Military-industrial complex (MIC) - a set of research, testing organizations and manufacturing enterprises that carry out the development and production of military and special equipment, ammunition, ammunition, etc. mainly for state law enforcement agencies, as well as for export. http://en.wikipedia.org

The military-industrial complex has played and continues to play a backbone role in the economy as regions Russian Federation and Russia as a whole.

In May 1915 (g.), at the 9th Congress of Representatives, the idea of ​​​​creating military-industrial committees was first formulated. In July 1915, the 1st congress of the military-industrial complex took place. In August of the same year, a regulatory legal act was adopted that assigned the committees the functions of assisting government agencies in supplying the army and navy with the necessary equipment and allowances through the planned distribution of raw materials and orders, their timely execution and price fixing. The Central Military-Industrial Complex formed in its composition a number of sections for branches, the number of which increased all the time. Sections were created: mechanical, chemical, army supply, clothing, food, sanitary, inventions, automobile, aviation, transportation, coal, oil, peat and forestry, mobilization, large shells, machine tools, etc. http://ru. wikipedia.org

In the 1920s, the Soviet defense industry was characterized by the restoration of large-scale industry in the USSR. Having carried out the reform of the armed forces in 1923-1924, the Soviet government also developed and implemented the reform of the military industry. The main strategic reason for the need to create a permanent branch (organization) of military-industrial production in the USSR was that, without exception, all weapons and supplies for the army should be prepared within the Republic; all military production should be based exclusively on domestic raw materials.

Reporting in 1932 on the results of the defense preparation of industry in the 1st five-year plan, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR I.S. Unshlikht stated: "In the USSR, the military industry is a systematically organized industry that unites personnel military enterprises." Beskrovny L.G. The army and navy of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. Essays on the military-economic potential. http://rufort.info/library/simonov/simonov.html

During the 20-50s, the process of development of military-industrial production and the acquisition of military-industrial "cadre" and "reserve" factories went through several stages.

The first stage occupies the period from 1921 to 1930 and is characterized by the concentration of military-industrial production in separate groups of "personnel" military factories under the general supervision of one special management body under the single People's Commissariat of Industry - the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR.

The second stage occupies the period from 1930 to 1936 and is characterized by the concentration of "personnel" factories of the 1st group of military products and the dispersal of the rest (2nd and 3rd groups) in all related industries.

April 7 - May 3, 1930 military-industrial trusts and their Glavk (GUVP) were abolished. From the "personnel" factories of the 1st group of military products, the following were formed: the All-Union Association of Gun-Weapon-Machine-Gun Productions (Oruzhobedinenie), the All-Union Association of Cartridge-Tube and Explosive Production (Partubvzryv). Other factories capable of producing military products, such as shipbuilding, optical-mechanical, explosives and poisonous substances, passed or remained part of civilian trusts and departments.

In early January 1932, the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR was abolished. All military-industrial enterprises of the "cadre" and "reserve", on an equal footing, were transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR, its main departments and trusts, namely: aviation - to the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry (GUAP); shipbuilding - to the Main Directorate of the Shipbuilding Industry (GUSP); military chemical - to the Military Chemical Trust (Vokhimtrest), the All-Union Trust of Organic Production (VTOP) and the All-Union Trust of Artificial Fiber (VIV); weapons, machine-gun, bomb, shell, mine and torpedo - to the Main Military Mobilization Directorate; cartridge and cartridge cases - to the Cartridge and Case Trust; guns - to the Arsenal Trust; shell - to the shell trust; armored vehicles - in the Special Machine-Building Trust (Spetsmashtrest), optical-mechanical - in State association Optical-Mechanical Plants (GOMZ). As of April 5, 1934, the list of “personnel” factories of the “military industry” approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks includes 68 enterprises. They establish a special procedure for the reception of labor force.

The functions of the coordinator of the activities of military factories in the Narkomtyazhprom system were performed by its Main Military Mobilization Directorate (GVMU), divided in 1936 into the Main Board of the Military Industry and the Main Directorate of Ammunition.

The third stage covers the period from 1936 to 1941 and is characterized by the concentration of all "personnel" military factories and part of the "reserve" factories - at the beginning in the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry, and then in several military-industrial people's commissariats, specially created to accelerate the process of rearmament of the Army and Fleet.

The People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry was formed on December 8, 1936 by the Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. From the composition of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the new People's Commissariat included: 47 aircraft factories, 15 artillery factories, 3 weapons factories, 9 optical-mechanical factories, 10 tank factories, 9 cartridge case factories, 7 tube-explosive factories, 7 shell factories, 3 factories for the production of mine, torpedo and bomb weapons, 10 shipyards and shipyards, 23 military-chemical enterprises, 16 factories for the production of electrical appliances and radio devices, 8 precision engineering enterprises, 5 batteries and 3 metallurgical plants.

The fourth stage covers the period of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 and is characterized by the transformation of most of the machine-building national economic complex of the USSR into a military-industrial complex, with a division into special military-industrial sectors under the leadership of the relevant people's commissariats: weapons, ammunition and mine-mortar weapons, aviation, tank and shipbuilding industries. supreme body The State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR becomes the head of the activities of the entire state defense complex.

The fifth stage covers the period from 1946 to the end of the 1950s and is characterized by the modernization of the production of the so-called "general military equipment"and the emergence of new types of military products, united under the general name of" special military equipment "; these are systems of reactive and missile weapons and jet aircraft, samples of nuclear weapons and various radio-electronic systems of military equipment and military communications.

In 1946-1957, "personnel" military factories were concentrated in the ministries aviation industry, armaments (since 1954, the Ministry of Defense Industry), the shipbuilding industry and more or less evenly dispersed by special "bushes" in the civilian ministries: transport engineering, agricultural engineering, heavy engineering, auto-tractor industry - as the head enterprises of the partially mothballed military-industrial productions: ammunition, mine and mortar weapons, special vehicles and armored vehicles. Golovanov Ya. Korolev. Facts and myths. http://rufort.info

To organize work on the creation of rocket- nuclear weapons a Special Committee and three Main Directorates are created under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. To organize work on the creation of radar and electronic equipment, a Committee on Radar is created under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Functions of the coordinator of the activities of the ministries of "defense industries", the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the Ministry of State Security of the USSR in matters of drawing up a plan for orders for weapons and military equipment, organizing research work on defense topics, etc. carried out until 1952 by the Bureau for Military-Industrial and Military Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and then - the Commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on military-industrial issues.

In 1956, 220 “personnel” military factories were concentrated in the Minaviaprom system, 210 in the Ministry of Defense Industry, 135 in the Minsudprom system, and 216 in the Minradtechprom system. In addition to production functions, these ministries are intensively working to create new types of weapons and military equipment through the efforts of 270 experimental plants, design bureaus, research, special and design institutes.

In 1958, all research institutes, design bureaus, special design bureaus and design bureaus of the Soviet military-industrial complex, together with pilot plants, were transferred to the jurisdiction of the State Committees for aviation technology, defense technology, electronic technology and shipbuilding. The ministries of the military industry are disbanded, and the serial factories of the military-industrial "cadre" are transferred to the jurisdiction of the councils of ministers of the union republics and economic councils of economic regions.

Until the beginning of the 60s, the formation of the all-Union defense complex and its development were completed, aimed primarily at creating a nuclear missile shield of the country and means of delivering nuclear weapons, the 60s - early 80s - the powerful self-development of the Soviet military-industrial complex and its transformation in the dominant of the national economy of the country, the second half of the 80s - 90s - the gradual degradation of the military-industrial complex in connection with the collapse of the USSR and the first attempts of the military-industrial complex to fit into the new market socio-economic conditions. A. Losik, A. Mezentsev, P. Minaev, A. Shcherba. "Domestic military-industrial complex in the XX - early XXI century" / http://vpk-news.ru/articles/6102/ 2008

By the mid-1960s, there were nine basic defense-industrial ministries in the USSR, which, together with 10 related ministries under the leadership of the highest party bodies and the Military-Industrial Commission under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, formed the basis of the entire socio-economic system of the USSR.

In the late 1980s, defense complex enterprises produced 20-25% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), absorbing a huge part of material and human resources (military spending accounted for up to 60% of the country's budget). The best scientific and technical developments and personnel were concentrated in the defense industry: up to 3/4 of all research and development work (R&D) was carried out in the field of the defense industry. The enterprises of the defense complex produced most of the civilian products: 90% of televisions, refrigerators, radios, 50% of vacuum cleaners, motorcycles, electric stoves. About 1/3 of the country's population lived in the area where defense industry enterprises are located. All this, at the same time, led to an excessive inflation of the zone of "unproductive" expenditures on the development and creation of weapons, to the detriment of the sphere of consumption.

Since the early 1990s, the defense industry, together with Russian society, has entered a period of economic and political crisis. A sharp reduction in appropriations led to the degradation of defense enterprises, the leaching of qualified personnel into other areas of activity (business, going abroad, etc.). According to the estimates of the Ministry of Economy of Russia, in 1991-1995. 2.5 million workers left the defense industry. The military production of the defense industry decreased in 1997 compared with 1991 by almost 90%. Bystrova I.V. Domestic military-industrial complex in the XX century. / http://hist.msu.ru/Labs/Ecohist/OB8/bystrova.htm / 2002

Since 1999, Russia's military-industrial policy has changed in the direction of increasing the financing of the defense industry, consolidating and increasing the competitiveness of the export of arms and military equipment. On June 22, 1999, the Commission on Military Industrial Issues was established under the government of the Russian Federation to develop military-industrial policy. The management system was reorganized: 5 federal agencies of the defense industry were created (Russian Aviation and Space Agency, agencies for conventional weapons, for ammunition, for shipbuilding, for control systems).

Today, the military-industrial complex is being further formed in accordance with modern working conditions. At a meeting of the Government of the Russian Federation on January 20, 2011, a draft federal law “On Amendments to the Federal Laws “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)” and “On Enforcement Proceedings” in terms of improving the procedures used in bankruptcy cases of strategic organizations” was considered. http://www.vpk.ru/cgi-bin/uis/w4.cgi/CMS/Item/2540012

military industrial shelf rental

EXAMPLE LIST OF DOCUMENTS TO SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY-PATRIOTE CLUB (ASSOCIATION)

I. Approximate position on the military-patriotic club (association) at an educational institution.

1. General Provisions

Military-patriotic club (association), hereinafter VPK - a children's, youth public association created at an educational institution with the aim of developing and supporting children's initiative in studying the history of domestic military art, weapons and military costume, mastering military professions, preparing young people for military service .


This Regulation does not apply to children's and youth commercial, political associations, organizations, institutions.


The activities of the military-industrial complex are carried out in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws "On Public Associations", "On Military Duty and Military Service", "On State Support for Youth and Children's Public Associations", Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated May 16, 1996 No. 727 "On measures of state support for public associations working on the military-patriotic education of youth, by this Regulation, the Charter of the military-industrial complex and other regulatory legal acts.


2. Tasks of the military-industrial complex


The tasks of the military-industrial complex are:


2-1. Education among the youth of the district of love for the Motherland on the best traditions of serving the Fatherland.


2-2. Implementation of the state youth policy in the field of moral and patriotic education.


2-3. Preservation, enhancement of the glorious traditions of the Russian army.


1. Perpetuation of the memory of the fallen defenders of the Fatherland.
   

   Assistance in preparing young people for military service.
   

   Development of technical and military-applied sports.
   

   Formation of an active life position in adolescents.
   

Raising in students a sense of love for the state symbols of the Russian Federation, respect for military rituals, military uniform clothes.


3. The main activities of the military-industrial complex


The military-industrial complex carries out its activities under the leadership of the administration educational institution, and also interacts with organizations whose activities are aimed at spiritual and
moral, patriotic and physical development of youth.


The military-industrial complex determines the profile of its activities, plans work and draws up training programs.


The military-industrial complex participates in search expeditions; construction, maintenance of memorials and monuments of military glory and care for them.


Conducts information and publishing activities in the field of development of citizenship and patriotism of youth.


3.6. Provides patronage assistance to veterans of the Great Patriotic War, labor and law enforcement agencies; families of servicemen who died in the line of duty.
4. Logistics support for the activities of the military-industrial complex


4.1. The activities of the military-industrial complex are provided at the expense of:
4.1.1 Educational institution;


4.1.2. Received from membership fees, donations from sponsors, as well as other raised funds accumulated on the account of an educational institution.


4.2. The use of the military-industrial complex of the educational and material base of military
units, military educational institutions, as well as the transfer to the military-industrial complex
(on the balance sheet of OS) discontinued, written off and not used in
troops of military property, uniforms, equipment is carried out
in agreement with the command military units in accordance with applicable law.


4.3 The educational and material base of educational institutions, organizations that train young people for military service can be used by the military-industrial complex in the implementation of statutory tasks on a contractual basis in the prescribed manner


5. Support for the activities of the military-industrial complex


5 1. The district department of education, the Center for Patriotic and Civic Education provide comprehensive support to the activities of the military-industrial complex in the development of citizenship and patriotism of children and adolescents;


1. Develop regulatory legal acts to support the activities of the military-industrial complex.
   

   Organize and conduct educational and methodological meetings of the leaders of the military-industrial complex.
   

   They publish informational, educational and methodological materials, visual aids, produce videos about the activities of clubs for the spiritual, moral and civil-patriotic education of youth.
   

   They assist in the establishment of military-sponsored relations of the military-industrial complex with organizations, enterprises, creative, labor collectives.
   

   5.2. Military commissariats:
   

Inform pre-conscripts and persons dismissed from military service about the activities of the military-industrial complex.


They take into account the training profile of military-industrial complex students when determining the type and type of troops of the Armed Forces, as well as other
troops, military formations and bodies when they are called up for military service.


6. Management of the military-industrial complex


The management of the activities of the military-industrial complex is carried out in accordance with its own Charter, Regulations and current legislation.


Control over the work of military-patriotic clubs and accounting for their number is carried out by the Department of Education of the city of Moscow. The Center for Military-Patriotic and Civil Education of the Department of Education of the City of Moscow organizes a methodological
the work of the military-industrial complex, plans and conducts city patriotic events with military-patriotic clubs.


To coordinate the activities of the military-industrial complex, a military-industrial complex board of trustees can be created, which includes parents of pupils, leaders of the military-industrial complex, representatives of executive authorities, local self-government, the founding organization, military registration and enlistment offices, as well as other legal and individuals contributing to the development of citizenship and patriotism of youth.


7. Notes


7.1. Taking into account the specifics of educational institutions, the leaders of the military-industrial complex can develop documents on the activities of clubs
independently, based on this Regulation and the current legislation.


II. Exemplary Charter


military-patriotic club (association)


1. General Provisions


A military-patriotic club (association) (hereinafter referred to as the military-industrial complex) is opened on the basis of an educational institution (or other organization) at the initiative of the teaching staff with the permission of the higher leadership.


2. The main goals and objectives of the club:


- upbringing in the spirit of devotion to the Fatherland;


- the formation of civil-patriotic views and an active life position, activities for the benefit of society;


- intellectual, cultural and moral development of pupils, improvement of their moral and psychological state and adaptation to life in society, development of a sense of collectivism; positive attitude towards a healthy lifestyle, physical development the younger generation;

feelings of fidelity to constitutional and military duty, discipline, a conscientious attitude to study, one's duties and the desire to achieve the task;


preparation for serving the Fatherland in the civil and military fields.


3. Organization of the educational process


The educational process should be carried out on the basis of curricula for various types of activities, taking into account methodological requirements that reveal the technology for conducting theoretical and practical disciplines (Law of the Russian Federation "On Education"). Club teachers should be guided in their work by notes and lesson plans for various types of classes.


The academic year in the military-industrial complex begins in September and ends in May.


To implement the main goals and objectives of the educational and educational process, the leadership of the military-industrial complex uses a variety of forms and methods of work:


• classes in military applied and technical types sports;
  

classes in history, regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, drill training, humanitarian and civil law, basic medical training, the study of the heroic and cultural past of the Fatherland;


organizes and conducts competitions in military applied sports, rallies, sports days, military sports games;

- takes part in district, district and city events of a patriotic orientation (participation in actions dedicated to the days of Russia's military glory, meetings with representatives of veteran organizations, with soldiers Russian army, organizes trips to places of military glory, participates in the restoration and protection of monuments of architecture, history and military glory of Russia, etc.).

4. Pupils of the military-patriotic club (association).

Their rights and obligations.

Pupils of this voluntary social and patriotic organization can be children and youth from 10-11 years old until graduation from an educational institution, recognizing the Charter of the club (association) and actively implementing its program. Religion, nationality and gender do not matter.

A pupil of the military-patriotic club (association) is OBLIGED:

to be a patriot of our Motherland;

comply with the requirements of this Charter, comply with the decisions of the leaders of the club (association);


show initiative and actively participate in all military-industrial complex activities;


observe ethical norms and rules of social behavior (do not drink alcohol, do not smoke, do not use foul language, be neat);


be an active participant in public life at the place of study and residence;


take care of the material and technical base of the military-industrial complex (take care of the premises and sports grounds of the club, clothing, sports equipment, etc.).


III. Approximate passport


military-patriotic club (association)


(full name of the club, association)

Location, direction of activity (goals and objectives) -


Creation date, org., founder.


Full address (with zip code) of the association, telephones, fax.


Head (full name, position, teaching experience).

5 Number of pupils:

Total

Of them:

Boys 11 -14 years old

Girls 11 -14 years old

Boys 15-17 years old _____________________

Girls 15-17 years old

6. Number of instructors, teachers

Total

Including:

full-time

on a voluntary basis

Documents regulating the activities of the association (regulations, charter, programs in various areas of upbringing and educational activities, etc., the time of their creation.


Management body of the association (among pupils and among organizers-teachers).


Cooperation with other public (including veterans) organizations.


10. Characteristics of the educational and material base (basic classes
educational institution, other premises allocated for temporary use; playgrounds, sports equipment, pneumatic weapons (number of copies), equipment for hand-to-hand combat, camping equipment, etc.).


11. Symbolism of the association (motto, emblem, text of solemn promise, oaths, anthem, etc.).


12. Additional information.


IV. Sample programs, plans, lesson plans


in various areas of activity


military patriotic club


(associations)


They are developed independently, taking into account the direction of the association's activities.

Historical prerequisites for the formation of the military-industrial complex in Russia

The military-industrial complex in the USSR actually appeared from the beginning of industrialization. But we can assume that industrialization primarily solved the problems of creating the military-industrial complex. Therefore, Stalin had no time to wait for the passage of the natural phases of primitive accumulation, and contrary to economic laws, he began the construction of industry from its lowest floors. In addition, the production of weapons is always subject to requirements that are significantly different from the production of civilian products.

Weapons must be highly reliable, ergonomic, and training in their use does not imply a very high educational level of soldiers. The high quality of labor in the military-industrial complex has always been encouraged and supported by high wages and an incomparably higher level of social services.

According to available estimates, at the end of the era of perestroika, defense products were produced in the USSR at almost two thousand enterprises that employed 5 million people (this is 1/4 of those employed at that time in industry), including about 1 million people were scientific frames. If family members are taken into account, then 12-15 million inhabitants of the country were directly connected with the military-industrial complex.

The cost of maintaining the army (which is a sector of the non-productive sphere) and the military-industrial complex has always fallen on the shoulders of the country's population and significantly reduced its standard of living. At the same time, weapons were developed and produced not necessarily for the purposes of their direct use in hostilities.

Mankind has come up with enough words to justify the production of weapons. Perhaps the most familiar of all these concepts - Vis pacem, para bellum ("If you want peace, prepare for war") - has been known for several thousand years, that is, weapons most often act as a deterrent. And this, in general, is not denied by anyone.

The military doctrine is the methodological basis for developing the military-industrial complex and determining the volumes and types of necessary weapons. This is a document developed and updated by every state that has not declared itself neutral. Based on an analysis of the geopolitical and international situation, it defines potential adversaries and allies, goals and objectives of defense, as well as methods and means for solving these problems.

The military-industrial complex is always focused on the production of the maximum possible number of weapons. In this regard, the USSR began to come to grips with the production and accumulation of armored vehicles, tactical aviation, and artillery systems: sometimes more than all of its potential opponents put together. In part, this can be explained by the specifics of the proposed theater of operations, as well as overestimation of the effectiveness of certain types of weapons. So, for example, after the Second World War, the tank was considered the main and most important tool for solving tactical problems in the land theater of operations.

But the Arab-Israeli wars and other local conflicts of recent years have clearly shown that this is not entirely true.

Weapons development is a very effective engine of scientific and technological progress.

Now people are actively using such advanced aircraft, ships, cars, tractors, means of communication and computer technology, precisely because at one time military specialists paid attention to their pitiful and clumsy prototypes.

Definition and sectoral structure of the military-industrial complex. Now let's try to define the military-industrial complex. The military-industrial complex is a set of enterprises and organizations of various sectors of the economy, primarily industry, science and technology, providing the country's armed forces with the necessary weapons, ammunition, equipment and uniforms, as well as selling and exporting these weapons, military equipment and other products. In a broad sense, the military-industrial complex also includes the leadership of the armed forces and the part of the state-administrative apparatus and socio-political forces associated with them.

The military-industrial complex includes: research organizations, design bureaus (design bureaus), testing laboratories and test sites, NGOs (scientific and production associations) and manufacturing enterprises, organizations involved in the sale of products. The military-industrial complex concentrates the production of complex products, including civilian ones. This is facilitated by the high technical level of most military-industrial complex enterprises. The best equipment and highly qualified personnel are concentrated here. The military-industrial complex in our country has a huge scale, the reason for this was the cold war that our country has waged with the United States since 1949, and the arms race directly related to it. The sectoral structure of the Russian military-industrial complex is a rather complex and diverse phenomenon. It is usually considered in the following form.

• 1. Nuclear weapons complex:
  • - mining of uranium ore;
  • - production of uranium concentrate;
  • - production of TVELs (fuel elements);
  • - production of weapons-grade plutonium;
  • - assembly of nuclear warheads;
  • - Disposal and disposal of nuclear waste.
• 2. Aviation industry:
  • - production of aircraft;
  • - production of helicopters;
  • - production of aircraft engines.
• 3. Rocket and space industry:
  • - production of ballistic missiles;
  • - production of intercontinental missiles;
  • - production of cruise missiles;
  • - production of anti-aircraft missile systems;
  • - production of spacecraft;
  • - production of rocket engines;
  • - production of equipment for space technology.
• 4. Production of artillery and small arms:
  • - production of small arms;
  • - production of artillery systems.
• 5. Armored industry:
  • - production of tanks;
  • - production of armored personnel carriers (APCs);
  • - production of infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and airborne combat vehicles (BMDs).
• 6. Military shipbuilding:
  • - production of surface ships;
  • - production of nuclear and diesel submarines.
• 7. Radio electronics and instrumentation.

Geography of the military-industrial complex. By the time the Russian Federation left the Soviet Union on its territory there was practically not a single region and not a single large city where one or another link of the military-industrial complex would not be represented. And yet, in the first approximation, it is possible to identify the main features of the domestic geography of this complex. Research, design, experimental and upper, in technical terms the most complex and in many ways science-intensive, requiring highly qualified personnel for the production of the military-industrial complex, have a pronounced concentration in the largest millionaire cities and their satellites. First of all, in this regard, Moscow stands out with its immediate environment, as well as St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk. Another specific feature for the Soviet Union and Russia, as the main heir in the field of the military-industrial complex, is the location of its facilities in the so-called closed cities, which for a long time were listed under numbers and only in recent years received official titles. In such cities, it was easier to provide the necessary secrecy regime, as well as to organize a higher level of social services for the population than the national average. A great influence on the deployment of all parts of the military-industrial complex had geographical features terrain, strategic and many other factors, a set of which is specific to each branch of the complex.

So, for example, the location of military shipbuilding and the construction of seaplanes is due to the presence of certain water areas (St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Severodvinsk, Taganrog). They tried to hide the production of nuclear weapons as far inland as possible (Zelenogorsk, Seversk, Angarsk, Zheleznogorsk). However, the construction of a military shipyard in Komsomolsk-on-Amur pursued approximately the same goal, but adjusted by time and the situation - finding the enterprise outside the range of Japanese bomber aircraft. The placement of shipbuilding in St. Petersburg is traditionally due to the concentration of significant scientific potential there. And the construction of nuclear submarines in Severodvinsk simplifies their transfer to the most important - the North Sea - theater of operations. The placement of production, which is directly related to artillery in the Urals, and small arms - in Tula, is associated with traditions and vast experience accumulated there. Of the two cosmodromes now available in Russia, one is located in Plesetsk (now the city of Mirny in a sparsely populated area of ​​the Arkhangelsk region). The clandestine nuclear test site on the territory of the practically uninhabited northern island of Novaya Zemlya is located at a great distance from the nearest settlements. The greatest territorial concentration of institutions and industries of the military-industrial complex is observed in the Central Economic Region, where Moscow is in the lead with its nearest satellite cities, the Volga, Ural and Volga-Vyatka economic regions. According to the degree of development of the military-industrial complex, these areas stand out on a global scale. So, for example, in the mid-1980s, the Volga region and the Urals were among the four regions - leaders in the world aerospace industry (the other two regions were in the United States - California and Texas). Outside these four economic regions, St. Petersburg, Omsk, Upper Priobye, Krasnoyarsk with the nearest satellite cities and the Pribaikalsky region stand out in terms of the concentration of military-industrial complex enterprises.

Characteristics of individual branches of the military-industrial complex. Almost immediately after the start of perestroika, the need for conversion was announced, which refers to the transfer of part of military production to the production of civilian products. It is difficult to disagree with this, since the economy of a country that is in a deep and protracted crisis is unrealistic to maintain the same pace and volume of weapons production. Although the purely military aspect of the decision is not indisputable, since our former potential adversaries are not at all in a hurry to take reciprocal steps towards disarmament and reducing the military presence near the borders of Russia. As the past years have shown, solving the problems of conversion in such a directive way familiar to the government does not lead to anything other than the collapse of production and the loss of highly qualified personnel. Perhaps conversion is a long and painful journey in which economic factors and levers must play a dominant role. Moreover, the conversion paths may not be direct at all, but rather unexpected and unconventional. The conversion also implies the preservation of the production of the most effective types of weapons, and the transition to the production of so-called high-precision types of weapons. It is necessary to develop and produce such weapons and systems that are in demand on the world market. It would be unjustified to lose positions in the development and production of such types of weapons, where Russia is considered a recognized leader. According to Western estimates, the world military-industrial complex produces 31 classes of weapons, among which our country is the leader in five types: chemical and bacteriological weapon, ballistic missiles, ground-to-air missiles and anti-satellites.

Aviation industry. This branch of the military-industrial complex is located mainly in large industrial centers, where finished products are assembled from parts and assemblies supplied by hundreds of related manufacturers. Factors in the location of aviation industry enterprises are the convenience of transport routes and the availability of skilled labor. The design of almost all types of aircraft and helicopters is carried out by design bureaus in Moscow and the Moscow region. The only exception is the design bureau. Beriev in Taganrog, engaged in the development and production of amphibious aircraft. Moscow is undoubtedly the largest research and production center of the aviation industry. The leading design bureaus of the country are located here: Yak, Il, Tu, Su, Mig, Mi, KA, etc.

In the suburbs of Moscow, components and assemblies for aircraft and helicopters are produced. In the aviation industry for this moment more than 335 enterprises and organizations operate.

In addition to the developed and produced civil aircraft and helicopters, a whole range of combat vehicles has been created - MiG-29, MiG-31, Su-27, Su-37, KA-50, KA-52, etc.

The largest centers of the aviation industry are: Moscow (Il-96-300, Il-114, Tu-204, Tu-334, Yak-42M), Smolensk (Yak-42), Voronezh (Il-86, Il-96-300) , Taganrog (Tu-334), Kazan (Il-62), Ulyanovsk (Tu-204, An-124), Samara (Tu-154, An-70), Saratov (Yak-42), Omsk (An-74) , Novosibirsk (An-38). There are factories for the production of military aircraft in Moscow (Mig), Nizhny Novgorod (Mig), Irkutsk (Su), Ulan-Ude (Su), Arseniev, Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Helicopters are produced in Lyubertsy, Kazan, Kumertau, Ulan-Ude, Rostov-on-Don, Moscow, Arsenyev. Large aircraft engine factories have also been set up in St. Petersburg, Rybinsk, Rostov-on-Don, Perm, Ufa, Omsk, Tyumen and other cities.

Rocket and space industry. This is the most science-intensive and technically complex branch of the military-industrial complex. Research institutes and design bureaus of this branch of the military-industrial complex are concentrated mainly in Moscow and the Moscow region. This is due to the presence of a highly skilled workforce in the area, as well as a long tradition in the production of precision and knowledge-intensive products. It develops intercontinental ballistic missiles (Moscow and Reutov), ​​rocket engines (Khimki and Korolev), cruise missiles(Dubna and Reutov), ​​anti-aircraft missiles (Khimki).

The production of these products is scattered throughout almost the entire territory of Russia. At present, a powerful Energia corporation is operating in the city of Korolev near Moscow, which specializes in the creation of satellites (artificial earth satellites, spacecraft). Research and production associations "Energomash" and them. Lavochkin. Khimki and Korolev produce rocket engines for most space systems. In the small town of Reutov near Moscow, carrier rockets and artificial Earth satellites were created. In Moscow, in the research and production association named after.

Khrunichev, ballistic missiles and long-term orbital stations "Mir" were created, and now elements of the international space station "Alpha" are being created. The Moscow region also hosts a number of industries serving the rocket and space industry, that is, producing the necessary components and equipment for the needs of this branch of the military-industrial complex. Production enterprises of the rocket and space industry are located in accordance with the principles of security and duplication, that is, in regions of the country remote from state borders. In particular, factories for the production of ballistic missiles are operating in the Urals (Votkinsk, Zlatoust) and in Siberia (Omsk, Krasnoyarsk). Launch vehicles are produced in Samara, Omsk, Moscow and other cities. Votkinsk and Krasnoyarsk specialize in the production of ballistic missiles for submarines. There is also a large-scale production of rocket technology in St. Petersburg, Primorsk and Kaliningrad.

The main military cosmodrome of Russia Plesetsk is located in the Arkhangelsk region near the town of Mirny. All unmanned space vehicles, as well as military artificial Earth satellites, launch from it. It should also be noted that our country continues to lease the Baikonur cosmodrome from Kazakhstan to launch space rockets with cosmonauts on board. In addition to the test sites mentioned above, there is also the Kapustin Yar test site in the Astrakhan region, where missiles and military equipment are tested. In 1997 in Amur region The Svobodny Cosmodrome was created. To control the military space forces of the Russian Federation, an unmanned flight control center was created (Krasnoznamensk, formerly Golitsino-2). Mission Control Center (MCC) is located in Korolev. Near it there is a center for the training of cosmonauts - the town of Zvezdny.

Manufacture of artillery and small arms. The most famous and widespread type of small arms - the Kalashnikov assault rifle, which is used today in more than 60 countries of the world, is even depicted on the coats of arms and flags of some African states. The production of artillery and small arms historically arose in large areas and developed centers of metallurgy (Tula, Kovrov, Izhevsk, etc.). Small arms and their main parts are developed and produced in Moscow and a number of cities near Moscow (Roshal, Krasnoarmeysk, Krasnozavodsk, etc.). The scientific center for the development of small arms is located in the small town of Klimovsk near Moscow. Artillery systems are produced mainly in the Urals. Yekaterinburg is the most major center artillery and weapons industry and specializes in the production of self-propelled guns, anti-aircraft missile systems, field and tank guns, howitzers, self-propelled mortars. Another Ural city, Perm, is known for the production of self-propelled versions of guns, rockets, systems salvo fire"Smerch", "Hurricane". Izhevsk produces anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. It should be noted that Izhevsk is more famous for the products of its arms industry. The small Udmurt city of Votkinsk is the main center for the production of strategic and tactical missiles. The Bashkir city of Sterlitamak is the main center for the production of self-propelled howitzers on chassis. Outside the Urals, there are large-scale production facilities in Nizhny Novgorod (guns for infantry fighting vehicles, combat towers for air defense systems, artillery guns, etc.), St. Petersburg (self-propelled guns), Murom (machine gun turrets). The town of Fryazino near Moscow specializes in the production of equipment for air defense systems.

armored industry. Initially, tanks of the Tu-54/55 models were produced in the country, then T-62, T-64. In addition to tanks, self-propelled guns and tractors, the production of armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, etc. was mastered. Now Russian tank factories are in a deep crisis. The factories of Chelyabinsk and St. Petersburg have been redesigned and no longer produce tanks. There are only two tank factories left in Russia - in Omsk and Nizhny Tagil. At the same time, a relatively stable situation is observed at the only plant in the country so far, located in Kurgan, which produces combat vehicles infantry type BMP. This is due to the export deliveries of this type of product.

The plans of Russian tank factories (in particular, Omsk) include a transition to the production of the T-90 based on the T-72S and T-80U.

A large-scale production of armored personnel carriers (APCs) has been created in Arzamas. The production of armored banking vehicles and floating armored vehicles has also been mastered. In a number of cities in Central Russia and the Ural-Volga region, various types of production of armored vehicles have been created.

In Murom, engineering reconnaissance and cash-in-transit vehicles are produced on the chassis of airborne combat reconnaissance vehicles (BRMD). This plant also armors passenger cars. Saratov produces a self-propelled anti-aircraft missile system(SAM) "Strela", and in Volsk, Saratov region - anti-tank self-propelled missile system "Shturm". Volgograd specializes in the production of airborne combat vehicles BMD-3. In Yekaterinburg, the production of the self-propelled reconnaissance complex of the Zoo Department, self-propelled guns, mortars, howitzers and cannons, etc. has been launched.

Military shipbuilding. Military shipbuilding ensures the stable operation of the construction complex, aimed at the production of all types of warships. Most factories sought to be located in the center of the country, in conditions of increased security.

The release of submarines for the Navy (Navy) has practically ceased. Only warship factories are operating in St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad. Of the 5 centers of nuclear submarine shipbuilding (Kaliningrad, Nizhny Novgorod, St. Petersburg, Severodvinsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur), production has been preserved only in Severodvinsk. Most of the military shipbuilding enterprises are located in St. Petersburg (6 factories) and its suburbs. Let us now consider the geography of production for certain types of military vessels. Hovercraft are produced in the village of Nikolsky, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Sosnovka, repair, modernization and disposal of nuclear submarines are carried out in Murmansk, the city of Bolshoi Kamen, Severodvinsk, patrol boats are produced in Rybinsk, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, St. Petersburg, patrol and missile boats - in Rybinsk, Zelenodolsk, Perm, Vladivostok, St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, diesel submarines are produced today only in Nizhny Novgorod, enterprises in Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, Rybinsk, Nizhny Novgorod specialize in the production of landing ships, hydrofoils, ship guns , nuclear ship reactors are produced only in Nizhny Novgorod, the main facilities for the production of warships are concentrated in Zelenodolsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur and some other centers.

Thus, despite the seemingly wide geography of military shipbuilding, its production is concentrated in several of the largest centers of the country. These, in particular, include St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Severodvinsk, Kaliningrad (these 4 centers account for the lion's share of military ships produced in Russia), Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Rybinsk, Zelenodolsk and some others.

The Russian military shipbuilding industry is characterized by a high level of monopolization of production, deep specialization of individual enterprises and centers in the production of certain products, and a systemic economic crisis that has engulfed the economy of the entire country. Of all the sectors and industries of the military-industrial complex, the economic crisis manifested itself most acutely at military shipbuilding enterprises.

Geography of the nuclear-industrial complex of Russia. The nuclear industry of Russia was established in April 1943. The nuclear industry complex consists of 2 groups of industries - nuclear power and nuclear weapons complex. We have already talked about nuclear energy before. We only note that in addition to production, there are also research reactors. They are located, as a rule, in large scientific centers and closed cities. These are Moscow and the Moscow region, Obninsk, Sarov, Chelyabinsk region, Dimitrovgrad, St. Petersburg, Leningrad region, Tomsk, Yekaterinburg, Ufa, Belgorod, Norilsk.

It is known about the existence of 11 reactors in Moscow and 9 in the Moscow region (2 in Dubna, 5 in Lytkarino, 2 in Sergiev Posad). Obninsk is a large research and scientific center for nuclear power, where there are 4 reactors. There are also reactors at the Research Institute of Nuclear Physics in Gatchina. Here the most powerful in Eastern Europe research reactor.

9 reactors are located near the city of Dimitrovgrad, where the Research Institute of Nuclear Reactors is located. The following cities are major research nuclear centers: Sosnovy Bor, St. Petersburg, Dubna, Protvino, Moscow, Obninsk, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Troitsk, Dimitrovgrad, Nizhny Novgorod, Gatchina, Norilsk, Podolsk, etc.

A feature of the military-industrial complex is the location of many of its enterprises in closed cities, which could not be found on any geographical map. They arose in the 1950s and 1960s, in the Russian outback, beyond the reach of foreign intelligence. In total, there are 10 closed cities in Russia. Together they make up the so-called Minatom Archipelago.

About 800 thousand people live in such cities, called nuclear ones. Closed cities are located in Siberia and the Ural-Volga region. The main task of nuclear cities is to create a nuclear shield for the country and equip the Russian Armed Forces with it. Closed cities were created as elite settlements. They had a high level of housing provision and developed social infrastructure. This made it possible to concentrate here the best specialists of the country. But now the volume of military orders has dropped sharply. These cities began to lose their former positions, scientific potential and became noticeably poorer. Sometimes auxiliary or related productions arise around the main activity. So, in Novouralsk, a branch of ZIL appeared - an automobile plant. In Zheleznogorsk, the production association "Sibvolokno" appeared, and in Zelenogorsk - the production of space technology.

Thus, Minatom's cities are making the transition from narrow specialization to multifunctionality. The leading role among them belongs to the federal nuclear centers - Sarov and Snezhinsk. Three components of strategic weapons are associated with nuclear weapons: the Rocket Forces (RV), the Navy (Navy), and the Air Force (Air Force). Heavy strategic bombers and missile carriers with cruise nuclear missiles are based in Mozdok and Engels. There are about 80 of them in Russia. There are about 6900 nuclear charges in the country. Most of them are located in Tatishchevo (720), Kostroma (120), Mozdok (316), Dombarovsky (560), Kartaly (460), Aleysk (300), Rybachye (500), Ukrainka (444), Uzhur (520), Nerpichy (1200), Yagelnaya (704 Yab), Kozelsk (360), Krasnoyarsk (120). Sea-based strategic nuclear forces are part of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. At present, the following tasks are being solved in Russia: the elimination of Russian nuclear weapons, the dismantling of nuclear warheads, the production of new warheads for SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Warheads are being dismantled by 4 Russian enterprises (Zarechny, Sarov, Trekhgorny, Novouralsk).

Nuclear materials are returned to Novouralsk (highly enriched uranium) and Seversk (plutonium and highly enriched uranium).

In connection with the dismantling of warheads, plans are underway to create warehouses in the Urals (Production Association "Mayak") and in Siberia (near Tomsk) to store more than 100 tons of weapons-grade plutonium.

Uranium industry in Russia. military weapons defense

This group of industries includes uranium mining and enrichment, as well as uranium metallurgy. Extraction and enrichment of uranium is usually carried out at uranium mines and mining and chemical plants. In Russia, this is the Krasnokamensky uranium mine (Chita region). The Priargunsky and Zabaikalsky (Pervomaisky village) mining and chemical plants producing uranium concentrate are also located there.

Earlier, in the 60s. of the twentieth century, the extraction and enrichment of uranium ore were carried out at the Lermontov mine and the Almaz production company located there. But a little later, with the wide involvement in the use of the resort resources of this territory (and this is the territory of the famous resort area of ​​​​Caucasus Mineralnye Vody), all work related to the extraction and enrichment of uranium was curtailed.

Large deposits of uranium and thorium ore were also discovered near the cities of Vikhorevka in the Irkutsk Region (Vikhorevskoye deposit), Slyudyanka (deposit of uranium and rare earth elements), Lovozero (uranium and thorium minerals), Lake Onega region (uranium and vanadium minerals), Vishnevogorsk, Novogorny (uranium mineralization). Uranium metallurgy has become widespread in only 3 cities of Russia: Elektrostal (PO "Machine-building Plant"), Novosibirsk (PO "Chemical Concentrates Plant"), Glazov (PO "Chepetsky Mechanical Plant").

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Novosibirsk 2011

Introduction3

Chapter 1. Concepts and structure of the military-industrial complex

1.1 Definition of VPK

1.2 Structure of the military-industrial complex

1.3 Branches of the military-industrial complex

Chapter 2. Development, problems and factors affecting the state of the military-industrial complex

2.1 The position of the military-industrial complex of Russia in recent years

2.2 Problems of the Russian military-industrial complex

2.3 Factors that contributed to the emergence of problems in the military-industrial complex

2.4. Defense complex of the Novosibirsk region

Chapter 3. Forecasts and ways to solve the problems of the military-industrial complex

3.1 Tasks and ways of modernization of the military-industrial complex

3.2 Medium-term trends in the development of the military-industrial complex

3.3 General disarmament

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

military industrial russia

The topic "Military-industrial complex of Russia" is very relevant, since the military-industrial complex is a special component of the Russian economy, which has a pronounced impact on the development of the country's industry, includes government controlled and authorities, industrial enterprises and scientific organizations engaged in defense research and the creation of weapons and military equipment.

In preparing this work, we studied and analyzed various sources: scientific articles, educational literature, Internet resources.

The military-industrial complex (MIC) is the leading link in the life support system of the armed organization of the state (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops and military formations). It is a complex structure consisting of many industries located throughout the geographical space of Russia. The military-industrial complex of Russia has gone through a complex history of the formation of its structure and composition in different periods.

The purpose of our work was an attempt to study in detail the military-industrial complex, the pace of its development, the factors affecting it, the problems associated with it, and possible ways their decisions. To achieve this, we have set ourselves the following tasks:

1. analyze sources of information on the issue of the military-industrial complex;

2. to reveal the concepts, types, structure of the military industry in Russia;

3. study the history and prospects for the development of the military-industrial complex;

4. give complete description problems of the military-industrial complex.

5. analyze ways to solve the problems of the military-industrial complex

Chapter 1. Concepts and structure of the military-industrial complex

1.1 Definition of VPK

The military-industrial complex (MIC) is a set of research, testing organizations and manufacturing enterprises that develop, manufacture, store, put into service military and special equipment, ammunition, ammunition, etc., mainly for state law enforcement agencies, and also for export. This is a powerful system of enterprises producing military equipment, weapons and ammunition. Also, the military-industrial complex is a segment of the industrial sector of the economy that consumes the military budget.

At the moment, the term military-industrial complex is officially used in Russia. The terms "military industry" and "defense industry" are also used as synonyms for the military-industrial complex.

The American political and military leader D. D. Eisenhower argued that the military-industrial complex is an alliance of the military industry, the army and related parts of the state apparatus and science. And the scale of the military-industrial complex and the measure of its influence on the external and internal politics is an expression of the militarization of a certain country.

1.2 The structure of the military-industrial complex

The VPK includes:

Research organizations (their task is theoretical developments);

Design bureaus (KB) that create prototypes (prototypes) of weapons;

Test laboratories and ranges, where, firstly, the “finishing” of prototypes in real conditions takes place, and secondly, the testing of weapons that have just left the factory walls;

Production enterprises where mass production of weapons is carried out.

But in addition to military products, military-industrial complex enterprises produce civilian products. Most of the refrigerators, tape recorders, computers, vacuum cleaners and washing machines in Russia were produced at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex. And televisions, video recorders, cameras and sewing machines were produced only in military factories.

Thus, the military-industrial complex concentrates the production of more complex products. This was facilitated by the high technical level of most military-industrial complex enterprises. This was the sector of the national economy in which production was at the level of the best world standards, and in many cases even exceeded it.

The military-industrial complex concentrated the most qualified and initiative personnel, the best technique and skillful organizers of production. Its scope was enormous. At the end of the 80s. about 4.5 million people were employed at 1800 enterprises of the military-industrial complex of Russia, including 800 thousand in the field of science. This accounted for about a quarter of those employed in industry. Including family members, 12-15 million people were directly connected with him, that is, every tenth inhabitant of Russia.

The cost of maintaining the army and the military-industrial complex lay on the entire population of the country, lowering its standard of living. The defense industry was dominated by the conviction that the most important thing was to produce as many products as possible.

A feature of the military-industrial complex is the location of many of its enterprises in "closed" cities, which until recently were not mentioned anywhere, they were not even put on geographical maps. Only recently they received real names, and before that they were designated by numbers (for example, Chelyabinsk-70).

1.3 Branches of the military-industrial complex

The military-industrial complex consists of several main branches:

Nuclear weapons production

Aviation industry

Rocket and space industry

Small arms production

Production of artillery systems

Military shipbuilding

armored industry.

The nuclear weapons complex is part of the Russian nuclear industry. It includes the following productions:

Extraction of uranium ore and production of uranium concentrate. In Russia, only one uranium mine is currently operating in Krasnokamensk (Chita region). It also produces uranium concentrate.

Uranium enrichment (separation of uranium isotopes) takes place in the cities of Novouralsk (Svedlovsk-44), Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45), Seversk (Tomsk-7) and Angarsk. 45% of the world's uranium enrichment capacities are concentrated in Russia. With a reduction in production nuclear weapons these industries are increasingly export-oriented. The products of these enterprises are used both for civilian nuclear power plants and for the production of nuclear weapons and for industrial reactors for the production of plutonium.

The manufacture of fuel elements (TVELs) for nuclear reactors is carried out in Elektrostal and Novosibirsk.

Production and separation of weapons-grade plutonium is now carried out in Seversk (Tomsk-7) and Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26). Russia's plutonium reserves have been accumulated for many years to come, but the nuclear reactors in these cities do not stop, as they provide them with heat and electricity. Previously, Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65) was a major center for the production of plutonium, where in 1957, due to a failure in the cooling system, one of the tanks in which liquid production waste was stored exploded. As a result, an area of ​​23,000 km was contaminated with radioactive waste.

The assembly of nuclear weapons took place in Sarov (Arzamas-16), Zarechny (Penza-19), Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45) and Trekhgorny (Zlatoust-16). The development of prototypes was carried out in Sarov and Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70). The first atomic and hydrogen bombs were developed in Sarov, where the Russian Federal Nuclear Center is now located.

Disposal of nuclear waste is one of the most difficult environmental problems today. The main center is Snezhinsk, where waste is processed and buried in rocks.

The aviation industry is located, as a rule, in large industrial centers, where finished products are assembled at head enterprises from parts and assemblies supplied by hundreds (and sometimes thousands) of subcontractors. The main factors in the location of industrial enterprises are the convenience of transport links and the availability of skilled labor. And the design of almost all types Russian aircraft carried out by the Design Bureau of Moscow and the Moscow Region. The only exception is the Beriev Design Bureau in Taganrog, where amphibious aircraft are manufactured.

The rocket and space industry is one of the most science-intensive and technically complex industries. For example, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) contains up to 300 thousand systems, subsystems, individual devices and parts, and a large space complex - up to 10 million. Therefore, there are much more scientists, designers and engineers in this field than workers.

Research and design organizations of the industry are concentrated to a large extent in the Moscow region. ICBMs (in Moscow and Reutov), ​​rocket engines (in Khimki and Korolev), cruise missiles (in Dubna and Reutov), ​​anti-aircraft missiles (in Khimki) are being developed here.

And the production of these products is scattered almost throughout Russia. ICBMs are produced in Votkinsk (Udmurtia), ballistic missiles for submarines - in Zlatoust and Krasnoyarsk. Launch vehicles for launching spacecraft are produced in Moscow, Samara and Omsk. Spacecraft are manufactured in the same place, as well as in St. Petersburg, Istra, Khimki, Korolev, Zheleznogorsk.

The main cosmodrome of the former USSR was Baikonur (in Kazakhstan), and in Russia now the only operating cosmodrome is in the city of Mirny, Arkhangelsk region (near Plesetsk station). Anti-aircraft missile systems are being tested at the Kapustin Yar test site in the Astrakhan region.

The control of the military space forces and all unmanned space vehicles is carried out from the city of Krasnoznamensk (Golitsyno-2), and manned ones - from the mission control center (MCC) in the city of Korolev, Moscow Region.

Artillery and small arms is a very important branch of the military-industrial complex. The most famous and mass-produced type of small arms produced is the Kalashnikov assault rifle, which is used in at least 55 countries (and in some it is even depicted on state emblem). The main centers for the production of small arms are Tula, Kovrov, Izhevsk, Vyatskiye Polyany (Kirov region), and the leading scientific center is located in Klimovsk (Moscow region). Artillery systems are produced mainly in Yekaterinburg, Perm, Nizhny Novgorod.

The armored industry was one of the most developed branches of the military-industrial complex. Over the past period, 100 thousand tanks have been produced at the factories of the former USSR. Now a significant part of them is subject to destruction under the treaty on the limitation of arms in Europe. Of the four Russian plants, tanks are now produced only at two - in Nizhny Tagil and Omsk, while the plants in St. Petersburg and Chelyabinsk are being redesigned. Armored personnel carriers (APCs) are produced in Arzamas, and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) - in Kurgan.

It is difficult to separate military shipbuilding from civil shipbuilding, since until recently the majority of Russian shipyards worked for defense. The largest shipbuilding center since the time of Peter I is St. Petersburg, where there are about 40 enterprises in this industry. Almost all types of ships were built here. Nuclear submarines were previously produced in Nizhny Novgorod and Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Currently, their production is preserved only in Severodvinsk. Other centers of military shipbuilding are a number of cities on the rivers where small ships are produced (Yaroslavl, Rybinsk, Zelenodolsk, etc.)

Chapter 2. Development, problems and factors affecting the state of the military-industrial complex

2.1 The position of the military-industrial complex of Russia in recent years

Recently, the Russian military-industrial complex, according to many media outlets, has been in a very difficult state: corruption, overpricing of products, the inability to develop and manufacture modern weapons that would be responsible for the country's safety from real modern threats - the main "points of accusation". At the same time, the Ministry of Defense does not try to improve the situation, but only aggravates the situation by the following actions: a significant reduction in the number and disorganization military units and industrial facilities, modernization of obsolete military equipment in exchange for the purchase of new and promising, placing orders abroad. And also the Ministry of Defense has actually stepped aside from the interests of the domestic defense industry, and pays great attention to customers in the market. These factors lead to the weakening of the defense capability of our country.

The military power of the Soviet Union rested on a significant general economic foundation. Its economy, from the point of view of the possibilities for the functioning of military production, was complex and self-sufficient, that is, the manufacture of the entire range the latest weapons practically independent of foreign economic relations.

The most common and widely used indicators of the role of the military-industrial complex in the economic structure of the state in world statistics are the share of military spending in GDP and the volume of military production. In the USSR in the 80s. the share of defense spending was 9-13%. About 10 million people were employed in the complex. The sectoral structure and high scientific and technical potential of the industry made it possible to ensure strategic parity with the leading economic and military country in the world - the United States (having approximately 1/3 of the US GDP).

Since the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s, virtually all Russian industry, including the military, has been virtually completely destroyed. The exception was the oil and gas, food and mining industries. Of the 24 thousand industrial companies working partly for military purposes and producing the necessary dual-use products, only 1,200 survived. With all this, all these factories and plants, having no funding, did not progress - neither at the technical level, nor mentally. While they "stood in place", military special technologies in competing advanced countries stepped forward. And among more than 5.6 thousand scientific research institutes and hidden scientific centers developing modern military special technologies, only 677 remained in a very weakened form - without qualified personnel, without the current technical base. Of the 126 thousand experts of classes A1-A3 (according to the ILO systematization) employed in the defense industry in Russia in 1990, 102 thousand, i.e. more than 80% left to work in far-abroad countries.

William Fokkingen (international military-technical and defense-industrial cooperation at the Pentagon), in June 2000 at a conference on national security, said: “According to our estimates, less than 6% of Russia's defense potential remains. If the current trends continue, 0 will remain in 5 years. In 1999, the defense budget amounted to only 3.8 billion dollars - the amount that is now spent on paying for 2 land brigades. And the cost of R&D development has been equated to zero for many years.

Compared to the USSR, Russia's economic opportunities have deteriorated significantly. Today, in terms of GDP, Russia lags behind the United States 10 times, China - 6 times, Japan - 4 times, Germany - 3 times, India, France, Great Britain and Italy - 2 times. In terms of GDP, we are ranked 15th in the world, leaving behind not only these countries, but also Spain, Brazil, South Korea, Canada, Mexico and even Indonesia. In terms of GDP per capita, our position is even worse (about 100th in the world).

Russia inherited 80% of the defense industry of the USSR. This means that the degree of militarization of the economy turned out to be higher in comparison with other republics of the former Soviet Union. True, the number of people employed in the military-industrial complex has decreased to 5.4 million people, but it still remains excessive. Thus, the share of workers in the defense industry is 23.5% of total strength employed in the country, with about 2 million people directly producing weapons and military equipment.

As of the beginning of 1999, the Russian military-industrial complex included about 700 research institutes and design bureaus of the defense profile, as well as 1,700 enterprises and organizations and eight industries. In addition, more than 1,500 subcontractors in 10 CIS countries are associated with them. Defense industry facilities produce 20% of the country's total engineering output.

Military-industrial complex enterprises are located on the territory of most subjects of the Russian Federation, although extremely unevenly. Some areas and more than 70 cities-factories, including closed administrative-territorial entities, are completely dependent on the operation of the complex, since there are practically no other areas of labor application in them. This situation is most difficult in Udmurtia (55.3% of the employed population works at defense industry enterprises), in the Saratov region (50.9%), the Novosibirsk region (43.5%), the North-West region of Russia (30.7% ).

Regions with a high proportion of employment employed at military-industrial complex enterprises form a great potential for mass migration of labor to other areas, which, in the absence of sufficient investment in the production, housing and communal services, creates economic and social tension. Therefore, in these regions, it is important to take into account local employment opportunities for workers released from the defense industries.

The extremely difficult situation in the military-industrial complex is manifested in a landslide drop in production volumes, financial difficulties, a decrease in the technical level of production, violations of the existing system of cooperative ties, and a decrease in mobilization opportunities. Some of these difficulties Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, and some of them are the result of economic policy mistakes.

Thus, the main reasons for the difficulties in the Russian defense industry are the imperfection of management, lack of financial support, ill-conceived conversion and privatization of the enterprises of the complex.

2.2 Problems of the Russian military-industrial complex

Having listed the main characteristics of the Russian military-industrial complex, several specific points related to its problems can be distinguished:

Many enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex (DIC) are not yet ready for mass production of high-tech weapon systems. According to Vladislav Putilin (Deputy Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation), only 36% of strategic enterprises are financially healthy, and 25% are on the verge of bankruptcy. The Russian defense industry includes 948 strategic enterprises and organizations that are subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Chapter IX of the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", which provide for special bankruptcy rules. Currently, 44 of them are in bankruptcy proceedings.

According to the Federal Tax Service of Russia, 170 strategic enterprises and organizations of the military-industrial complex have signs of bankruptcy. Moreover, in relation to 150 strategic enterprises and organizations, the tax authorities have already issued resolutions on the collection of debts at the expense of their property, which are sent for execution to bailiffs. Additional problems were created by the defense industry and the delay in the transfer of funds under the state defense order. An analysis of enterprises in the aviation industry and armored engineering shows that in recent years the defense industry has managed to accumulate very large debts. In the aviation industry: RAC "MiG" - 44 billion rubles., MMP them. V.V. Chernyshev - 22 billion rubles, NPK "Irkut", the company "Dry" - about 30 billion rubles. In armored engineering, for example, the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Omsk Transport Engineering Plant produces T-80U and T-80UK tanks. The company's accounts payable amount to 1.5 billion rubles. In 2008, a three-year contract was signed between the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and OAO NPK Uralvagonzavod for the purchase of 189 tanks (63 tanks per year). In 2010, the Russian Ministry of Defense planned to acquire 261 new tank T-90, which are produced by OAO NPK Uralvagonzavod. If the order for the purchase of tanks for 18 billion rubles is nevertheless realized, then the plant will have a chance to pay off its debt - 61 billion rubles.

Despite the fact that in recent years Russia has managed to partially regain its lost positions in the global arms trade, success cannot be overestimated. After all, the crisis in the field of military-technical cooperation is based not only and not so much on the imperfection of state administration (although this is also important), but on the problems of manufacturers of weapons and military equipment. In many military technologies, Russia is still at the level of the 1970s and 1980s. The state of defense industry enterprises and their significant technological dependence on foreign suppliers remain critical. Thus, in comparison with 1992, the production has decreased: military aircraft - 17 times, military helicopters - 5 times, aviation missiles - 23 times, ammunition - more than 100 times.

The decline in the quality of military products (MPs) is alarming. The cost of eliminating defects in the course of production, testing and operation of HPP reaches 50% of the total cost of its manufacture. While in economically developed countries this figure does not exceed 20%. The main reason is the depreciation of the main equipment, which has reached 75%, and the extremely low level of re-equipment: the rate of equipment renewal is no more than 1% per year, with the minimum required need of 8-10%.

In recent years, the decline in the quality of military equipment and the increasing cases of non-compliance with the deadlines for fulfilling contractual obligations by Russian military-technical cooperation entities, combined with an unjustified increase in the price of weapons and military equipment, began to noticeably affect the relationship in the field of military-technical cooperation with traditional Russian buyers of military equipment (primarily with India and China) and , as a result, on the volume of deliveries.

Defense industry enterprises are not fully coping with the implementation of the concluded contracts. Some foreign customers have to queue for Russian weapons. True, it is still not entirely clear how to keep the 2011 price for the entire range of military equipment that the military is going to buy from industry until 2020. For some reason, the deflators included in the budget always turn out to be less than the real growth in inflation and the growth in the cost of materials and components for the final product. As a result, all weapons programs in five years turn out to be unbalanced, and the amount of lost money and, consequently, equipment not received by the troops reaches 30-50%. Comparison of the volume of sales of military products for export with the purchases of military products in the interests of the RF Ministry of Defense showed that for many years the volume of sales of weapons and military equipment (AME) to foreign states exceeded the volume of domestic purchases, and only in recent years there has been a trend towards an increase in domestic demand. If in 2000-2003 Russia's military spending amounted to about 30-32% of the volume of military equipment exports, then in 2004-2005 they became comparable, and since 2006 they exceeded exports, amounting to 114.6% in 2006, in 2007 - 132.6%. These data reflect not only the improvement in the economic situation in the country that has been observed over the past five or six years, but also a change in the attitude of the state towards the state of the Russian Armed Forces, which require re-equipment and modernization. The federal budget for 2009-2011 provides for a significant increase in the volume of purchases of military products, despite the financial crisis.

The degradation of the scientific and technical complex has led to the fact that, despite the growth of the state defense order, the production of a new generation of weapons cannot be established. The current situation poses a threat to Russia's national security.

According to Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute for the US and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the leading Western countries spend 2-3% of GDP on R&D, including 2.7% in the United States, while countries such as Japan, Sweden, and Israel reach 3.5-4.5% of GDP. China is increasing R&D spending at a very high rate (1.7% of GDP). China is expected to overtake the United States in terms of spending on science in the next decade. R&D spending is also rising rapidly in India. By 2012 they will reach 2% of GDP. The European Union has set a target to increase spending on R&D to 3% of GDP. The share of Russia's spending on defense R&D is 0.6% of GDP, and on civilian science is 0.4%. For comparison: in the last years of the existence of the USSR, the total expenditure on R&D amounted to 3.6-4.7% of GDP. Unfortunately, in Russia the share of all spending on fundamental research is only 0.16% of GDP. In developed countries, spending on basic research is 0.5-0.6% of GDP. In the leading countries of world science, science policy has two sides. On the one hand, the state directly finances scientific research, and on the other hand, it stimulates spending on R&D in the private sector with the help of tax measures. In Russia, according to the OECD, the tax system does not encourage, but infringes on R&D spending. Russian business spending on R&D is 7-10 times less than in developed countries. Only three Russian companies are among the 1000 largest companies in the world in terms of R&D spending. At the same time, meeting the requests of Rosoboronexport takes precedence over the needs of the Russian Armed Forces. The contracts of Rosoboronexport are more important for the state than the orders of the Ministry of Defense, since domestic prices are inferior to export ones. That is why Uralvagonzavod cannot start production of the new T-95 tank and tank support combat vehicle (BMPT).

Autonomy remains the main element of the Russian defense doctrine. One of the main goals of the implementation of the new policy for the defense industry is "preventing the critical dependence of the defense industry on the supply of components and materials of foreign production." The aspirations of the heads of defense industry enterprises are fully reflected: the state will facilitate the acquisition of unique equipment and its leasing to Russian defense industry.

The problems of developing the domestic electronic component base, as well as radio electronics, special metallurgy and small-tonnage chemistry, will be addressed within the framework of federal targeted programs and public-private partnerships.

The military-industrial complex management system in Russia has been reviewed six times. As a result, the level of this department has decreased from the Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation to the Head of the Department of the Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation. The activities of various structures involved in the development of various types of military products are not coordinated with the Federal Law of September 26, 2002 No. 127-FZ "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)". This law softened the requirements for strategic enterprises of the military-industrial complex in terms of signs of insolvency and established an increased list of measures aimed at preventing their bankruptcy. However, this law also requires a number of changes. This is especially true for the procedure for providing state guarantees for the obligations of strategic enterprises during the period of their financial recovery, limiting the rights of creditors to dispose of the debtor's property, the rights of the owner of mobilization (reserve) production capacity. It is proposed that the amended law should include the right to initiate the bankruptcy of a strategic enterprise only to the government of the Russian Federation or initiate a bankruptcy case after the strategic status is removed from the enterprise.

An unsuccessful policy has developed in the field of pricing for defense industry products. Now the prices for military products are approved by the customer in accordance with departmental standards on the basis of cost calculations submitted by the main contractor of the order. Often, the approved prices for defense industry products do not correspond to the growth of tariffs of natural monopolies. As a result, prices for military products are constantly rising. Therefore, despite the annual increase in spending on the state defense order, there is not enough money to purchase new modern weapons.

There is no solution to such an important problem for the defense industry as taxation. Land tax, property tax, and other types of taxes that strategic enterprises of the defense industry are now required to pay have become one of the main brakes on its reform. And when the need arises for the removal of Russian garbage by container, defense industry enterprises use the services of specialized companies, such as CJSC Landman. For many years, the heads of defense enterprises have been seeking the abolition of the value added tax on advance payments made under contracts under the state defense order on the profits of defense industry enterprises.

2.3 Factors that influenced the emergence of problems in the military-industrial complex

The following characteristics of the conjuncture can be attributed to the group of factors that give rise to the crisis of the military-industrial complex and the subsequent appearance of problems in its functioning and development.

1) Conversion. The main goals set before the conversion are, firstly, to increase the national economic efficiency of the military-industrial complex in the country's economy, and secondly, to redistribute the resources and production capacities of the defense complex in favor of civilian industries - primarily consumer goods and civilian products (investment equipment for processing industries APK, light industry, TEK). In conversion programs, a clear priority is given to the direction associated with the release of consumer goods and household appliances.

2) Privatization. The main goal of privatization is to find an "effective owner". The results of privatization both in industry as a whole and in the military sector are not particularly successful. There are a number of reasons for this, the main of which is the empirical observation that a simple change in the title of the owner cannot be stimulating for the intensive development of progressive forms of management. A feature of the privatization of state defense enterprises is the preservation of the profile of orders in the post-privatization period, the provision of state sales markets for a certain period. The state is the guarantor of future orders and purchases. This approach justifies itself economically, because it stimulates the entrepreneur to make long-term investments in the enterprise, and the state - to help mitigate the harsh economic circumstances that the enterprise has fallen into after privatization.

3) The inefficiency of programs for the long-term development and reform of the defense industries. To ensure the processes of privatization and conversion, a plan for a number of programs should be developed to ensure the possibility of a smooth transition of enterprises to new economic relations. With the aim of redistributing production resources freed up with a sharp reduction in the military order, the development of civilian industries and the scientific and technical potential of the branches of the defense complex. But many directions may turn out to be unpromising due to the lack of demand or even the need for this kind of equipment. All this makes the program heterogeneous and makes it impossible to determine priorities. As a result, the main part of the funds allocated by the government for the implementation of investment conversion programs is used to pay wages, replenishment of working capital, repayment of interest on "non-convertible" loans to commercial banks, or simply returned back to the budget in the form of taxes.

4) Unfavorable macroeconomic environment. Defense complex enterprises are forced to operate in an extremely unfavorable economic environment. Recently, the following unfavorable macroeconomic trends have begun to affect, which may intensify the negative processes in the defense sector. This is, firstly, the growth of production costs - an increase in the cost of energy resources and transport services. Secondly, the orientation of the sectors of the fuel and energy complex and the complex of structural materials to deliveries abroad will lead to the fact that, in the conditions of the expected economic growth, resources will turn out to be extremely expensive.

5) Suppression of investment activity. Against the backdrop of an unfavorable macroeconomic environment, the investment activity of enterprises is rather sluggish. Even if the investment decision is made, the greatest difficulties arise when attracting debt capital to finance investments. Five potential sources of financing can be considered: conversion loans revenues from domestic arms sales revenues from civil and military industry exports foreign investments return of Russian financial resources from abroad

Of these sources, only exports and foreign investment are more or less real in the future. Since foreign investment (also due to legal restrictions) is currently less than 1%, the company will have to rely on its own funds and on export earnings. In general, according to experts, the Russian military-industrial complex will need about $150 billion to carry out a full-scale restructuring and conversion of the military sector.

2.4 Defense complex of the Novosibirsk region

The Novosibirsk region today remains one of the largest military-industrial centers with a high scientific, technical, industrial and human potential, representing in the aggregate all the main branches of the defense industry. At present, the military-industrial complex of the region includes 35 enterprises and organizations subordinate to the Ministry of Economy of Russia and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia.

Almost all areas of the defense complex are represented in the region (nuclear industry, aircraft industry, rocket and space industry, electronics, radio industry, ammunition and special chemicals industry, communications and weapons industry), including unique and one-of-a-kind defense enterprises and research institutes with their own specific technology and highly professional personnel, the reprofiling of which is extremely difficult, in some cases it is simply impractical.

the most important hallmark The military-industrial complex of the region is unique in terms of quality and quantity, as well as the breadth of specialization, scientific and technical potential, represented by three Siberian branches of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the state scientific center of virology and biotechnology "Vector", twenty industry, design institutes and design bureaus. The level of research being carried out is of world importance, and a number of industry-specific research institutes of the defense profile are the leading organizations in Russia in the development of various types of weapons.

While there is potential for significant growth in the defense industry, the areas remain unclear. The main issue in the next five years remains the financial support of enterprises, a significant increase in their own funds during this period, most likely, is not expected. State support can only apply to those who fall into the composition of a particular federal program or the list of state-owned factories. Hopes for foreign investment are negligible, especially enterprises with outdated production equipment and limited opportunities for the production of competitive products, including military ones, may find themselves in a difficult situation, so it is obvious that not all defense enterprises of the city will exist in their current form in the long term. In this regard, the immediate tasks are a complete inventory of their capabilities, reorganization of the reform and all possible local support in the implementation of the planned projects. Analysis of the results of the activities of enterprises, the share of which now accounts for 15% of the output of the entire industry, while the economic state of defense enterprises is very heterogeneous: there are enterprises that more or less “keep on the surface” and enterprises that are experiencing a serious crisis, regardless of the form of ownership.

Chapter 3. Forecasts and ways to solve the problems of the military-industrial complex

3.1 Tasks and ways of modernization of the military-industrial complex

The main task in solving the problems of the military-industrial complex is the creation of new competitive enterprises with modern technologies and highly qualified personnel, ensuring the advanced development of the latest technological order, forming effective system management. The dynamics of the development of the military-industrial complex of the leading countries is largely determined by new companies operating in the field of high technologies. At the same time, they direct large investments to the acquisition of knowledge and technologies, smaller investments to the improvement of fixed production assets. First of all, it is necessary to stop the unpromising injection of huge resources into already inactive JSCs and Federal State Unitary Enterprises. Focus efforts on selective support for those enterprises that can become points of growth for the new Russian military-industrial complex and prove their viability in fierce competition with world leaders, ensure advanced training and consolidation for them competitive personnel.

According to some estimates based on the analysis of foreign experience, when creating points of innovative growth of the economy, the main investment costs (up to 70%) should go to the development of human resources (primarily, to scientific, design and technological personnel), and no more than 30% should calculate the cost of equipment. Thus, the problem of personnel training is a key one in the innovative development of the defense industry. The first step in solving this problem is the problem of training a new generation of personnel, which requires an increase in costs, including for retraining and advanced training, research and development.

Obviously, to a large extent, the solution of the issue of training and retraining of personnel for the military-industrial complex is connected with the need to form the Federal University of Defense Technologies (FUOT). This university should be endowed with independence in the development and application of curricula, which is especially important for such a specific industry as the military-industrial complex.

The task of training professional personnel for the defense industry is actually divided into two: 1) training personnel for enterprises in a modernized economy; 2) the formation of personnel capable of modernizing.

Obviously, these are two different tasks that require different approaches and different methods for their solution. They need to be solved almost simultaneously, since the real training cycle for training highly qualified specialists (including personnel of the highest scientific qualification) takes up to ten years, which actually coincides with the time allotted by the Concept 2020 for the modernization of the country's economy. While the training of specialists who should work in the new “defense industry” is underway, it is necessary to have time to modernize it with the help of specialists who will have to be trained for this much faster. These specialists will have to be found in today's engineering and management environment and organized for them in an appropriate short but intensive retraining within the framework of additional professional education (AVE). Then form effective teams of managers and specialists and reform the defense industry.

The main personnel in the new production environment will be specialists who are properly trained and well versed in the current state and prospects of a certain, but rather broad scientific and technical direction. These are "synthesizers" capable of translating their ideas into specific technical solutions with the help of computer technology, and "analysts", whose task should be to critically analyze the efficiency and performance of the systems being developed.

3.2 Medium-term trends in the development of the military-industrial complex

talking about the medium-term development of the military-industrial complex, there are several points that in the future will change the role of the military-industrial complex both in the economy and in politics.

1. Statistical analysis of cross-country comparisons indicates that with the growth of the economy, the need for weapons increases. Thus, it can be argued that weapons are a kind of "luxury". Therefore, in the future it makes sense to expect arms purchases from developing countries.

2. due to changes in the geopolitical picture of the world, it is quite possible to expect further redistribution military force and in the future. This means that these processes will be able to enhance the role of the military-industrial complex as an instrument of military-economic pressure.

3. The revision of the tasks facing the army of a militarily developed country will entail a change in the quality level of products manufactured in the military-industrial complex. The main task of the armed forces at the new stage will be participation in local conflicts without the use of weapons of mass destruction. According to Pentagon military analysts, the US Armed Forces must in the future have the forces and means to wage not one global war, but two local military conflicts. However, as practice shows, in the conditions of a small war, high-precision, "intelligent" weapons will be of the greatest importance.

This means that the military order is oriented towards technologically superior products of the defense industries. This stimulates the production of weapons based on the latest technologies and the acceleration of research and development in the relevant areas. The upward trend in the cost of military equipment against the backdrop of declining spending on the army will lead to a further reduction in the number of the Armed Forces and an increase in the qualifications of military personnel.

4. The comparative advantages of countries in the field of military-economic developments will acquire a new shade. Previously, emphasis was placed on strategic parity, when the superiority of the enemy in some types of weapons was offset by the development of other types.

The approach from the point of view of market efficiency, i.e. on the part of not purely military, but economic-military parity, eliminates these difficulties. Economic-military parity is the comparative advantages of the military-industrial complex of countries. This approach takes into account not only certain types weapons, but primarily technologies designed to ensure the production of a certain type of weapons, if needed, in sufficient quantities and cheaply. Therefore, in the future it makes sense to talk not about parity in terms of types of weapons, but in terms of technologies. The market mechanism stimulates the development of new, promising technologies, adapts them for use in the civil sector.

5. as a consequence of the transition to the comparative advantages of the military-industrial complex, the arms race will be replaced by a military technology race. And this has a number of important consequences for the development of military-technical policy. First, a breakthrough in the field of high technologies is possible only as a result of large-scale fundamental research, the results of which are embodied in experimental design developments. And this means that the critical situation in the field of science today leads to a loss of competitiveness. Secondly, the evolution and refinement of technologies is possible only where it has been developed from scratch.

6. The already mentioned tendencies towards the concentration of military-industrial capital and monopolization will lead to the displacement of "non-core" countries from the production of weapons. Which, by the way, is already happening. In fact, this will create a small group of countries (USA, France, Great Britain, Israel, Russia) that are a supplier of weapons to the world market. The loss of competitiveness in this market means the elimination of the military-industrial complex and the loss of the market almost forever. Therefore, it is necessary to constantly monitor the situation on the world arms markets and prevent the loss of competitiveness of products by domestic manufacturers. First of all, this concerns the support of the "intellectual filling" of technology, expressed in the stimulation of domestic fundamental science.

Speaking about the evolution of the economy of the military-industrial complex in Russia, it is necessary to separate two factors that generate this evolution. On the one hand, this is a purely economic factor, mainly embodying the consequences of the course of reforms and changes in economic policy in the field of both the military-industrial complex and the entire industry as a whole. The second (political) factor will be the impact of final demand (formed from domestic and foreign demand) on defense industry products.

The first factor will determine the evolution of technological structures and encourage enterprises to create the most economically efficient production infrastructure.

The second factor will in the future determine the specialization of the military-industrial complex both within the framework of the national market and in the field of the world arms market. As can be seen, these two factors are complementary, and the economic factor is decisive. Having an irrational economic infrastructure in the defense industries, it is impossible to maintain its positions in the long term, even if the forecast of the need for weapons on the part of both internal and external consumers is made successfully. This stems from the fact that adaptation to a changed market environment in an underdeveloped infrastructure will lead to so-called transaction costs (information support costs, decision-making costs, etc.), which can reach significant amounts and in the long run lead to higher product costs. sectors of the military-industrial complex, which will ultimately lead to a further decrease in the competitiveness of the military-industrial complex on the world stage.

3.3 General disarmament

One of the most important issues in the field of strategic security and the military-industrial complex is arms control and disarmament in the world. We, as the authors of this essay, believe that one of the most effective, productive and expedient solutions to the problems of the military-industrial complex not only in Russia, but in the whole world is general disarmament.

Disarmament is the reduction of the means of warfare that states possess. Disarmament measures taken by states may include both interstate agreements and unilateral actions; they can be relatively simple arrangements affecting limited territories, or elaborate formulas aimed at the demilitarization of the entire globe.

The idea of ​​disarmament in the name of peace has repeatedly arisen in the history of mankind. As one of the directions of state policy, disarmament has been known since the 19th century. In the 20th century, due to the rapid development of military technology, its role increased many times over. After two devastating world wars, disarmament became the most important aspect of diplomatic activity aimed at eliminating wars. In the nuclear age, everyone's attention is focused on negotiations on the control, limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. In this regard, the United Nations and others international organizations Arms control and disarmament efforts have been made in three areas: nuclear, conventional and biological weapons. However, unfortunately, the human community still does not have a clear program of general disarmament.

Currently, the arms trade is a significant part of the total world trade, or rather about 16% of the 5 trillion. dollars of world trade, this is 800 billion. The sale of weapons and military equipment in the world continues to grow, so that weapons and defense enterprises in 2002-2003. increased production by 25%. In 2003, these businesses generated $236 billion in arms sales, with US companies accounting for 63%. The United States has been the world's largest arms supplier since the end of the Cold War. They are followed by Russia, Great Britain and France.

Due to the devastating consequences of the buildup of armaments, namely wars, conflicts, destruction and the colossal costs associated with this, the world community has been striving for many years to somehow curb the arms race and achieve general disarmament. In recent years, as a result of progress in the development of ever new weapons, it has become increasingly difficult to give qualitative and quantitative estimates of the production of weapons in the world. The complexity is added, on the one hand, by the growing accuracy of destruction, and, on the other hand, by the development of new means of intercepting these weapons. Today, the pace of qualitative, technical development of means of warfare is constantly accelerating. Therefore, the first step is to “slow down”. However, all signs point to the fact that the world community has not yet achieved appreciable success in arms control, curbing the arms race and general disarmament.

Due to the huge profits made from the arms trade, the military industries are constantly developing and applying the latest technologies in production. At the same time, growing investment in the military-industrial complex, mainly from the private sector in Western countries, increases the anxieties and fears of the entire human community.

Conclusion

Based on the results of the work done, we can say that the Russian military-industrial complex is going through its hard times. From the peak of its growth in the former USSR, it goes through a stage of a sharp reduction in production volumes, a decrease in funding for defense orders, and an outflow of qualified personnel. At the same time, it is still the only production system capable of solving many technological problems at the level of modern requirements. Moreover, the military-industrial complex was and remains today the only base for the breakthrough of Russian technologies to the world market of products and not only to it.

To accelerate the revival of the military-industrial complex and turn it into a scientific, technical and technological base of the national economy, it is necessary to develop and adopt at the federal level a system of measures to stimulate the innovative development of the defense industry.

We examined all the important aspects of the existence and functioning of the military-industrial complex and analyzed its activities. The goals of our work can be considered achieved.

Bibliography

1. Glazyev S.Yu. "Two Concepts of Conversion and Causes of Failure". Moscow, Nauka, 2008.

2. Chistova V.E. "Financial aspects of reforming the military-industrial complex". 2005

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A week ago, I casually noticed here that the thesis about the alleged inability of pre-communist Russia to the rapid and successful development of the defense industry and the absence in Russia until 1917 of large investment funds directed to defense is refuted as the successful implementation in Russia of programs for the development of military shipbuilding industries in 1910-1917, and the rapid growth of the defense industry in Russia during the First World War (WWI), when Russia was able to achieve phenomenal growth in military production, which was also ensured by a sharp expansion of production capacities and the rapid construction of new enterprises.

These my remarks have caused here numerous angry cries and type of objection. Alas, the level of the majority of objections testifies to the extreme ignorance of the public in this matter and the incredible littering of heads with all sorts of prejudices and completely mossy ideas borrowed from accusatory journalism and propaganda.

In principle, this should not be surprising. The denunciation of the alleged inability of the vile Ancien Régime to cope with the needs of military production was promoted by the liberal and socialist opposition even before February 1917, was unanimously supported by the generals who tried (having found themselves on both the red and white sides) to dissociate themselves from the "old regime", and then became a commonplace of communist propaganda for obvious reasons. As a result, in Russian historiography, this has become a common historical cliché, practically undiscussed and incomprehensible. It would seem that almost 100 years have passed, and one could hope for a more objective coverage of this issue now. Alas, the study of the WWI (and the domestic military-industrial complex) in Russia is still at an extremely low level, no one deals with the study of the development of the country's military-industrial complex during the years of the WWI, and if this topic is touched upon in publications, then it all comes down to a thoughtless repetition of memorized clichés. Perhaps only the authors and compilers of the recently published collection "The Military Industry of Russia at the Beginning of the 20th Century" (volume 1 of the work "History of the Creation and Development of the Defense Industrial Complex of Russia and the USSR. 1903-1963") questioned and criticized this mythology.

It can be said without exaggeration that the development of the Russian military industry in WWI remains a large-scale white spot national history.

I have been very interested in this topic lately, and I even think about the possibility of starting to study it more seriously. Nevertheless, even a little acquaintance with the materials is enough to assert and repeat it here again: during the First World War, Russia made a huge leap in military production, and the pace of industrial development was so high that it was not repeated after that in Russian history. , and were not repeated in any of the segments of the Soviet period of history, including the Second World War. The basis of this leap was the rapid expansion of military production capacities in 1914-1917. due to four factors:

1) Expansion of existing state military enterprises
2) Massive attraction of private industry to military production
3) A large-scale emergency construction program for new state-owned factories
4) Extensive construction of new private military factories secured by state orders.

Thus, in all cases, this growth was provided by large-scale capital investments (both state and private), which makes it completely absurd to talk about the alleged inability of Russia before 1917 to make large-scale investments in the defense industry. Actually, this thesis, as noted, is clearly refuted by the rapid creation and modernization of shipbuilding capacities for large shipbuilding programs before WWI. But in matters of shipbuilding and the fleet, the criticizing public is at a very profane level, therefore, not being able to object, it quickly switches to shells, etc.

The main thesis is that there were few shells made in Russia. At the same time, as a favorite argument, figures are given for the total release of shells in Western countries for the entire period of WWI - including both 1917 and 1918. The scale of the military industry in the West by 1918 and artillery battles in 1918 are compared with the Russian army that had just begun to deploy military production in 1915-1916 (because in 1917 Russian industry went downhill) - and on this basis they are trying to draw some conclusions. It is interesting what kind of “argumentators” of this kind are counting on to prove. However, as we will see below, even in 1917, with the production and availability of the same artillery shells, things in Russia were not so bad.

It should be noted here that one of the reasons for the distorted ideas about the work of Russian industry in WWI is the work of Barsukov, and Manikovsky (that is, partly Barsukov again) - in fact, partly because since then nothing new has appeared on this topic. Their works were written in the early 1920s, kept in the spirit of those years and, in matters related to the defense industry, concentrated to a large extent on the shortages of military supplies in the period 1914-1915. Actually, the very issues of deploying the production of weapons and supplies are reflected in these works insufficiently and contradictory (which is understandable from the conditions of writing). Therefore, the “sufferingly accusatory” bias taken in these works has been uncritically reproduced for decades. Moreover, both Barsukov and Manikovsky have a lot of false information (for example, about the state of affairs with the construction of new enterprises) and dubious statements (a typical example is howls directed against private industry).

For a better understanding of the development of Russian industry in WWI, in addition to the aforementioned collection “The Military Industry of Russia at the Beginning of the 20th Century”, I would recommend the recently published “Essays on the History of the Military Industry” by Gen. V.S. Mikhailova (in 1916-1917, head of the military chemical department of the GAU, in 1918, head of the GAU)

This comment was written as a kind of educational program to educate the general public about the mobilization and expansion of the Russian defense industry during the WWII and is designed to demonstrate the scale of this expansion. In this commentary, I do not touch on the issues of the aircraft and aircraft engine industry, as well as the automotive industry, because this is a separate complex topic. The same applies to the fleet and shipbuilding (also a separate issue). Let's just look at the army.

Rifles. In 1914, there were three state-owned arms factories in Russia - Tula, Izhevsk (actually a complex with a steel plant) and Sestroretsk. The military capacity of all three factories for the summer of 1914 was estimated by equipment at a total of 525 thousand rifles per year (44 thousand per month) with 2-2.5 shifts (Tula - 250 thousand, Izhevsky - 200 thousand, Sestroretsky 75 thousand). In reality, from August to December 1914, all three factories produced only 134 thousand rifles.

Since 1915, accelerated work was undertaken to expand all three factories, as a result of which the monthly production of rifles for them from December 1914 to December 1916 was quadrupled - from 33.3 thousand to 127.2 thousand pieces . In 1916 alone, the productivity of each of the three plants was doubled, and the actual delivery was: the Tula plant 648.8 thousand rifles, Izhevsk - 504.9 thousand and Sestroretsky - 147.8 thousand, a total of 1301.4 thousand. rifles in 1916 (figures excluding those being repaired).

The increase in capacity was achieved by expanding the machine and power park of each of the plants. The largest scale work was carried out at the Izhevsk plant, where the machine park was almost doubled, a new power plant was built. In 1916, an order was issued for the second stage of the reconstruction of the Izhevsk plant at a cost of 11 million rubles. with the aim of bringing its release in 1917 to 800 thousand rifles.

The Sestroretsk plant underwent a large-scale expansion, where by January 1917 the output of 500 rifles per day was achieved, and from June 1, 1917, the output of 800 rifles per day was planned. However, in October 1916, it was decided to limit the production of rifles with a capacity of 200 thousand pieces per year, and to focus the increased capacity of the plant on the production of Fedorov assault rifles at a rate of 50 pieces per day from the summer of 1917.

We add that the Izhevsk Steel Plant was a supplier of weapons and special steel, as well as gun barrels. In 1916, the production of steel in relation to 1914 was increased from 290 to 500 thousand pounds, gun barrels - six times (up to 1.458 million units), machine gun barrels - 19 times (up to 66.4 thousand) , and further growth is expected.

It should be noted that a large part of the machine tools for weapons production in Russia was produced by the machine-tool production of the Tula Arms Plant. In 1916, the production of machine tools on it was brought to 600 units. per year, and in 1917 it was supposed to transform this machine-building department into a separate large Tula State Machine-Building Plant with capacity expansion up to 2400 machine tools per year. 32 million rubles were allocated for the creation of the plant. According to Mikhailov, of the 320% increase in rifle production from 1914 to 1916, only 30% of the increase in growth was achieved by "forced work", and the remaining 290% was the effect of equipment expansion.

However, the main emphasis in the expansion of rifle production was placed on the construction of new arms factories in Russia. Already in 1915, appropriations were approved for the construction of a second arms factory in Tula with an annual capacity of 500 thousand rifles per year, and in the future it was supposed to be merged with the Tula arms factory with a total total capacity of 3,500 rifles per day. The estimated cost of the plant (3700 units of machine equipment) amounted to 31.2 million rubles, by October 1916 the appropriations increased to 49.7 million rubles, and an additional 6.9 million rubles were allocated for the purchase of equipment from Remington ( 1691 machine) for the manufacture of another 2 thousand rifles per day (!). In total, the entire Tula weapons complex was supposed to produce 2 million rifles per year. The construction of the 2nd plant was started in the summer of 1916 and should be completed by the beginning of 1918. In fact, due to the revolution, the plant was already completed under the Soviets.

In 1916, the construction of a new state-owned Ekaterinoslav Arms Plant near Samara began, with a capacity of 800,000 rifles per year. At the same time, it was planned to transfer the capacities of the Sestroretsk Arms Plant to this site, which was then abandoned. The estimated cost was determined at 34.5 million rubles. Construction was intensively carried out in 1916, by 1917 the main workshops were erected, then collapse came. The Soviet government tried to complete the construction of the plant in the 20s, but did not master it.

Thus, in 1918, the annual production capacity of the Russian industry for the production of rifles (without machine guns) should have been 3.8 million pieces, which meant an increase of 7.5 times in relation to the mobilization capacities of 1914 and a tripling in relation to the release of 1916. This overlapped the applications of the Headquarters (2.5 million rifles per year) by one and a half times.

Machine guns. The production of machine guns remained the bottleneck of Russian industry throughout WWI. In fact, until the revolution itself, only the Tula Arms Plant was producing easel machine guns, which increased their production to 1200 units per month by January 1917. Thus, in relation to December 1915, the increase was 2.4 times, and in relation to December 1914 g. - seven times. During 1916, the production of machine guns almost tripled (from 4251 to 11072 pieces), and in 1917 the Tula plant was expected to supply 15 thousand machine guns. Together with large import orders (in 1917, the delivery of up to 25 thousand imported heavy machine guns and up to 20 thousand light machine guns was expected), this should have satisfied the requests of the Stavka. In exaggerated hopes of imports, proposals from private industry for the production of easel machine guns were rejected by the GAU.

The production of Madsen light machine guns was organized at the Kovrov machine gun plant, which was being built under an agreement with Madsen. An agreement on this with the issuance of an order to the syndicate for 15,000 manual steering wheels for 26 million rubles was concluded in April 1916, the contract was signed in September, and the construction of the plant began in August 1916 and was carried out at a very fast pace. The assembly of the first batch of machine guns was carried out in August 1917. By the beginning of 1918, despite the revolutionary mess, the plant was almost ready - according to the plant survey report of August 1919 (and nothing has changed there in a year and a half), the readiness of the plant's shops was 95%, power plants and communications - 100%, equipment was delivered 100%, installed 75%. The production of machine guns was planned at 4,000 pieces in the first half of the year of work, followed by an output of 1,000 pieces per month and bringing up to 2.5-3 thousand light machine guns per month when working in one exchange.

Ammo. In 1914, in Russia, three state-owned cartridge factories were engaged in the production of rifle cartridges - Petrograd, Tula and Lugansk. The maximum capacity of each of these plants was 150 million cartridges per year with one-shift operation (450 million in total). In fact, all three plants already in the peaceful 1914 should have produced a total of a third more - the state defense order amounted to 600 million rounds.

The release of cartridges was largely limited by the amount of gunpowder (more on that below). From the beginning of 1915, great efforts were made to expand the capacities of all three factories, as a result of which the production of Russian 3-lin cartridges was tripled from December 1914 to November 1916 - from 53.8 million to 150 million pieces (in this number does not include the production of Japanese cartridges in Petrograd). In 1916 alone, the total output of Russian cartridges was increased one and a half times (to 1.482 billion pieces). In 1917, while maintaining productivity, it was expected to supply 1.8 billion rounds of ammunition, plus the receipt of approximately the same number of Russian cartridges from imports. In 1915-1917. the number of pieces of equipment of all three cartridge factories has doubled.

The rate in 1916 made clearly excessive demands for cartridges - for example, at the inter-allied conference in January 1917, the need was estimated at 500 million cartridges per month (including 325 million Russians), which gave an expense of 6 billion per year, or twice as high as the consumption in 1916, and this is with sufficient supply of cartridges to the units by the beginning of 1917.

In July 1916, the construction of the Simbirsk Cartridge Plant was started (capacity 840 million cartridges per year, estimated cost 40.9 million rubles), scheduled for commissioning in 1917, but put into operation due to collapse already under the Soviets only in October 1918. In general, the total expected capacity of the Russian cartridge industry for 1918 can be calculated up to 3 billion cartridges per year (taking into account the production of foreign cartridges).

Light weapons. The production of light and mountain 3-inch artillery was carried out at the Petrograd state and Perm gun factories. In 1915, the private Putilov Plant (which was eventually nationalized at the end of 1916), as well as the private Tsaritsyn Group of Plants (Sormovo Plant, Lessner Plant, Petrogradsky Metallic and Kolomensky) were connected to production. Monthly issue of guns mod. 1902 eventually grew in 22 months (from January 1915 to October 1916) by more than 13 times (!!) - from 35 to 472 systems. At the same time, for example, the Perm plant increased the production of 3-dm field guns in 1916 by 10 times compared to 1914 (bringing up to 100 guns per month by the end of 1916), and carriages for them - by 16 times .

The production of 3-dm mountain and short guns at Russian factories for 22 months (from January 1915 to October 1916) was tripled (from 17 to about 50 months), and plus, from the fall of 1916, the production of 3-dm anti-aircraft guns. In 1916, the annual total production of 3-dm guns of all types was three times higher than the production in 1915.

The Tsaritsyn group, having started production from scratch and handed over the first six 3-dm guns in April 1916, six months later (in October) produced 180 guns per month, and in February 1917 200 guns were manufactured, and there were reserves for further increasing production. The Putilov plant, having resumed production of 3-dm guns only in the second half of 1915, by the end of 1916 reached a capacity of 200 guns per month, and in the middle of 1917 it was expected to produce 250-300 guns per month. In fact, due to the sufficiency of the production of 3-dm guns, the Putilov plant was given a program for 1917 of only 1214 guns mod. 1902, and the rest of the capacities were reoriented to the production of heavy artillery.

To further expand artillery production, at the end of 1916, the construction of a powerful Saratov state-owned gun factory was begun with a capacity per year: 3-inch field guns - 1450, 3-inch mountain guns - 480, 42-lin guns - 300, 48-lin howitzers - 300, 6-inch howitzers - 300, 6-inch fortress guns - 190, 8-inch howitzers - 48. The cost of the enterprise was determined at 37.5 million rubles. Due to the revolution of February 1917, the construction was stopped at the initial stage.

Thus, with a monthly requirement for 1917, declared by the Headquarters in January 1917, of 490 field and 70 mountain 3-dm guns, Russian industry had actually already reached its supply by that time, and in 1917-1918, likely to far outweigh this need. With the commissioning of the Saratov plant, one could expect a total output of at least approximately 700 field guns and 100 mountain guns per month (assuming the retirement of 300 guns per month by execution without taking into account combat losses) ..

It should be added that in 1916 the Obukhov plant began mastering the 37-mm Rosenberg trench gun. Of the first order of 400 new systems from March 1916, 170 guns were delivered already in 1916, the delivery of the rest was scheduled for 1917. There is no doubt that new mass orders for these guns would follow.

Heavy weapons. As we all know, the production of heavy artillery in Russia during the WWI is a favorite topic of all the accusers of the "old regime". At the same time, it is hinted that the vile tsarism could not organize anything here.

By the beginning of the war, the production of 48-linear howitzers arr. 1909 and 1910 was carried out at the Putilov plant, the Obukhov plant and the Petrograd gun plant, and 6-inch howitzers arr. 1909 and 1910 - at the Putilov and Perm plants. After the start of the war, special attention was also paid to the production of 42-lin guns mod. 1909, under which the expansions of the Obukhov and Petrograd plants were made, and their mass production at the Putilov plant began. In 1916, the Obukhov plant began producing a 6-inch Schneider gun and a 12-inch howitzer. The Putilov plant was the leading manufacturer of 48-lin howitzers throughout the war, reaching the production of up to 36 of these guns per month by the autumn of 1916, and was supposed to increase their production in 1917.

The release of heavy artillery increased very quickly. In the first half of 1915, only 128 heavy artillery guns were manufactured (and all of them - all 48-lin howitzers), and in the second half of 1916 - already 566 heavy guns (including 21 12-dm howitzers), in other words, in the calculated coefficients Manikovsky's output has grown 7 times in a year and a half (!). At the same time, this number, apparently, does not include the supply of land guns (including 24 6-dm howitzers) for the Naval Department (mainly the IPV Fortress). In 1917, a further increase in production was to continue. First of all, 42-ling guns, the output of which at all three manufacturing plants in 1917 should have been estimated at 402 units (against 89 in 1916). In total, in 1917, without a revolution, the GAU (without Morved) by industry should have been estimated to have delivered up to 2000 heavy Russian-made guns (against 900 in 1916).

Only one Putilov plant in its main production under the 1917 program was supposed to produce 432 48-lin howitzers, 216 42-lin guns and 165 6-inch howitzers for the army plus 94 6-inch howitzers for Morved.

Additionally, with the nationalization of the Putilov plant, it was decided to create a special heavy artillery plant for the production of 6-inch and 8-inch howitzers with production volumes of up to 500 howitzers per year. The plant was built at an accelerated pace for 1917, despite the revolutionary chaos. By the end of 1917, the plant was almost ready. But then the evacuation of Petrograd began, and by the decision of the GAU of December 14, the new plant was subject to priority evacuation to Perm. Most of the enterprise's equipment was eventually delivered to the Perm plant, where it formed the basis of Motovilikha's heavy gun production capacity for the next decades. However, a considerable part was dispersed throughout the country in the context of the civil war of 1918 and lost.

The second new center for the production of heavy artillery was to be the aforementioned Saratov State Gun Plant with an annual program for heavy guns: 42-lin guns - 300, 48-lin howitzers - 300, 6-inch howitzers - 300, 6-inch fortress guns - 190, 8-dm howitzers - 48. Due to the revolution of February 1917, the construction was stopped at the initial stage.

Among other measures considered by 1917 to increase the production of heavy artillery were the issuance of an order for 48-lin howitzers to the private Tsaritsyn Group of Plants, as well as the development in 1917 of the production of 12-dm howitzers and new "light" 16-dm howitzers at the Tsaritsyno plant for the production of naval heavy artillery (RAOAZ), which was built since 1913 with the participation of Vickers, whose construction was carried out sluggishly during the WWI, but the first stage of which was expected in July 1916 to be commissioned in the spring of 1917. A production project was also put forward there since 1918, 42-lin guns and 6-dm howitzers (note that the production of 42-lin guns and 6-dm howitzers was eventually mastered at the Barricades by the Soviets in 1930-1932).

With the commissioning of the howitzer plant at the Putilov plant and the first stage of the Tsaritsyn plant, Russian industry in 1918 would have reached an annual output of at least 2600 heavy artillery systems, and more likely, and more, given the fact that, apparently, in 1917-1918. serious efforts would have been made to expand the production of 48-lin howitzers. And this is without taking into account the Saratov plant, the possibility of commissioning which before 1919 seems to me doubtful.

In fact, this meant that the applications of the Headquarters of 1916 for heavy artillery could be covered by the Russian industry by the end of 1917, and the massive production of 1918 could be used, along with covering losses, for a sharp (actually multiple for many artillery systems) increase TAON states. Let us add to this that in 1917-early 1918. about 1000 more heavy artillery systems were to be imported (and this is without taking into account possible new orders abroad). In total, the total Russian heavy artillery, even minus losses, could reach the number of 5000 guns by the end of 1918, i.e. be comparable in number to the French.

It should be noted that at the same time in Russia (mainly at the Obukhov plant, as well as at Perm) a very large-scale production of powerful large-caliber naval artillery (from 4 to 12 dm) continued, the production of 14-dm naval guns was mastered, and despite the WWI, reconstruction continued in full swing Perm plant to organize the production of 24 ship guns of caliber 14-16 dm per year.

And, by the way, a little touch for those who like to speculate that the de fleet before WWI ate the army, and the unfortunate army suffered from a lack of guns. According to the “Highest Report on the War Ministry for 1914”, as of January 1, 1915, the land fortress artillery consisted of 7634 guns and 323 half-hearth mortars (425 new guns were delivered to the land fortresses in 1914), and the stock of shells of the fortresses was 2 million pieces The artillery of the coastal fortresses consisted of another 4162 guns, and the stock of shells was 1 million pieces. No comments, as they say, but it looks like the story of the real greatest Russian drank before WWI is still waiting for its researcher.

Artillery shells caliber 3 dm. Arguments about shells is a favorite topic of critics of the Russian military-industrial complex in WWI, while, as a rule, information about the shell famine of 1914-1915. completely wrongly transferred to a later period. Even less awareness is shown in the issue of the production of heavy artillery shells.

The production of 3-dm shells before the WWII was carried out in Russia at five state-owned (Izhevsk steel foundry, as well as Perm, Zlatoust, Olonetsk and Verkhneturinsky mining departments) and 10 private factories (Metal, Putilovsky, Nikolaevsky, Lessner, Bryansk, Petrograd Mechanical, Russian Society, Rudzsky, Lilpop, Sormovsky), and until 1910 - and two Finnish factories. With the outbreak of war, shell production underwent a rapid expansion, both by increasing production at the factories mentioned, and by adding new private enterprises. In total, by January 1, 1915, orders for 3-dm shells were issued to 19 private enterprises, and by January 1, 1916 - already 25 (and this is without taking into account Vankov's organization)

The main role in shell production along the GAU line was played by the Perm plant, as well as the Putilov plant, which eventually united a number of other private enterprises around itself (Russian society, Russian-Baltic and Kolomenskoye). Thus, the Perm plant, with an annual estimated capacity of 3-dm shells of 500 thousand units, already in 1915 produced 1.5 million shells, and in 1916 - 2.31 million shells. The Putilov plant with its cooperation produced in 1914 only 75 thousand 3-dm shells, and in 1916 - 5.1 million shells.

If in 1914 the entire Russian industry produced 516 thousand 3-dm shells, then in 1915 - already 8.825 million according to Barsukov, and 10 million according to Manikovsky, and in 1916 already 26.9 million. shots according to Barsukov. "The Most Submissive Reports of the War Ministry" give even more significant figures for the supply of 3-dm shells of Russian production to the army - in 1915, 12.3 million shells, and in 1916 - 29.4 million shots. Thus, the annual production of 3-dm shells in 1916 practically tripled, and the monthly production of 3-dm shells from January 1915 to December 1916 increased 12 times!

Of particular note is the well-known organization of the authorized GAU Vankov, which organized a large number of private enterprises for the production of shells and played an outstanding role in the mobilization of industry and the promotion of shell production. In total, Vankov involved 442 private factories (!) in production and cooperation. Since April 1915, the Vankov organization received orders for 13.04 million French-style 3-inch grenades and 1 million chemical projectiles, as well as 17.09 million ignition cups and 17.54 million detonators. The issuance of shells began already in September 1915, by the end of the year it produced 600 thousand shells, and in 1916 the Vankov organization manufactured about 7 million shells, bringing the output to 783 thousand in December 1916. By the end of 1917, there were it manufactured 13.6 million 3-inch shells of all types.

In view of the success of the work of the Vankov organization, in 1916 it was issued orders for an additional 1.41 million heavy shells with a caliber from 48 lin to 12 dm, as well as 1 million shells (57, 75 and 105 mm) for Romania. Vankov's organization in the shortest possible time set up a new for Russia production of heavy shells from steel cast iron. As is known, it was the mass production of steel-cast iron shells that to a large extent contributed to the resolution of the shell crisis in France. Starting the production of such shells in Russia at the end of 1916, the Vankov organization almost completely fulfilled orders for the casting of all ordered heavy shells by the end of 1917 (although due to the collapse, only about 600 thousand of them were processed).

Along with this, efforts continued to expand the production of 3-inch shells at state-owned enterprises. In 1917, it was planned to bring the production of 3-dm shells at the Izhevsk plant to 1 million per year, in addition, 1 million 3-dm shells per year were planned to be produced at the new large Kamensk state-owned steel plant under construction (more on that below).

Let us add that 56 million shots for Russian 3-inch guns were ordered abroad, of which 12.6 million, according to the "Most Submissive Report", were received in 1916 (notes that Barsukov generally gives lower figures for many positions than "Reports"). In 1917, 10 million shells of the Morgan order were expected from the USA and up to 9 million from the Canadian order.

Estimated in 1917, it was expected to receive up to 36 million 3-dm shots from Russian industry (taking into account Vankov's organization) and up to 20 million from imports. This number exceeded even the highest possible wishes of the army. It should be noted here that on the basis of the shell crisis at the beginning of the war, the Russian command in 1916 was seized by something like a psychopathy in terms of stockpiling shells. For the whole of 1916, according to various estimates, the Russian army expended 16.8 million shells of 3 dm caliber, of which 11 million - in five summer months the most intense battles, and not experiencing any special problems with ammunition. Recall that with such an expense, in 1916, up to 42 million shells were actually delivered to the War Department. In the summer of 1916, the gene. Alekseev in a note demanded for the future the supply of 4.5 million shells per month. In December 1916, the Headquarters formulated the need for 3-inch shells for 1917 with a frankly overestimated figure of 42 million pieces. In January 1917, the Upart took a more reasonable position, formulating the requirements for the supply of 2.2 million shells per month for this year (or 26.6 million in total). Manikovsky, however, considered this too high. In January 1917, Upart stated that the annual need for 3-dm shells was "satisfied with excess" and that by January 1, 1917, the army had a stock of 3-dm rounds of 16.298 million pieces - in other words, the actual annual consumption of 1916. During the first two months of 1917, approximately 2.75 million 3-inch rounds were delivered to the front. As we can see, practically all of these calculations would have been more than covered in 1917 only by Russian production, and most likely by 1918 Russian light artillery would have come up with a frank overstocking of ammunition, and while maintaining and at least a limited increase in the pace of production and deliveries to by the end of 1918, the warehouses would generally be bursting with huge stocks of 3-dm shells.

Heavy artillery shells. The main manufacturer of heavy ground artillery shells (caliber over 100 mm) before the WWII was the Obukhov plant, the Perm plant, as well as the other three plants of the mining department mentioned above. At the beginning of the war, four mining plants (including Perm) already had 1.134 million (!) Shells of caliber 42 and 48 lin and 6 dm in operation (excluding heavier ones), another 23.5 thousand shells were ordered by Russian society. With the outbreak of war, emergency orders were made for another 630,000 rounds of heavy artillery. Thus, statements about the supposedly small amount of heavy projectiles produced before the war and at the beginning of the war are in themselves an absurd myth. During the war, the release of heavy shells grew like an avalanche.

With the outbreak of war, the expansion of the production of heavy shells at the Perm plant began. Already in 1914, the plant produced 161 thousand heavy shells of all types (up to 14 dm), in 1915 - 185 thousand, in 1916 - 427 thousand, including the production of 48-lin shells was from 1914 quadruple (up to 290 thousand). Already in 1915, the production of heavy shells was carried out at 10 state-owned and private factories with a constant expansion of output.

In addition, since 1915, mass production of heavy shells (up to 12 dm) was started at the Putilov factories group - in 1915, 140 thousand shells were delivered, and in 1916 - already about 1 million. In 1917, despite collapse began, the group produced 1.31 million heavy shells.

Finally, Vankov's organization manufactured more than 600,000 ready-made heavy shells in a year from the end of 1916 to the end of 1917, having mastered the production of steel-cast iron shells, which was new for Russia.

Summing up the production of heavy shells in Russia before the revolution, it should be noted that Barsukov, whom they like to refer to, gives obviously incorrect data on the release of heavy shells in 1914 - allegedly only 24 thousand 48-dm shells and 2100 11-dm grenades , which contradicts all known data and his own information about the release of shells for individual factories (he has the same incorrect data for 3-dm shells). The tables cited in Manikovsky's edition are even more stupid. According to the "Most Submissive Report on the War Ministry for 1914", from August 1, 1914 to January 1, 1915, 446 thousand shots for 48-lin howitzers, 203.5 thousand shots for 6- dm howitzers, 104.2 thousand shots for 42-lin guns, and this is not counting shells of other types. Thus, it is estimated that only in the last five months of 1914, at least 800 thousand heavy shells were fired (which coincides with the data on the reserve at the beginning of the war). The document of 1915 "The summary of information on the supply of the army with artillery shells" in the "Military Industry of Russia" gives the release of approximately 160 thousand heavy land shells in the last 4 months of 1914, although it is not clear from the text how complete these data are.

There are suspicions that Barsukov also underestimated the production of heavy artillery shells in 1915-1916. So, according to Barsukov, in 1915, 9.568 million shells of all types (including 3 dm) were manufactured in Russia and another 1.23 million shells were received from abroad, and in 1916, 30.975 million shells of all types were manufactured and about 14 million received from abroad. According to the “Most Submissive Reports on the War Ministry”, in 1915 more than 12.5 million shells of all types were delivered to the active army, and in 1916 - 48 million shells (including 42 million 3-dm). For Manikovsky, the figures for supplying shells to the army in 1915 coincide with the “Report”, however, the figure for filing for 1916 is one and a half times less - he gives only 32 million shells, including 5.55 million heavy ones. Finally, according to another table by Manikovsky, in 1916, 6.2 million heavy shells were delivered to the troops, plus 520,000 rounds for French 90-mm guns.

If for 3-dm shells Barsukov’s numbers are more or less “beating”, then for shells of larger calibers, when Barsukov’s numbers are taken for granted, obvious inconsistencies form. The figure cited by him for the release of 740 thousand heavy shells in 1915, with the release of at least 800 thousand in five months of 1914, is completely inconsistent and contradicts all known data and obvious trends - and the data of the same Manikovsky about supplying 1.312 million heavy shells to the army in 1915 In my opinion, the release of heavy shells in 1915-1916. at Barsukov, it is underestimated by about 1 million shots (apparently due to the failure to take into account the products of some factories). There are also doubts about Barsukov's statistics for 1917.

However, even if we take Barsukov’s figures on faith, then in 1916 Russia produced 4 million heavy shells, and in the crisis year of 1917, despite everything, already 6.7 million. At the same time, according to Barsukov, it turns out that that the release of 6-inch howitzer shells in 1917 increased in relation to 1915 by 20 times (!) - up to 2.676 million, and 48-lin howitzer shells - 10 times (up to 3.328 million). The actual increase, in my opinion, was somewhat less, but nevertheless, the numbers are impressive. Thus, only from 1914 to 1917, Russia manufactured from 11.5 million (Barsukov's estimate) to at least 13 million (my estimate) of heavy shells, and up to 3 million more heavy shells were imported (from 90 -mm). In real terms, all this meant that the Russian heavy artillery quickly overcame the “shell hunger”, and in 1917 a situation of an overabundance of heavy artillery ammunition began to develop - for example, 42-lin guns in the active army had 4260 rounds in January 1917 per barrel, 48-lin and 6-dm howitzers by September 1917 - up to 2700 rounds per barrel (despite the fact that a considerable part - more than half - of the huge release of shells of these types in 1917 did not hit the troops). Even the mass deployment of heavy artillery production in 1917-1918. unlikely to change this situation. It is most significant that even the extremely inflated and unjustified requirements of the Stavka of December 1916 for 1917 - 6.6 million shells of 48-lin and 2.26 million shells of 6-inch - were covered by 6-inch by the actual release of this disastrous 1917 G.

However, as it was noted, in fact, production was only heating up, the results of which appeared precisely in 1917. Most likely, without a revolution, one could expect a summer residence in 1917 of up to 10 million heavy shells. There was an expansion of the production of heavy shells at the Putilov group, and the possibility of loading the Vankov organization with mass production of 48-lin and 6-inch howitzer shells after completing its order for 3-inch grenades was considered. Judging by the rate of release of these heavy shells by the Vankov organization in 1917, the successes here could also be very significant.

Finally, for the mass production of heavy shells, the largest of the projects of the Russian defense industry being implemented in WWI was calculated - a large state-owned steel and shell factory in st. Kamensk Region of the Don Cossacks. Initially, the plant was designed and approved by the construction in August 1915 as a steel foundry for the production of weapons steel and gun barrels with a design annual capacity of 1 million gun barrels, 1 million 3-dm shells, and more than 1 million pounds of "special steels". The estimated cost of such production was 49 million rubles. In 1916, the project of the plant was supplemented by the creation of the most powerful state-owned shell production in Russia with a planned output per year of 3.6 million 6-inch shells, 360 thousand 8-inch shells and 72 thousand 11-inch and 12-inch shells. The total cost of the complex reached 187 million rubles, the equipment was ordered in the USA and Great Britain. Construction began in April 1916, by October 1917 the construction of the main workshops was underway, but due to the collapse, only a small part of the equipment was delivered. At the beginning of 1918, the construction was finally stopped. Being at the epicenter civil war, the unfinished plant was plundered and actually liquidated.

Another steel-making state-owned plant has been built since 1915 in Lugansk with a design capacity of 4.1 million poods of weapons-grade steel per year.

Mortars and bombers. The production of mortar and bomb-throwing weapons before the start of WWI was absent in Russia and unfolded on a broad front starting in 1915, mainly due to the division of private enterprises through the TsVPK. If in 1915 1548 bombers and 1438 mortars were handed over (excluding improvised and obsolete systems), then in 1916 - already 10850 bombers, 1912 mortars and 60 trench mortars of Erhardt (155 mm), and the release of ammunition for mortars and bombers increased from 400 thousand to 7.554 million shots, that is, almost 19 times. By October 1916, the needs of the troops in bombers were covered by 100%, and in mortars by 50%, and full coverage was expected by July 1, 1917. As a result, by the end of 1917, bombers in the army were twice against the state (14 thousand with a staff of 7 thousand), small-caliber mortars - 90% of the staff (4500 with a staff of 5 thousand), large-caliber mortars for TAON - 11% (267 units) of the projected huge need for 2400 systems. There was a clear surplus in ammunition for bombers, and therefore their release in 1917 was curtailed with a reorientation to the production of mines for mortars, in which there was a shortage. In 1917, the production of 3 million mines was expected.

For 1917, it was planned to reorient production from bomb-throwers to mortars (in 1917, according to Barsukov, 1024 mortars were produced, but there are suspicions that his data for 1917 is clearly incomplete, which is confirmed by his own data on the presence of systems in the troops), as well as an increase in the production of large-caliber systems (for example, the production of 155-mm trench mortars of its own production began at the Metal Plant - 100 units were commissioned in a year, and the production of 240-mm mortars was also mastered). Another 928 bombers, 185 mortars and 1.29 million pieces of ammunition for them were imported by the end of 1917 (the data may also be incomplete).

Hand grenades. The production of hand grenades was carried out before the start of WWI in small quantities for fortresses. The production of grenades in Russia was mainly carried out by small private industry in 1915-1916. increased in colossal quantities, and increased from January 1915 to September 1916 by 23 times - from 55 thousand to 1.282 million pieces. If in 1915 2.132 million grenades were made, then in 1916 - already 10 million. Another 19 million grenades were in 1915-1916. obtained by import. In January 1917, the need was declared for the army to supply 1.21 million hand grenades per month (or 14.5 million per year), which was completely covered by the achieved level of Russian production.

Rifle grenades were manufactured in 1916, 317 thousand, and delivery was expected in 1917 to 600 thousand. In January 1917, 40 thousand Dyakonov mortars and 6.125 million rounds for them were also ordered, but due to the collapse that had begun, mass production was never arranged.

Powder. By the beginning of the WWI, gunpowder for the military department was produced at three state-owned gunpowder factories - Okhtensky, Kazansky and Shostkensky (Chernigov province.), The maximum productivity of each of which was estimated at 100 thousand pounds of gunpowder per year., And for the naval department - also at the Shlisselburg private plant with a capacity of up to 200 thousand pounds. At factories and warehouses, gunpowder stocks amounted to 439 thousand pounds.

With the outbreak of war, work began on the expansion of all four plants - for example, the capacity and number of employees at the Okhtensky plant were tripled. By 1917, the capacity of the Okhten plant was increased to 300 thousand pounds, Kazan - up to 360 thousand pounds, Shostken - up to 445 thousand pounds, Shlisselburg - up to 350 thousand pounds. At the same time, starting from 1915, next to the old Kazan plant, a new Kazan powder plant with a capacity of another 300 thousand pounds was built, which began work in 1917.

In 1914, even before the war, the Military Department began the construction of a powerful Tambov state-owned gunpowder plant with a capacity of up to 600,000 poods per year. The plant cost 30.1 million rubles and began work in October 1916, however, due to the collapse of 1917, it had just begun to function. At the same time, in order to fulfill the orders of the Maritime Department, at the beginning of 1914, the construction of a private plant of Baranovsky (Vladimirsky) with a design capacity of 240 thousand pounds was started. in year. After the outbreak of the war, the equipment ordered in Germany had to be re-ordered in the USA and Great Britain. The Baranovsky plant was put into operation in August 1916, although it continued to be equipped, and by the end of 1917 produced 104 thousand pounds of gunpowder. At the end of 1916 the plant was nationalized.

The production of smokeless powder (including the Shlisselburg plant) in 1914 amounted to 437.6 thousand pounds, in 1915 - 773.7 thousand, in 1916 - 986 thousand pounds. Thanks to the reconstruction, by 1917 the capacity was increased to 2 million poods, but due to the revolution, they did not manage to get a return on this. Prior to this, the main needs had to be covered by imports, which amounted to 2 million poods of smokeless powder in 1915-1916 (200 thousand in 1915 and 1.8 million in 1916).

In the summer of 1916, the construction of the Samara state-owned gunpowder plant with a capacity of 600 thousand pounds, with an estimated cost of 30 million rubles, began on American equipment, and, among other things, the pyroxylin plant of the American company Nonabo was bought. Almost all the equipment arrived in Russia, but in 1917 construction slowed down sharply and came to naught in 1918, and the equipment was eventually distributed among the “old” gunpowder factories under the Soviets. Thus, in 1918, the total capacity of gunpowder production in Russia could reach 3.2 million poods per year, pacifying compared to 1914, which made it possible to actually get rid of imports. This amount of gunpowder was enough to produce 70 million charges for 3-inch shells and 6 billion cartridges. It should also be added that the possibility of issuing orders for the development of the production of gunpowder to private chemical plants was considered. I note that at the beginning of 1917, the total need for the next year and a half of the war (until July 1, 1918) was determined at 6.049 million poods of smokeless and 1.241 million poods of black powder.

In addition, in 1916-1917. the construction of the Tashkent state-owned cotton-cleaning plant was carried out at a cost of 4 million rubles with an initial capacity of 200 thousand poods of refined material per year with prospects for a subsequent sharp expansion.

Explosives. The release of TNT and the equipment of ammunition of the Military Department before WWI was carried out by the Okhtensky and Samara explosives plants. With the outbreak of war, the capacities of both plants were expanded many times over. The Okhten plant produced 13,950 poods of TNT in 1914, but its TNT production was severely damaged by an explosion in April 1915. The Samara plant increased TNT output from 1914 to 1916. four times - from 51.32 thousand poods to 211 thousand poods, and tetrila 11 times - from 447 to 5187 poods. The equipment of shells at both factories increased during this period by 15-20 times - for example, for 3-inch shells at each from 80 thousand to more than 1.1 million units. In 1916, the Samara plant supplied 1.32 million heavy shells, plus 2.5 million hand grenades.

By 1916, the Shlisselburg plant of the Naval Department produced up to 400 thousand poods of TNT, the Grozny plant of the Naval Department - 120 thousand poods, in addition, 8 private factories were connected to the production of TNT. Before WWI, picric acid was produced at two private factories, and already in 1915 at seven, and in Russia a synthetic method for producing picric acid from benzene was developed, mastered by two factories. Two plants mastered the production of trinitroxyol and two - dinitronaphthalene.

The total number of enterprises for the production of explosives for the GAU increased from four by the beginning of WWI to 28 in January 1917. Their total capacity in January 1917 was 218 thousand pounds per month, incl. 52 thousand pounds of TNT, 50 thousand pounds of picric acid, 60 thousand pounds of ammonium nitrate, 9 thousand pounds of xylene, 12 thousand pounds of dinitronaphthalene. This meant a tripling in comparison with December 1915. In fact, in a number of cases, the capacities were even excessive. In 1916, Russia produced only 1.4 million poods of explosives, and imported 2.089 million poods of explosives (including 618.5 thousand poods of TNT) and 1.124 thousand poods of ammonium nitrate. In 1917, a turning point was expected in favor of domestic production, and in 1918, the volume of Russian explosives production was estimated to be at least 4 million poods, excluding ammonium nitrate.

Even before the WWI GAU, the construction of the Nizhny Novgorod Explosives Plant was planned. Construction began at the beginning of 1916 at an estimated cost of 17.4 million rubles and a planned output per year of 630,000 poods of TNT and 13,700 poods of tetryl. By the beginning of 1917, the main structures were erected and the delivery of equipment began. Due to the collapse, everything stopped, but later, under the Soviets, the plant was already put into operation.

In the autumn of 1916, the construction of the Ufa Explosives Plant was also authorized, costing 20.6 million rubles and with a capacity of 510 thousand pounds of TNT and 7 thousand pounds of tetryl per year and a capacity of 6 million 3-dm per year. and 1.8 million heavy shells, as well as 3.6 million hand grenades. Because of the revolution, things did not go further than choosing a site.

In 1915-1916. A special Trinity (Sergievsky) equipment factory was built near Sergiev Posad. The cost is 3.5 million rubles, the capacity is 1.25 million hand grenades per year, as well as the production of capsules and fuses. Six equipment workshops have also been built for equipping hand grenades and mines for mortars and bombers.

To obtain benzene (for the production of toluene and picric acid) in 1915, the Makeevsky and Kadievsky state-owned factories were built in the Donbass in a short time, and a program was adopted to build 26 private benzene factories, of which 15 were commissioned by the beginning of 1917. three of these plants also produced toluene.

In Grozny and Ekaterinodar, by the end of 1916, under a contract with the GAU, private production facilities were organized for the extraction of mononitrotoluene from gasoline with a capacity of 100 and 50 thousand poods per year, respectively. At the beginning of 1916, the Baku and Kazan plants for the production of toluene from oil were also launched, with a capacity of 24,000 (in 1917 it was planned to increase to 48,000) and 12,000 poods of toluene, respectively. As a result, the production of toluene in Russia increased from zero to 28 thousand poods per month by May 1917. Then the construction of three private plants for this purpose (including Nobel) was started in Baku, commissioned in 1917.

For the production of synthetic phenol (for the production of picric acid) were in 1915-1916. four factories were built, giving 124.9 thousand pounds in 1916

Before WWI sulfuric acid produced in Russia in the amount of 1.25 million poods per month (of which 0.5 million poods in Poland), while ¾ of the raw materials were imported. During the year from December 1915, 28 new private factories for the production of sulfuric acid were put into operation with an increase in monthly production in Russia from 0.8 million to 1.865 million poods. The extraction of sulfur pyrites in the Urals has tripled in a year and a half since August 1915.

Nitric acid was produced in Russia from Chilean selite, the annual import of which amounted to 6 million poods. To work out nitric acid a whole program was launched from Russian materials (ammonia), and in 1916 an experimental state-owned plant was built in Yuzovka with a capacity of 600 thousand pounds of ammonium nitrate per year, according to the model of which it was planned to build a network of plants, of which they managed to build two in the Donbass. In the autumn of 1916, the construction in Grozny of a large calcium cyanamide plant for the production of bound nitrogen was also authorized.

In 1916, the construction of a large Nizhny Novgorod plant for nitric and sulfuric acids began, with an output of 200,000 poods of nitric acid per year. On the Suna River in the Olonetsk province, in 1915, the construction of the Onega plant for the production of nitric acid by the arc method from air was started. The cost of this enterprise was a hefty sum of 26.1 million rubles. By 1917, only part of the work had been done, and because of the collapse, everything was stopped.

It is interesting that the main motive for accelerating the work on the construction and modernization of gunpowder production and the production of explosives since 1916 was a frank desire to get rid of the import of gunpowder and explosives (as well as materials for their production) "to the new Berlin Congress" in the face of a possible confrontation with the former allies. This is especially true of the establishment of the production of nitric acid, which was directly linked by the leadership of the GAU with the possibility of a British naval blockade in the event of a confrontation in a future peace settlement.

poisonous substances. The development of the production of OM in Russia began in an accelerated way in the summer of 1915. First of all, the production of chlorine was already established at two factories in the Donbass by September, and its output by the autumn of 1916 was 600 pounds per day, which covered the demands of the front. In parallel, in Finland, state-owned chlorine plants were being built in Vargauz and Kayan worth 3.2 million rubles. the total capacity is also 600 pounds per day. Due to the actual sabotage of construction by the Finnish Senate, the factories were only completed by the end of 1917.

In 1915, in a short time, the Globinsky military-chemical state-owned plant was built in the Donbass, which at first produced chlorine, but in 1916-1917. reoriented to produce 20,000 poods of phosgene and 7,000 poods of chloropicrin per year. In 1916, the Kazan State Military Chemical Plant was built and put into operation in early 1917 at a cost of 400,000 rubles and with an annual output of 50,000 poods of phosgene and 100,000 poods of chlorine. Four more private factories were oriented to the production of phosgene, two of which began to produce products in 1916. Chloropicrin was produced at 6 private factories, sulfurin chloride and chloride anhydride - at one plant, stannous chloride - at one, potassium cyanide - at one, chloroform - on one, arsenic chloride - on one. In total, 30 plants were already producing poisonous substances in 1916, and in 1917 another 11 plants were expected to be connected, including both Finnish chloride plants. In 1916, 1.42 million 3-inch chemical shells were equipped.

You can also write separately about the production of tubes and fuses, optics, supplies, etc., but in general, we see the same trend everywhere - absolutely enchanting scale of the expansion of military production in Russia in 1915-1916, the massive involvement of the private sector, the construction of new large modern state-owned enterprises, which would enable an even more grandiose expansion of output in 1917-1919. with real prospects for complete elimination of imports. Mikhailov determined the estimated cost of the Great Program for the Construction of Military Plants at 655.2 million rubles; in fact, taking into account a number of other enterprises, it was at least 800 million rubles. At the same time, there were no problems with the allocation of these funds, and the construction of large military enterprises was carried out in many cases at an accelerated pace.

Brief conclusions:

1) Russia achieved a colossal and still underestimated jump in military production in 1914-1917. The growth of military production and the development of the defense industry in 1914-1917. were probably the largest in Russian history, surpassing in relative numbers any jumps in military production during the Soviet period (including the Second World War).

2) Many bottlenecks in supply and military production were successfully overcome and by 1917, and even more so by 1918, Russian industry was ready to supply the Russian army in abundance with almost everything necessary.

3) The accelerated volumes of military production and the real prospects for its further build-up made it possible in 1918 for the Russian army to reach the parameters of providing for the main types of ground weapons (primarily artillery), comparable to the armies of the Western allies (France).

4) The growth of military production in Russia in 1914-1917. It was ensured by the mobilization of private and state-owned industry on a huge scale, as well as by increasing production capacities and building new enterprises, with an enormous amount of state investment in military production. Many of the military enterprises built or started during this period formed the basis of the domestic defense industry in their specializations for the interwar period and even beyond. The Russian Empire has demonstrated high ability to invest in the military industry and real opportunities a gigantic increase in the capacities and capabilities of the PKK in the shortest possible time. Thus, there are no grounds for ascribing such opportunities only to Soviet power, except for religious ones. The Soviet government rather continued the traditions of the organization and development of the Russian military industry of the late imperial period, rather than fundamentally surpassed them.