GRADUATE WORK
Topic: "The Creation of the Red Army"
Introduction
Chapter 1. The first stage of the construction of the Red Army. Legal regulation of the demobilization of the old army
1 Legal support for the demobilization of the old army
2 Construction of the Red Army on a voluntary basis
Chapter 2. The second stage of the construction of the Red Army. Creation of a regular army
1 Building the Red Army on the basis of universal military service
2 Creation of new governing bodies of the Red Army
3 Attracting military specialists to serve in the Red Army
4 Institute of Military Commissars
Conclusion
Bibliography
Introduction
Relevance of the research topic. In the period from the end of the 20th century to the present time, military reform is taking place in Russia. Reducing the size of the army is a problem for the country's leadership. The difficult economic situation does not allow maintaining a large number, and foreign policy conditions require the creation of a highly qualified army of a modern type on a contract basis. In modern realities, this can only result in an increase in the number of unemployed.
All these questions arose before the Bolsheviks during their coming to power. It was necessary at the same time to demobilize the old army, tired of the war, and create a new one to defend the gains of the revolution. And the Bolsheviks managed to do it.
It is the army, created during the military reforms of 1917-1920, with some changes that will exist throughout the 20th century, and then form the basis of the modern Russian armed forces. And now recruitment into the army is carried out by military commissariats created at that time, on the basis of universal military service, which the Bolshevik government initially wanted to abandon, replacing it with "universal arming of the people." But this project failed to materialize. It is also worth noting that new army planned to be created on a voluntary basis. By evaluating the conditions for rejecting this idea as well, we can understand why contract picking modern army has its downsides. The country's leadership got rid of unrealistic political dogmas in time and moved on to a clear and systematic creation of a new army. It was thanks to the creation of the Red Army that the Bolsheviks managed to keep power in their hands and win the Civil War, which ultimately indicates the success of military reforms.
Thus, modern legislator, in our opinion, it is necessary to take into account the experience of building a new army in the most difficult economic and political conditions, in order to avoid mistakes in the process of lawmaking in the future.
The subject of the study is the legal basis for the creation of the Red Army.
The purpose of the study is to analyze the legal acts that formed the basis for the creation of the Red Army in 1917-1920.
Research objectives:
-establish the basic principles for the creation of the Red Army; -establish the relationship of changes in acts of state power with changes in the military-political situation; -identify characteristic features regulation Red Army; -show the strengths and weaknesses of military law, its inconsistency; -consider the individual institutions of the Red Army and characterize them. The degree of development of the topic. One of the most important sources on this issue is the work of Molodtsygin M.A. No less significant are the works of Bazanov S.N., Gorodetsky E.N., who studied in detail the topic of demobilization of the old army. It is worth noting such sources as the books of A. G. Kavtaradze, V. V. Kaminsky, who developed the issue of attracting military specialists to serve in the Red Army. Such authors as Barabanov V.V., Britov V.V., Klyatskin S.M., Pobezhimov I.F. consecrated the issues of building the army both at the early and subsequent stages. The methodological basis of the study is the method of materialistic dialectics, which allows taking into account the interconnections and interdependence of the phenomena under consideration, their inconsistency, as well as the logical, comparative legal and historical-legal methods of cognition, which make it possible to formulate objective, scientifically based conclusions and proposals. Chapter 1. Legal regulation of the demobilization of the old army. The first stage of the construction of the Red Army
.1 Legal support for the demobilization of the old army
The issue of demobilization during the coming of the Bolsheviks to power was one of the most important. The country was tired of the world war, it was impossible to force the millions of people at the front to fight further. And one of the main slogans of the Bolsheviks was peace, after the conclusion of which the soldiers had to return home. But demobilization is a very complex process that cannot be carried out all at once. The problem was also that peace could not be concluded, and the process of the dissolution of the army was accompanied by the onset of the Central Powers. How did it manage to demobilize about 8 million fighters in four months (from November 1917 to April 1918)? What are the legal bases included in this process? To what extent did the Bolsheviks manage to cope with the task of demobilizing the old army? And why was it necessary to do so? Wouldn't it have been more logical to carry out a partial demobilization of the army, leaving in its ranks devoted fighters for the cause of the revolution? We will try to answer these questions in this section. There is a version that the old army, numbering, as mentioned above, about 8 million people, simply collapsed (mainly under pressure from the German troops), and the Bolsheviks did not interfere at all in this process of self-liquidation1. In fact, the demolition of the old army took several months and required great effort for the legislator to develop a mechanism for the phased dissolution of the army. The first attempts at demobilization were carried out during the reign of the Provisional Government. However, these projects failed to materialize. The effect was that part of the Provisional Government adhered to the position of continuing hostilities. The indecisiveness inherent in this body manifested itself in this problem. The Bolsheviks decided to move this issue to the practical plane. On November 10, 1917, the Council of People's Commissars issued a Decree "On the gradual transition to the demobilization of the old army"2. On it, the fighters of 1899 were transferred to the reserve. This decree was not clearly formulated, it did not indicate the body that was supposed to control the demobilization process. The process itself was not clearly regulated. All this led to a lot of misunderstandings at the front. The decree reflected the haste of the ongoing demobilization, caused by the unauthorized departure of fighters from their positions. The proclamation of the decree on land hurried the soldiers to their homeland to divide the landed estates. After all, the distribution of land was carried out egalitarianly, depending on the number of "eaters". Yes, and the legislator himself understood that if the dissolution of the army was not carried out, then he would suffer the fate of the Provisional Government. Desertion began to grow more and more. It was impossible at that moment to stop the mass desertion: the officers for the most part lost all the threads of command of the army and distanced themselves from command; the soldiers' committees, focused on the struggle for power and the establishment of a truce, had no time for demobilization3. Mass desertion, the absence of bodies carrying out demobilization, caused an influx of unauthorized demobilization, sanctioned by local soldier committees. The situation was aggravated by the growing transport collapse that took place on all railway lines adjoining the fronts. The growing economic crisis in the country put the army in a difficult position - the delivery of food was extremely difficult. There were no specific instructions from the Council of People's Commissars regarding the conduct of demobilization. Additional legal acts regulating this process were required. But those were not published, as a result of which the army had to resolve this issue on its own. From late November to early December, front-line and army congresses were held, one of the most important issues at which was demobilization. Thus, the 1st Congress of Soldiers' Deputies of the Northern Front of Soldiers, held in Pskov on November 28 - December 2, adopted a resolution on the demobilization of the army in order to determine its organizational principles4. It was emphasized that it should be carried out in strict accordance with the conditions of conscription, starting from the oldest age (1900). The need to create a demobilization commission was pointed out, which was supposed to manage the demobilization commissions. Soon similar congresses were held on all fronts. On December 11-16, an all-army congress at the Headquarters worked. The congress made the most important decision on the formation of demobilization commissions. Thus, the army itself began to resolve the issue of demobilization. But a single center at the head of the system was never established. But on December 15, the All-Army Congress on the demobilization of the army began its activities in Petrograd, which lasted until January 3, 1918. His main task was to resolve the issue of demobilization. The congress was divided into four departments: the first dealt with the organizational foundations of the new army, the second - general demobilization, the third - technical questions demobilization, the fourth - the organization of management. Thus, it was possible to develop problematic issues in more detail. December, the Congress adopted a decision on the procedure for demobilization, according to which the demobilization procedure was carried out by seniority, starting from the oldest ages. This was to resolve an important issue that caused controversy among the soldiers: many of them were mobilized only in 1916, so the veterans demanded demobilization in accordance with the length of their stay at the front. However, if this principle were adopted, it would most likely only delay the demobilization process. Subsequently, the deadlines for the demobilization of individual conscription ages were announced. By a decree of November 10, the soldiers of 1899 conscription were demobilized, then 1900 and 1901, on January 3, 1918, the conscription soldiers of 1902 were demobilized, January 10 - 1903, January 16 - 1904 and 1907, January 29 - 1908 and 1909, February 16 - 1910 and 1912, March 2 - 1913 and 1915 the soldiers of the last four years of conscription (1916-1919) were demobilized before April 125. The measures taken brought organization to the demobilization and reassured the soldiers. The congress also developed and adopted important decisions related to the process of demobilization of military property, weapons, and so on, because a new army, provided with everything, should be created soon. In addition, with the departure of fighters with weapons, they could get to the counter-revolutionary elements. But the soldiers demanded that military property be divided, and personal weapons remain with the fighters. An interesting question is how it was planned to divide collective weapons (artillery, armored vehicles, and so on)? As a result, in its decision of January 2, 1918, the Congress decided that "with partial demobilization, soldiers go home without weapons"6. The work of the Congress made it possible to introduce clarity on many issues, as a result of which the process went much faster. If in November - December, military personnel of three draft ages were demobilized, then in one January - eight draft ages (from 1902 to 1909) The measures taken increased the pace of demobilization, which made it possible to demobilize about half of the army even before the conclusion of the Brest Peace. But on February 18, 1918, the troops of the Central Powers went on the offensive. This further accelerated the process of the final collapse of the army, and increased desertion. On February 24, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars accepted the German conditions. The Quadruple Alliance stopped the offensive. After the stop of the German offensive, the systematic demobilization of the army continues, especially since this was required by the conditions of the Brest Peace. On March 2, an order was issued by the Commissariat for Military Affairs on the simultaneous demobilization of 1913-1915. recruiting ages. The last draft-age demobilized during March - April. Only “veil” detachments of “separate detachments holding the areas indicated to each of them and acting in mutual communication” remained on the line of demarcation. These will be the first operational formations of the future new army, from which divisions will subsequently be formed, and then fronts. In March, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars, Krylenko was relieved of the post of Commander-in-Chief, thus this position was abolished. On March 16, the Stavka ceased to exist. On March 27, headquarters, departments and soldiers' committees were disbanded. On this, the process of breaking the old army was completed. Thus, it is worth noting that the demobilization of the old army was accompanied by significant difficulties. The absence of a clear demobilization plan, the main body aimed at controlling this process, a developed system of acts aimed at accelerating the process of disbanding soldiers, mass desertion, and then the German offensive led to the fact that the Council of People's Commissars for a short time almost completely lost control over the demobilization process . This resulted in huge material costs. But the Bolsheviks succeeded in taking this first necessary step. The old army, with all its institutions unsuitable for the new government, was liquidated. But why couldn't these institutions be built into the new army command and control apparatus? First, it was planned to replace the army with the "universal armament of the people." But under conditions civil war this idea was soon abandoned. But for the time being (late 1917 - early 1918), this idea was still alive. Secondly, the conditions of the Brest Peace for the demobilization of the army and navy were fulfilled. Thirdly, in most of these bodies there were persons hostile to the new state. Yes, but why not carry out a "cleansing" of the composition and bring in sympathizers of the new government? The formation of the Headquarters and headquarters is not an easy process: this required experienced personnel who had been trained in one of the five military academies and had years of military service behind them. And there were very few of these at the disposal of the Bolsheviks, because they are mostly people from social groups who are opponents of the new government. However, in the future, the legislator realizes the urgent need for military specialists. How the problem of their lack will be solved, we will consider in subsequent chapters. Despite any difficulties, the first step in creating a new army was taken - the Russian Imperial Army finally ceased to exist. The desire of millions of people was granted. Nevertheless, now it was necessary to create an army that would become a solid support for the new government in the flaring Civil War. .2 Construction of the Red Army on a voluntary basis
The demobilization of the old army confronted the Bolsheviks with the need to create an army on new grounds. Therefore, on January 15 (28), 1918, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree "On the organization of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army"8. It is from this act, in our opinion, that the existence of the Red Army can be counted. The goals of creating a new army were outlined in the first paragraph: the stronghold of Soviet power in the present and the need for armed support for the world revolution in the future. The formation was based on the class principle: "... from the most conscious and organized elements of the working classes" (I. 1). A citizen could join the Red Army Russian Republic who has reached the age of 18. It was proclaimed that the soldiers of the Red Army were on full state allowance and received 50 rubles a month. Social guarantees were established for disabled members of the families of Red Army soldiers, which were provided according to local consumer standards. In fact, the act consolidated the voluntary principle of the formation of the army: “Access to its ranks is open to all citizens of the Russian Republic no younger than 18 years old. Anyone who is ready to give his strength, his life to defend the gains of the October Revolution enters the Red Army ... ". (I.2). That is, the defense of the Republic was proclaimed a right, not a duty. But specific indications of the volunteer method of manning the army were twice deleted from the draft decree9. It seems that the uncertainty in the decision of this issue by the legislator was reflected here: volunteerism at that moment was the only acceptable way to recruit a new army, but universal military service was still closer to a form of general armament than volunteerism. A special All-Russian Collegium for the formation of the Red Army was created by decree. Also at this meeting, the issue of appropriating 20 million rubles for the organization of the Red Army was resolved. Thus, the first special legislative act pointed to the principles of building the Red Army: class, which determines the social basis of formation (I.1), and the main organizational principle - regularity, that is, the introduction of a single and permanent organization. According to this principle, the Red Army exists only until “the replacement of the standing army by the general armament of the people,” as stated in the first paragraph of the decree. Thus, the creation of the Red Army was considered a temporary measure, which the government wanted to abandon soon. January 1918, a decree was adopted on the organization of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet10. A citizen entering the service in the fleet entered into an agreement in which his rights and obligations were determined. All members of the fleet were insured against death and injury. Decrees of January 15 and 29 not only legitimized the ways and principles of creating a new army, but also resolved the issues of managing this creation, providing it with all means. After the promulgation of the decree on the creation of the Red Army, the enrollment of volunteers began, of which, as of May 1918, there were about 300 thousand people11. Taking into account the fact that before that there were about 8 million people at the front, this figure looks extremely modest. The collapse of the front after the offensive of the Central Powers in February 1918 showed that it was necessary to more carefully study the issue of organizing the Red Army - a clear system of governing bodies was needed that could manage large and regular armed forces. On March 4, 1918, the Supreme Military Council (hereinafter referred to as the Air Force) was formed to manage military operations at the direction of the Council of People's Commissars, consisting of: M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, military leader, and two political commissars P. P. Proshyan and K. I. Shutko12. The Air Force was entrusted with the leadership of all military operations with the unconditional subordination of all military institutions and persons without exception. Within a few days, the Supreme Military Council presented a program for strengthening the armed forces, which the military leader of the Air Force, M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, presented to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, V. I. Lenin, on March 913. It indicated urgent measures that must be immediately applied "for the success of the formation of the armed forces." The first paragraph stated that “all councils should immediately (underline M. D. Bonch-Bruevich) begin to form companies and battalions, where, according to local conditions possibly…". It was especially noted that the states for these units should be the same as those in the demobilized army (paragraph 1). All formed units were to have former regular officers in command positions (paragraph 2). It was pointed out that in order to carry out the formation, it is necessary to include the administration of district military commanders in the military department and strengthen them with people “experienced in the formation” (paragraph 3). All information about the number of formed units was concentrated with the commander of the troops in the military districts (paragraph 4). The supply of the formed units was entrusted to the military departments of local councils from local stores and warehouses. Point 6 was of the greatest importance, according to which appointments to the highest leadership positions were assigned to the Supreme Military Council. On March 1918, the Council of People's Commissars, by its resolution14, endowed the Supreme Military Council with specific functions. This supreme body of military command was put "at the head of the country's defense", it was entrusted with the tasks of leading, planning and coordinating the activities of the military and naval departments, as well as selecting senior command personnel "according to their knowledge and combat experience." The Air Force enjoyed wide command powers. Positions from the head of the division and above were replaced only with the consent of the Supreme Military Council. Military operations were controlled by the Supreme Military Council through its headquarters. The special position of the Supreme Military Council was also determined by the fact that its leadership, and in particular the military leader M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, was given the right to address the most important issues of the country's defense personally to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. I. Lenin. Characteristically, almost all positions in the Supreme Military Council were occupied by former regular officers, 13 of them were officers of the General Staff15. The creation of the Air Force was opposed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief N.V. Krylenko. It was he who proposed and then adopted the SNK decrees on the equalization of military personnel in rights and on elective principles in the army. According to the first, all ranks, titles, awards, and insignia were canceled in the army. According to the second, the power in each military unit was concentrated in their hands by the corresponding soldiers' committees. N. V. Krylenko was one of the main promoters of the idea of a voluntary beginning in the creation of a red army on an elective, democratic basis without the involvement of military experts. With the establishment of the Supreme Military Council, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief N.V. Krylenko filed a report addressed to V.I. Lenin with a request to release him from this position16. The resignation of N. V. Krylenko was accepted, and then, as mentioned earlier, on March 15, 1918 The headquarters of the supreme commander-in-chief was disbanded, and the post of supreme commander-in-chief was abolished. April 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a decree "On Compulsory Training in the Art of War"17. It, among other things, pointed out the need to involve all citizens in universal labor and military service ("The Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Republic makes it its immediate task to involve all citizens in universal labor and military service."). That is, the transition to universal military service was realized by the legislator, but was postponed to a later date. The class approach to military training was especially emphasized - only workers and peasants could take it (“But military training and the arming of the people in the next transitional era will be extended only to workers and peasants who do not exploit the labor of others”). After completing military training, citizens became liable for military service and remained so between the ages of 18 and 40 (“Citizens aged 18 to 40 who have completed a course of compulsory military training will be registered as liable for military service”). All military students were divided into three categories: the first - school, the lowest level of which was determined by the People's Commissariat of Education; the second - preparatory at the age of 16 to 18; the third - draft, aged 18 to 40 years. Women could also be educated at their own request. Of particular note is the fact that the note indicated that a person whose religious beliefs do not allow the use of weapons are involved in training only for duties not related to the use of weapons (Article 1). The organization of compulsory training in military affairs was in charge of the military commissariats (Article 4). The trainees did not receive any remuneration, but the training had to be organized in such a way that, if possible, the draftees should not be distracted from the training (Article 5). The term of study was set at 8 weeks (Article 6). Those who refused to study were held accountable (Article 9). On the same day, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a decree “On the procedure for filling positions in the Red Army.”18 This decree, in our opinion, is very important in the sense that, thanks to it, electivity in appointment to positions was put an end to; only for the lowest positions were elections for command personnel (commander of a platoon, company, non-separate battalion (Articles 1, 4)). The other posts were appointed by the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs (Articles 9, 10). Candidates for the positions of unit commanders had to have been trained in special schools or to prove themselves with courage and ability to manage in a combat situation (Article 2). Such a retreat is caused by a shortage of specialists who have passed even the lowest degree of military training. According to the lists, the commanders, together with the military commissars, allowed candidates to command. Any electiveness of the command staff was excluded during the formation of headquarters military units and compounds (note to article 10). All issues related to the replacement of existing posts in them were decided only by their superiors. Thus, the decree "On the procedure for filling positions in the Red Army", which limited the election of command personnel in the army, contributed to the strengthening of one-man command and military discipline in it, which ultimately contributed to strengthening its combat capability. Together with the two normative acts mentioned above, on April 22, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee also adopted a decree “On the term of service in the Red Army”20. According to the established norm, the period of service was 6 months from the date of signing the obligation (Article 1). A citizen entering the service was obliged to serve this term. In the event of non-compliance with this obligation, a person was held legally liable "to the fullest extent of revolutionary laws, up to and including the deprivation of the rights of a citizen of the Soviet Republic" (Article 2). This decree was supposed to stop the turnover of the army, because many came there only in order to receive food for a few days, uniforms, some - deposits - and leave the army. Thus, with the adoption of the decree "On the term of service in the Red Army", the legislator took the first step towards the transition to universal military service. next step will be the decree "On forced recruitment into the Red Army", which will be discussed in the next chapter. What made the Bolsheviks ultimately abandon the principle of voluntariness? Fourth, in initial period The existence of the army has not yet developed a clear structure of the armed forces, so it was not possible to bring combat units to the proper level of combat capability. Thus, in the "List of units that left for the front from Petrograd and its environs during the period from April 15 to June 1918"25, more than 50 different combat units with a strength of 11 to 900 people were indicated. Such a "detachment" system could not achieve victories over the White Guard units with a clear structure adopted from the old army. Fifthly, the danger caused the “fluidity” of personnel, which was mentioned above. Sixth, an important and still existing problem of the voluntary army is its high cost. The Bolshevik government in the conditions of the Civil War could not provide sufficient material incentives for the soldiers. At present, according to M. Moiseev, main disadvantage professional army in the exorbitant cost of maintenance. According to him, such armed forces cost our country 5 to 8 times more than an army based on universal military service. Seventh, the impossibility of creating a sufficient number of reservists was realized. In a mercenary army, a soldier serves without replacement for 10-15 years. Such arguments against the contract army are expressed even now27. Under conditions of aggression, there is no way to quickly build up an army. Thus, the Bolsheviks could not carry out their idea of creating an army on a purely voluntary basis. It was a forced retreat in the initial period of the existence of the Soviet state. It was clear that a truly strong army could only be created on the basis of universal military service. Having destroyed the old system of government, the legislator began to create a new one. As part of the Council of People's Commissars, the Committee for Military and Naval Affairs was created (later renamed the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs), which dealt with the demobilization and supply of the army. Decree of January 15 (28) created the All-Russian Collegium for the organization and formation of the Red Army, which concentrated in itself the power to create a new army. She exercised leadership over local organizations for the formation and accounting of combat units. In February 1918, the All-Russian Collegium issued instructions to local Soviets and military committees on the creation of the Red Army28. According to the instructions, the Red Army was subordinate to the Soviet People's Commissars. Direct supervision was carried out by the All-Russian Collegium. The acquisition of units of the new army and their management “...is assigned to local, district, provincial and regional (territorial) Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, for which military departments are created under these councils; in the army to the army (front), corps and divisional committees, for which they create the headquarters of the Red Army. It is also worth noting the body of state power, whose competence also included the powers of the military administration - the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage, which was created on December 6, 1917. Later, specially created troops were subordinated to it, which became part of the auxiliary troops. The status of employees of the Cheka was equated to the status of Red Army soldiers29. Thus, I would like to conclude that the activity of the Soviet state in creating a new army was distinguished by a number of contradictions. The country's leadership sought to get rid of the standing army, replacing it with the general armament of the people. But the cruel realities of life did not allow this plan to pretend to be a reality. If in the 19th century this principle could at least somehow be implemented, then in the 20th century, the century of multi-million regular armies with the latest achievements in science and technology, it was almost impossible for the principle of voluntariness to survive. The British Army entered world war just with the voluntary principle of acquisition, which was quickly abandoned. This example showed the futility of volunteering. If for the "small", colonial wars the army was enough, then for the world war the number of volunteers was clearly not enough. The same can be said about the Civil War in Russia. The population, exhausted by the world war, could not provide enough volunteers. But the size of the army was fundamentally important for the Bolsheviks, since the “white” formations surpassed the Red Army in terms of quality. The Bolsheviks realized that it was possible to retain power only thanks to a strong army. That is why we see a gradual rejection of volunteering, which eventually led to universal compulsory military service. Chapter 2. The second stage of the construction of the Red Army. Creation of a regular army
.1 Building the Red Army on the basis of universal conscription of the working people red army volunteer military The intensification of the confrontation between the Bolsheviks and their political opponents forced them to move on to more intensive military reforms aimed at creating a powerful regular, disciplined army based on universal military service. It was these reforms that ultimately enabled the Bolsheviks to triumph over their political opponents. By decree of May 4, 1918, military districts30 were formed. In total, eleven of them were created: Yaroslavl, Moscow, Orlovsky, Belomorsky, Ural, Volga, West Siberian, Central Siberian, East Siberian, North Caucasian and Turkestan. The creation of military districts marked the beginning of the construction of a centralized system for replenishing the army. The Decree “On forced recruitment into the Red Army”31 adopted by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on May 29, 1918, had a huge impact. It consolidated the transition from the voluntary principle of manning the army, which had shown its inconsistency, to the general conscription of the working people. The units formed on the principle of volunteering showed for the most part instability, and the number of volunteers did not satisfy the needs of the army. First of all, the residents of the threatened areas were subject to forced recruitment (since if they were lost, the mobilization potential of these regions would be used by the whites), as well as the centers of the labor movement, because it was the workers who formed the “backbone” of the best units of the Red Army. The transition to the mobilization principle of manning the army required the immediate creation of military commissariats on the ground. Therefore, on April 8, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree "On the establishment of commissariats for military affairs"32. According to it, commissariats for military affairs were established, the main purpose of which was the formation of the armed forces of the RSFSR on the basis of the class principle. This principle was taken as the basis of recruitment due to the fact that its creators needed it as a weapon in the fight against their political opponents. The legislator could not allow the penetration of elements hostile to the state system into the army. In order to solve the above problem, the military commissariats had to carry out registration of persons liable for military service, their training and conscription for service and control of troops intended "... to serve local needs ..." (first paragraph of the decree). The decree fixed the features of the formation of these bodies, their structure and competence. So, all the commissariats, except for the district ones, were formed by the corresponding Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies, and the district one - by the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs (I. 1, II.1, III.1, IV. 1). District military commissariats were created by the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs (IV. 1). All these bodies included two commissars and one military leader each (I. 1, II.1, III.1, IV. 1). These officials at the level of the volost, district and province were approved by the local Soviets, at the level of the district - by the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. A clear system of subordination was built, where the lower commissariat was subordinate to the higher one: the volost commissariat - the county commissariat - the district commissariat - the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. Speaking about the competence of the military commissariats, it is worth noting that their main duties have remained unchanged up to the present time: registration of persons fit for military service (I, 5, “registered”, A, and in modern legislation - chapter II, article 17, clause 1 of the Regulations on military commissariats of December 7, 201233 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations)), registration of means of transportation (I, 5, “on account”, B, now - Chapter II, Article 17, paragraph 6 of the Regulations), training in military affairs ( I, 5, “registered”, B, now - chapter II, article 17, paragraphs 23, 24 of the Regulations), medical examination of citizens (I, 5, “registration”, D, now - chapter II, article 17, paragraphs 20, 21), recruitment and agitation (I, 5, “on recruitment and agitation”, now - chapter II, article 17, paragraph 34), collection of information and other measures for mobilization (I, 5, “on mobilization”, A-Z, now - chapter II, article 17, paragraphs 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13-17 of the Regulations). Thus, the main duties of the military commissariats have remained unchanged up to the present day. The logical continuation of the acts related to the formation of military commissariats were several decrees of the Council of People's Commissars on the conscription of citizens for military service. For example, the decree "On the conscription of workers and peasants in a number of districts of the Volga, Ural and West Siberian military districts"34 regulated the conscription and recruitment of workers and peasants who did not exploit the labor of others, born in 1893-1897 in the corresponding military districts. This act clarified the "Instruction on Conscription for Military Service"35 of these districts. The instruction regulated in detail the procedure for the appearance of persons liable for military service, indicated the documents that they were required to provide, and proposed measures aimed at strengthening organization during the call. In particular, it spoke about the need to create additional recruiting centers, about the responsibility of military commissariats for their timely equipment. The instruction also indicated persons exempted from conscription for military service. Persons suffering from serious illnesses that prevented their personal appearance, as well as railway employees, were exempted from the obligation to appear at the relevant recruiting stations. Along with the above-mentioned persons, those who were unworthy to serve in the army due to their moral qualities were exempted from admission to military service. The basis for the decision of the commission to refuse to accept a person for military service for this reason could be an application or other document sent from his place of work or study, as well as any body located at the place of employment or residence of such. The manual regulated in detail the activities of the commissions engaged in recruitment for military service. After the selection of documents, the conscripts were asked about their state of health. If they declared that they considered themselves fit to serve in the army, then after an external examination they were accepted into military service. When the conscript declared that he was incapable of military service or asked for sick leave, or did not have documents confirming his age, the commission had to make a thorough examination. It was carried out according to the list of diseases contained in the appendix to the act. The age of the face was determined by its appearance. Persons fit for service were drafted into the army, the sick were given leave, and a separate decision was made about those dissatisfied with the results of the examination by general voting. In doubtful or difficult cases, the case was referred to higher provincial (regional, district) commissions, which were to make a final decision that was not subject to appeal. All persons accepted for military service were sent to special collection points established at the commissariats or Soviets, where selection committees operated. Those who were not fit for it received a special certificate. When examining doctors, pharmacists, paramedics and persons drafted into the fleet, special rules were applied. The above acts were of great importance for the Red Army, since they were then extended to all military districts. The course of military construction in Soviet Russia was reflected in the pages of the Constitution of the RSFSR,36 adopted in June 1918 by the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It enshrined the principle of universal military service. But this duty was assigned "only to the working elements." As you can see, the class principle was one of the fundamental principles in the formation of a new army. Non-labor elements were assigned "other duties". These duties were listed in other decrees. So, on July 20, 1918, the decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the rear militia"37 was adopted. The militia was subject to conscription those who were not subject to conscription in the Red Army, aged 18 to 45 years (namely, "non-labor elements"). The person served in the rear militia for a year. Citizens who evaded the draft were subject to liability in the amount of up to two years in prison with confiscation of the property of the citizen and those persons who contributed to the evasion from service. The working units formed from the militias were supposed to participate in the production of roads, the construction of fortifications, their representatives could be sent to work in military workshops, warehouses, railways, and also used "for other assignments caused by national and local needs." In order to streamline the conscription, on July 29, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a special decree "On the general registration of those liable for military service"38. According to its norms, all citizens fit for military service between the ages of 18 and 40 were subject to registration. Of course, the decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On liberation from military service religious beliefs." For the first time in the military law of Russia, the possibility of alternative service was indicated. This decision was made by the People's Court. The service for a certain period of conscription in hospitals or other socially useful works was replaced. 2.2 Creation of new governing bodies of the Red Army.
In addition to all of the above, the army management system was changing. So, by the decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the unification of all the armed forces of the Republic"40 of August 19, 1918, all military units at the disposal of various commissariats were now transferred to the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs in terms of: staffing, arrangement, training, weapons, supplies , combat training and use as military force. The leadership of the special forces in the performance of tasks in their specialty was to be carried out on the basis of acts issued by the people's commissariats to which they belonged. The intensification of hostilities between the opposition and the Bolsheviks in the summer and autumn of 1918 forced the latter to strengthen the army authorities. On September 2, by the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee "On the transformation of the republic into a single military camp", the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was created, heading all the armed forces of the Republic. It was the Revolutionary Military Council that was proclaimed the highest military body for organizing the defense of the country. L. D. Trotsky was appointed chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council. Along with the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Revolutionary Military Councils of the army and fronts were also created. All these bodies of military command were collegiate. They consisted of one commander-in-chief and two military-political workers. Revolutionary military councils could control the activities of commanders and military specialists. In a real combat situation, this could and did harm the management of military units and formations. On November 1918, by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense41 was created. The Decree was adopted in conditions of exacerbation of external danger. Germany was defeated, and now it was clear that the intervention of the Entente in the country could not be avoided. Therefore, it was necessary to urgently take measures to strengthen the country's defense capability. The resolution reflected the urgent problems in the tasks: to improve the supply of the army, to provide food to large cities and to establish a transport network. The Council included the chairmen of the most important people's commissariats and departments: the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, the people's commissar of communications, the deputy people's commissar of food and a representative of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense received unlimited powers in the field of mobilization and the forces and means of the country for the cause of defense. All decisions of the Council were binding on all institutions and citizens. Of great importance in strengthening unity of command in the army were the provisions on the commanders of large military formations. On December 5, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a position on the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Republic42. The commander-in-chief was given freedom in matters of a military-strategic nature, appointment to command posts, orders for military operations, and changes in the composition of military units (Article 3). He was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council with a decisive vote (Article 2, paragraph 1). The only body controlling the activities of the commander-in-chief was the Revolutionary Military Council. The commander-in-chief had to present candidates for the positions of commanders of the fronts, armies and chiefs of staff to the Revolutionary Military Council (Article 2, paragraph 2). The orders of the commander-in-chief had to be countersigned by a member of the Revolutionary Council (Article 2, paragraph 2). It was especially emphasized that “No government place, institution or person ... except for the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the persons standing above this institution, the Council of People’s Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, does not give instructions to the commander-in-chief and cannot demand reports from him” (Article 5). It is also worth noting that the commander-in-chief could change the composition of military formations (Article 8, paragraph a), as well as “establish relations between the heads of higher military formations of the army and navy and the commandants of fortresses.” Simultaneously with this provision, two more were adopted on the same day: “Regulations of the Council of People's Commissars on the commander of the armies of the front”43 and “Regulations of the Council of People's Commissars on the commander of the army, who is part of the armies of the front”44. These acts established the status of these officials and the procedure for their relationship with the highest bodies of military command. In the winter of 1918-1919. reform of the local military apparatus was carried out. By the decrees of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, announced in orders dated December 28, 1918, January 16, 1919 and February 19, 1919, all previously issued regulations and states of the volost, district and provincial military commissariats were canceled and a new regulation and new data states were introduced military authorities. As a result, the structure, functions and staff of the provincial and county military commissariats have changed significantly, and the volost military commissariats have been merged with the executive committees of the volost Soviets. One-man command was introduced in the military registration and enlistment offices, the absence of which had a negative impact on the work of local military authorities45. The adoption of military regulations contributed to the establishment of firm discipline in the army ranks. On November 29, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted the Charter of the Internal Service, which determined the duties of military personnel and the special duties of officials of the Red Army. In the same month, the Charter of the garrison service was approved. In December 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted the first part of the Field Manual of the Red Army. Work on the creation of new charters continued in 1919. This year, the Red Army Infantry Charter was put into effect. On January 30, 1919, a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was issued, introducing the Disciplinary Regulations in the Red Army, which was of great importance for strengthening military discipline46. The Charter also strengthened the position of the command staff of the Red Army, among which, as we know, there were many specialists of the old school. All of the above measures allowed the Red Army to gradually increase its strength and increase the number of military specialists. But the creators of the Red Army were under serious pressure from the country's leadership. Many normative acts caused sharp criticism among the Bolsheviks. Disputes over the involvement of military specialists and the principle of unity of command flared up especially sharply. The defeats on the fronts of the Civil War from the more disciplined and experienced parts of the White armies also affected. Nevertheless, the legislator managed to abandon the original ideological dogmas and move on to building the army on the principles of military construction proven by practice with iron discipline, the strictest centrism, the appointment of command staff and one-man command. But real success could not be achieved without the full involvement of military specialists with experience in combat operations during the First World War. 2.3 Attracting military specialists to serve in the Red Army
The recruitment of military specialists was one of the main problems of the Red Army. Who can be considered military specialists? A military specialist (military specialist) is an officer of the old Russian army and navy, recruited to serve in the Red Army and the Red Army Fleet during the Civil War47. It was originally planned that there would be no place for officers in the new army. But the defeats on the fronts of the Civil War forced the Bolsheviks to turn to military experts. The growth in the size of the Red Army required an increase in the number of experienced military personnel. It was impossible to prepare them in a short time. Therefore, the beginning of the development of legislation was laid on the recruitment of military experts both on a voluntary basis, and their mobilization, as well as control over the activities of these persons. Here it is appropriate to note that after the destruction of the old army, the officers were left without a livelihood. It was not only expelled from the army, but also deprived of pensions. This, in our opinion, was the reason that the former officers began to voluntarily enter the service in the Red Army. March 1918, the Supreme Military Council was established. As mentioned above, the Air Force was given the leadership of all military operations, control and leadership of the military department, organization and strengthening of the Red Army. According to A. G. Kavtaradze, the vast majority of posts in the Supreme Military Council were held by former high-ranking officers of the old army48. It was the Air Force that became the first body concentrating the military experts of the former General Staff. October 1918, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree "On the call to active military service of former officers and military officials"49. According to it, six ages of the listed persons were called up for active service: in addition to officers, doctors, paramedics, medical assistants and military officials who were in active service or in reserve were indicated. This indicates an acute shortage not only of the actual officers, but also of persons with a narrow specialty. Persons who had obvious signs of unfitness for service, as well as "obsessed with serious illnesses" were exempted from conscription. But here another problem arose. The fact is that a fairly large number of officers left after the breakdown of the old army in various civilian institutions in order to at least somehow feed themselves and their loved ones. Soon, many of them became indispensable specialists, without whom it was difficult to manage in production. Therefore, on December 7, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree "On the conscription of all former officers for military service"50. According to it, only 10 percent of all officers working at the enterprise could be exempted from conscription. Control over this was entrusted to local departmental commissions and the Special Commission under the Mobilization Directorate (established on April 16, 1918), which was supposed to consider applications for leaving more than 10 percent of the officers in the institution and extended its activities to the territory of the Moscow Military District. A special commission was to carry out checks to determine the number of officers fit for military service. The work of the commission showed that a general check is required of all persons who received a deferment from conscription for any reason throughout the country in order to use the full potential of the officer corps of the imperial army. This was especially true of much-needed military specialists. Therefore, on July 2, 1918, by a decree of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense, a Special Commission was created to record former officers under the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (Osobkomuchet). The task of the commission was to search for and mobilize all former officers of the Russian imperial army on the territory of the RSFSR. For this, all local departments of the commission were subordinate to her. Subsequently, the Regulation on the Special Committee was adopted, as well as orders No. 1-3 of the Chairman of the Special Committee, which regulated the activities of this body and its local departments51. The Special Committee experienced significant difficulties in its work due to the confrontation of the interests of two departments: the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, which wanted to get as many officers as possible, and the All-Russian Council of the National Economy, which sought to keep specialists in production. Forced mobilization was carried out mainly by the very "lower classes" of the officer corps, who constantly suffered heavy losses in their composition. But now I would like to talk about that privileged part of military specialists who, being the smallest group of them, nevertheless had a tremendous impact on the course of the Civil War. These are former officers of the General Staff. It is by their example that I would like to show the urgent need for military specialists that existed in the Red Army. Who was included in this group? The names of these officers were included in the "List of the General Staff", published annually. It included officers who served in the positions of the General Staff or who had ever served, passed through and transferred either to other positions in the army, or left for civilian service. In order to get into the General Staff, it was necessary to graduate from the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, which could be attended by chief officers who had at least three years of service in the officer rank, had a positive reference, were fit for health reasons and successfully passed the entrance exams. Every year about 70 people were recruited. As a result, very difficult entrance tests (for example, in 1914, out of 823 officers who took preliminary examinations at the headquarters of military districts, 420 people (51%) passed them). The training took two years and a nine-month additional course52. We have listed all these requirements here in order to show how valuable the specialists of the General Staff were and how difficult it would be to create an institution of these specialists anew and how long it would take. And they were required immediately, especially since many of the military specialists were in the ranks of the Whites. Therefore, it is the representatives of this group of military experts who will occupy leading posts in the Red Army. The General Staff officers were in more favorable material conditions than other categories of the command staff of the Red Army (salary - at least 700 rubles per month). The terror of the Cheka practically did not affect the military experts of this category: in total, in 1918, according to V.V. Kaminsky, about 4.4 percent of the graduates of the Nikolaev Academy were arrested. Conditions lured the officers of the General Staff to the Red Army: as a result, it was the Red Army that concentrated more military specialists of the former General Staff than the combined White armies53. Thus, the development of the institute of military specialists was of great importance for the development of the Red Army. It is these faces that will allow the Red Army to win victories on the battlefields. All the measures listed above, taken by the legislator, mainly concerned the replenishment of the army and its management. But an apparatus was required that had passed the combat school of the First World War. After all, the wars of the 20th century became not only wars of large masses of people, but, first of all, technical wars. And this required high-class specialists. Finally, talents were also required - the talents of organizers, managers, commanders. And such could only be a person with certain military knowledge. And the country's leadership understood their value and rolled back from the policy of confrontation, the persecution of former officers of the tsarist army. Moreover, the legislator went further - he tried to create favorable conditions for attracting as many military specialists as possible. And in the end it succeeded - the Red Army had more officers than its opponents. 2.4 Institute of military commissars
Control over the activities of military specialists was carried out by the institute of military commissars. In addition to control, the commissars were engaged in cultural, educational and educational work. Commissars were created under the Provisional Government to monitor disloyal officers. The Bolsheviks preserved this apparatus and developed it further. Initially, the commissars of the Provisional Government were replaced by representatives of the Bolshevik Party. From the first days of the revolution, a Bureau of Commissars was formed as part of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee to select and manage commissars. On November 2, the Military Revolutionary Committee decided to introduce the institution of "auditors over commissars". These forms of control, presumably, were caused by the inconsistency of many commissars with their purpose. To manage the activities of commissars throughout the country, in April 1918, under the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars was created by order of the People's Commissariat of April 8, 1918, which indicated that the purpose of organizing this body is to coordinate and unify the activities of military commissars and establishing "control over them on an All-Russian scale..."54. Initially, the legal status of military commissars was determined by the Regulation approved by the Supreme Military Council on April 6, 1918. Military commissars were appointed from among persons loyal to the Bolshevik regime and were obliged to control the activities of military specialists, educate them in the spirit of devotion to Soviet power and maintain military discipline. Military commissars had the right to remove military leaders from their posts and, if necessary, arrest them. Orders of military experts acquired force only after they were signed by the military commissar. In June 1918, at the first All-Russian Congress of Military Commissars, the Regulations on Military Commissars and Commissariats were adopted55. According to the regulation, the military commissar was "direct political body Soviet power under the army and defender of the gains of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry. The military commissar was declared an inviolable person, his insult and violence against him in the performance of his official duties was equated with grave crimes against Soviet power. He was responsible for the reliability of military specialists and the entire command staff. The military commissar was obliged to observe the activities of military specialists, without interfering, however, in their command activities. He also retained the right to temporarily suspend military specialists from the performance of their duties and arrest them. In the event of a person being removed from office due to disagreement with his operational orders, the military commissar was obliged to draw up a reasoned report on the reasons for his removal and send it to a higher military body. A copy of the report was sent to the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars. This provision largely protected the rights of military specialists, increased the responsibility of military commissars when they made decisions to remove military specialists from their posts or to arrest them. All meetings in which military specialists took part were to be held with the obligatory presence of the commissar or his deputy. Military commissars were required to submit to higher authorities and to the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars monthly reports on their activities and the activities of military specialists. On January 1919, the chairman of the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars issued an order56, according to which, under the agitation and educational departments created at the district, provincial and district commissariats, advisory boards were formed from representatives of local military, cultural, educational and party organizations. This act was aimed at further politicization and ideologization of the army, without which it could not be a means of struggle in the hands of the Bolsheviks against their political opponents. Thus, the creation of the institution of military commissars strengthened state control over the army. The "unreliable" institute of military specialists was firmly held together by military commissars. Conclusion
Taking everything into their own hands in October 1917, the bodies of the Soviets began to carry out transformations in all spheres of society. These transformations did not bypass the army either. The offensive of the armies of the Central Powers deep into Russia showed the defenselessness of Soviet power in the face of external aggression. The country actually had no army at the moment, which showed its extreme weakness. Therefore, the Bolsheviks begin the process of creating a new army, Red Army, a decree on the organization of which was adopted in January 1918. Initially, emphasis was placed on the voluntary principle of manning the army; workers and peasants who did not exploit the labor of others could join it. But at the beginning of 1918, the Red Army looked like detachments with a very weak level of interaction, discipline and control. The outbreak of the Civil War forced the country's leadership to switch to other methods of organizing the army. A transition is being made to universal conscription of the working people. A system of conscription of citizens for military service is being created, the main bodies of which are military commissariats. There comes an understanding that it is impossible to do without the involvement of high-quality military specialists. And the policy vector is changing to their broad and comprehensive involvement. Under the conditions of the Civil War, the Bolsheviks managed to create more favorable conditions for the work of military experts, which ultimately predetermined their qualitative and quantitative superiority over specialists from the “whites”. Military commissars are established to control the activities of military specialists. In many cases, conflicts arose between military specialists and commissars, which could not have a positive effect on the state of the army. Realizing that with a larger number of Red Army suffers defeat from the White Guard units, the legislator changes the system of the army's governing bodies. Having proclaimed the republic a single military camp, the Soviet government is throwing all its forces into the fight against its opponents. The system of governing bodies allows the Bolsheviks to firmly hold the army in their hands and redistribute them, if necessary, all the possible resources of the country to one front. The multi-million regular army created in Soviet Russia was able to defeat the troops of the White Guards and foreign invaders. Despite some inconsistency, the legislator managed to get rid of many List of sources and literature
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Despite the fact that the first armed uprisings of the internal counter-revolution were suppressed, the situation in the country remained tense. The Party and the Soviet government clearly perceived and realistically assessed the threat posed by the capitalist encirclement. The preparations for a broad offensive against Soviet Russia by Kaiser Germany intensified more and more. Demonstrations of the strength of the troops and fleets of other imperialist powers began. At the beginning of 1918, Japanese, British and American warships appeared on the Vladivostok raid. Our enemies, V. I. Lenin emphasized, are “the capitalists of the whole world, who are now organizing a campaign against the Russian revolution...” 312.
The most difficult task of defending the Soviet state from the armed intervention of the imperialists and the forces of internal counter-revolution could not be performed by the old army, which served as an instrument of the exploiting system. In addition, she was decomposing and falling apart before our eyes. In terms of combat, this army, according to V. I. Lenin, represented a "zero value" 313. The process of demobilization of the soldiers of the old army took on a spontaneous character.
The task of defending the Republic could not be successfully solved by the Red Guard, built on a militia basis with an irregular organization, which did not have a clear organizational structure, an established centralized system of control, combat training and logistics. Her detachments were scattered throughout the vast country and often did not interact. They fought heroically against the rebellious forces of the internal counter-revolution, had a high class consciousness and were devoted to the cause of the revolution, but the Land of Soviets needed regular troops to repel foreign military intervention.
In the face of the threat to the Republic from international imperialism, the Communist Party found it necessary to create a massive regular army, composed of liberated workers and peasants, capable of resisting the well-armed and trained interventionist and White Guard troops.
The task of building a new army was extremely complex and difficult. It had to be solved in the conditions of economic ruin in the country, in the conditions of the outbreak of civil war and foreign military intervention.
The great merit of the Communist Party and its leader, V. I. Lenin, was that in the most difficult conditions, often “groping their way”, “from experience to experience” 314, they managed to overcome these difficulties and in the shortest possible time create an army of a new type. In building the army, the party relied on the experience of creating, arming and fighting workers' squads in the first Russian revolution, the revolutionary army during the preparation and implementation of the October Revolution, the formation and consolidation of Soviet power. The experience of the previous development of military affairs, military science, especially the experience of the First World War, was also used.
On January 12, 1918, the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets adopted Lenin's "Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People" - the most important constitutional act of the Soviet Republic. “... In the interests of ensuring full power for the working masses and eliminating any possibility of restoring the power of the exploiters,” it said, “the arming of the working people, the formation of a socialist red army of workers and peasants are decreed ...” 1 The decision of the congress is complete and accurate predetermined the class nature of the new army, its purpose and name. On January 15, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars proclaimed Lenin's decree on the creation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. On January 29, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree on the organization of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet. These decrees marked the beginning of the systematic construction of a new type of army.
So the Red Guard was replaced by the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army - a military organization of a new type, which history had not yet known. It was created from the most conscious and organized representatives of the working classes 2; thus it was openly proclaimed that the new army was being built on a strictly class basis. Its historical role, according to V. I. Lenin, was that “this army is called upon to protect the gains of the revolution, our people’s power, the Soviets of Soldiers’, Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies, the whole new, truly democratic system from all enemies of the people who are now they use every means to ruin the revolution.” 3. From the first days of its existence, the Red Army has been an instrument of struggle against imperialist aggression and intervention, a major factor in the preservation and strengthening of peace throughout the world.
The creation of the Red Army took place under the leadership of the Communist Party, its Central Committee, headed by V. I. Lenin. According to the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 15, 1918, the direct formation of the army and its management were entrusted to the Commissariat for Military Affairs and the All-Russian Collegium 4 created under it. At the suggestion of V.I. Board), N. V. Krylenko, K. A. Mekhonoshin, and from the General Staff of the Red Guard of Petrograd - V. A. Trifonov and K. K. Yurenev The Board launched a huge organizational and propaganda work. Party, Soviet and trade union organizations joined in the creation of the Red Army. Throughout the country, under the Soviets and soldiers' committees, military departments and headquarters of the Red Army were created, which included representatives of the soldiers' sections of the Soviets and local headquarters of the Red Guard. In the active army, for the recruitment of volunteers, the headquarters of the Red Army were organized at the front, army, corps and divisional soldier committees. A network of recruiting centers was also created, hundreds of agitators and organizers of the Red Army were allocated in the rear and at the front, the necessary funds were allocated, etc. So, already on January 16, 1918, the Soviet government allocated 20 million rubles 6.
The working class and its Red Guard played an exceptionally important role in the creation of the new army. The soldiers of the Red Guard formed the basis of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army 7.
Many detachments of the Red Guard were wholly merged into the formed units and formations of the Red Army, constituting their core. On the basis of the Red Guard detachments in Petrograd, Moscow, cities and workers' settlements of the Central Industrial Region, in the Volga region, in Ukraine, the Kuban, the Urals, in Belarus, Siberia, in Far East and in other parts of the country the first regiments and divisions were formed. Among them: the 1st revolutionary regiment of Red 1
L e n and N V. I. Full. coll. cit., vol. 35, p. 222.2
See: L e n and N V. I. Poln. coll. cit., vol. 37, p. 76.3
L e n and N V. I. Full. coll. cit., vol. 35, p. 216.4
See: Decrees of Soviet Power, vol. 1, p. 357-358. 5
See ibid. 6
See ibid., p. 366.7
See: V. I. Lenin and the struggle for power of the Soviets in the Far East. Collection of documentary materials. Vladivostok, 1968, p. 192; Marxist Historian, 1938, No. 1 (65), p. 28; Army named after V. I. Lenin, 1st Petrozavodsk Communist Regiment 1st Workers 'and Peasants' Regiment of the Ural Workers, 1st Revolutionary Orsha Regiment, 1st Soviet Regiment "Fighter for Freedom" (in the Kuban), 1st Tallinn communist regiment, 1st Ufa regiment, 1st Yaroslavl socialist regiment, regiment of the Red Cossacks - the first regular part of the Red Army in Ukraine, the 1st and 2nd regiments of the Nikolaevsky district of the Samara province (later renamed Pugachevsky and named after Stepan Razin), as well as the 1st Petrograd, 1st Moscow workers, 1st Voronezh, 1st Samara, 1st Ukrainian, 1st Ural divisions and other formations and units.
At the suggestion of V. I. Lenin in Petrograd, from January 18, 1918, the 1st Corps of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army began to form, in which two months later there were already more than 16 thousand people, and in April - "26 thousand people, of which about 10 thousand were workers-fighters and commanders of the Red Guard of Petrograd “So, with the approval of Vladimir Ilyich,” wrote K. S. Eremeev, commander of the troops of the Petrograd Military District, “the 1st Corps of the Red Army was born” 315.
Formations and units of the Red Army were also created from front-line soldiers on the Western, Northern and other fronts. By February 23, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th regiments were formed from volunteer soldiers on the Northern Front. total strength about 12 thousand people. Almost in full force, Latvian soldiers entered the Red Army. rifle regiments. By the spring of 1918, 69 thousand volunteers 316 signed up for the Red Army on the Northern, Western, Southwestern, Romanian and Caucasian fronts.
On the initiative of V. I. Lenin, hard work was also carried out to form the first units and institutions of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet. On February 9, 1918, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars, the People's Commissariat for Maritime Affairs was established, headed by P. E. Dybenko. The Supreme Maritime Collegium was renamed the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Maritime Affairs. This created a solid foundation for the new, Soviet naval apparatus 317.
Workers of all nationalities and peoples of the Republic of Soviets, and often workers of other countries who were in Russia, voluntarily joined the units, formations and institutions of the Red Army. For example, in Siberia, in Novonikolaevsk, not only Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars and representatives of other peoples of our country, but also internationalists - Hungarians, Germans, Romanians, Poles, Czechs and others 318. Foreign internationalists joined the ranks of the Red Army Armies in Petrograd, Moscow, on the Don, in the Volga region. The 1st International Battalion of the Red Army was formed in Petrograd. In Kazan, the international battalion of the Red Guard, which received the name of the battalion named after Karl Marx, became one of the first units of the Red Army319.
More than 250 international detachments, companies, battalions, regiments with a total number of about 250-300 thousand volunteers operated in the ranks of the Red Army. In the autumn of 1918, internationalists made up about 5-7 percent of the Kh.
A characteristic feature of the initial period of building a new type of army was that, along with units of the Red Army, Red Guard detachments continued to operate. Moreover, in a number of places the formation of new detachments of the Red Guard 320 did not stop.
On March 10, 1918, the leaders of the Tyumen Committee of the RCP (b) reported to the Central Committee of the party that they had begun to organize the Red Army, volunteers were being registered, at the same time, 300 people signed up for Red Guard Detachment 321. In April 1918, new Red Guard detachments were organized at the stations of the Murmansk railway, in Karelia, the Yenisei province and other places 322. In July 1918, the Blagoveshchensk Regional Executive Committee had at its disposal a Red Guard detachment of up to 700 people 323. At the same time, detachments of the Red Guard and Red Army units also existed in other places. The fact is that at that time kulak gangs appeared in the villages and villages, and the Red Guard detachments in the hands of the local Soviets were a reliable means of suppressing enemy uprisings. In some places, after the decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the construction of the Red Army, they did not immediately start this important business, continuing to create Red Guard detachments, while using the experience already available. The parallel formation of units of the regular Red Army and detachments of the Red Guard in the field was caused by the combat situation.
Both those and other formations were urgently sent by the Soviet government to suppress the forces of counterrevolution.
The transition of the Red Guard to the Red Army, which began in the country in January 1918, continued until the summer of 1918324, and in the Far East until the end of 1918. The Council of the Turkestan Republic decided to abolish the Red Guard 325, most of whose detachments were transferred to the Red Army.
In the initial period of the creation of the Red Army, the Communist Party sent its prominent workers, comrades-in-arms V.I.
I. Lenin, who had experience in organizing combat squads and the Red Guard, revolutionary work among the soldiers of the old army, armed struggle against the forces of counterrevolution. Among them: A. S. Bubnov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Kirov, N. V. Krylenko, V. V. Kuibyshev, A. F. Myasnikov, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, N. I. Podvoisky , M. V. Frunze, E. M. Yaroslavsky and others.
The Red Guard was a school for the training and education of the first commanding and political cadres of the Red Army, one of its most important sources. Hundreds of organizers and commanders of the Red Guard detachments were placed by the party at the head of the first units and formations of the young Red Army. Of the 1,000 representatives of the Red Guard, more than 200 people were promoted to responsible command and political positions in the Red Army. Of these, in the first months of the construction of the Red Army, 26 people became members of the revolutionary military councils and heads of the political departments of the armies, 17 were the heads of divisions, 17 were commissars and heads of the political departments of divisions, 28 were commanders of regiments, 20 were commissars of regiments, etc. Among them were B.
N. Bozhenko, S. P. Voskov, B. S. Gorbachev, G. S. Drogoshevsky, B. M. Dumenko, D. P. Zhloba, S. P. Zakharov, M. V. Kalmykov, N. N. Kuzmin, A. Ya. Lapin, A. Ya. Parkhomenko, V. A. Trifonov, D. A. Furmanov, A. M. Cheverev, P. K. Sternberg, I. E. Yakir and many others X.
An important source of replenishment of the command and political cadres of the Red Army were revolutionary soldiers, sailors and non-commissioned officers of the old, tsarist army. “... Non-commissioned officers and competent revolutionary soldiers,” wrote Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov, “were ... welcome candidates for combat, administrative, and even staff positions.” The Soviet authorities defended the army with weapons in their hands. Among them were the future heroes of the civil war: V. M. Azin, V. K. Blucher, S. M. Budyonny, S.
S. Vostretsov, G. D. Gai, N. D. Kashirin, V. I. Kikvidze, G. I. Kotovsky, S. G. Lazo, M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. P. Uborevich, Ya. F. Fabricius, I.F. Fedko, V.I. Chapaev, N.A. Shchors, and others. They were mostly Bolsheviks, participants in the First World War.
For the construction of the new army, the best representatives of the old military intelligentsia, who had experience and great knowledge, were also attracted loyal to the Soviet government. Some of the progressively minded generals and officers of the old army voluntarily joined the ranks of the Red Army already in the first days of its creation. Among them are M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, I. I. Vatsetis, A. I. Egorov, V. N. Egoriev, S. S. Kamenev, D. M. Karbyshev, D. P. Parsky, A. A. Samoilo, P. P. Sytin, A. A. Taube, B. M. Shaposhnikov and others327.
In order to accelerate the training of command cadres from workers and peasants, the Communist Party and the Soviet government soon after the decree on the creation of the Red Army launched short-term command courses, military schools and schools, and later military academies. Back in December 1917, at the direction of V. I. Lenin, the 1st Moscow Revolutionary Machine Gun School 328 was created, which became the first military educational institution in the country that trained command cadres from the people for the young Red Army. On January 28, 1918, the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs announced the opening of courses for the training of instructors for the Red Army. On February 14, the opening of the first 13 accelerated courses for the training of command personnel in Petrograd, Moscow, Tver, Kazan and other cities was announced. Already in the second half of February, about 5.3 thousand people 329 studied at these courses. “I welcome 400 comrade workers who are graduating today from the courses of the Red Army command staff and joining its ranks as leaders,” 330 wrote V. I. Lenin in a telegram On September 18, 1918, Vladimir Ilyich expressed confidence that thousands of workers would follow their example. This was the beginning of the deployment of a wide network of military educational institutions of the Soviet Armed Forces.
In building the Red Army, the Communist Party creatively used the experience of the Red Guard and the Leninist principles of its organization. This is above all the leading role of the Party, the class approach in recruiting, the closest ties with the working people, the friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism, strict, conscious discipline.
An important role in the initial period of the formation of a new type of army was played by the central (main), provincial, city and other headquarters of the Red Guard. They, who had experience in organizing combat forces, were widely used by the party in the work of creating the Red Army and its rear. The Red Guard detachments became strongholds that carried out a lot of work on the formation, arming and training of the first regular military units and formations. “The first steps in organizing the registration were taken by the General Staff of the Red Guard,” says the information sheet on the progress of registration in the Red Army in Petrograd in February 1918. 331
Often, on the basis of the headquarters of the Red Guard, local headquarters of the Red Army were created. This was the case in Petrograd, Moscow, the Ukraine, the Urals, Siberia, and many other places 332. On April 6, 1918, in the Far East, the Red Guard Commissariat was reorganized into the joint regional headquarters of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, Red Guard and Fleet.
The Communist Party, when creating the Red Army, attached great importance to the participation of commanders and fighters of the Red Guard, revolutionary soldiers and sailors in agitation and propaganda work. That agitation, which is conducted by ordinary people from the Red Guard workers and peasants, noted V. I. Lenin, is invincible. “It will bypass millions and tens of millions and firmly ... create a socialist Red Army ...” 333 Prominent organizers and leaders of the Red Guard, the Bolsheviks, acted as agitators and organizers of the Red Army in the localities on the instructions of the Party. The active organizer of the Red Guard in the Nikolaev district, V. I. Chapaev, in the spring of 1918, speaking at a rally in front of the working people of Balakovo, said: “We have established Soviet power - the power of workers and peasants. But a dark cloud hung over her. The landowners and capitalists, with the support of foreign capitalists, are organizing conspiracies, uprisings, killing representatives of the Soviet government ... We must defend our native Soviet power with arms in hand. That is why I urge you to sign up as volunteers for the Red Army.”334 To explain to the broad masses of the people the role and significance of the Red Army that was being created, to form its first formations and units, the Party sent hundreds of agitators and organizers to the localities. From February 14 to April 5, 1918, the All-Russian Collegium for the Formation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army sent more than 110 organizers and over 280 agitators to 43 provinces of the country, the overwhelming majority being Bolsheviks
Local agitators and the press reported that the agitation among the working people was a great success. In the name of the Soviet government, personally V. I. Lenin from Vladimir, Samara, Tver, Kursk, Orel, Smolensk, Yaroslavl, from the Donbass, the Urals and from many other cities and regions there were reports of the mass entry of volunteers into the ranks of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army . “In the districts of the Olonets province ... - reported in April 1918 the Putilov worker I. V. Matveev, who became the representative of the All-Russian Collegium for the Organization and Formation of the Red Army, - up to 1236 Red Army soldiers were recruited” 335. Volunteers were successfully enrolled in the Red Army in Rostov -on-Don, where by that time several thousand 336 had become Red Army soldiers. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the initial stage of the construction of the Red Army took place in the most difficult conditions due to lack of experience, lack of command personnel, incomplete provision of weapons, food, fodder, uniforms, lack of funds. Telegrams and reports to the All-Russian Collegium for the Organization and Formation of the Red Army about an acute shortage of weapons and materiel came from many places. “The organization of the Red Army,” reported, for example, from the Don region, “is being hampered by the complete lack of funds, weapons, and a sufficient staff of experienced organizers.” “156 people signed up for the Red Army in the Krestetsky district of the Novgorod province,” says one of the documents, “but due to the famine, only 51 people remained in the country” 338.
The overthrown exploiting classes in every way prevented the creation of the Red Army on the ground. They sought to prevent or at least slow down the formation of units and formations of the regular army of workers and peasants. The decree on the creation of the Red Army by the enemies of Soviet power was met with hatred and fierce resistance. One of the organizers of the Red Guard detachments and units of the Red Army, the Bolshevik A. V. Dubrovsky, writes in his memoirs that when his detachment in March 1918 suddenly seized the headquarters of the counter-revolutionary conspiracy in Petrozavodsk, led by an officer of the tsarist army Skachkov, the Red Guards found conspirators "practicing shooting with a revolver at portraits of Soviet leaders", and saw "a decree of the Soviet government on the organization of the Red Army, pierced with a saber" 339 lying on the floor.
Creation of the Red Army
| Parameter name | Meaning |
| Article subject: | Creation of the Red Army |
| Rubric (thematic category) | Story |
Experiencing the threat of loss of power, which was rapidly growing in the first months of the civil war, the Bolsheviks acted in their usual style - decisively and purposefully.
Back in January 1918 ᴦ. The Council of People's Commissars adopted decrees on the organization on a volunteer basis of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army and Navy. But with the deployment of hostilities, the extreme importance of a mass, and most importantly, a regular, strictly disciplined army became more and more obvious. Its formation began from the end of May 1918, when a decision was made on the first mobilization of the draft age of workers and peasants. On the basis of mobilizations regularly carried out in the future, the size of the army grew rapidly. If during the volunteer period up to 300 thousand people fought in the ranks of the Red Army, then by the end of 1918 ᴦ. - over 1 million, and in the autumn of 1920 ᴦ. - already about 5.5 million people (of which over 3 million was in internal military districts and spare parts).
From June 1918 ᴦ. military specialists began to be mobilized, without which it was impossible to create a modern regular army. This made it possible to attract up to 75 thousand soldiers to the Soviet Armed Forces. former generals and officers - only a little less than they were in the ranks of the white formations (about 100 thousand people). The rest of the officers from the 250,000th officer corps of the tsarist army did not take part in the armed struggle at all: they turned, as they said then, into a "primitive state", scattered throughout the country, or emigrated.
The transition from the volunteer principle to mobilization markedly increased the political instability of the command staff of the Red Army, the danger of betrayal of the "proletarian cause" by former officers. In this regard, the rights of military commissars, who were appointed to military units already in the spring of 1918, are expanding - usually from the number of professional revolutionaries and communist workers with pre-October party experience. Without their signature, the orders of the commanders were not valid; if they refused to comply with the orders of higher headquarters, the military experts were immediately subject to arrest. The families of officers were turned into hostages. ʼʼEach commissioner must know exactly marital status command staff of the unit entrusted to him in order to immediately arrest family members in case of treason or betrayal of the commanderʼʼ, - it was said in one of the directive documents of that time. A special resolution of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party also established the strict responsibility of the commissars (up to and including execution) in the event that the officers under their care go over to the side of the enemy. Severe punishment also threatened the Red Army soldiers for desertion from the ranks of the Red Army (nevertheless, it reached an average of 30% of the workers and peasants called up for military service).
Not all communists approved of the transformation of volunteer formations into a regular army with strict discipline, the involvement of former officers and generals as military experts. In March 1919 ᴦ. At the VIII Congress of the RCP(b), the so-called military opposition (A.S. Bubnov, K.E. Voroshilov, G.L. Pyatakov, and others) came out openly, defending the semi-partisan principle in the development of the Armed Forces of the republic. At the same time, she did not receive the support of the congress delegates.
The transformation of the republic into an ʼʼsingle military campʼʼ
September 2, 1918 ᴦ. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee declared the Soviet Republic ʼʼa single military campʼʼ. The Revolutionary Military Council headed by L. D. Trotsky was created, which exercised direct leadership of the army and navy, as well as all military and naval departments. The post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the RSFSR was established (from September 1918 ᴦ. it was occupied by former Colonel I. I. Vatsetis, from July 1919 ᴦ. - former Colonel S. S. Kamenev). In November 1918 ᴦ. the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense was created under the chairmanship of V. I. Lenin. He concentrated in his hands the fullness of state power. In the autumn of 1919 ᴦ. The Soviets in the front-line and front-line regions were subordinate to emergency bodies - revolutionary committees. In June 1919 ᴦ. the then Soviet republics - Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Latvia - entered into a military alliance that provided for a single military command, financial management, industry, and transport.
The Bolsheviks, following the proven tactics of concentration at the decisive moment and on the decisive direction of the maximum strength of their supporters, from the middle of 1918 ᴦ. systematically carried out mass communist, Komsomol and trade union mobilizations, skillfully maneuvered military reserves. Here, the fact that Soviet power was firmly entrenched in the central regions of the country, where there was a fairly dense network of railways and other roads, played into their hands. This made it possible to quickly move troops and reinforcements to any sector of the front and achieve a temporary but overwhelming superiority in forces there.
In an effort to cement the rear and paralyze political opponents, the Bolsheviks at the end of February 1918 ᴦ. restored the death penalty, abolished by the II Congress of Soviets, significantly expanded the powers of the punitive body - the Cheka. In September 1918, after the attempt on the life of V. I. Lenin and the assassination of the head of the Petrograd Chekists, M. S. Uritsky, the Council of People's Commissars announced the Red Terror against persons "touched by the White Guard organizations, conspiracies and rebellions". The authorities began to take hostages en masse from among the nobility, the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. Many of them were then shot. In the same year, a network of concentration camps began to unfold in the republic. According to official data, by 1921 ᴦ. about 80 thousand people were thrown there. In January 1919 ᴦ. in the Bolshevik leadership, a decision is made to start a ʼʼmerciless war with all the tops of the Cossacks by their total extermination. As a result of this brutal action, which was soon stopped due to protests in the Communist Party itself, the villages of the Don, according to eyewitnesses, were "depopulated".
It is not necessary to think that the Chekist sword fell on the heads of only random victims of Bolshevik arbitrariness. Quite a few people, mostly from among the intellectuals, did not want to put up with the rule of the Communists and carried on secret anti-government work, prepared conspiracies and rebellions. The largest military-political organization of the white underground was the National Center with branches in Moscow, Petrograd, Yekaterinburg, Kharkov, Novorossiysk and other cities. Formed by the Cadets and monarchists in the summer of 1918 ᴦ., the NC actively acted in close contact with the headquarters of Generals A. I. Denikin and N. N. Yudenich until its defeat in June - September 1919 ᴦ.
The socialist parties were also under the vigilant supervision of the Cheka.
The failure of the idea of the right SRs and Mensheviks with the creation of anti-Soviet democratic governments contributed to the development of a new position by them. At the turn of 1918-1919. the leaders of the leading socialist parties condemned the armed struggle against the Soviet regime, reserving the right to conduct an "ordinary political struggle". In response, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee canceled the decision to expel the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks from the Soviets. But this did little to change their position. Οʜᴎ were still subjected to repression by the Cheka and actually operated underground (especially the right SRs).
The real legalization affected only those socialist groups that declared their recognition of Soviet power (part of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists, the Maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries, the ʼʼPeopleʼʼ' group that broke away from the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Party in 1919 ᴦ and others; in April 1920 ᴦ. to them the official leadership of the Mensheviks joined). Οʜᴎ, in addition to the Mensheviks, were able to publish newspapers and magazines. The Central Committee of the RCP (b) clearly wanted to introduce the activities of these political forces into the mainstream of their recognition of ʼʼ leadership Communist Partyʼʼ with all the ensuing consequences. Although such a goal was generally not achieved, the flexible tactics of the Bolsheviks in relation to the "petty-bourgeois" parties bore fruit: the socialist opposition was disorganized, and its irreconcilable elements were largely neutralized.
Starting from the second half of 1918, the parties of populist communists and revolutionary communists (they were formed from the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who condemned the armed putsch of their Central Committee in July 1918) entered the path of close cooperation with the RCP (b), the left part of the Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries -maximalists and a number of others. All of them eventually joined in 1919-1920. into the ranks of the RCP(b), which was mainly due to their small number and lack of support among the people.
A huge role in ensuring political and moral-psychological unity Soviet rear agitation and propaganda played, in which the Bolsheviks showed themselves to be unsurpassed masters. Courses and circles of "political education" were opened everywhere in the republic, agitation trains and steamboats ran, films and discs with gramophone recordings of speeches by V. I. Lenin and other Soviet leaders were widely used, leaflets, brochures, newspapers were printed in millions of copies, disseminating communist ideas. The streets of the cities were decorated with flags and banners, posters and monuments to revolutionaries of different eras and peoples, grandiose theatrical performances and rallies were held in the squares. The recognized masters of Russian art, such as M. V. Dobuzhinsky, P. V. Kuznetsov, B. M. Kustodiev, A. V. Lentulov, V. E. Meyerhold, brothers A. A. and V. A. Vesnin and others.
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In the work of the Bolshevik ʼʼagitpropʼʼ two motifs were bizarrely intertwined.
The first one is internationalist. Citizens of Soviet Russia were convinced that they had begun the cause of an "international proletarian revolution", which carried the satisfaction of mankind's age-old dream of freedom, equality, fraternity and social justice, that the "sacrificial feat" of Russian workers and peasants in the struggle for socialism found a warm response in a world where their ʼʼbrothers in classʼʼ also rise to overthrow ʼʼbourgeois ruleʼʼ. A powerful wave of revolutionary uprisings in the countries of Western and Central Europe in 1918-1920. provided the richest material for the propaganda exercises of the Bolshevik authorities, creating the impression of vitality and authenticity.
The second motive is patriotic. The beginning of it, like the first one, was laid by V. I. Lenin, calling on the people to February days German invasion 1918 ᴦ. to defend the Fatherland, even if it is a "socialist" one. The intervention of the Entente in support of the Whites allowed the Bolsheviks to develop this campaign line and declare themselves as defenders of the freedom and independence of the Motherland: they defended Russia from foreign invaders, whose accomplices could only be considered ʼʼenemies of the peopleʼʼ. The patriotic motive in propaganda reached its peak during Soviet-Polish war. In June 1920 ᴦ. the former Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the tsarist army, A. A. Brusilov, at the initiative of the authorities, addressed the officers with an appeal in which he urged them to forget all grievances and prevent the “plundering of Russia”. Otherwise, the general warned, "our descendants will justly blame us for the fact that we have ruined our mother Russia" because of the selfish feelings of the class struggle.
The combined and skillfully carried out "political and educational" work of the Bolsheviks found a noticeable response in different sections of the Russian population, often causing genuine enthusiasm among the discoverers and defenders of the new world. A vivid evidence of this is the mass ʼʼcommunist subbotniksʼʼ, when hundreds of thousands of people worked for free for the defense of the republic.
Politics of ʼʼwar communismʼʼ
The socio-economic policy of the Bolshevik government during the war years, which had as its goal the concentration of all labor and material resources in the hands of the state, led to the formation of a kind of system of "war communism". It was characterized by the following main features:
nationalization industrial enterprises, including small ones (ʼʼ with more than ten or more than five workers, but using a mechanical engineʼʼ); transfer to martial law of defense plants and railway transport;
super-centralization of industrial management (through the Supreme Council of National Economy and its head offices), which did not allow any economic independence in the localities. In an effort to control everything and all of Moscow, it is filled with institutions such as Glavkrakhmal, Glavspichka, Glavkost or Chekvalap - the Extraordinary Commission for the procurement of felt boots and bast shoes;
further development of the principle of food dictatorship and the complete official prohibition of freedom of trade (although in fact it continued to exist in the form of "sacking" and "black markets"; in 1920, illegal private trade was equal to almost half of the total turnover of commodity values in the country). In January 1919 ᴦ. a surplus appropriation was introduced, according to which the state actually seized all surplus grain from the peasants for free (and often the necessary stocks). In 1920 ᴦ. the apportionment extended to potatoes, vegetables and other crops;
naturalization of economic relations in conditions of almost complete depreciation of money (if in the fall of 1917 ᴦ. the paper ruble fell in price 15 times compared to 1913 ᴦ., then by the end of 1920 ᴦ. - already 20 thousand times); the issuance of food and manufactured goods rations to workers and employees, along with the cash wages that have lost their significance; free use of housing, transport, utilities and other services;
the introduction of labor service: in 1918 ᴦ.- for representatives of the ʼʼexploiting classesʼʼ, in 1920 ᴦ.- universal; creation of labor armies.
In some ways, ʼʼwar communismʼʼ, which was formed mainly under the pressure of the emergency situation of the civil war, resembled that classless society of the future, free from commodity-money relations, which the Bolsheviks considered their ideal, hence its name. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that many Bolsheviks, including the party leadership, perceived the "military-communist" measures not so much as forced, but as natural steps in the right direction - towards socialism and communism. Not without reason, a considerable part of such measures were taken in 1920 ᴦ., when the war had already subsided.
The 8th Congress of the RCP(b) approved the new party program. She proclaimed the main goal of building a socialist society in Russia on the basis of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the "highest form of democracy" and "transformation of the means of production into the property of the Soviet Republic, that is, into the common property of all working people." As a priority, the task was put forward to "steady continue replacing trade with a systematic, organized on a national scale distribution of products" and to implement a number of measures that "expand the area of non-monetary settlement and prepare for the destruction of money" ʼʼ.
The creation of the Red Army - the concept and types. Classification and features of the category "Creation of the Red Army" 2017, 2018.
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The beginning of the formation of the Red Army
At the end of November, N. I. Podvoisky instructed N. M. Potapov, Assistant Manager of the Military Ministry and Chief of the General Staff, to request the opinion of specialists from the Main Directorate of the General Staff, “is it necessary to retain some of the troops under the banners in order to use them as personnel for the new army" 119 . As N. M. Potapov testifies, the General Staff spoke in favor of just such a project for building a new army on the basis of the old one. This request of N. M. Potapov cannot, of course, be regarded as the line of the People's Commissariat for the Preservation of the Old Army. It was about preparing materials of various nature to identify all possible options for the construction of new armed forces. This is also evidenced by the fact that a little later, in late November - early December 1917, the Main Directorate of the General Staff was instructed to prepare a project for the organization of a nationwide militia army.
While military specialists were working on projects to reorganize the old and create a new army, while there were disputes and searches for ways to build the armed forces, experience was accumulated in the battles of the Triumphal Procession to resolve these important issues. The consciousness of contemporaries perfectly reflected these searches during the battles. In the editorial article of the newspaper "Army and Fleet ..." dated December 2, 1917, we read: "Tsarskoye Selo. Gatchina, Moscow, Kyiv and new fronts last days- Belgorod, Rostov - they say that not only soldiers trained in the barracks, “drilled” by all sorts of commanders, but also citizens who have been trained in military affairs without being involved in “serving military service”, know how not only to die, but also to win.
In this article, through a clearly negative attitude towards “all sorts of commanders”, “drilling” and “conscription”, there is admiration for citizens who know how to win with weapons in their hands. That in the not too distant future training in the barracks and conscription, i.e., the creation of a standing army, was an almost unanimous opinion among party workers that the standing army was subject to final demolition. This also met the program requirements of the Bolsheviks.
Meanwhile, the General Staff completed its work on the design of the future army. On December 8, 1917, the note of the General Staff was discussed at a meeting of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of War with the participation of representatives of the General Staff. Let us cite N. M. Potapov's testimony on the course of this discussion. “Especially intense discussion was subjected to the proposal of a note on the preservation of a certain number of personnel in the service under the banners, through which it was planned to pass the entire population, and during the debate opposed to this assumption. the need for this purpose not to preserve the old, decayed military units, but form new organizational cells on the ground, from a local element that has passed the necessary military training and firmly connected with the local population by a community of interests” (italics mine. - E. G.) 120 . It is clear from N. M. Potapov's note that the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs did not accept the General Staff's proposal to preserve the foundations of the old army and was inclined towards the need to create a new army on a militia basis.
The same issue was again discussed at a meeting of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of War on December 14, 1917. This time, delegates who arrived from the front for the All-Army Congress on the demobilization of the army were involved in the discussion. Most of the meeting participants supported the project of creating a militia army. However, at this meeting, for the first time, another project was also put forward - the creation of a socialist guard from some industrial workers, without the participation of the peasants.
This project was clearly at odds with the task of creating an army in an agrarian country with a predominantly peasant population. N. M. Potapov considers M. S. Kedrov to be the author of this project. But in reality it cannot be attributed to any one person, since it reflected the opinion of a group of leading workers of the General Staff of the Red Guard of Petrograd. It was then that the General Staff of the Red Guard developed the "Regulations on the universal Red Guard service" 122 . According to this Regulation, it was supposed to create two Red Guard corps in Petrograd, consisting of 80 thousand Red Guards, of which 10-12 thousand people were to be under arms during the week. Then they returned to the machines and were replaced by the next line of 10 thousand workers. Within 2 months, all 80 thousand had to go through "duty duty".
V. F. Malakhovskiy, one of the leading employees of the headquarters, said that even then “the Regulations caused us at the headquarters to disbelieve in its reality. The fancifulness and far-fetchedness of the scheme sketched out in the above "Regulations" were noticeable even at that time. 123 The majority of the Red Guard headquarters adhered to the absolutely correct point of view that the Red Guard should serve as the core, the basis for the new army.
As early as mid-December (until December 16) the Petrograd Soviet discussed the question of the Red Guard. The very posing of the question was evidently prompted by the provocative attempts of the counter-revolution to incite the soldiers against the workers of the Red Guards and cause disintegration in the camp of the revolution. The resolution adopted by the Petrograd Soviet is imbued with the idea of the unity of soldiers and workers. The Council recognized that the organization of the Red Guard "is the basis of the future general arming of the people and therefore must be carried out with the greatest possible energy and on the largest scale" 124 .
At the same time, the Main Staff of the Red Guard overestimated its capabilities when it proposed creating a governing body for the construction of a new army in Petrograd from the employees of the Red Guard Headquarters, into which "the number of representatives equal to the General Staff is introduced from the Military Ministry." True, in order to direct the organization of the socialist army on an all-Russian scale, the General Staff agreed to create the Central Commissariat for the Affairs of the Volunteer Army, limiting its representation in it to three persons, and giving the War Ministry the opportunity to appoint four representatives.
Of course, for the creation of a mass worker-peasant army, this approach was too narrow and was based only on the experience of organizing armed groups of workers.
On the other hand, it was impossible to accept proposals to "recreate" the old army, to turn the most combat-ready units of the old army into the basis for building a new one. It was impossible to accept such proposals coming from the circles of the old officer corps, not only because these proposals contradicted the party’s programmatic directive for the demolition of the standing army and the general arming of the people, but also for purely practical reasons, since the old army was falling apart and “forbid” or “ undo" this process was impossible.
As already noted, on December 15 the Council of People's Commissars approved decrees on the elective beginning in the army and the abolition of all ranks, titles, distinctions, etc. By adopting these most important documents, the Council of People's Commissars once again confirmed its course towards the demolition of the old army. This, of course, did not mean that the Council of People's Commissars refused to use the best elements of the old army for the construction of new armed forces. On the contrary, the democratization of the army was supposed to solve this problem as well - to single out the best elements from the soldiers and officer corps for the creation of a new army. However, due to the fact that all these issues were resolved in the conditions of an unfinished war, when more than 150 German and Austrian divisions could launch an offensive every minute, it was necessary to create some kind of temporary, transitional forms of armed forces for the period when the old army was passing through stage of democratization and demobilization, and there was no new army yet.
On December 16, 1917, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief N.V. Krylenko spoke at the Council of People's Commissars with a report "On transitional forms of organization of the Army during the period of demobilization." This issue was not resolved at the meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on December 16. Apparently, there was not enough material to draw conclusions about the state of the old army and the possible forms of its use. This material was to be given by the all-army congress on the demobilization of the army.
Since the end of December, the main issue of the work of the congress on demobilization has been the question of creating a new army. On the eve of the opening of the congress and in the first days of its work, a number of meetings were held with delegates - prominent workers in front-line and army organizations. At one of these meetings, according to the testimony of its participants (N. I. Podvoisky and D. S. Vitebsky), V. I. Lenin was present. Most likely, this happened on December 17, 1917, the day when the All-Army Congress urgently assigned representatives of the armies and fronts to participate in a meeting of the demobilization commission at the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. At this commission with representatives of the fronts and armies, V. I. Lenin read out a questionnaire he had compiled, asking the representatives of the armies to answer the questions posed.
The questionnaire, compiled by V. I. Lenin on December 17, consisted of questions, mainly related to the attitude of the army to the possibility of resuming hostilities. V. I. Lenin was interested in how the delegates of the All-Army Congress assess the possibility of a new offensive by the Germans: “Is it possible to fear that the news of a disruption peace talks will cause a mass anarchist mood in the army and an escape from the front, or can you be sure that the army will steadfastly hold the front even after such news? - V. I. Lenin asked 127 . In a series of questions, V. I. Lenin tried to find out the opinion of the delegates about the ability of the army to resist a possible German offensive.
As can be seen from these questions, V. I. Lenin did not directly put forward the task of creating a new army to the congress delegates. However, the essence of Lenin's questions boiled down to clarifying the conditions of life and the political state of the old army, on the basis of which the formation of a new type of armed forces capable of resisting the imperialist invasion could arise. These questions were posed directly by V. I. Lenin a few days later in a letter to the congress delegates. At that moment, it was important for V.I. Lenin to establish objective data on the state of the old army. These data were obtained by him in response to the questions of the questionnaire.
Here is how N. I. Podvoisky talks about this meeting on December 17: “Lenin listened to the information of representatives of the fronts and the most important armies about the state of the troops. It was clear that the army as a fighting organism, an army ready at any moment to meet the attacking enemy fully armed and defeat him - there is no such army in the country. There is only a gigantic, multimillion-strong mass, parts of which are not militarily connected with each other, they do not obey their command staff and treat it with acute hostility, while the command staff (officers), in turn, treats it even more hostilely. But the main question at the meeting was the question of how to build a new army, on the procedure for the formation and recruitment of detachments, "which were supposed to serve after the end of demobilization," as N. M. Potapov wrote 129 . The exchange of opinions showed that the creation of such detachments could be ensured "only on the condition that people enter military service voluntarily" 130 .
We find more detailed coverage of these issues in the speeches of N. V. Krylenko and N. I. Podvoisky these days.
On December 17, N. V. Krylenko spoke at a mass rally in Petrograd with a report on the work of the People's Commissariat of War and the Supreme Commander. His speech is interesting, first of all, by the clear formulation of the question of the need to demolish the old military machine. “The whole task and all the work in the War Ministry, guided by the general principles of revolutionary socialism, first of all received one goal,” said N. V. Krylenko. “To smash, as soon as possible, with short decisive blows, the old machine for controlling living people, to destroy the former standing army, and to put living and thinking people in place of machines dressed in gray overcoats.” N. V. Krylenko emphasized that this task was solved by democratizing the army in the difficult conditions of the struggle against counter-revolution and the struggle for peace. Under these conditions, N. V. Krylenko said, “it was impossible ... to immediately destroy or destroy the entire complex machine, it was necessary for the time being to make it work so that the supply business would not suffer ...”.
Thus, the commander-in-chief clearly pointed out the temporary nature of the use of the old military machine, subject to its reorganization. A specially highlighted section of the report by N. V. Krylenko was called "The Army of the Future - the Red Soviet Guard." In this part of the report, he spoke on behalf of the people's commissars for military and naval affairs. He stated that the people's commissars "set themselves the task of reorganizing the front on a different basis. Like the existing Red Guard in the rear, at the front, people's guard corps must be created from experienced revolutionaries who are ready to voluntarily remain and defend the revolution at the front to the end.
In this speech, it is extremely important that N. V. Krylenko raised the question of creating "corps of the Soviet Guard" 131 at the front, which should be built on the same principles as the Red Guard in the rear, i.e., on the basis of voluntariness, strict selection, discipline and clearly defined revolutionary goals.
At this time there were significant changes in the international situation. On December 15, 1917, peace negotiations in Brest were interrupted. More and more it became clear that a militarist group was gaining the upper hand in Germany, which, through General Hoffmann, was dictating its terms at the negotiations in Brest. On December 17, the Soviet peace delegation reported at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars. It was decided to invite the delegation to submit to the Council of People's Commissars the text of German peace conditions. The situation was becoming alarming, it was necessary to be prepared for a possible German offensive.
Meanwhile, by this time, the materials of the questionnaire distributed among the delegates of the All-Army Congress on Demobilization had been studied. On December 18, N. V. Krylenko made a report to the Council of People's Commissars “On the situation at the front and the state of the Army; results of a questionnaire among representatives of the Army” 132 . The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars, adopted on December 18, 1917, based on the report of N. V. Krylenko, recognized "the results of the questionnaire ... as exhaustive of the question of the state of the army" 133 . A resolution proposed by V. I. Lenin 134 was adopted. which spoke of the need to launch agitation against the annexationism of the Germans, the continuation of peace negotiations and countering their forcing by the Germans. At the same time, the resolution outlined intensified measures to reorganize the army while reducing its composition and strengthening its defense capability. The resolution provided for emergency measures for the defense of Petrograd.
This resolution testifies that in mid-December there was still hope for the possibility of temporarily using the old army, for carrying out a partial demobilization, which was supposed to strengthen the combat capability of the front-line units. It is necessary to distinguish between temporary measures to strengthen the existing front, parts of the old army, and measures to create a new army on a completely different principle. As already mentioned, V. I. Lenin did not consider it possible to build a new army on the basis of selecting the most combat-ready units of the old army or reorganizing these units. But at the same time, V. I. Lenin admitted the need to temporarily strengthen the existing army by replenishing with new units created on a volunteer basis 135 .
What these measures were, we will learn from the documents of the leading bodies and the speeches of the party's military leaders in the days after December 18.
On the advice of V. I. Lenin, the question of creating a new army was raised on December 19 at the soldiers' section of the Petrograd Soviet and at the plenum of the Soviet. The documents adopted at these meetings help us to understand in what ways the search for the best forms of organizing the armed forces of the revolution proceeded.
The Soldiers' Section reminded once again that the abolition of the standing army has always been a demand of revolutionary democracy. At the same time, the section noted that “the abolition of the standing army and the general arming of the people, in a state of war that we have not yet ended, and may be forced to continue, with all the technical shortcomings of the weapons and equipment of the standing army itself, can be a measure of profoundly pernicious capable of undermining combat power Russian Republic..." 137 . The adopted resolution spoke of the inadmissibility of the dismissal of soldiers with weapons belonging to the state. This resolution was announced by the commander of the Petrograd Military District K. S. Eremeev in the form of an order for the Petrograd garrison.
On the same day, December 19, the plenum of the Petrograd Soviet decided on the need to create a strong spirit, powerful and tightly knit socialist army "not only to repel attacks from foreign governments", but also "to consolidate our victory over the Russian landowners, Russian capitalists , over our own bourgeoisie" 138 . The Petrograd Soviet noted that the old army was weary and exhausted, that a new army had to be created. “Let only those who are ready to fight for freedom to the end, who feel in themselves the ability to give everything for the great cause of the workers' and peasants' revolution, join the renewed socialist army,” said the Council's address to the workers.
The Petrograd Soviet outlined certain principles for building a new army. “The socialist army will be built from top to bottom on an elective basis, on the basis of comradely mutual respect and discipline. We will show the whole world an example of a truly democratic army that knows what it is sacrificing for, that recognizes itself as flesh and bone and bone from bone of the working class and peasantry, ready at any moment to fulfill its duty to its class, to the new, socialist Russia. .
These documents, adopted on December 19 by the Petrograd Soviet, allow us to draw some conclusions. First, the resolutions made it clear that the old army could not form the basis for the creation of new armed forces. Secondly, they, especially the resolution of the soldiers' section, testify to the fact that in the conditions of the unfinished war, the Soviet did not consider it possible to abandon the standing army, since this would weaken the combat power of the republic. And finally, the Soviet proposed to build a new army on the same principles of democratization, which were a means and a form of demolition of the old army. This latter, of course, reflected the contradiction between the need to create a strong, disciplined army and the introduction of elective command personnel. But this was a contradiction inherent in the transitional period, when the old discipline, the discipline of the stick, was broken and destroyed, and the new discipline, iron proletarian discipline, was only being created in the mass army of workers and peasants, along with the creation of the army itself.
The next few days showed that the hopes for the possibility of strengthening the old army without simultaneous decisive measures to form units of the new army have no grounds. The rapid disintegration of the old army required a sharp acceleration in the construction of new armed forces and emergency measures to temporarily strengthen the front until it was possible to replace parts of the old army with new formations.
On December 22, 1917, N. V. Krylenko telegraphed from Headquarters to Petrograd that there was an extreme shortage of food on the Romanian front, a mass withdrawal of soldiers to the rear, and a growing threat to our troops from the Romanian army. N. V. Krylenko considered it necessary "to withdraw the troops of the Romanian Front to several crossings to the rear in order to properly arrange them there and supply them with food, than to eliminate the most important reason for further unauthorized abandonment of the army" 141 . This question acquired a very important significance, since the withdrawal of the troops of the Rumanian Front would entail the retreat of the armies of other fronts.
On the same day, December 22, a meeting was convened at the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs with the participation of V. I. Lenin. N. I. Podvoisky, P. E. Dybenko, K. A. Mekhonoshin, and N. M. Potapov also took part in the meeting.
The meeting was held in the small room of the adjutant on duty. “After the announcement of Com. Podvoisky sent from comrade. Krylenko's telegram, Vladimir Ilyich suggested first of all that "military specialists" 143 have their say, N. M. Potapov relates. “Specialists expressed a number of considerations about the difficulty of stopping the avalanche of troops that once rushed back and pointed out the impossibility of quickly picking up and taking out huge stocks of military materials that were concentrated at the front.” In the “Brief Information ...” the decision of the meeting on December 22 is formulated as follows: “... it was decided, along with the immediate implementation of emergency measures to streamline transport, to raise the spirit of the troops by pouring a fresh element into the units at the front. With this last goal in mind, it was decided as soon as possible - within 8-10 days, if possible - to send ready-made Red Guard detachments available in the Petrograd and Moscow districts to the front and immediately begin organizing new units in the same districts (mainly in Moscow). Red Guard, but in total up to 10 corps (or 300,000 people). As instructors for the newly formed units, special delegates were to be called from the front at the choice of the soldiers' committees, a total of 400 infantry and 100 artillery.
According to the memoirs of N. M. Potapov, these solutions were proposed by V. I. Lenin. The accuracy in the decision proposed by Lenin, his complete awareness of the military situation, made a strong impression on military specialists. “First of all,” says N. M. Potapov, “I was irresistibly impressed by the charming personality of Vladimir Ilyich, his friendly, friendly attitude towards others, his quick grasp of the essence of issues, his brief and apt remarks” 145 .
On the same day and the following day, all the necessary orders arising from this plan were worked out and sent to Headquarters and to the localities.
Twenty years later, N.I. Podvoisky gave the following assessment of the plan to create ten corps: armies of the healthiest units and groups to introduce them into the new army that is being formed. The 300,000 proletarians poured into the five million old army of the front, according to Lenin, were to carry out gigantic agitational work. They were to strengthen the elected soldiers' committees, to reorganize the work of these committees in accordance with the political tasks of the moment. These proletarians, by the very fact of their presence at the front, had to exercise workers' control over the old army, and especially political control over the command staff.
We do not know the sources used by N. I. Podvoisky in such a concretization of the Leninist plan. It is possible that this source is the memory of the author, his personal conversations with V. I. Lenin. If we can unreservedly agree that the plan for the formation of ten corps had in mind not only the strengthening of the front, but also the creation of new armed forces, then the provision on workers' control over the old army is doubtful. This was not what the workers' corps at the front were needed for, not for control. Control was in the safe hands of the Bolshevik Soldiers' Committees, and it is unlikely that even the most reckless of the counter-revolutionaries could think of wresting the army from the control of the revolutionary committees and directing it against Soviet power. It was mainly about external danger, about foreign intervention. In order to smash the counter-revolution, it was enough to unite the detachments of the Red Guard and the revolutionary units of the old army. This was shown quite convincingly by the triumphal procession of Soviet power. To fight the foreign invasion, these forces were clearly not enough. That is why the plan for the formation of ten corps arose in connection with the state of the external front, directed against the danger of an offensive by the German-Austrian armies.
On the same day, December 22, an inquiry was sent to the General Headquarters on how it felt about the formation of a new army of volunteers in the deep rear, initially consisting of 144 regiments 148 .
How did the Headquarters react to these proposals? This is evidenced by a telegram from M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich, which he sent to the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs on December 26: "The formation of a disciplined and combat-ready army in the rear in case of war is highly desirable" 149 . M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich recommended to deploy the formation of an army on the principles of volunteerism in the region east of Moscow, "in the provinces, better supplied with food than the northern provinces" 150 . As for the number of regiments of the new army, M. D. Bonch-Bruevich believed that it was taken arbitrarily.
On December 23, at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, the question of preparing a manifesto on a socialist war, that is, on a war in defense of the socialist fatherland, was discussed. A commission consisting of I. V. Stalin, A. V. Lunacharsky, and P. P. Proshyan was set up to discuss the text of the manifesto. Its main ideas are expressed in N. V. Krylenko's order of December 25, 1917, "On the Creation of a Revolutionary People's Socialist Army", which was published on December 29 153 .
The fact that Krylenko's order reflected these ideas follows from the text of negotiations on a direct wire between N. V. Krylenko and B. V. Legrand, attached to the protocol of the Council of People's Commissars of December 23. According to the tape of negotiations, it is clear that B. V. Legrand outlined the contents of the manifesto to Krylenko. He announced that an order would be issued on the formation of Soviet detachments in the rear to be sent to the front in connection with the international situation. Legrand proposed, without waiting for a manifesto, to publish an order for the withdrawal of troops in accordance with the usogram transmitted on December 22 154 .
The manifesto was not published, but in his order Krylenko outlined both the provisions of the manifesto and the plan for creating a new army and temporarily strengthening the old army in every possible way, which was proposed by V. I. Lenin on December 22. Pointing out that the treacherous policy of the Ukrainian Central Rada is frustrating the cause of peace, that the German imperialists, as well as the American and French ones, are preparing to strangle the Soviet Republic, N. V. Krylenko wrote: “... the workers and peasants of Russia are faced with the question of defending all the gains revolution and a holy war against all enemies... In these conditions, the people face the task of creating an armed force to repulse... The army is tired, the army is exhausted. The old army, the old army is not capable of such a task. For this, a new army must be created - an armed people, such an army, the rudiments of which were the Red Guard of the workers ... The Revolutionary People's Socialist Guard must be created everywhere - at the front and in the rear. The order ended with the words: "Comrade-comrades will receive support and reinforcements, and then we will not be afraid of any force of the bourgeois armies" 155 .
This was the first document that proclaimed the need to create a new army, a document prepared by discussion in the People's Commissariat of War and the Council of People's Commissars. At the same time, this order did not yet contain an exact development of a plan for creating a new army, did not formulate quite clearly and definitely the principles of its organization. But there it was stated quite definitely about the need to strengthen the front with new formations, the rudiment of which was the Red Guard, about the impossibility of solving the tasks of defending the revolution by the forces of the old army.
The most important center of the struggle for the creation of a new army was the Military Organization under the Central Committee of the Party. Between December 22 and 26, an emergency meeting of representatives of the People's Commissariat of War, the headquarters of the Red Guard and military organization under the Central Committee of the Party. Practical measures were developed for the formation of units of the socialist army 156 .
One of the main sources for characterizing the position and activities of the Military Organization is the minutes of its meeting dated December 26, 1917. A very imperfect record makes it somewhat difficult to use this source, but it is extremely important for us not only as a collection of factual data on the activities of the party in the field of creating armed forces , but also as a reflection of the search, mentality and struggle of opinions around these issues among the military workers of the party.
Speaking at a meeting of the Military Organization, N. I. Podvoisky pointed out the changed situation and the need for new solutions. “As early as December 9,” he said, “the Petrograd Soviet spoke in favor of replenishing the army. Today the international situation, the changes that have taken place, suggest to us that we need to create a socialist army.
The People's Commissariat of War and the Main Staff of the Red Guard began the formation of parts of the first corps. N. I. Podvoisky declared at the meeting that two days after the decision was made, the headquarters of the Red Guard would send 5,000 Red Guards to the front. It would be a mistake to think that these Red Guard formations were only material for strengthening the old army at the front. The main task was the creation of a new army, and the "infusion" of parts of this army into front-line formations, cementing the old army was a side and temporary task. This is evidenced by the exchange of views at the meeting of the Military Organization.
It should be taken into account that all these questions were resolved in an atmosphere of tremendous revolutionary upsurge, growth revolutionary movement in the West and the unshakable confidence among the masses and among the cadres of party and military workers that the socialist revolution in the main belligerent countries is about to take place. This conviction had nothing in common with the Trotskyist assertions about the inevitable doom of our revolution if it were not state support West. On the contrary, the military workers of the party educated by Lenin were convinced, as N. I. Podvoisky stated, that “the sooner we create such a socialist army, the sooner we cement the front, the sooner peace will be concluded and the sooner the socialist revolution will develop in the West” 159 .
NI Podvoisky expressed the opinion of the Council of People's Commissars. He explained what it meant to "pour" new units into the old army at the front. “... We must,” he said, “infuse fresh elements into the ranks of tired comrades from the front, cement the army and give the elements that cause disorganization the opportunity to leave. That is why we need a socialist army...” 160 It is clear that N. I. Podvoisky considered the creation of a new army a condition for cementing the front.
The military organization clearly defined the class character of the future army. V. I. Nevsky stressed that the new army should be fundamentally different from the militaristic armies. He proposed to create an army not only from the workers, but from all the working people 161 . NI Podvoisky and other members of the Military Organization spoke in the same spirit. This position was clearly directed against the sectarian plans to create a "Red Guard Army" from workers alone.
N. I. Podvoisky outlined to the Military Organization the Leninist plan for creating a 300,000-strong army, indicating that this task should be completed a month and a half before a possible German offensive. “According to our calculations,” said N. I. Podvoisky, “in 1 1/2 months it is possible to create 300,000 bayonets of the socialist army, which will serve as the cement and skeleton of the new army.” 162
Outlining the organizational plan of work for the creation of a new army, N. I. Podvoisky put in the first place the creation of party cells in the regiments for the deployment of agitation work among the soldiers, mainly poor peasants. He proposed to allocate special organizers to work at the factories. In addition, N. I. Podvoisky set the task of training military instructors and proposed the creation of a commission, which, together with the workers of the Central Committee and the PC, would begin work on organizing a new army.
The military organization approved the proposal to create a headquarters for technical work on the creation of a socialist army. The speeches of some members of the Military Organization reflected the complex, contradictory situation of that time. The military workers of the party pointed out the dangers that might arise if "all the socialist juice was taken from the regiments, leaving only the irresponsible"; they emphasized that it was necessary not to “pour” individual groups into the old regiments, but to re-create regiments of the socialist army and strengthen the front with them.
N. I. Podvoisky raised the question before the Military Organization whether it was possible to create a new army from parts of the old army of the Petrograd garrison. 16 people voted for such a decision, 28 abstained. Thus, this proposal did not receive even half of the votes. From this it is clear that the Military Organization considered it necessary to adopt a broader base for the creation of a new army, shaping it around the Red Guard, and enlisting en masse the best elements from the old army.
The military organization unanimously supported the proposal of N. I. Podvoisky on the creation of a socialist army, the organization of party cells and the deployment of their work in the regiments of the garrison. The leadership of all work on the creation of a new army was entrusted to N. I. Podvoisky, K. A. Mekhonoshin and a representative of the Red Guard. It was also decided to strengthen the protection of the revolutionary order, to streamline the work of railway transport.
Lenin's instructions on the development of a plan for the military-technical supply of the new army date back to the same time. Lenin considered it necessary to use for this purpose the apparatus of the Special Conference on Defence, which was in charge of the military industry. At the end of November 1917, N. I. Podvoisky, on the instructions of V. I. Lenin, convened a Special Conference on Defense. He told the meeting participants that the Council of People's Commissars was counting on their loyal cooperation.
As P. A. Kozmin tells in his memoirs, he was asked to study the mechanism of the Conference on Defense and report daily to Lenin on the progress of its work. “After we became well acquainted with the apparatus of the Conference,” says P. A. Kozmin, “comrade. Lenin proposed to work out a new regulation on it and gave an urgent task (this was between December 8 and 10, O.S.) to convene military specialists and work out with them a plan for the military-technical supply of the revolutionary army for waging a civil war. - Not only Vendée is rising against us, - said Vladimir Ilyich, - therefore we must prepare. Stop the production of heavy shells and guns, make light field artillery, machine guns, rifles.
Such a plan involved the demobilization of a significant part military industry, which was under the jurisdiction of the Defense Conference. On December 20, the Defense Conference was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council of the National Economy.
As P. A. Kozmin testifies, in terms of military-technical supply, “the nature of the military supplies of the revolutionary army was determined and a basic list of these items was given, it was planned to close a number of some industries and expand others that were more in line with the technique of conducting a civil war; dangerous and relatively safe areas were outlined ... in connection with the proposed theater of the civil war ”166.
From all this it is clear that the Soviet government, born under the banner of peace, did not intend to create large military forces, to deploy a large army. Being anti-militarist in its essence, the Soviet state set itself the task of liquidating the standing army and creating armed forces according to the militia system. To suppress the internal counter-revolution, to liquidate the resistance of its own bourgeoisie, the socialist revolution could confine itself to the detachments of the Red Guard and the revolutionary units of the old army. This was clearly not enough to fight the interventionists - it was necessary to create a new army.
On December 24, 1917, the commander of the Northern Front, B.P. Pozern, proposed to all the soldiers' organizations of the front - starting from the company committees - "simultaneously with demobilization, proceed immediately to the creation of the Red Revolutionary Army ..." 167 . The telegram from the command of the Northern Front did not give a clear definition of the principles of manning the new army, but stated that it would consist of volunteers, from everyone “who feels the strength to go to fight against the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, from wherever it launches an offensive - from inside or outside of Russia ". The telegram ended with very characteristic words: "The plan of proposed measures for the formation of a revolutionary army will be announced later." The organizational plan was just that missing link, which was essential for the implementation of the idea of creating a new army, which was not in the order of the Commander-in-Chief of December 25.
The search for ways to create a new army also took place in the individual armies of the front. Between December 24 and 29 in Pskov, at a meeting of representatives of the armies of the Northern Front, the main provisions for the creation of a new army were worked out. On December 29, 1917, Iskosol of the 12th Army proposed to all divisional committees "to immediately convene divisional meetings to implement the order of the Commander-in-Chief on the formation of the Red Guard on a volunteer basis" 168 . Each regiment was to elect one instructor. On January 5, 1918, Iskosol appointed a congress of instructors, at which "the instructors will be informed of the developed regulations on the Red Guard and further decisions will be adopted" 169 .
The regulation was drafted and sent by telegraph to the Northern Front on January 4, 1918. 170 The main idea of the Northern Front command was to form units of the new army and quickly replace them with units of the old army at the front. In order to achieve such coordination, the command intended to create units of the new army both in the rear of the front and "in the ranks of the active army itself by selecting for this from its ranks the appropriate elements ...". “Only such simultaneity,” the telegram said, “can ensure to the extreme the necessary speed in the reorganization of the army and, at the same time, preserve the continuously possible stability during the period of re-creation of the army” 171 .
From this plan, prepared by the command of the Northern Front, it is clear that under the "reorganization of the army", "re-creation of the army" meant the creation of new volunteer formations, which were supposed to replace parts of the old army at the front.
Of course, in other historical conditions, in a different state of the old army, the possibility of using it would be much greater. Responsibility for the collapse of the army, for the decline in its combat effectiveness, lay with the compromising parties. “If then (in March-April 1917 vol. - E. G.) power had passed to the Soviets, if the Compromisers, instead of helping Kerensky to drive the army into the fire, if they had then come with a proposal for a democratic peace, then the army would not have been so destroyed,” said V. I. Lenin at the plenum of the Moscow Soviet in March 1918. 172 He emphasized that the Russian army could have been saved from incredibly difficult trials and humiliations if the Compromisers had renounced secret treaties and proposed democratic peace to all peoples. "That's when it was possible to save the army and the revolution," said Lenin. This, of course, in no way means that Lenin considered it possible, even under favorable conditions, to preserve the old army and, with a certain reorganization, turn it into the armed force of the socialist revolution. It was only about the possibility of a wider use of the old army, a less painful process of its demolition and final liquidation.
This was clearly recognized by the representatives of the old army themselves. The appeal of the command of the 1st Army to the soldiers spoke of the danger of enemy intrigues against the revolution. “How to organize the force to resist them? If we weren’t so exhausted by the war, if we weren’t so drawn home, if there wasn’t such a breakdown in the army, we would represent a force that our enemies would not dare to oppose. But, unfortunately, the present army does not represent such a force. And an organized enemy can crush us with little force. Hence the conclusion that we need to organize a new army...” 174
On December 29, the conference of the armies of the Western Front adopted a draft for the organization of a new army. The project was preceded by an appeal signed by the commander of the Western Front A.F. Myasnikov: “The army must be radically transformed. There is no old army, but the new one has not yet been created, and the army is going through a difficult transitional time, how, on what principles can a new army be built. The project developed on Western front was more specific and specific. First of all, he established that the formation of revolutionary units was entrusted to the corresponding military and local Soviets, which should be guided by nationwide instructions. However, if there were no such instructions yet, the project proposed to start forming a new army without waiting for instructions from above, subject to coordinating their actions with the highest military and local Soviets. In the rear, it was proposed to carry out the formation of units no larger than a company, gradually gathering them into larger revolutionary units and sending them to the front.
The project provided that all power in the formations of the new army belongs to the respective Councils, and for positions requiring special technical knowledge, the Council invites specialists. Discipline and revolutionary order in the units had to be maintained by comradely influence, the authority of the Soviets and the action of the courts or revolutionary tribunals. The project established the payment of volunteers and provision for their families.
On January 5 - 6, 1918, a congress of instructors was held in the 12th Army of the Northern Front on the formation of the Red People's Guard from the soldiers of the old army. Representatives of Iskosol, as well as representatives of individual units, made presentations at the congress. The congress revealed two tendencies among the soldiers and revolutionary organizations of the 12th Army. On the one hand, there is an undoubted desire to create a new army, an understanding of its necessity. On the other hand, inertia, a very weak entry into new formations, the fear that the creation of the People's Guard means militarization, something like "death battalions", etc. There were also fears that the separation of the People's Guard detachments from parts of the old army would split the army and discord.
Speeches at the Congress of Instructors showed that the objections to the creation of the Red People's Guard were connected with fears of isolation, isolation of the Red Guard from the old army. In other words, these objections were based on the opinion that the old army should be preserved and strengthened. But during the work of the Congress of Instructors, this misconception was dispelled.
In a resolution adopted by the congress, Iskosol was asked to issue an order for the immediate opening of enrollment in the ranks of the Red People's Guard, for the deployment of propaganda and agitation among the soldiers for the formation of the Red Guard. The resolution proposed "corps, division, regiment, company, squadron, battery and command committees to allocate one instructor each from among the volunteers who are entrusted with the formation of the Red People's Guard" 176 . In practice, it was recommended that one or more units, where there was the largest number of volunteers, be declared the Red Guard and all volunteers should be transferred to it.
Thus, both from below - in the local Soviets, in the soldiers' organizations at the front and in the rear - and from above - in the Military Organization, in the General Staff of the Red Guard - there was an intensified search for ways, forms, methods of building a new army.
On December 28, 1917, the issue of creating a new, socialist army was discussed by the All-Army Demobilization Congress. On behalf of the Bolshevik faction, a draft was proposed to the congress, which took into account both the previously developed proposals at a meeting in the Commissariat for Military Affairs on December 22, and the proposals of the Military Organization. This project was based on Lenin's ideas about the creation of a workers' and peasants' revolutionary mass army. N. I. Podvoisky, People's Commissar for Military Affairs, who spoke on this issue, called on "all socialists to respond to the call of the People's Commissars: to contribute with all their might to the speedy formation of cadres of the socialist army for the holy war for socialism" 177 .
The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, not daring to oppose the project for the creation of a new army, proposed that no decisions be made on this issue, "leave this issue to be decided by the masses themselves." The Mensheviks and Right SRs from the "non-factional" group opposed the Bolshevik project. They proposed to confine ourselves to partial demobilization, and to replenish the front with volunteer detachments and marching companies. At this point, the Left SRs were forced to oppose the "non-factional group" and declared that they would vote for the Bolshevik project of creating a new, Workers 'and Peasants' Army. The project for the creation of a socialist army, proposed by the Bolsheviks, was adopted by a majority - 153 votes to 40, with 13 abstentions 178 .
The project established the principle of voluntariness when joining a new army, required those joining the army to recommend organizations that stood on the platform of Soviet power. The project was in clear connection with the plan for the organization of ten buildings. It said that when organizing socialist guard corps in the rear, the principle of volunteerism is put into practice immediately, and at the front - gradually, as the demobilized socialist formations from the rear are replaced.
The project established the procedure for curtailing the old army and gradually replacing it at the front with new formations. The supreme leadership of the new socialist army, as the project established, belonged to the Council of People's Commissars.
On January 4, 1918, this draft was published in the name of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs under the title "Regulations on the Organization of the Socialist Army" 179 . The appeal approved by the congress on the creation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Army was published later along with Lenin's decree on the creation of the Red Army.
The results of all this work showed up very soon. As planned, on January 1, 1918, the first detachments of the socialist army were sent from Petrograd to replenish and strengthen the front. V. I. Lenin, speaking at the farewell of these detachments in the Mikhailovsky Manege, said: "I welcome in your person those first heroes-volunteers of the socialist army who will create a strong revolutionary army" 180 . Lenin set two tasks for the volunteers - to protect the gains of the revolution, the people's power and to support the tired in the trenches, to inspire them by personal example.
The course of events at the front in January 1918, the growing disintegration of the old army showed not only the utopian nature of the projects for its reorganization, but also the impossibility of even temporarily raising its combat effectiveness. Obviously, on the basis of this information coming from the front, the materials of a questionnaire survey on January 3, 1918, of the delegates of the All-Army Congress for the Demobilization of the Army 181 and numerous telegrams from the revolutionary organizations of the Northern, Western, and especially the Southwestern and Romanian fronts, V. I. Lenin formulated 14 th and 15th paragraphs of his "Theses on the immediate conclusion of a separate and annexationist peace." As is known, these theses were written on January 7, 1918, and the next day were made public by Lenin at a meeting of St. Petersburg party workers.
The state of the old army in the theses was characterized as follows: the army “at the moment and in the coming weeks (and probably in the coming months) is absolutely not in a position to successfully repel the German offensive, firstly, due to the extreme fatigue and exhaustion of most of the soldiers, while unheard of devastation in the matter of food, replacement of the overworked, etc.; secondly, due to the complete uselessness of the horse composition, dooming our artillery to inevitable death; thirdly, due to the complete impossibility of defending the coast from Riga to Revel, giving the enemy the surest chance of conquering the rest of Livonia, then Estonia and bypassing a large part of our troops from the rear, and finally capturing Petrograd. The peasant majority of the army, according to Lenin, was unconditionally for peace.
In the Theses, V. I. Lenin put forward the task of creating a really solid and ideologically strong socialist Workers 'and Peasants' Army, pointing out that it would take months and months to solve this task, that the solution of this task had just begun. The same task was formulated by V. I. Lenin in early January in his letter to the All-Army Congress. The congress delegates asked Vladimir Ilyich to come and speak to them. These were anxious days, when the struggle against the counter-revolution in the center and on the outskirts of the country reached a particular acuteness, when every minute a new German offensive could be expected. All the forces of the monarchists, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks united around the slogan "All power to the Constituent Assembly." During this critical period of the revolution, as V. I. Lenin characterized it, he addressed the All-Army Congress for the demobilization of the army with a greeting. Significant is the fact that in this greeting there was not a word about demobilization! “I warmly welcome the confidence,” wrote V. I. Lenin, “that great task creation of a socialist army, in connection with all the difficulties of the moment, and despite these difficulties, will be solved by you successfully» 183 .
By mid-January 1918, by the time the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree on the creation of the Red Army, a lot of work had been done, the search for ways, forms, methods - both among the masses and in the leading revolutionary organizations - of building new armed forces. creative work, held for two and a half months at the front and army congresses, at the All-Army Congress, in the People's Commissariat of War and the Military Organization, gave its results. It was a gigantic work of thinking through, selecting, summarizing, sifting and testing the experience of the broadest masses.
Of the numerous projects, proposals, practical experience in creating new armed forces, the Bolshevik Party. V. I. Lenin took the most important, basic, essential.
An important role in the preparation of the decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the creation of the Red Army was played by the Agitation Board, allocated by the All-Army Congress for the Demobilization of the Army. The Collegium organized a Provisional Bureau for the Creation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, which became part of the People's Commissariat of War as its department. The Provisional Bureau developed the structure and defined the functions of the All-Army Collegium for the organization and management of the Red Army, the draft decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the creation of the Red Army, and launched a large practical effort to create new armed forces.
On January 14-15, a meeting of front-line delegates to the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets considered and adopted a draft decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the creation of the Red Army. On the same day, January 15, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars approved a decree on the organization of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. “Unexpectedly for me,” says N. I. Podvoisky, “Vladimir Ilyich made a proposal not to launch a general debate, based on the fact that the creation of the Red Army is already a fact and therefore only the most accurate formulation of guidelines is necessary for the correct further process of creating the Red Army » 186 .
How accuracy was achieved in the wording can be seen from the work of V. I. Lenin on the text of the decree. In the introductory part of the decree, where it was said that the new army "will be the stronghold of Soviet power in the present and the foundation for replacing regular troops with nationwide weapons in the future ...", V. I. Lenin corrected this way: "... for replacement of the standing army with national armaments in the near future...” 187 . The point here is not only that the foreign word “regular” has been replaced by the understandable “permanent”. Such a revision is of fundamental importance, since the Red Army created by decree was to be a regular army.
V. I. Lenin precisely defined the nature and principle of manning the new army. The draft decree said: “The Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army is being created without coercion and violence; it is made up of volunteers only.” In this formulation, emphasis was placed on the volunteer nature of the army. V. I. Lenin eliminated in the decree the reference to the fact that the army is created only from volunteers and wrote: “... it is created from the most conscious and organized elements of the working masses” 188 .
With this amendment, V. I. Lenin emphasized the vanguard character of the fighters of the new army and opened up the possibility for a transition in the future from a volunteer to a permanent army based on the universal military duty of Soviet citizens.
In the amendment on the tasks of the army, V. I. Lenin emphasized the high role of the soldiers of the new army. “Everyone who is ready to give his strength, his life to defend the conquered October Revolution and the power of the Soviets enters the Red Army,” the draft decree read. V. I. Lenin corrected: "... to defend the gains of the October Revolution, the power of the Soviets and socialism" 189 .
Thus, V. I. Lenin determined that the most important task of the Red Army is the defense of the socialist Fatherland. For this, a new army was created.
The democratization and demobilization of the old army were the conditions for the creation of the new armed forces of the Soviet Republic. It was an interconnected process that can only be understood in the unity of all its contradictions.
The complex process of liquidating the old army was at the same time the process of building the Red Army. The best elements of the old army - the revolutionary soldiers who went through the crucible of the struggle against the internal counter-revolution and the German interventionists, the command staff who went over to the side of the people and realized that Russia could be defended only under the banner of the Soviet Republic - formed the basis for the creation of the Armed Forces of the socialist revolution, the core which the Red Guard appeared. In the struggle for the democratization of the old army, such an important element of the new military apparatus began to take shape as the command staff, put forward by the mass of soldiers from their midst in place of officers alien to the people from the landowners and the bourgeoisie. It also became possible to use that part of the old officer corps that submitted to the will of the people and agreed to give their knowledge and experience to the service of the revolution. But above all, the Red Army needed a massive source of reinforcements. Such a source, along with the Red Guard, could be soldiers of the demobilized army. This possibility became apparent from the very beginning of the demobilization of the old army, but it manifested itself with particular force in the conditions of the struggle against internal and external counter-revolution.
The organizing revolutionary will of the working class, the Bolsheviks, the Soviet state overcame chaos, disorganization and anarchy. Under the leadership of Lenin, the Central Committee of the party, the Bolsheviks organized millions of soldiers and used democratization and demobilization to strengthen Soviet power. In the course of demobilization, the best elements from the soldiers and commanders stood out, who poured into the ranks of the young Red Army. The demobilized soldiers became the organizers of Soviet power throughout the vast territory of the republic. They raised the peasants to fight for the land against the kulaks and counter-revolutionaries.
It should be noted the close relationship between the main stages of demobilization and the stages of building the Red Army in the volunteer period. Thus, the initial stage of demobilization - from Lenin's decree of November 10 (23), 1917 on the gradual reduction in the size of the army to the All-Army Congress, which opened on December 15 - was at the same time the stage of deploying preparatory work to create the Red Army. The all-army congress on the demobilization of the army, under the leadership of the party and with the personal participation of Lenin, turned into a congress for working out the foundations for creating a new army.
The second stage of demobilization, which covered the period from the All-Army Congress to the start of the German offensive, was marked by an intensification of the struggle for the preservation of military property, equipment, weapons and ammunition in order to create a material base for organizing a new army.
The third stage - from the beginning of the German offensive to mid-April - was the end of demobilization and the end of the volunteer period in the construction of the Red Army. In the context of the rapid demobilization of more than 8 million soldiers, it was impossible to build a new army on any other basis than on a volunteer basis. About a month after the completion of demobilization, the Soviet state moved from the voluntary principle of manning the army to the general mobilization of workers and the poorest peasants.
fiEEnj Reasons for the formation of the Red Army:
1 J 1) The Decree on Peace of October 26 (November 8), 1917 declared the need for the withdrawal of Russian troops and led to the conclusion of the Brest peace treaty; 2)
start of the Civil War.
The first program for the formation of the army of the Soviet state assumed the absence of an army in the country of the Soviets, where eternal peace should be established. In the event of a threat from the enemies of the proletariat, it was assumed that the masses of the people would immediately mobilize according to their own revolutionary consciousness.
In December 1917, the complete demobilization of servicemen from the army began. An elective system of command of the Red Army was introduced (Decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the elective beginning and on the organization of power in the army" of December 16, 1917). At the same time, all military personnel were given equal rights and the ranks and ranks of military personnel were abolished. Soldiers' committees appeared to exercise control over military headquarters.
The decrees "On the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" and "On the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet" of 1918 confirmed the need to create a workers' and peasants' army.
The principle of the formation of the Red Army is voluntariness. Later, the Red Army began to be formed on the principle of appointment and unity of command.
Citizens could enter military service if they had recommendations from military committees, party and trade union organizations.
In the system of the Red Army of the Soviet state, mutual responsibility was established within the military units.
Workers and peasants could enter the Red Army, the army was a class one.
The situation changed in April 1918, when a decision was made on universal military service. The beginning of universal conscription was laid by the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee “On universal training in the art of war” of April 22, 1918. And in May 1918, the Decree “On forced recruitment into the worker-peasant Red Army” was adopted.
Red Army leadership system:
3 "military commissars (exercised control over the commanders of the Red Army and carried out their revolutionary agitation):
(YG revolutionary military council.
The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (Revolutionary Military Council) was formed in 1918. Its competence:
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