Over the past 50 years, relations in the military-strategic field and in the directly related sphere of international arms control, primarily nuclear arms, have been the central element of Russian-American interaction. It seems that from now on, bilateral, and, consequently, multilateral nuclear arms control is becoming a historical monument.
Today, the US does not intend to tie its hands by any kind of agreements on the issues of arms limitation and reduction.
Noticeable changes are taking place in US military policy for reasons deeper than the need to combat transnational terrorism. The START-2 and CTBT (on nuclear testing) treaties that they have not ratified have long been forgotten. Washington announced its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The Pentagon's budget has been sharply increased (almost by $100 billion). A new nuclear doctrine has been adopted that provides for the modernization of strategic offensive weapons, the creation of low-yield penetrating nuclear warheads that can be used in combination with high-precision conventional weapons, and the possibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
In addition to the political component - the continuation of the US line on global military-political dominance in the 21st century - this course also has technological and economic dimensions related to the interests of American military-industrial corporations, as well as the intention of the American leadership through massive financial injections into large military-technological programs to ensure an increase in the scientific and technical level of American industry.
According to some of our experts, the changes military policy Washington do not pose a direct threat to Russia's national security, at least for the next 10-15 years, until the actual deployment of a strategic missile defense system by the Americans. However, these changes, above all the termination of the ABM Treaty, call into question the international arms control regime, may cause new round arms race, to give an additional impetus to the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.
Russia's tactical line with regard to US actions appears to have been correct: the Russian leadership did not panic, did not take the path of rhetorical threats, and did not declare a desire to compete with the US in the field of offensive and defensive weapons. At the same time, it is also obvious that the steps taken by the Americans are classified as strategic and therefore require strategic decisions from us regarding our own nuclear policy.
The following factors seem to be important in determining our further line.
Despite the significant improvement in the international situation and the minimization of the likelihood of major wars and military conflicts between the leading states, there is no drastic reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in their policies. On the contrary, September terrorist attacks of unprecedented scale and changing threat priorities lead, judging by the new US nuclear doctrine, to lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons with the possibility of a poorly controlled escalation. This is also facilitated by the further proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, as well as the growing regional instability.
In whatever direction political relations between Moscow and Washington develop, as long as nuclear weapons remain in their arsenals, the military departments will be forced to develop plans for their use against each other, at least "as a last resort."
The peculiarity of the period after the end of the Cold War lies in the unpredictability of the development of the military-political situation in the world. In this situation, the United States continues to modernize its nuclear forces and retain the ability to build them up quickly; at the same time, the issue of concluding new legally binding and verifiable agreements with Russia on irreversible reductions in strategic offensive arms remains open.
The technological backlog accumulated in the United States and the results of full-scale tests of individual missile defense components indicate the possibility in the medium term to deploy a fully operational limited anti-missile system, the density of which can be constantly increased in the future.
Based on this, Russia has no other choice but to remain a powerful nuclear power for the foreseeable future. The current plans for the development of Russian strategic nuclear forces, on the one hand, were designed for the entry into force of the START-2 Treaty and the preservation of the ABM Treaty, and on the other hand, they are focused on turning them into a kind of American "triad" with an increase in the contribution of naval and aviation components to the detriment of the ground grouping of ICBMs.
In the new strategic situation created by the United States, it becomes necessary to urgently review our plans in the field of strategic nuclear forces in the direction of maximizing the service life of a ground group of ICBMs with MIRVs; maintain the planned combat strength the marine part of the "triad", as well as the aviation component, capable of solving both nuclear and non-nuclear tasks. Neither from the military nor from the economic point of view would it be unjustified to retain the old plans developed for a qualitatively different situation. The relevance of the development of information and control systems for Russia's strategic nuclear forces is also increasing.
A nuclear balance with the United States in a relatively wide range of total warheads and combat capabilities (we are not talking about the unrealizable restoration of parity) would still ensure a special strategic relationship with the United States and a politically significant role for Russia in the world. At the same time, the interest of the United States in continuing the dialogue on offensive and defensive weapons and on the entire range of political and economic relations would be maintained. The relevance of the development of information and control systems for Russia's strategic nuclear forces is also increasing.
On the diplomatic side, everything possible must be done to preserve the negotiated arms control regime, including the task of concluding a new START treaty with the United States.
At the same time, the analysis shows that the United States most likely will not agree to a full-scale treaty providing for irreversible and controlled reductions in strategic arms, which the Russian side initially insisted on. In addition, contrary to earlier repeated assurances that the American missile defense system being developed will be limited (capable of intercepting only a few dozen warheads), Washington is clearly not yet inclined to fix such restrictions. If behind this are US plans for the active use of space systems, then it becomes all the more obvious that the future American missile defense system could potentially threaten Russia as well.
The Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials (SNOR), concluded in May 2004 in Moscow, does not meet the fundamental requirements of the irreversibility and controllability of reductions and, moreover, does not provide for restrictions on the capabilities of the missile defense system. Essentially, it means that the United States is not actually reducing either strategic delivery vehicles or nuclear warheads for them. By conditionally dividing their strategic offensive arms into operationally deployed and reserve, they only transfer part of the currently deployed assets to the operational reserve, thereby increasing the return potential. This means that at any moment in time the Americans can increase their operationally deployed strategic weapons to almost the current level. But we, taking into account the peculiarities of our strategic offensive weapons, their remaining service life, the collapse of the previously existing cooperation between manufacturers and a number of other factors, are forced to actually reduce our strategic offensive weapons. At the same time, the economic costs of their elimination and disposal are quite significant for us.
Under these conditions, the United States, especially taking into account the creation of an anti-missile potential in the near future, will receive absolute strategic dominance in the world, the opportunity to act without any reservations from a position of strength in resolving any international issues, including in relation to Russia.
For our part, it would be expedient to move towards the signing of a new agreement that would include the following fundamental elements:
An agreed limit on warheads (in the range of 1700-2200 units), achieved within 10 years, combined with the freedom to place warheads on carriers and the irreversibility of reductions in strategic offensive arms;
Keeping the control measures established under the START-1 Treaty in a "light" mode;
Fixing the provisions on the limitation of the future missile defense system, which the American side is talking about, by establishing the maximum agreed number of warheads that such missile defense system will be able to intercept;
Ban on the deployment of space-based systems;
Ensuring transparency and enhanced regime of confidence-building measures in the field of strategic arms.
With this option, Russia would largely retain the independence of its nuclear policy and at the same time achieve acceptable restrictions for us on the development of strategic offensive and defensive weapons.
If no agreement can be reached on this basis, then the Americans could be invited to sign a joint statement on the readiness of the parties to complete consultations (negotiations) on the problem of strategic arms in the near future. Such a decision would allow us to more thoroughly and comprehensively analyze the current situation, including taking into account the long-term consequences of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, as well as to calculate various options for the development of our strategic nuclear forces in the new conditions, not limited by treaty obligations.
At the same time, it is advisable to put forward our deeply thought-out and well-reasoned proposals for cooperation with the United States in the field of missile defense that does not undermine strategic stability, including the joint creation and use of global information systems, as well as a new generation of confidence-building measures in the field of nuclear weapons - both strategic as well as tactical. The political advantage of such a step for Russia is obvious.
In particular, it could be proposed to jointly develop a Russian-American space-based information system (now the Americans themselves are working on such a low-orbit system, called SBIRS-Low, which for us is one of the most critical components of the future American missile defense system). This idea of ours can be motivated by the new nature of Russian-American relations, the readiness of the United States for cooperation between our two countries, including in the field of missile defense, the strengthening of confidence and the fact that the future missile defense system, according to the US President, will not be directed against Russia. The attitude of the Americans to our proposal will clearly demonstrate how true the statements of American officials about the absence of a Russian orientation of the missile defense system being developed in the United States.
At the same time, it would be highly desirable to involve the American leadership in a broader political and strategic dialogue. To this end, a proposal could be made on the need to jointly seek ways to minimize the risks arising from the objectively existing situation of mutual nuclear deterrence.
If the Americans show no interest at all in working out any kind of mutually acceptable agreement that takes into account Russia's security interests, we will most likely have no choice but to switch to an independent nuclear policy. In the new situation, Russia could independently determine the quantitative and qualitative composition of its nuclear forces, placing the traditional emphasis on ground-based ICBMs, and above all with MIRVs, which would provide it with the possibility of guaranteed preservation of the US nuclear deterrence potential in any scenario of the development of the military-political situation. Economic opportunities for this, as estimates show, we have.
Under these conditions, it is necessary to weigh the expediency of resuming work on means providing effective counteraction to the American missile defense system, including various methods of both overcoming it and neutralizing it. It is also important to outline a set of measures for active and passive protection of domestic strategic nuclear forces. This is estimated to be the most economical way to counter US missile defense plans. In addition, here we have a solid reserve, which it would be advisable to claim.
In developing Russia's long-term line in the nuclear field, it seems that we need to proceed from the following obvious provisions:
The former understanding of strategic stability, based mainly on the nuclear balance between Russia and the United States, is outdated, and in this sense the ABM Treaty has lost the quality of the "cornerstone" of strategic stability;
The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence, based on the ability of the parties to mutually assured destruction, fundamentally contradicts the proclaimed principle of partnership in bilateral relations;
The ABM Treaty is also outdated in the sense that it was an integral part of the strategic relationship between the USSR and the United States during the Cold War era, a kind of instrument for managing the nuclear arms race during the period of acute confrontation between the two superpowers;
Although the stake on nuclear deterrence is proclaimed in the military doctrines of the leading countries of the world, it should be clear that nuclear weapons are not weapons of the 21st century: they will inevitably be devalued by the deployment of missile defense systems, high-precision conventional weapons and other latest military technologies. We must be prepared for the fact that the United States will at some point raise the question of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons - at least for propaganda purposes. In this sense, "nuclear greatness" after some time will not be able to provide the status of a great power to anyone. Moreover, those countries that continue to focus on nuclear weapons may find themselves at a moral loss after a while.
Therefore, the point is that, taking into account these strategic paradigms for the development of world military policy, which are objective in nature and do not depend on the will of certain political figures, to calculate the most optimal nuclear policy of Russia in essence for the transition period - from nuclear to post-nuclear (non-nuclear) ) to the world. Even if such a transition drags on for decades, a meaningful line of conduct in this matter is needed now - at least taking into account the duration life cycles modern systems nuclear weapons (from 10 to 30 years or more).
At the same time, the Americans could be invited to start a broad political dialogue on transferring the partnership from a declarative phase to a real one. For example, to offer them to conclude a new large-scale agreement of a political nature, similar to the “Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the USA” (1972), but already meeting new realities, challenges and threats international security and a new partnership level of bilateral relations. (It is clear that the Declaration on the Strategic Framework for Russian-American Relations, adopted in Sochi on April 6, 2008, does not solve this problem.) It is in this kind of document that a provision could be made on the need to jointly seek a way out of the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence, confirming previous commitments to work towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This obligation, in particular, could be concretized by an agreement to start consultations on ways for a joint and balanced step-by-step movement towards a nuclear-free world and the conditions for maintaining it.
If a substantive dialogue begins in this area, then the mutual concerns of the parties regarding offensive and defensive weapons will fade into the background, if they are not removed at all. And then the relationship of the parties in the military-strategic field will finally cease to be the dominant feature of bilateral interaction, giving way to cooperation in other areas that are more in line with the challenges and threats of the 21st century
Based on the fact that Russian Federation is the legal successor of the USSR, then it is a full participant in the international treaties ratified by the USSR.
At the end of July 1991, the START-1 Treaty was signed in Moscow. We can boldly say that in terms of its scope, the degree of detail, the complexity of the problems solved in it, this is the first and last Treaty of its kind. Subject of the agreement: ICBMs, SLBMs, launchers of ICBMs, launchers of SLBMs, TBs, as well as warheads of ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear weapons of TBs. The parties agreed to reduce their strategic weapons to the level of 1,600 deployed carriers and 6,000 warheads on them. At the same time, the number of our heavy ICBMs should be reduced by half. Restrictions were also imposed on non-deployed funds. For the first time, a limit was set on the total cast weight ballistic missiles. It should not exceed 3600 tons.
It turned out to be very difficult to agree on the procedure for offsetting strategic offensive weapons, especially TB weapons. Without dwelling on this issue in detail, it should be emphasized that, in the end, a conditional count was adopted here - a heavy bomber was counted as one unit in the number of carriers, and all nuclear bombs and missiles short range on it - like one nuclear warhead. As for ALCMs, they were counted as follows: for the USSR, within 180 TB, 8 warheads per bomber; for the USA, within 150 TB, 10 warheads; which he is actually equipped with.
Reductions in armaments must be carried out in stages within 7 years from the date the Treaty enters into force. It should be noted right away that the Treaty entered into force three and a half years after its signing in December 1994. There were reasons for such a long delay (unfortunately, there is no way to dwell on them). In December 2001, the parties completed the reduction of their armaments to the agreed levels stipulated by the START-1 Treaty. Reductions in armaments were carried out by their elimination or re-equipment according to detailed procedures. Lukashuk, I.I. International law. General part: textbook. for law students fak. and universities; 3rd edition, revised. and additional / I.I. Lukashuk. - M.: Volters Kluver, 2005. - 432 p.
Monitoring compliance with obligations under the START-1 Treaty includes the use of NTSC; 14 different types of inspections; continuous surveillance at mobile ICBM production facilities; providing access to telemetry information transmitted from ballistic missiles during their launches, including the exchange of magnetic tapes with recorded telemetry information; confidence building measures that contribute to the effectiveness of control. To promote the implementation of the goals and provisions of the START-1 Treaty, the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCCI) was created and is still functioning.
It must be said that in the future, important shifts took place in the negotiation process.
Even before the entry into force of the START-1 Treaty, was signed (in January 1993) the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of START, called the START-2 Treaty. This Treaty is ninety percent, if not more, based on the provisions of the START-1 Treaty, and therefore it was prepared in an extremely short time frame, approximately within six months. Tolstykh, B.JI. Well international law: textbook / B.JI. Tolstykh. - M.: Wolters Kluver, 2009. - 1056 p.
The START-2 Treaty provided for the reduction of the strategic offensive arms of the parties to the level of 3000-3500 warheads, with a sublevel of 1700-1750 warheads on SLBMs. The advantage of this Treaty can be considered an agreement on a real count of weapons for all TB. At the same time, its features, and many experts considered it shortcomings, were the requirements for the elimination of ICBMs with MIRVs, as well as the complete elimination of all our heavy ICBMs. The possibility of reorientation (without any mandatory procedures) up to 100 TB for non-nuclear tasks was envisaged. In essence, they were withdrawn from the count. Essentially, all restrictions on the possibility of reducing the number of warheads on ballistic missiles were removed.
All this, it was believed, gave clear advantages to the United States and, as a result, predetermined very heated discussions during the ratification of this Treaty in the State Duma. Ultimately, the State Duma ratified the START-2 Treaty, but the US Congress did not complete this procedure (the Protocol to the START-2 Treaty, signed on September 26, 1997 in New York, on the extension of the arms reduction period was not ratified). With the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the question of putting the START-2 Treaty into effect was finally removed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia June 14 this year issued a formal statement that we no longer consider ourselves bound by this Treaty.
With the coming to power of the US administration of George W. Bush, Jr. abrupt change the attitude of the American side to the development of agreements in the field of arms control. A line was proclaimed to carry out arms reductions unilaterally, without the development of legally binding documents, without appropriate control. It is clear that such an approach, if adopted, would lead to the destruction of the negotiating process. This could not be allowed.
Under such conditions, the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials of Russia and the United States was born, which was prepared in record time and signed on May 24 of this year in Moscow. This treaty immediately sparked heated debate. The supporters of the Treaty see the reductions envisaged in it to the level of 1700-2200 deployed warheads as a step aimed at further strengthening strategic stability. It is also considered an achievement that it is legally binding. Opponents of the SORT Treaty emphasize that it is essentially only a document of intent. It does not define the subject of the agreement, there are no rules for counting nuclear warheads, reduction procedures, and control provisions. The reductions under the new Treaty should be completed in 2012. At the same time, it keeps in force the START-1 Treaty, which expires 3 years earlier - in 2009. And it is not clear how the new Treaty will function during these three years?
Of course, all these questions are valid. But one cannot ignore the fact that the reduction in the level of warheads on deployed launchers from 6000 units. (under the START-1 Treaty) to 1700-2200, this is a step that contributes to strengthening security and stability.
By the end of the 1990s. the process of nuclear disarmament between countries has significantly slowed down. The main reason is the weakness of the Russian economy, which could not maintain the quantitative parameters of the strategic forces at the same level as the Soviet one. In 2002, the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials (SOR Treaty) was concluded, which entered into force on June 1, 2003. The Treaty consists of 5 articles, strategic delivery vehicles are not mentioned in it. According to the agreement, the parties pledged by December 31, 2012 to increase the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 units. However, the treaty does not have a clear concept of what is meant by the term "strategic nuclear warhead", and therefore it is not clear how to count them. When signing the SOR Agreement, the parties did not agree on what they were going to reduce, and therefore this agreement does not provide for control measures. After the signing of this treaty, a long period of stagnation in the disarmament sphere began, and finally, in 2009-2010. certain positive trends began to emerge. Tolstykh, B.JI. Course of international law: textbook / B.JI. Tolstykh. - M.: Wolters Kluver, 2009. - 1056 p.
On April 5, 2009 in Prague (Czech Republic), the President of the United States announced an initiative on a future without nuclear weapons and possible ways to achieve it. During his speech, Barack Obama not only noted the existing challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons, ongoing testing of nuclear weapons, the black market for trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, etc., but and outlined the trajectory to be followed in order to build a world without nuclear weapons. First, it is the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies of states. It is necessary to begin work in this direction with the reduction of strategic arms. To implement a global nuclear test ban, the Obama administration will immediately and aggressively push for US ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and encourage other countries to join the process. To cut off the channels through which the elements needed to build nuclear bombs come in, it is necessary to push for a new treaty that would ban the production of fissile materials in a controlled manner for use in the state's nuclear weapons arsenals.
Second, in order to strengthen the NPT, a number of principles need to be adopted:
- 1. It is urgently necessary to find additional resources to strengthen the powers of international inspections;
- 2. Real and immediate consequences need to be identified for countries that break the rules or attempt to withdraw from the NPT without good reason.
NPT violators must be punished. On April 6, 2010, a new US nuclear doctrine was adopted, which allows the US to use nuclear weapons against a number of states, in particular those that do not comply with obligations under the NPT. Moreover, these countries are named specifically - North Korea and Iran;
3. A new framework for civilian nuclear cooperation should be created, including an international nuclear fuel bank, so that all countries that have given up nuclear weapons have access to peaceful energy without increasing the risk of proliferation. Paramuzova, O.G. Nuclear safety in the conditions of modern international law and order / O.G. Paramuzov. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg. un-ta, 2006. - 388 p.
At the same time, the US President stated that his administration would strive to interact with Iran on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect. The US supports Iran's right to peaceful nuclear activities subject to rigorous IAEA scrutiny. However, until these checks are carried out in full, Iran's activities pose a threat to Iran's neighbors, the United States, as well as American allies. As long as the Iranian threat persists, the US will continue to pursue plans to create effective system missile defense (ABM). If the Iranian nuclear threat is eliminated, the US will terminate the missile defense program; 5. It is imperative that we work together to ensure that terrorists never acquire nuclear weapons. In this regard, B. Obama announced new international efforts aimed at ensuring the protection of all vulnerable nuclear materials throughout the world within four years. All countries should develop partnerships to secure these potentially dangerous materials and step up their efforts to destroy the black market, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial instruments to eliminate the channels of this dangerous trade. We need to start with a global nuclear security summit.
The United States, as the only nuclear power to use nuclear weapons, has no moral right to remain idle, which is why the President of the United States has clearly and with conviction proclaimed America's commitment to the cause of peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons. At the same time, the US President emphasized that he is well aware that this goal will not be achieved quickly, perhaps this will not happen while he is alive, but the entire world community will need patience and perseverance in resolving this complex issue.
For its part, the Russian Federation has always supported and interacted with the authors of initiatives aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament (the Hoover Initiative, the Evans-Kawaguchi Commission, etc., which are based on proposals aimed at strengthening the NPT, solving global security problems on a multilateral basis) . Russia views the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal of a gradual, stage-by-stage process of general and complete disarmament. This goal can only be achieved through an integrated approach under favorable international conditions, i.e. while maintaining strategic stability and observing the principle of equal security for all states without exception, taking into account the existing inextricable relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons, as was said by the President of the Russian Federation D.A. Medvedev at the 64th session of the UN General Assembly. On February 5, 2010, a new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was approved by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, which directly states that the creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems that undermine global stability and violate the existing balance of forces in the nuclear missile sphere, as well as an increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons are the main external military threats to Russia.
The Russian Federation also believes that in order to strengthen international security, it is necessary to formulate specific parameters under which further advancement along the path of nuclear disarmament is possible. We are talking about such conditions as the settlement of regional conflicts, the elimination of incentives that push states to acquire or retain nuclear weapons, a controlled cessation of the buildup of conventional weapons and attempts to “compensate” with them the reduction of nuclear systems, reliable maintenance of the viability of key disarmament and non-proliferation tools, and the prevention of the deployment of weapons in space. The Russian initiative to concentrate nuclear weapons within national territories nuclear states. Its implementation would lead to the maximum expansion of the territory of regions where nuclear weapons are completely absent. Russia believes that in the foreseeable future, all states possessing nuclear weapons, including nuclear states, should smoothly join the Russian-American efforts to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals.
outside the scope of the NPT.
An important step in the process of nuclear disarmament should be the early entry into force of the CTBT. Russia welcomes the changed position of the United States in relation to this treaty and persistently urges all states, and in the first place those on which the entry into force of this Treaty depends, to sign and ratify it without delay. Compliance with a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, while important as this measure, cannot replace legal obligations in this area. An important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be the early launch at the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on the development of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Sidorova EA International legal regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and legal problems of its strengthening. Diss. c.yu. n. -M., 2010.
The tasks of preventing nuclear materials and related technologies from falling into the hands of non-state actors, primarily terrorists, remain in the foreground. It is necessary to build up multilateral cooperation in this matter, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of April 28, 2004.
In view of the rapidly growing world demand for energy that can be met by peaceful atom, Russia believes that the movement towards “global zero” is impossible without building a modern obligations under the 1968 NPT; and multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. The Russian Federation considers it an important task to achieve an increase in the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and the universalization of the Additional Safeguards Protocol, which should become mandatory standards for verifying compliance with the obligations assumed under the NPT and a universal standard in the field of nuclear export control. Today, Russian * initiatives to develop a global nuclear power infrastructure and establish international centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services are being implemented at full speed. A serious step forward was the approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Russian proposal to create a guaranteed stock of low-enriched uranium under the auspices of the IAEA.
On March 29, 2010, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN V.I. Churkin, who detailed Russia's official position on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and on May 4, 2010 at the next Review Conference to Review the NPT, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.A. Ryabkov, who gave a detailed account of the work done by Russia within the framework of the NPT. In particular, it was noted that the Russian Federation is consistently working to reduce its nuclear arsenal. Commitments under such disarmament agreements as the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and the 1991 Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms have been fully implemented. The Russian Federation considers it necessary to systematically move forward along the path of real nuclear disarmament, as required by Art. VI NPT. Realizing the special responsibility as a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia in good faith continues deep, irreversible and verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms. One of the important steps along this path was the signing on April 8, 2010 of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on measures to further reduce and limit strategic
offensive weapons.
The provisions of the new Treaty provide that each of the parties reduces and limits its strategic offensive weapons in such a way that seven years after its entry into force and thereafter, their total numbers will not exceed: 700 units for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs; 1,550 units for warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs; 800 units for deployed and non-deployed launchers (PUs) of ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as TBs (Articles I and II of the Treaty). This level establishes deployed and non-deployed launchers, as well as TBs, in the legal field of the Treaty, which allows limiting the parties' "return potential" (the possibility of a sharp increase in the number of deployed warheads in a crisis situation) and creates an additional incentive to eliminate or re-equip the reduced strategic offensive weapons. At the same time, the Treaty provides that each of the parties has the right to independently determine the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.
Thus, the Russian Federation once again clearly demonstrated its desire for large-scale reductions in strategic offensive arms. Now it is necessary to ensure the early ratification of the Treaty and its entry into force, as well as to guarantee the consistent and unswerving fulfillment of all the obligations laid down in the Treaty without exception. Paramuzova, O.G. Nuclear safety in the conditions of modern international law and order / O.G. Paramuzov. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg. un-ta, 2006. - 388 p.
According to experts in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as soon as the START-3 Treaty enters into force, non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSW) and anti-missile defense (ABM) should become the next subject of negotiations between the parties. It seems that in isolation from them, further progress along the path of reductions in strategic offensive arms will be extremely difficult.
For NSNW, there is no international legal mechanism requiring their control and reduction. Carried out in the early 1990s. NSNW reductions were carried out by the USSR / RF and the USA on a voluntary basis unilaterally. There is no official data on the number of non-strategic nuclear warheads. According to non-governmental experts, the United States currently has about 1,300 nuclear warheads of this class, and Russia about 3,000. changes in the field of disarmament; secondly, stockpiles of nuclear weapons will make it difficult to involve other nuclear states in the process of controlled reduction of nuclear weapons; and thirdly, the lack of control over NPT will be a source of doubt among non-nuclear countries about the commitment of the US and Russia to their obligations under the NPT. Sidorova EA International legal regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and legal problems of its strengthening. Diss. c.yu. n. -M., 2010.
However, the establishment of control over NSNW is impossible without its complete withdrawal from the territory of Europe due to the fact that the deployed NSNW in Europe is considered by the Russian military as strategic, since it is located in sufficient proximity to the borders of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Russia will seek to link its readiness to consider NSNW issues with the consent of the NATO and EU countries to accept for consideration Russian proposal for the development of a European Security Treaty. In addition, there are technical difficulties in establishing control, which is due to the fact that it must be established directly over nuclear weapons, and not delivery vehicles.
The implementation of further steps to reduce nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to the issue of missile defense. The unilateral actions of the United States to create a missile defense system raise Russia's fears about its impact on the survival of Russian strategic forces. At the signing of the START-3 Treaty, Russia issued a Statement on Missile Defense, which noted that the new Treaty could be effective and viable only in the absence of a qualitative and significant quantitative build-up of the capabilities of US missile defense systems, which could ultimately lead to threaten the Russian strategic forces. The fact is that the replacement by the United States of the plans adopted by the previous administration for the deployment of missile defense elements in the Czech Republic and Poland removed the acuteness of the issue only for a while, since the new four-story adapted plan for building a US missile defense system in Europe provides for the deployment by 2020 of a system capable of intercepting ICBMs . Therefore, today it makes sense to take advantage of the current positive situation to resume efforts to strengthen confidence-building measures and develop cooperation in the field of missile defense. The first step in this direction, according to the Russian Federation, could be work on a joint assessment of the capabilities of "third" countries in the field of creating ballistic missiles in order to develop a common point of view on emerging threats. This, in particular, would be facilitated by the opening of the Data Exchange Center for Early Warning Systems (DPC). On June 4, 2000, the Russian Federation and the United States signed an appropriate memorandum regarding the creation of a joint data center, which was supposed to take effect from the moment of signing until 2010, but work on the creation of the data center ran into organizational problems, and as a result, the data center did not start working despite of all importance for cooperation and the formation of relations between Russia and the United States.
Cooperation between Russia and the United States to find comprehensive solutions to the problems outlined above will make it possible to create real conditions for a further stage in the reduction of nuclear weapons.
Serious concerns of the world community in connection with the existing challenges related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the need for international action to prevent them were reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 1887, adopted unanimously on September 24, 2009. The resolution contains two main conclusions: firstly, modern challenges in the field of nuclear proliferation can and must be resolved on the basis of the NPT, which has stood the test of time and established itself as the only universal basis for cooperation in this sensitive area; secondly, the danger of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists is causing serious concern, which means that it is necessary to strengthen the international "safety net" that makes it possible to stop such risks at distant approaches.
On April 12-13, 2010, Washington (USA) hosted a nuclear security summit, which was attended by representatives of 47 countries, including Russia. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss ways to improve physical nuclear protection and prevent the danger of nuclear terrorism. At the summit, it became known that Canada had abandoned significant reserves of highly enriched uranium. Chile and Mexico abandoned all uranium reserves. President of Ukraine V. Yanukovych expressed the same intention when he announced that all stocks of highly enriched uranium would be exported to the Russian Federation by 2012. President of the Russian Federation D. Medvedev announced the closure of the weapons-grade plutonium production reactor in Zheleznogorsk.
During the summit, US Secretary of State H. Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov signed the Protocol to the 2000 bilateral intergovernmental agreement on the disposition of plutonium, declared as plutonium no longer necessary for defense purposes, its handling and cooperation in this area. This agreement was signed by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and the Vice President of the United States on August 29 and September 1, 2000. In accordance with Art. XIII of the Agreement, it was to be applied temporarily from the date of its signing and enter into force from the date of receipt of the last written notification of the completion by the parties of their internal state procedures necessary for its entry into force. Unfortunately, the agreement was never implemented for some technical reasons. The protocol signed by H. Clinton and S. Lavrov should eliminate these technical obstacles, as a result of which the practical implementation of the agreement will become possible. The agreement itself is a specification of the joint Statement of the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States on the principles of handling and disposition of plutonium, declared as plutonium no longer necessary for defense purposes, dated September 2, 1998.
In accordance with the principles for the disposal of such plutonium agreed in the Statement, the Agreement provides for its disposal as nuclear fuel for existing nuclear reactors, reactors that may appear in the future, as well as through immobilization with highly radioactive waste or any other mutually agreed methods (Article III of the Agreement). The agreement does not provide for any restrictions on the type of mixed uranium-plutonium fuel. In accordance with Art. II of the Agreement, each party must dispose of at least 34 metric tons dismantled plutonium. The implementation of this Agreement will also clearly demonstrate the commitment of the Russian Federation and the United States to the further development of the nuclear disarmament process, since, in addition to the actual limitation and reduction of nuclear strategic offensive weapons, something must be done with regard to plutonium, which is released as a result of this process, which is an important contribution to the implementation Art. VI NPT.
The Washington summit ended with the signing of a joint declaration, which stipulates further actions for disarmament. The next summit is scheduled for 2012, which will be held in South Korea.
Iran was not invited to the nuclear security summit in Washington, and as an alternative, on April 17-18, 2010, Tehran hosted a conference on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, held under the motto - "Nuclear energy for everyone, nuclear weapons for none." The conference was attended by representatives from more than 50 countries, including the Russian Federation, who outlined their national approaches and priorities in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear disarmament. In addition, representatives of the expert community and specialized non-governmental organizations made presentations.
As a result of the conference, a document was adopted, which sets out the main provisions of the discussions. In particular, it was said about the need for nuclear disarmament as the main priority of human society, as well as the complete destruction of these inhuman weapons within a certain period of time; implementation of the disarmament commitments assumed by the nuclear states on the basis of the NPT and the final documents of the 1995 and 2000 NPT review conferences, the full implementation of the 13 Steps to Disarmament program; conclusion of a universal Convention and adherence to a non-discriminatory and legal approach to the problem of a complete ban on the distribution, production, transfer, stockpiling, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in order to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the experience of concluding two conventions: the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and the Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1972 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use chemical weapons and on its destruction in 1993, as well as the provision of security guarantees to non-nuclear countries until general disarmament is achieved; the implementation of further programs to create areas free of nuclear weapons in various regions of the world, especially in the Middle East; observance of the principles of immutability, openness and truthfulness in the exercise of international control over the implementation of bilateral and multilateral agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons.
The document also emphasizes the right of states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the need to develop international cooperation in this area on the basis of the obligations formulated in Art. IV NPT; expressed serious concern about the weakening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime due to the application of double and discriminatory standards by some nuclear powers and, especially, the cooperation of these nuclear countries with states that are not parties to the NPT and ignoring the fact that they have a nuclear arsenal.
Taking into account the importance of this Conference and the results achieved at it, Iran proposed to send the final document of the forum to the UN Secretary General, as well as other international bodies and organizations. Taking into account the attention shown by the participants of the Conference to the topic discussed at it, as well as in order to monitor the implementation of the tasks set by the Conference, in accordance with the wishes of the majority of its participants, it was decided to hold the second meeting of the Conference on Disarmament and International Security in the second half of April 2011. in Tehran.
Thus, on the basis of the above initiatives and real steps taken by the nuclear countries, it can be assumed that building a nuclear-free world is not a utopia. Progress towards it is possible if effective, systematic, consistent legal measures are taken in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If the world community does not work together to achieve a world without weapons, then it will forever remain out of reach. Paramuzova O.G. Nuclear safety in the conditions of modern international law and order / O.G. Paramuzov. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg. un-ta, 2006.
Disarmament Week is held annually from 24 to 30 October, as stipulated in the Final Document of the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly.
Disarmament is a set of measures designed to stop the build-up of means of war, their limitation, reduction and elimination. The general international legal basis for disarmament is contained in the UN Charter, which includes "the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments" among " general principles cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security".
The only multilateral negotiating forum international community to work out agreements on disarmament issues - Conference on Disarmament(Conference on Disarmament). Created in January 1979. As of 2007, it has 65 member states.
Since the decisions of the Conference on Disarmament are taken strictly by consensus, since 1997 the body has experienced difficulties in agreeing on a substantive program of work due to the lack of agreement among the participants on disarmament matters.
Nuclear weapons began to be produced in 1945. Since then, more than 128 thousand charges have been manufactured. The peak of the arms race came in 1986, when the total world nuclear arsenal reached 70,481 charges. At the end of the Cold War, a reduction process began. In 1995, the total number of charges was 43200, in 2000 - 35535.
As of January 1, 2007, Russia's strategic nuclear forces included 741 strategic carriers capable of carrying 3,084 nuclear warheads.
Major arms reduction treaties
Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). Signed May 26, 1972. It limited the number of anti-missile systems of the USSR and the USA to two on each side - around the capital and in the area of concentration of launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (in 1974, the USSR and the USA signed an additional protocol limiting the number of anti-missile systems to one on each side). Not valid since June 14, 2002, when the US unilaterally withdrew from it.
Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-1 Treaty). Signed May 26, 1972. It limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers of the USSR and the USA at the level reached by the time the document was signed, and also provided for the adoption of new ballistic missiles deployed on submarines, strictly in the amount in which obsolete ballistic missiles were previously decommissioned ground-based.
Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2 Treaty). Signed June 18, 1979. He limited the number of launchers and introduced a restriction on the placement of nuclear weapons in space.
Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Short-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). Signed on December 7, 1987. The parties pledged not to manufacture, test or deploy ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles of medium (from 1,000 to 5,500 kilometers) and shorter (from 500 to 1,000 kilometers) range. In addition, the parties undertook to destroy all launchers and ground-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. This was the first time in history that an agreement was reached on the question of a real reduction in armaments.
By June 1991, the agreement was fully implemented: the USSR destroyed 1846 missile systems, USA - 846. At the same time, technological equipment for their production was eliminated, as well as operational bases and places for training specialists (a total of 117 Soviet facilities and 32 American ones).
Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1 Treaty). Signed on July 30-31, 1991 (an additional protocol was signed in 1992, which fixed the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). The USSR and the USA undertook to reduce their own nuclear arsenals to 6 thousand warheads on each side within seven years (however, in reality, according to the rules for counting warheads on heavy bombers, the USSR could have about 6.5 thousand warheads, the USA - up to 8 .5 thousand).
On December 6, 2001, the Russian Federation and the United States announced that they had fulfilled their obligations: the Russian side had 1,136 strategic launchers and 5,518 warheads, while the American side had 1,237 strategic launchers and 5,948 warheads.
Russian-American Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-2). Signed on January 3, 1993. It assumed a ban on the use of ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles and provided for the reduction by January 2003 of the number of nuclear warheads to 3,500 units on each side. It did not enter into force, because in response to the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty on June 14, 2002, the Russian Federation withdrew from START-2. Superseded by the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials (SOR Treaty).
Russian-American Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials (SOR Treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty). Signed on May 24, 2002. Limits the number of nuclear warheads on alert to 1700-2200 on each side. Remains in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the parties.
Multilateral Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and has more than 170 participating states (these do not include, in particular, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea). Establishes that a state possessing nuclear weapons is considered to be one that produced and detonated such weapons before January 1, 1967 (that is, the USSR, USA, Great Britain, France, China).
Since the signing of the NPT, the total number of nuclear warheads has been reduced from 55,000 to 22,000.
Multilateral Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Opened for signature on 24 September 1996 and has 177 member states.
Conventional weapons
Main documents:
1980 - The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) bans certain types of conventional weapons that are considered excessively damaging or indiscriminate.
In 1995, the revision of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (also known as the Convention on Inhuman Weapons) resulted in Amended Protocol 2, imposing more severe restrictions on certain uses, types (self-deactivating and detectable) and transfer of anti-personnel mines.
1990 - The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) limits the number of various types of conventional weapons in the region stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.
However, a group of states considered the measures taken insufficient and developed a total ban on all anti-personnel mines - the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines - opened for signature in 1997. As of 2007, 155 states have acceded to the convention.
The application of the conventions has led to the destruction of stockpiles, the clearance of areas in some States and a reduction in the number of new casualties. At least 93 states are now officially cleared of mines, and at least 41 out of 55 producing states have ceased production of this type of weapon. States that are not members of any of the conventions have declared a unilateral moratorium on the use and transfer of anti-personnel mines.
Chemical and biological weapons
Main documents:
In 1925, the Geneva Protocol "On the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other similar gases and bacteriological agents" was signed. The Protocol was an important step in the creation of an international legal regime for restricting the use of bacteriological weapons in war, but left out their development, production and storage. By 2005, 134 States were members of the Protocol.
In 1972, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was adopted, which imposed a comprehensive ban on these types of weapons. It entered into force in 1975. As of April 2007, signed by 155 states.
In 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was adopted, which imposed a comprehensive ban on this type of weapon. It entered into force in 1997. As of August 2007, signed by 182 states. It is the first multilateral treaty banning an entire class of weapons of mass destruction and providing for a mechanism for international verification of the destruction of this type of weapon.
As of August 2007, CWC member countries have destroyed 33 percent of their chemical weapons stockpiles (the process must be completed by April 29, 2012). The CWC member states hold 98 percent of the world stocks of chemical warfare agents.
In the Russian Federation, in order to fulfill obligations under the CWC, in 2001, the Federal Target Program "Destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation" was approved. The beginning of the implementation of the Program - 1995, the end - 2012. It provides for both the destruction of all stocks of chemical warfare agents in the Russian Federation and the conversion or liquidation of the corresponding production facilities.
At the time the Program was launched, there were about 40,000 tons of chemical warfare agents in the Russian Federation. Upon completion of the second stage of the fulfillment of international obligations under the CWC - on April 29, 2007 - 8,000 tons of chemical warfare agents (20 percent of the available ones) were destroyed in the Russian Federation. By the end of December 2009, when it is determined to complete the third stage of the fulfillment of international obligations on the destruction of chemical weapons, Russia will destroy 45 percent of all stockpiles of chemical weapons, i.e. - 18.5 thousand tons.
On May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements (SALT). In connection with the anniversary of this event, the newspaper Le Figaro brings to your attention an overview of the main Russian-American bilateral agreements.
Disarmament or limiting the buildup of strategic arms? The policy of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War led to a frenzied arms race between the two superpowers that could have led to disaster. That is why 45 years ago the US and the USSR signed the first strategic arms reduction treaty.
Treaty 1: the first bilateral arms reduction agreement
On May 26, 1972, US President Richard Nixon and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev signed an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. The signing took place in front of television cameras in the Vladimir Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. This event was the result of negotiations that began in November 1969.
The treaty limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers, their location and composition. An addendum to the treaty in 1974 reduced the number of missile defense areas deployed by each side to one. However, one of the clauses of the agreement allowed the parties to terminate the agreement unilaterally. This is exactly what the United States did in 2001 in order to start deploying a missile defense system on its territory after 2004-2005. The final date for US withdrawal from this agreement was June 13, 2002.
The 1972 treaty includes a 20-year temporary agreement that bans the production of land-based ICBM launchers and limits submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers. Also, according to this agreement, the parties undertake to continue active and comprehensive negotiations.
This "historic" agreement was to be especially helpful in restoring the balance of the forces of deterrence. And this does not apply to the production of offensive weapons and restrictions on the number of warheads and strategic bombers. The striking forces of both countries are still very large. First of all, this treaty allows both countries to moderate spending while maintaining the ability to mass destruction. This prompted André Frossard to write in a newspaper on May 29, 1972: “To be able to arrange about 27 dooms of the world – I don’t know the exact number – gives them a fair sense of security and allows them to save us from many additional ways of destruction. For this we need to thank their good heart.”
Treaty 2: easing tensions between the two countries
After 6 years of negotiations, a new treaty between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic offensive arms was signed by American President Jimmy Carter and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. This complex document includes 19 articles, 43 pages of definitions, 3 pages listing the stockpiles of the military arsenals of the two countries, 3 pages of a protocol that will enter into force in 1981 and, finally, a declaration of principles that will form the basis of negotiations on SALT-3 .
The treaty limited the number of strategic nuclear weapons of both countries. After the signing of the treaty, Jimmy Carter stated in his speech: "These negotiations, which have been going on continuously for ten years now, give rise to the feeling that nuclear competition, if it is not limited by common rules and restrictions, can only lead to disaster." At the same time, the American president clarified that "this treaty does not take away the need for both countries to maintain their military power." But this treaty was never ratified by the United States due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles
On December 8, 1987 in Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the indefinite Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which came into force in May 1988. This "historic" treaty for the first time provided for the elimination of armaments. It was about medium and short-range missiles with a range of 500 to 5.5 thousand km. They represented from 3 to 4% of the entire arsenal. In accordance with the agreement, the parties, within three years from the date of its entry into force, had to destroy all medium and short-range missiles. The treaty also provided for procedures for mutual inspections "on the spot".
During the signing of the treaty, Reagan emphasized: "For the first time in history, we have moved from a discussion of arms control to a discussion of their reduction." Both presidents have been particularly pushful of cutting 50% of their strategic arsenals. They focused on the future START treaty, the signing of which was originally scheduled for the spring of 1988.
START-1: the beginning of real disarmament
On July 31, 1991, US President George W. Bush and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. This agreement was the first real reduction in the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers. According to its terms, the countries had to reduce the number of the most dangerous types of weapons by a quarter or a third in three stages (seven years each): intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles.
The number of warheads was to be reduced to 7,000 for the USSR and 9,000 for the United States. A privileged position in the new arsenal was assigned to bombers: the number of bombs was to increase from 2.5 to 4 thousand for the United States and from 450 to 2.2 thousand for the USSR. In addition, the treaty provided for various control measures and finally entered into force in 1994. According to Gorbachev, it was a blow to the "infrastructure of fear."
START II: radical cuts
Context
End of the INF Treaty?
Defense24 16.02.2017Is the INF Treaty dead?
The National Interest 03/11/2017START-3 and Russia's nuclear breakthrough
The Washington Times 10/22/2015US to discuss nuclear disarmament with Russia
Voice of America Russian Service 02.02.2013 On January 3, 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his American counterpart George W. Bush signed the START-2 treaty in Moscow. It was a big deal because it called for a two-thirds reduction in nuclear arsenals. After the entry into force of the agreement in 2003, American stocks were to decrease from 9,986 warheads to 3,500, and Russian stocks from 10,237 to 3,027. That is, to the level of 1974 for Russia and 1960 for America .Another important point was spelled out in the agreement: the elimination of missiles with multiple warheads. Russia has abandoned precision weapons, which formed the basis of its deterrence force, while the US removed half of the missiles installed on submarines (virtually undetectable). START II was ratified by the US in 1996 and by Russia in 2000.
Boris Yeltsin saw him as a source of hope, and George W. Bush saw him as a symbol of "the end of the Cold War" and "a better future free from fear for our parents and children." Be that as it may, the reality is not so idyllic: both countries can still destroy the entire planet several times.
SNP: Point in the Cold War
On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SOR) in the Kremlin. It was about reducing the arsenals by two-thirds in ten years.
However, this small bilateral agreement (five short articles) was not precise and did not contain any screening measures. Its role in terms of the image of the parties was more important than its content: it was not the first time that the reduction was discussed. Be that as it may, it nevertheless became a turning point, the end of military-strategic parity: lacking the economic capabilities necessary for this, Russia abandoned its claims to the status of a superpower. In addition, the treaty opened the door to a "new era" because it was accompanied by a declaration of a "new strategic partnership." The United States relied on conventional military forces and understood the uselessness of most of its nuclear arsenal. Bush noted that the signing of the SNP allows to get rid of the "legacy of the Cold War" and hostility between the two countries.
START-3: protection of national interests
On April 8, 2010, US President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev signed another agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms (START-3) in the Spanish drawing room of the Prague castle. It was intended to fill the legal vacuum that arose after START I expired in December 2009. According to it, a new ceiling was set for the nuclear arsenals of the two countries: the reduction of nuclear warheads to 1.55 thousand units, intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles of submarines and heavy bombers - to 700 units.
In addition, the agreement provides for verification of the figures by a joint team of inspectors seven years after its entry into force. It is worth noting here that the installed slats are not too different from those that were indicated in 2002. It also does not talk about tactical nuclear weapons, thousands of deactivated warheads in warehouses and bombs. strategic aviation. The US Senate ratified it in 2010.
START-3 was the last Russian-American agreement in the field of nuclear weapons control. Days after taking office in January 2017, US President Donald Trump announced that he would offer Vladimir Putin the lifting of sanctions on Russia (imposed in response to the annexation of Crimea) in exchange for a treaty to reduce nuclear weapons. According to the latest data from the US State Department, the US has 1,367 warheads (bombers and missiles), while the Russian arsenal reaches 1,096.
The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.
In 1958, in response to the launch of the first artificial Earth satellite in the USSR, the Americans founded DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), an agency for advanced defense research projects. The main task of the new agency was to maintain the primacy in US military technology.
Today, as it was half a century ago, this agency, subordinate to the Pentagon, is responsible for maintaining the world's technological superiority. armed forces USA. Among the concerns of DARPA is the development of new technologies for use in the armed forces.
In February 2013, the agency's specialists began to actively prepare for a nuclear war. A project was launched to protect against radiation damage, including using methods that directly affect human DNA. We are talking about new methods of treatment, devices and systems that can mitigate the effects of radiation exposure. The main goal of the agency's project is to develop technologies that will radically reduce the susceptibility of the human body to high doses of radiation. Those who are treated with the latest technology have a high chance of survival.
Today, the efforts of scientists are directed in three directions: a) prevention and treatment after exposure to radiation; b) decrease in level negative consequences and prevention of death and the development of oncological complications; c) modeling the impact of radiation on the human body through research at the molecular and systemic levels.
The agency took up a new project because the level of nuclear threat in the world has increased and has not decreased. Today, any country may face the threat of nuclear terrorism, a catastrophe at a nuclear power plant or a local conflict with the use of nuclear weapons.
This project, of course, did not come out of nowhere. It is known that Barack Obama positions himself as a peacemaker. Atomic bombs like Truman, he on foreign states on dumped. And in general, he constantly talks about reductions in nuclear arsenals - not only Russian, but also native, American.
It was his peacemaking that reached the point that very influential misters turned to him with a written petition in which they tearfully asked not to reduce the nuclear weapons of the long-suffering homeland of the Republicans and Democrats.
The appeal to the president was signed by 18 people: former CIA director James Woolsey, former US representative to the UN John Bolton, former commander of the Marine Corps, General Karl Mundy and others. International analyst Kirill Belyaninov (Kommersant) believes that such an appeal was a confirmation that the White House is indeed working on plans to reduce nuclear arsenals.
According to some secret report, among the authors of which are individuals from the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, intelligence services and the US strategic command (in a word, a complete military secret set), the number of nuclear warheads in service with the country today "far exceeds the number needed to ensure nuclear deterrence", while in modern conditions an arsenal of 1-1.1 thousand warheads is quite enough. But a group of influential politicians who, of course, know these data, still demand that Obama abandon the "rash step."
What were the 18 misters afraid of?
The authors of the petition are confident that "the growing cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran" can lead to "catastrophic changes." And the aspirations of Iran and North Korea can be restrained by "the American nuclear triad, which guarantees strategic stability," and only that, and nothing else.
The signatories of the document believe that the threshold set by the new START treaty is critical: by 2018, the Russian Federation and the United States must leave no more than 1,550 warheads on combat duty.
However, the Obama administration intends to continue talks with Moscow to reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons.
The concern of eighteen people is based more on the interests of the US military-industrial complex than on the real situation. What "catastrophic changes" can Iran cause in the world? It is absurd to admit that gentlemen American politicians and the military, who signed the letter to their president, were frightened by Ahmadinejad's recent words that Iran is a "nuclear power." Or is 1550 warheads not enough to defeat the DPRK?
The reduction in stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which Obama is sure to enforce this time, is by no means a "working off" of the Nobel Peace Prize. The President of the United States is facing the fact of the collapse of the national economy: a huge public debt is also complemented by a large budget deficit, the issue of which is being solved through sequestration, cuts, layoffs, cuts in military programs and an extremely unpopular tax increase among any class of the population. Reducing nuclear stockpiles is a road to savings: after all, maintaining arsenals costs a lot of money.
Tom Vanden Brook (USA Today) recalls that the US military budget will be reduced by $ 500 billion over 10 years through sequestration - the so-called "automatic reduction". The Pentagon assumes that before the end of the current fiscal year (September 30), it will have to "cut off" spending by $46 billion. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said the cuts would make America a minor military power.
The cuts will also affect military contractors. For example, the economic losses of Texas will amount to a gigantic sum of $2.4 billion. A whole army of civil servants - 30,000 people - will lose their jobs. Their personal financial loss in earnings will be $180 million.
In terms of maintenance, those states with large warehouses will suffer here, as they will be closed in the coming months due to upcoming budget cuts. Pennsylvania, for example, has two main maintenance depots where complex weapon systems are upgraded, including, for example, the Patriot. Texas and Alabama will be hit hard. The closure of the depot here will stop the repair of weapons, communication devices and Vehicle. The reduction in the flow of orders will affect 3,000 companies. Another 1,100 companies will face the threat of bankruptcy.
The latest data on the estimated losses of contractors directly for nuclear services are not yet available. But that they will be is beyond doubt. Obama will look for any reserves in order to cut budget spending.
As for the calls to Russia, everything is clear here: it is somehow not convenient for America to reduce nuclear weapons alone. That's why we started talking about negotiations with the Russians. Moreover, Obama swung at a large reduction: either by a third, or by half. However, these are only rumors, albeit coming from the United States.
Vladimir Kozin ("Red Star") recalls that regarding information about further reductions in strategic offensive arms, White House spokesman Jay Carney said that he does not expect new announcements on this matter in the next presidential message to Congress. Indeed, in his message on February 13, the American president only indicated Washington's readiness to involve Russia in the reduction of "nuclear weapons", without specifying any quantitative parameters. Nevertheless, the fact remains: the reduction is planned. Another thing is how and in what ways.
V. Kozin believes that the United States “still intends to follow the path of selective reduction of nuclear weapons, focusing only on the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons. But at the same time, they completely exclude from the negotiation process such important species weapons of a non-nuclear nature, such as anti-missile systems, anti-satellite weapons and high-precision means of delivering a "lightning strike" at any point the globe... "According to the analyst, the United States" is trying to obscure, behind various "new proposals and ideas" in the field of arms control, its far-reaching plans to deploy forward-based means in the form of tactical nuclear weapons and missile defense, destabilizing the global military-political situation and undermining the fragile military strategic parity between Moscow and Washington, which has been established over the course of several decades.”
That is, nuclear weapons will be reduced selectively, and in parallel, the European missile defense system will be created, and the first will serve as a distraction for the second. And at the same time, it will probably free up money for this very second one. With budgetary sequestration, this is a very hot topic.
It is useless to accuse the Americans of slyness or double standards: politics is politics. Sergei Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, founder of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, chairman of the editorial board of Russia in Global Affairs magazine, says that "the idea of a world free of nuclear weapons is slowly fading away."
“Moreover,” he continues, “if we trace the dynamics of the views of such famous people like Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry, who played a role in launching the idea of nuclear zero, you will find that these famous four in the second article, published two years after their first article, already talked about the reduction and even the destruction of nuclear weapons as a good goal, but really required an increase in efficiency and strengthening of the existing US military nuclear complex. They realized that the United States of America could not ensure its security without nuclear weapons. Understanding perfectly well this whole situation, our leadership - both Putin and Medvedev - announced without batting an eyelid that they also stand for complete nuclear disarmament. To say otherwise would be to admit to bloodlust. But at the same time, we are building up and modernizing our nuclear potential.”
The scientist's confession is also interesting:
“Once I studied the history of the arms race, and since then I sincerely believe that nuclear weapons are something sent to us by the Almighty in order to save humanity. Because, otherwise, if there were no nuclear weapons, the deepest ideological and military-political confrontation in the history of mankind, the Cold War, would have ended with World War III.
Russians should be thankful for their current sense of security, says Karaganov, Sakharov, Korolev, Kurchatov and their associates.
Let's go back to the USA. Under the 2010 nuclear doctrine, America retained the right to launch a nuclear strike first. True, it narrowed down the list of situations that lead to such use of the nuclear arsenal. In 2010, Obama announced the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess such weapons - on one condition: these countries must comply with the nonproliferation regime. Also in the strategic document it was stated: "... the United States is not ready to pursue a policy according to which the deterrence of a nuclear strike is the only goal of nuclear weapons." This speaks of a possible preventive use of nuclear weapons, albeit with the reservations cited above.
Both during the Cold War and after its conditional end, the United States and NATO did not rule out the option of using nuclear weapons against their opponents - and be the first to use them. The 2010 doctrine narrowed the list, but did not change the right of application.
Meanwhile, China announced a no-first-use policy almost half a century ago. Then India took the same position. Even North Korea - and she adheres to a similar position. One of the main objections to adopting the no-first-use doctrine, writes the American Foreign Policy magazine, is that the enemy can "act dishonestly" and strike first. However, there is no answer to the simple question of retribution. Why would an enemy arrange a nuclear catastrophe for himself? After all, the threat of guaranteed retaliatory destruction remains a very strong deterrent.
One can, of course, call Obama's policy logical. The same doctrine of 2010 was adopted at a time of growing concerns about terrorism. But what if nuclear bombs fall into the hands of terrorists? The President of the United States said in 2010: “The Concept recognizes that the greatest threat to the United States and global security is no longer nuclear war between states, but nuclear terrorism carried out by extremists and the process of nuclear proliferation ...”
Therefore, the current proposed reduction in nuclear arsenals is logically combined with the "taming" of what was called 3 years ago "the greatest threat to the United States and global security." The fewer nuclear weapons, as Foreign Policy magazine rightly notes, the less likely they are to fall into the hands of terrorists.
To create a perfectly clear logical picture, the White House lacks only one point. By declaring its right to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the United States is likening its artificially nurtured enemy, Al-Qaeda. The latter does not declare nuclear rights for obvious reasons. But, for even more understandable reasons, in case of "need" and with the appropriate opportunity, it will be the first to explode (it is not necessarily about a bomb: there is also a nuclear power plant). The right to a first, albeit “preventive,” nuclear strike puts America precisely in the ranks of those who threaten peace. Like Al Qaeda.
