace Treaty), 65 thousand captured Red Army soldiers returned to Russia. If the information about 200 thousand captured and the death of 80 thousand of them is correct, then the fate of about 60 thousand more people is unclear.

The mortality rate in Polish camps reached 20% of the number of prisoners, mainly the cause of death was epidemics, which, in conditions of poor nutrition, overcrowding and lack of medical care, quickly spread and had a high mortality rate. This is how a member of the International Committee of the Red Cross described the camp in Brest:

A sickening smell emanates from the guardhouses, as well as from the former stables in which prisoners of war were housed. The prisoners are chillingly huddling around a makeshift stove where several logs are burning - the only way to warm themselves. At night, sheltering from the first cold weather, they lie in close rows in groups of 300 people in poorly lit and poorly ventilated barracks, on planks, without mattresses or blankets. The prisoners are mostly dressed in rags... due to the overcrowding of the premises, unsuitable for habitation; close cohabitation of healthy prisoners of war and infectious patients, many of whom died immediately; malnutrition, as evidenced by numerous cases of malnutrition; swelling, hunger during the three months of stay in Brest - the camp in Brest-Litovsk was a real necropolis.

The story of a private of the Red Army: Manin Polikarp Ivanovich, a resident of the village of Akhidovka, Rodnikovsky district Ivanovo region Russia: “In 1919, our detachment of 17 people got lost and was captured near Warsaw. We were lined up and the Polish boss asked who could pay us off. I had a royal one gold coin, taken to war “for luck.” The Poles valued the coin at two lives and released me and my colleague. The rest were immediately hacked to pieces with sabers before our eyes.” Recorded from his words by his grandson, Mikhail Ivanovich Manin.

In the prisoner of war camp in Strzalkow, among other things, numerous abuses of prisoners took place, for which the camp commandant, Lieutenant Malinowski, was later put on trial.

As for Polish prisoners of war, according to updated data, 33.5-34 thousand prisoners of war were taken in 1919-1920 (the figure of 60 thousand prisoners of war given by Meltyukhov without citing sources does not correspond to reality - this figure is taken from the reports of the Polish Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (b. ), which in the spring of 1921 asked for trains for the repatriation of Poles for such a number of people); even up to 8 thousand prisoners, this is the 5th Polish division, which surrendered in the winter of 1919-20 in Krasnoyarsk). The total is 41-42 thousand Polish prisoners, of which a total of 34,839 Polish prisoners of war were repatriated from March 1921 to July 1922, and about 3 thousand more expressed a desire to remain in the RSFSR. Thus, the total loss amounted to only about 3-4 thousand prisoners of war, of which about 2 thousand were recorded according to documents as having died in captivity.

The role of the “great powers” ​​in the conflict

The Soviet-Polish war took place simultaneously with the intervention in Russia of the Entente countries, which actively supported Poland from the moment of its re-establishment as an independent state. In this regard, Poland's war against Russia was considered by the "great powers" as part of the struggle against the Bolshevik government.

However, the Entente countries' opinions regarding the possible strengthening of Poland as a result of the conflict differed greatly - the United States and France advocated all possible assistance to the Pilsudski government and took part in the creation of the Polish army, while Great Britain was inclined to limited assistance to Poland, and then to political neutrality in this conflict. The participation of the Entente countries concerned economic, military and diplomatic support for Poland.

From February to August 1919, Poland received 260,000 tons of food worth $51 million from the United States. In 1919, Poland received $60 million worth of military equipment from US military warehouses in Europe alone; in 1920, $100 million worth.

In total, in 1920, France alone supplied the following volumes of weapons (in parentheses for comparison, the figures for British deliveries to Denikin for the period March-September 1919):

(figures for French supplies to the Polish army are given according to the work of Kakurin and Melikov, for British - Denikin - according to the report of the British military mission of General Hallman dated October 8, 1919). According to other sources, in the spring of 1920, England, France and the USA supplied Poland with 1,494 guns, 2,800 machine guns, about 700 aircraft, and 10 million shells.

As can be seen from a comparison with British supplies of AFSR, the figures are quite comparable. At the same time, the scale and importance of British supplies is well demonstrated by the fact that, for example, the number of cartridges supplied by the British to the AFSR was comparable to the number of cartridges received by the Red Army during the same period from the warehouses of the tsarist army and from the cartridge factories operating at that time. Here, in relation to French supplies to Poland, the number of cartridges is not indicated, but the comparability of other figures allows us to draw a conclusion about the importance and scale of French supplies.

In addition to supplying weapons, France also sent a military mission, which not only trained Polish troops, but also had a significant influence in the planning and development of operations, and as a result, greatly contributed to the victory of the Polish army. Military personnel from the United States also took part in the fighting on the side of the Poles - the Kosciuszko squadron, which operated against Budyonny’s army, was composed of US pilots and was commanded by US Colonel Fauntleroy. In July 1919, a 70,000-strong army arrived in Poland, created in France mainly from emigrants of Polish origin from France and the United States. French participation in the conflict was also reflected in the activities of hundreds of French officers, led by General Maxime Weygand, who arrived in 1920 to train Polish troops and assist the Polish General Staff. Among the French officers in Poland was Charles de Gaulle.

Britain's position was more restrained. The Curzon Line, proposed by the British minister as the eastern border of Poland in December 1919, assumed the establishment of a border west of the front line at that time and the withdrawal of Polish troops. Six months later, when the situation had changed, Curzon again proposed to fix the border along this line, otherwise the Entente countries pledged to support Poland “with all the means at their disposal.” Thus, throughout virtually the entire war, Great Britain advocated a compromise version of the division of the disputed territories (along the eastern border of the Poles).

However, even in the conditions of Poland's critical military situation, Great Britain did not provide it with any military support. In August 1920, a conference of trade unions and labor voted for a general strike if the government continued to support Poland and tried to intervene in the conflict; further shipments of ammunition to Poland were simply sabotaged. At the same time, the International Federation of Trade Unions in Amsterdam instructed its members to strengthen the embargo on ammunition destined for Poland. Only France and the United States continued to provide assistance to the Poles, but Germany and Czechoslovakia, with whom Poland managed to enter into border conflicts over disputed territories, at the end of July 1920 banned the transit of weapons and ammunition through their territory for Poland.

The reduction in assistance from the Entente countries played a significant role in the fact that after the victory at Warsaw, the Poles were unable to build on their success and defeat the Soviet troops of the Western Front. The change in Britain's diplomatic position (under the influence of the trade unions, which in turn were secretly financed by the Soviet government) accelerated the conclusion of the peace treaty in Riga.

Results of the war

Neither side achieved its goals during the war: Belarus and Ukraine were divided between Poland and the republics that became part of the Soviet Union in 1922. The territory of Lithuania was divided between Poland and the independent state of Lithuania. The RSFSR, for its part, recognized the independence of Poland and the legitimacy of the Pilsudski government, and temporarily abandoned plans for a “world revolution” and the elimination of the Versailles system. Despite the signing of a peace treaty, relations between the two countries remained tense for the next twenty years, which ultimately led to the Soviet participation in the partition of Poland in 1939.

Disagreements between the Entente countries that arose in 1920 on the issue of military-financial support for Poland led to the gradual cessation of support by these countries for the White movement and anti-Bolshevik forces in general, and subsequent international recognition of the Soviet Union.

What happened after the Red Army entered Poland in September 1939?

Interview with historian Alexander Guryanov, Chairman of the Polish Commission of the Memorial Society. This part of the interview is devoted to the events that followed the entry of the Red Army into the territory of the Polish state on September 17.

-Still, why was the decision made to not resist the Red Army?

I think it was based on a military assessment of the situation. But this decision was not unconditional. The troops were ordered not to resist if the Soviets did not try to disarm the army. Military units were supposed to go across the border to Romania and Hungary. And do not engage in battles with the Red Army, except in cases of attempts at disarmament.

But besides the order, there was also the general mood of the troops. There was no moral spirit to fight the Soviets. Any military action requires psychological preparation of troops, but it was not carried out. Back in the spring of 1939, after the German ultimatum, it was clear to the Polish leadership and army that war with Germany was inevitable. And psychological preparations were made to repel the Polish invasion.

In reality, the Red Army was opposed by the border troops, the border guard corps. A thin chain of outposts - they really put up resistance. And ours did not take everyone prisoner. When the outpost was captured after a bloody battle, the officers were shot and the privates were taken prisoner. This is described in the memoirs. And then the order of the commander-in-chief simply did not reach the border guards. He did not reach many scattered army units that were retreating from the Germans, escaping encirclement, being in the western part of Belarus and Ukraine. For example, the cavalry brigade of Anders, which tried to leave Belarus for Hungary. She started this movement even before our invasion. When the Red Army entered, the brigade rushed along the corridor between the two enemy armies, engaging in battles with both the Germans and ours. And already somewhere near Lvov Anders was wounded, the brigade laid down their arms. That is, in most cases, Polish units did not clash with ours, but individual battles There were losses on both sides.

- The initial marking of the proposed zones of occupation (secret protocol) assumed that the indigenous regions of Poland were also transferred to the Soviet Union. But the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship and Borders of September 28, 1939 presupposes a fundamentally different concept of partition.

I think it was Stalin's idea to draw the border further east. He could understand that this was fraught with big problems with the Polish underground, the Polish resistance. And reduce your responsibility for aggression against Poland as much as possible. Then he gave up the Lublin Voivodeship for a reason; there was a profitable exchange for Lithuania. And the Germans also demanded money for themselves - 7 million gold rubles. But Hitler agreed to everything, because he clearly planned to take all the territories for himself in the future.

- What did the double occupation of Poland mean directly for the population of this country?

Poland, of course, fell under repression on both sides. Can they be considered equilibrium? Polish emigration historiography throughout the decades after the end of the war adhered to the figure of 2 million repressed by the Soviets (at first they spoke of one and a half million), meaning those people who were Polish citizens on September 1. It was assumed that all types of repression were taken into account. And next to this, until the 90s, there was another figure, a symbolic figure - 6 million Polish citizens destroyed - precisely destroyed - by the Germans. It is clear that the round figure of 2 million was kept in order to somehow numerically correlate the losses from the Soviets with the losses from the Germans. A problem with these historians arose immediately. Back in 1941, when there was a turning point in Soviet-Polish relations, and an amnesty was declared for all Polish citizens on the territory of the USSR, it turned out that for all categories of repressed people - special settlers, concentration camp prisoners, prisoners of war - a total of 390 thousand. This means that ends meet converged. How did Polish historians overcome this contradiction? - they said that the rest died within a year and a half. There are 400 thousand left, and a certain number of people whom the Soviets do not want to grant amnesty and are keeping in special camps. The Polish historian Shchedletsky and other representatives of this school believed that 700-800 thousand died.

- What did they say about the causes of death? Did they assume still unknown executions, besides Katyn, death in the camps?

They did not try to specify, they only named total number dead. It turns out that I am now speaking as a defender of Stalin, but when access to documents was opened in the 90s, it quickly became clear that the number of all those repressed was still 3-4 times less than Polish historians had assumed. Between September 1939 and June 1941, in the territories captured by the USSR, just under half a million people were subjected to all types of repression. From 460 to 490 thousand, such a fork turns out. Moreover, if we talk about people who lost their lives (during this period), this is 58 thousand. 33 thousand were shot, the rest died in camps and settlements.

- Still, the scale of repression on the Soviet side is very large.

With the German one - over the same period they are many times, almost an order of magnitude larger. Hundreds of thousands were executed alone. The well-known AB action, which coincided in time with Katyn (the question is always raised whether they were connected or planned), was not, unlike Katyn, aimed at the military. Its targets were intellectuals, officials, and, in general, the intellectual elite. There is no direct evidence that these shares are related, only guesses and assumptions. There is minimal documentary evidence of two meetings held on Polish territory by representatives of the Gestapo and the NKVD. But not only the NKVD, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs too. I saw a photograph of these negotiators, where the central Soviet figure was none other than Maxim Litvinov. Spring 1940. But there are no written documents. Only pictures - how the Soviet delegation was greeted in Krakow, how it was taken to Zakopane. Where are the pictures from? – were preserved by the Germans, and in 1945 they came to the Allies.

- But still, in the fall of 1939, there were agreements between the Gestapo and the NKVD on “countering Polish propaganda”?

On September 28, Germany and the USSR concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Borders, which established these new borders and formalized the exchange of the Lublin Voivodeship for Lithuania. (Stalin’s famous statement is that we understand you, any military man gives up his spoils with pain, so take it.) The agreement was accompanied by a secret protocol, according to which the parties pledged to counteract “Polish agitation.” This euphemism assumed that if there were attempts by the Poles to act against the Germans on the Soviet side of the border, we would stop them, but if there were Polish actions against the Soviets on the German side, then the Germans would stop them.

- Did you stop it?

It is known that from the very first weeks of the occupation the Polish underground began to organize, both in the German and Soviet zones. Both the Germans and the Soviet Union fought against this underground, and the successes of the NKVD were an order of magnitude higher than those of the Germans. In the German zone of occupation, the underground developed dynamically and rapidly; in the Soviet zone it was also possible to organize it, but it was all permeated by NKVD agents. In Western Belarus and Western Ukraine - right up to the highest officials who were put in command of the underground.

-What kind of agents were these? From Polish communists?

There is no talk about communists. The Polish communists were defeated in 1938 and those of them who ended up in these territories (and they survived because they were not in the USSR in 1938) sat quietly, below the grass. It is known that by the beginning of 1938 the Polish Communist Party had approximately 7 thousand members. Of these, 5 thousand people were in the Soviet Union at that moment. Almost everyone was repressed, most were shot, some were sent to camps. Those Polish communists who found themselves on the territory of the USSR in 1939 did not advertise their ideological affiliation. After all, the Comintern dissolved the Polish Communist Party and announced that we, the Comintern, would consider any attempt to restore it as a provocation. As an attempt to introduce agents of the world bourgeoisie into us, into the Comintern. For example, the communist Gomulka quietly worked as a plumber in Bialystok. So, returning to the topic of the Polish underground, the Soviet agents in it were not communists. The NKVD handled the processing of agents well.

At the same time, the activities of the Gestapo and other German services in this sense turned out to be quite helpless. By 1944 the Polish underground had become such an impressive force, so impressive! It was an underground state with its own departments, a clear division into civilian and military structures. The Home Army was not just an armed force, but part of this underground state.

- Among those repressed by the Soviets were not only Poles, but also representatives of other nations.

Yes, the territories annexed to the USSR in 1939 - 11 new regions (5 western regions of the Belarusian SSR and 6 western regions of the Ukrainian SSR) were cut up so that their eastern borders exactly coincided with the pre-war border of the USSR. In the summer of 1940, the Vilna region was added to them, in 1939 it was given to Lithuania, which had now also become Soviet.

The national composition of the population in these territories is not so easy to determine. There was no column for “nationality” in Polish pre-war statistics. But there were two columns that indirectly indicated nationality - “religion” and “language”. The language that a person uses in everyday life.

If we rely on these statistics, from 30 to 42-43 percent of Poles lived in the territories annexed to the USSR. By religion (Roman Catholics) it is 30%, by language – more than 40%. At the same time, in the Tarnopol and Lviv voivodeships, Poles made up more than half. But in the Volyn and Stanislavov voivodeships there were less than 20% of them, according to Polish statistics. And if we take the average statistics for all new Soviet regions, Ukrainians are in second place. In total, from 12.5 to 13 million lived on these lands. At least a third of them were Poles. Meanwhile, Molotov, in his famous speech - this is when he called Poland “the ugly child of the Treaty of Versailles” - stated that there are only 1 million Poles in these territories - a completely obvious fraud.

The national composition of those repressed in 1939-1941 is not proportional to the overall structure of the population. Poles made up something like 62-63%. Jews are in second place – about 22%. There are relatively few Ukrainians and Belarusians.

- This is understandable - those groups of the population for whose liberation the Red Army supposedly came showed less discontent, and the new authorities tried to irritate them less.

They were directly targeted. However, Belarusians and Ukrainians were also expelled.

And there was an expulsion, 84% of which consisted of Jews - refugees from Central Poland. Those who fled from the Germans to the Soviet zone of occupation, and then, having lived for several months under the Soviets, having no idea of ​​the rules of the German occupation and the impending destruction, expressed a desire to return to the German zone, to the places from which they fled. They wrote corresponding statements, and those whom the Germans did not accept were deported. This was the deportation on June 29, 1940, a total of 70-80 thousand people, of which more than 80% were Jews. They were sent to logging in the northern regions - Arkhangelsk, Komi, Ural, beyond the Urals, to the same place where the first and largest batch of exiled Poles was sent - the so-called. "siegemen".

- Who are the “siegemen”?

In Russian, the word “siege” is best translated as “colonist”. The Soviet repressive machine first hit the so-called. military siegemen. These were former military personnel, participants in the 1919-1920 war with Soviet Russia. After the end of the war there was mass demobilization. And the Polish government distributed large tracts of land to the demobilized in the eastern territories. They had several goals in mind - firstly, to somehow accommodate the mass of people who had become unnecessary for the army, and secondly, to strengthen Polish influence in areas where Ukrainians and Belarusians predominated. They distributed the lands of huge military training grounds that remained from the tsarist army and were not used for Agriculture. The settlers had a head start over the local population - free land, various benefits, loans for the purchase of equipment, they constantly felt the support of the state, and the local population looked at this rather angrily. But until the early 30s, relations with the surrounding population were quite correct, nothing foreshadowed the aggravation of relations. At 30 the situation began to change. Mainly due to the development of the Ukrainian separatist movement in the east of the Polish state.

- It is clear that the settlers came under repression, firstly, as a “Polish element”, and as a “rural bourgeoisie” - “kulaks”, and secondly.

The main thing, of course, is that they were seen as a potential basis for Polish resistance. But there were few of them in this vast territory - 9 thousand families. And on February 10, 1940, almost 27 thousand families were deported. It is clear that ours interpreted the term “sieger” broadly. In the 1930s, civilian, non-military siegemen appeared. These were land-poor peasants from Central Poland who were resettled to the east, giving them the opportunity to buy land on preferential terms. In addition, military settlers sold or leased land to local residents. And these latter were also enlisted by the Soviets as siege soldiers. Forest guards - foresters of various ranks - were also added here. All these people were subject to the most massive deportation of 1939-41 - 140 thousand in two weeks. And at the settlement they all began to be called Polish siegemen. They deported families with children.

-There is such an important question as the Polish memory of these events. Until the end of the 80s, there was no official Polish historiography on this topic?

Not certainly in that way. There were Polish historians, quite loyal to the regime of “people's democracy”, who tried to explore these topics, and even publish something “under camouflage”. All these movements and migrations were so large - even half a million people, not two - that it was impossible to ignore them, various euphemisms were invented to explain them. It was impossible to pretend that nothing had happened.

Already during the war, when it became clear that post-war Poland would be controlled by the USSR, and the border would run approximately along the Curzon Line, the question arose about the Poles remaining east of this line. And there was an idea to resettle them in central, indigenous Poland. In 1944, the new Polish government concluded the first of the treaties with the USSR, according to which the Poles were “repatriated” from Soviet territory, although, of course, this was not repatriation, rather an evacuation. The first wave - the end of 1945 and especially 1946 - amounted to about 1.5 million. Formally, it was a voluntary resettlement. In many places, resettlement was situationally forced, while maintaining formal voluntariness. But often the Poles had no choice. Especially in Ukraine, where an important factor in “repatriation” was the ethnic cleansing carried out by Ukrainian nationalists during the German occupation. The most famous is the “Volyn massacre,” which in fact was not only Volyn, but also Galician. For many months, the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army, “Banderists”) carried out terrorist actions, the purpose of which was to clear these lands of Poles. And the surviving Poles were so scared that after the war they rushed from there to Poland. But at the same time, there were Poles who believed it was their duty to stay and defend this land as their homeland.

- There were probably hopes for a return to the old borders?

There were hopes for the allies, for the third world war. But the main argument was this: if we stay, we can preserve the Polish character of these lands. Most, of course, left. Concentrations of Poles remained where there was no ethnic cleansing, in Belarus. In the Grodno region, Brest region, in the southwest of the Vitebsk region. Many remained in Lithuania, but the majority still left the Vilna region.

- Obviously, the taboo on the topic of the pact was lifted after the “Velvet Revolution” and the withdrawal of the USSR from Poland.

I would not say that the taboo of the pact came from the Soviet Union. I deeply disagree with the thesis that Poland was occupied from 1944 to 1989. Its sovereignty was greatly limited, but to consider that the entire Polish regime was supported by Soviet bayonets is a gross simplification. Poland had its own elite, which believed that posing as communists and being friends with Soviet Union in the national interests of Poland. Its main thesis: those who oppose friendship with the USSR harm Polish interests. This elite primarily arranged well-being for itself, but it relied on very broad layers of the population, who also arranged their own well-being. They raised it to a relatively meager level, but did not protest. And, despite the fact that in Poland the internal indignation at the loss of sovereignty was stronger than in neighboring countries, the majority of its inhabitants in the Soviet decades were not very keen on upheaval. That is, I want to say: the statement that Polish freedom was strangled only by Soviet bayonets is not true. But Soviet bayonets were implied.

And then, you say “velvet revolution”. The revolution in Poland was the most profound and less “velvety” than similar events in the GDR, Hungary or Czechoslovakia. Polish resistance to socialism struck the very first and swipe system of socialism, I would say that it greatly contributed to the collapse of this system. I mean the activities of Solidarity, 1980 – 81.

Questions were asked by Dmitry Ermoltsev and Natalya Darsavelidze.

Interview prepared by Dmitry Ermoltsev

The ultimatum contained a demand to transfer the city of Danzig to Germany and a number of other provisions, the acceptance of which would mean Poland’s dependence on the “Third Reich”.

Litvinov Maxim (1876-1951) Russian revolutionary, Soviet statesman and diplomat. In 1930-1939 People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. An opponent of the Hitler regime, he sought to create a system of " collective security" in Europe. Supporter of the alliance between the USSR and France against Nazi Germany. He was removed from office by Stalin in May 1939, due to the emerging rapprochement between the USSR and Germany.

Gomułka Władysław (1905-1982). One of the leaders of post-war communist Poland, in 1956-1970 the head of the PUWP (Polish Workers' Party). He criticized the Stalinist model of communism, the ideologist of the doctrine of the “Polish path to communism,” which assumed a less rigid socio-economic and political system than in the USSR.

This is the common name for the dividing line, which in 1919 was recommended by the leadership of the Entente as the eastern border of independent Poland. During the Soviet-Polish War, the advancing Red Army crossed this border; on July 11, 1920, the British Foreign Secretary J. Curzon sent a note to Moscow demanding the withdrawal of troops beyond the line, which has since received his name. The Curzon line established the border between the USSR and communist Poland. Since then, the Polish border has not changed.

An association of Polish trade unions created in 1980. The leader was Gdańsk worker Lech Walesa. Solidarity led a powerful anti-communist movement, to which the government led by Marshal Jaruzelski responded in 1981 with martial law and repression. The victory of Solidarity in the 1989 elections meant the collapse of the communist regime in Poland, Walesa became the first president of democratic Poland.